Legionellosis Outbreaks Associated with Two Hotels — U.S. Virgin Islands, October 2024–April 2025

Sarah Gallalee, PhD1,2; Hannah M. Cranford, PhD2; Aubrey Drummond2; Lisa LaPlace Ekpo, DrPH2; Brett R. Ellis, PhD2; Esther M. Ellis, PhD2 (View author affiliations)

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Summary

What is already known about this topic?

Legionellosis is a bacterial disease caused by inhalation or aspiration of Legionella bacteria. Legionella bacteria can pose a health risk when they contaminate building water systems.

What is added by this report?

In November 2024, two outbreaks of legionellosis occurred at two hotels in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Two of four total patients with legionellosis were hospitalized; none died. Although legionellosis outbreaks are commonly associated with warm water sources, probable sources of exposure included both cold (unheated) and hot (heated) water from showerheads and sinks in guest rooms.

What are the implications for public health practice?

Implementing effective water management programs and ensuring adequate water system disinfection to prevent the growth of Legionella bacteria is important for hotel operators.

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Abstract

Legionellosis is a bacterial disease caused by inhalation or aspiration of Legionella bacteria; Legionnaires disease is a type of legionellosis characterized by illness with pneumonia. During November 2024, the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) Department of Health (VIDOH) was notified of two confirmed Legionnaires disease cases among travelers to two different hotels on St. Croix Island. VIDOH investigated to determine exposure sources and prevent additional cases. Two additional legionellosis cases were identified. The four patients with cases were aged 53–73 years; two patients were hospitalized and none died. At hotel A, L. pneumophila was detected in three of 21 (14%) environmental samples. VIDOH required hotel A to close one guest room, remediate, and retest. At hotel B, L. pneumophila was detected in 22 of 40 (55%) samples. VIDOH required hotel B to cease hotel operations until remediation and retesting were completed. L. pneumophila was isolated from shower samples at both hotels, in the cistern and cold water system at hotel A, and in cold and hot water systems at hotel B. The two USVI outbreaks underscore the importance of reporting legionellosis among returned travelers to facilitate local public health investigations and prevent additional cases. In addition, in tropical climates, cold water systems operate at temperatures favorable for Legionella growth (77°F–113°F [25°C–45°C]), highlighting the importance of effective water management programs and water system disinfection to prevent disease spread.

Investigation and Results

Hotel A

On November 6, 2024, CDC notified VIDOH of a case of Legionnaires disease confirmed by a urinary antigen test (UAT) in a man aged 73 years (patient 1); Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists case definitions for legionellosis were used. On October 30, the patient developed fever, shortness of breath, body aches, joint pain, neck pain, loss of appetite, and diarrhea. He was hospitalized in his U.S. state of residence after returning from travel to St. Croix Island and recovered. He reported staying in two guest rooms at hotel A during October 21–29.

During the investigation of patient 1, a case of probable legionellosis was identified in a woman aged 71 years (patient 2). Patient 2 was a travel companion of patient 1, shared the same travel history, stayed in the same guest rooms, and experienced symptoms including fever and body aches, beginning November 4. She received treatment with antibiotics but was not tested for legionellosis. Both patients reported using showers and sinks in the guest rooms and reported no other water exposures.

In response to these cases, VIDOH conducted on-site environmental sampling at hotel A.* Sampling consisted of 21 swab and bulk water samples from the two guest rooms (showers and sinks), the water heater supplying those guest rooms, a cistern (container that collects and stores rainwater), and the water supply pipe separate from the cistern (Table). In the guest rooms, the bulk water samples were drawn immediately when the faucet or showerhead was turned on to capture a cold (unheated) water system sample and after running the water until hot to capture a hot (heated) water system sample. The cistern and water supply pipe were part of the cold water system. Samples were submitted to an external laboratory for Legionella species testing using Legiolert. L. pneumophila was detected in one showerhead, the cistern, and the water supply pipe. Serogroup 1 was detected in one sample and serogroups 2–14 in two samples. The most probable number (MPN) per 10 mL ranged from 1.1 to 213.3, indicating uncontrolled Legionella bacterial growth§ (1). All three positive samples were collected from cold (unheated) water system sources with water temperatures of 80°F–87°F (26.7°C–30.6°C). Free chlorine levels ranged from undetectable (<0.02 mg/L) to 0.04 mg/L in guest rooms, 0.03 in the cistern, and 0.02 in the water heater.

Hotel B

On November 22, 2024, a member of the public notified VIDOH of a woman aged 53 years (patient 3) who was hospitalized in an intensive care unit in her U.S. state of residence after returning from travel to St. Croix Island, where she had stayed at hotel B. Patient 3 had Legionnaires disease with laboratory confirmation by UAT. She had stayed in three guest rooms at hotel B during October 31–November 9. On November 7, she experienced chest tightness and trouble breathing. After returning to her state of residence, she was hospitalized and received a diagnosis of severe sepsis, bilateral pneumonia, and acute respiratory failure. During the investigation of patient 3, a probable case of Legionnaires disease was identified in another woman aged 55 years (patient 4), who was a family member of patient 3 and had traveled with her, had stayed in the same guest rooms, had symptoms consistent with Legionnaires disease (shortness of breath, cough, fever, headache, and muscle aches), and had received a positive serologic test result detecting antibodies to L. pneumophila. She had been treated with antibiotics for her illness, and completely recovered. Three additional family members who traveled with patient 3 also felt ill and received testing by UAT; all results were negative.

VIDOH collected 40 swab and water samples from showers, sinks, and faucets in the three guest rooms, cistern, and water heater (Table) at hotel B. In the guest rooms, the bulk water samples were drawn immediately when each water source was turned on to obtain a sample from the cold water system and after running the water until hot to obtain a sample of the hot water system. The cistern was part of the cold water system only. Samples were sent for Legionella species testing at the same laboratory that had tested hotel A samples. L. pneumophila was detected in 22 (55%) samples, including samples from six sinks and four showers. The positive samples consisted of 19 from serogroup 1 (86%) and three from serogroups 2–14 (14%). MPNs per 10 mL ranged from 1.1 to 149, indicating uncontrolled Legionella bacterial growth. Positive water samples were taken from a mixture of cold (unheated) and hot (heated) water sources, with temperatures ranging from 82°F to 118°F (27.8°C to 47.8°C). Free chlorine levels ranged from 0.04 to 0.87 mg/L among samples from cold and hot water sources from sinks and showers. The free chlorine level was below the detectable limit in the cistern and was not measured in the water heater because of limited accessibility. This activity was reviewed by CDC, deemed not research, and conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy.**

Public Health Response

VIDOH launched an investigation to determine possible sources of infection, mitigate exposures, and educate hotel staff members and guests, health care providers, and the public. Both hotels temporarily closed implicated water systems and undertook remediation and response activities to control the growth of Legionella. The hotels worked with VIDOH to identify and contact guests who had stayed in the identified guest rooms at the properties within approximately 4 weeks before identification of each outbreak. Guests were notified of potential Legionella bacteria exposure and advised to monitor themselves for cough, fever, and shortness of breath; to seek medical attention if symptoms developed; and to inform their health care provider about the exposure to aid in timely testing, diagnosis, and treatment.

VIDOH established a dedicated outbreak telephone hotline to address public concerns, provide information, and offer guidance to persons who might have been exposed. An official VIDOH press release was issued to announce the hotel B outbreak and inform the public of the ongoing investigation and public health actions (2). The press release emphasized the importance of recognizing symptoms early and encouraged potentially exposed persons to consult their health care providers.

VIDOH required hotel A to close the guest room where patients 1 and 2 had stayed. VIDOH provided recommendations to remediate the hotel’s water system and conducted follow-up testing to confirm the absence of Legionella bacteria in the system, in accordance with CDC guidance (1). The property owner conducted remediation during November 2024–February 2025, including replacing the showerhead and plumbing, hyperchlorinating the system, evaluating filtration, permanently closing the cistern with Legionella bacteria growth, and creating an access point for adding disinfectant to water piping. Postremediation sampling was conducted during January–February; hotel A was then cleared to fully reopen after test results indicated that the water system was well controlled.

VIDOH required hotel B to close the entire hotel until remediation and retesting for Legionella bacteria were completed. VIDOH guided the hotel in remediating the plumbing system and guest rooms. The property owner completed remediation during November 2024–April 2025, including replacing plumbing and fixtures, hyperchlorinating the system, and evaluating filtration. Sampling was conducted in January and April; after testing no longer detected Legionella bacteria, hotel B was cleared to fully reopen.

Discussion

VIDOH’s investigation of two unrelated legionellosis outbreaks at two hotels highlighted Legionella environmental challenges, transmission patterns, and case detection limitations in tropical climates. At hotel B, both cold and hot water systems were implicated; at hotel A, only the cold water system had detectable bacteria. Although hot water systems typically have temperatures that favor Legionella growth (77°F–113°F [25°C–45°C]), elevated cold water system temperatures can also increase the risk for colonization (3,4). In tropical climates such as those in USVI, consistently warmer temperatures can create ideal conditions for bacterial proliferation in cold water systems. These findings highlight the need for tailored Legionella bacteria control guidance for warmer environments.

At hotel B, multiple water samples tested positive for Legionella bacteria at temperatures above the optimal range for growth (>113°F [>45°C]), indicating the bacteria’s persistence under a wide range of temperatures. Hotel B’s hot water system might not have reached temperatures sufficiently high to suppress growth of Legionella bacteria. Water management programs should include protocols to maintain hot water storage >140°F (>60°C) and circulation >120°F (>49°C) to reduce the risk for Legionella growth (1). These findings highlight the observation that within a water system lacking thermal control, the system relies entirely on disinfectant to control Legionella bacterial growth. Both hotels had water samples with free chlorine levels that were below the detectable limit (eight samples at hotel A and one at hotel B).

Both hotels used mixed water supply systems, with combinations of cisterns, municipal water, and private bulk sources (e.g., water trucks). Cisterns in USVI are large volume storage containers typically built into the foundations of buildings to collect and store untreated rainwater captured on the roof. If not properly maintained, cisterns can harbor pathogens (5). Cisterns pose challenges for cleaning, monitoring, and disinfectant dosing and risk recontamination from open connections. Ongoing improvements in maintenance and disinfection recommendations for these systems are needed (1).

Legionnaires disease has a low attack rate (1%–6%) (6), and potable water outbreaks typically involve persons who were exposed to the same facility at different times. In these two outbreaks, additional legionellosis cases were detected among family members who traveled together, demonstrating clustering associated with shared exposures in guest rooms or specific showers. Lower respiratory specimens were not available for any patients; therefore, molecular comparisons with environmental results were not possible. These examples demonstrate the importance of thorough investigations of Legionnaires disease, even a single reported case, and the importance of notifying guests so that additional legionellosis cases can be identified during hotel outbreaks.

The investigation of these outbreaks also highlighted surveillance gaps, including delays in case identification and underreporting. Although Legionnaires disease is a nationally notifiable disease, hotel B’s outbreak was identified solely through a report from a member of the public. Legionnaires disease associated with a private vacation rental in USVI has been described previously (7); however, many travel-associated cases are likely missed among travelers who return home before becoming symptomatic. Including destinations in reports of travel-associated Legionnaires disease cases when notifying CDC is essential to improving multijurisdiction coordination that can help identify outbreaks and their sources (8).

This public health response underscores the importance of rapid reporting, environmental assessments, laboratory testing, and facility engagement in remediation to prevent additional illnesses. When investigating possible sources of Legionella outbreaks in tropical climates, public health officials should consider water systems without temperature regulation and alternative water storage systems, including cisterns.

Acknowledgment

Florida Department of Health, Public Health Laboratory.

Corresponding author: Sarah Gallalee, sgallalee@cdc.gov.


1Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC; 2U.S. Virgin Islands Department of Health.

All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. No potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.


* Hotel A’s water supply system used both chlorinated municipal water and rainwater cisterns; water was filtered using sedimentation and filtration. Water from the cistern, although seldom used, was treated with chlorine and dispersed to hot water heaters before reaching guest rooms. On occasion, the cistern was filled by a water truck delivery.

Positive results were considered presumptive until isolates were plated on buffered charcoal yeast extract, and their serogroups were identified to differentiate L. pneumophila serogroup 1 from other serogroups.

§ Legiolert reports in MPNs. The MPN of L. pneumophila colonies is based on reaction of L pneumophila with the enzyme substrate in the Legiolert test; after the number of positive wells is counted, an MPN table is used to determine the concentration in the original sample. The MPN method is considered scientifically equivalent to, or better than, the colony-forming unit plate method for determining concentration.

Hotel B’s water supply system used chlorinated municipal water and stored the water in a cistern. No additional information was available.

** 45 C.F.R. part 46, 21 C.F.R. part 56; 42 U.S.C. Sect. 241(d); 5 U.S.C. Sect. 552a; 44 U.S.C. Sect. 3501 et seq.

References

  1. CDC. Toolkit for controlling Legionella in common sources of exposure (Legionella control toolkit). Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC; 2026. https://www.cdc.gov/control-legionella/media/pdfs/Control-Toolkit-All-Modules.pdf.
  2. Government of the Virgin Islands. Department of Health orders hotel on the Cay on St. Croix to cease operations following confirmed Legionnaire’s disease cases. US Virgin Islands: Government of the Virgin Islands; 2025. https://doh.vi.gov/department-of-health-orders-hotel-on-the-cay-on-st-croix-to-cease-operations-following-confirmed-legionnaires-disease-cases/
  3. Donohue MJ, O’Connell K, Vesper SJ, et al. Widespread molecular detection of Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1 in cold water taps across the United States. Environ Sci Technol 2014;48:3145–52. https://doi.org/10.1021/es4055115 PMID:24548208
  4. Garner E, Brown CL, Schwake DO, et al. Comparison of whole-genome sequences of Legionella pneumophila in tap water and in clinical strains, Flint, Michigan, USA, 2016. Emerg Infect Dis 2019;25:2013–20. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2511.181032 PMID:31625848
  5. Rao G, Kahler A, Voth-Gaeddert LE, et al. Microbial characterization, factors contributing to contamination, and household use of cistern water, U.S. Virgin Islands. ACS ES T Water 2022;2:2634–44. https://doi.org/10.1021/acsestwater.2c00389 PMID:36530952
  6. Percival SL, Yates MV, Williams DW, Chalmers RM, Gray NF, eds. Microbiology of waterborne diseases, microbiological aspects and risks. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Academic Press; 2014. https://www.sciencedirect.com/book/edited-volume/9780124158467/microbiology-of-waterborne-diseases
  7. Mac VV, Labgold K, Moline HL, et al. Notes from the field: Legionnaires disease in a U.S. traveler after staying in a private vacation rental house in the U.S. Virgin Islands—United States, February 2022. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2023;72:564–5. https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7220a5 PMID:37200227
  8. CDC. Investigating Legionnaires’ disease. About the data: case report forms and instructions. Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC; 2026. https://www.cdc.gov/investigate-legionella/php/data-research/forms-and-instructions.html
TABLE. Legionella pneumophila environmental sampling and culture results from an investigation of two unrelated legionellosis outbreaks at two hotels — U.S. Virgin Islands, November 2024Return to your place in the text
Sampling site Sample type* Water temperature, °F (°C) Free
chlorine, mg/L
Legionella pneumophila culture result Serogroup MPN per 10 mL
Hotel A
Guest room 1
   Kitchen sink Swab NG
Bulk, cold 71 (21.7) 0 NG
Bulk, hot 142 (61.1) 0 NG
   Bathroom sink Swab NG
Bulk, cold 75 (23.9) 0.04 NG
Bulk, hot 149 (65.0) 0.04 NG
   Bathroom shower Swab NG
Bulk, cold 80 (26.7) 0 L. pneumophila 2–14 14.6
Bulk, hot 150 (65.6) 0 NG
Guest room 2
   Bathroom sink Swab NG
Bulk, cold 79 (26.1) 0 NG
Bulk, hot 149 (65.0) 0 NG
   Bathroom shower Swab NG
Bulk, cold 79 (26.1) 0 NG
Bulk, hot 148 (64.4) 0 NG
Hot water heater Swab NG
Bulk, hot 0.02 NG
Cistern Swab NG
Bulk, cold 85 (29.4) 0.03 L. pneumophila 2–14 1.1
Pipe Swab NG
Bulk, cold 87 (30.6) 0.14 L. pneumophila 1 213.3
Hotel B
Guest room 1
   Kitchen sink Swab L. pneumophila 1 3.9
Bulk, cold 73 (22.8) 0.45 NG
Bulk, hot 105 (40.6) 0.45 L. pneumophila 1 22.3
   Bathroom sink Swab NG
Bulk, cold 70 (21.1) 0.25 NG
Bulk, hot 103 (39.4) 0.25 L. pneumophila 1 47.4
   Shower Swab L. pneumophila 1 149.0
Bulk, cold 90 (32.2) 0.28 NG
Bulk, hot 110 (43.3) 0.28 NG
Guest room 2
   Kitchen sink Swab L. pneumophila 1 1.1
Bulk, cold 86 (30.0) 0.28 L. pneumophila 1 26.4
Bulk, hot 114 (45.6) 0.28 L. pneumophila 1 3.9
   Bathroom 1 sink Swab NG
Bulk, cold 84 (28.9) 0.18 NG
Bulk, hot 109 (42.8) 0.18 L. pneumophila 1 72.3
   Bathroom 1 showerhead Swab L. pneumophila 1 18.7
Bulk, cold 88 (31.1) 0.25 NG
Bulk, hot 105 (40.6) 0.25 L. pneumophila 1 21.9
   Bathroom 1 bath faucet Swab NG
Bulk, cold 88 (31.1) 0.87 L. pneumophila 1 41.6
Bulk, hot 107 (41.7) 0.87 L. pneumophila 1 72.3
   Bathroom 2 sink Swab L. pneumophila 1 1.1
Bulk, cold 83 (28.3) 0.79 NG
Bulk, hot 112 (44.4) 0.79 L. pneumophila 1 78.8
   Bathroom 2 showerhead Swab L. pneumophila 1 126.9
Bulk, cold 83 (28.3) 0.04 L. pneumophila 2–14 1.1
Bulk, hot 102 (38.9) 0.04 L. pneumophila 2–14 2.2
Guest room 3
   Kitchen sink Swab L. pneumophila 1 105.7
Bulk, cold 82 (27.8) 0.47 L. pneumophila 1 92.1
Bulk, hot 110 (43.3) 0.47 L. pneumophila 2–14 47.4
   Bathroom sink Swab NG
Bulk, cold 80 (26.7) 0.05 NG
Bulk, hot 82 (27.8) 0.05 NG
   Shower Swab L. pneumophila 1 22.3
Bulk, cold 83 (28.3) 0.08 NG
Bulk, hot 118 (47.8) 0.08 L. pneumophila 1 65.9
   Air conditioning unit Swab NG
Cistern Bulk, cold 0 NG
Hot water heater Bulk, hot 130 (54.4) NG
Bulk, hot 130 (54.4) NG

Abbreviations: MPN = most probable number; NG = no growth.
* Bulk samples were either drawn immediately when the faucet or showerhead was turned on (bulk, cold) to capture the cold (unheated) water system or after running the water until hot (bulk, hot) to capture the hot (heated) water system.


Suggested citation for this article: Gallalee S, Cranford HM, Drummond A, Ekpo LL, Ellis BR, Ellis EM. Legionellosis Outbreaks Associated with Two Hotels — U.S. Virgin Islands, October 2024–April 2025. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2026;75:322–326. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7525a2.

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