

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

convenes the

WORKGROUP MEETING

ADVISORY BOARD ON
RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

PART 2

The verbatim transcript of the Meeting of the
Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health
Workgroup held in Cincinnati, Ohio, on Aug. 4, 2005.

C O N T E N T S

Aug. 4, 2005

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TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such material is reproduced as read or spoken.

In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of word(s) when reading written material.

-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation of a word which is transcribed in its original form as reported.

-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is available.

-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and "uh-uh" represents a negative response.

-- "*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, without reference available.

-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker failure, usually failure to use a microphone.

In the following transcript (off microphone) refers to microphone malfunction or speaker's neglect to depress "on" button.

P A R T I C I P A N T S

(In Alphabetical Order)

BOARD MEMBERSEXECUTIVE SECRETARY

WADE, Lewis, Ph.D.

Senior Science Advisor

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Washington, DC

MEMBERSHIP

GIBSON, Michael H.

President

Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Union

Local 5-4200

Miamisburg, Ohio

GRIFFON, Mark A.

President

Creative Pollution Solutions, Inc.

Salem, New Hampshire

MELIUS, James Malcom, M.D., Ph.D.

Director

New York State Laborers' Health and Safety Trust Fund

Albany, New York

MUNN, Wanda I.

Senior Nuclear Engineer (Retired)

Richland, Washington

OTHERS:

ALLEN, DAVID, NIOSH

BEHLING, HANS, SC&A

BLOOM, CINDY, MJW

BROCK, DENISE, UNWW

CASE, DIANE, DOL

ELLIOTT, LARRY, NIOSH/OCAS

GUIDO, JOSEPH, MJW

HOMOKI-TITUS, LIZ, HHS/OGC

HOWELL, EMILY, HHS/OGC

KATZ, TED, NIOSH

KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL
LIPSZTEIN, JOYCE, SC&A
MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A
MAURO, JOHN, SC&A
MILLER, RICHARD, GAP
NETON, JIM, NIOSH
SAMSON, BOB, GAO
SHEFFITS, SANDRA, GAO
TAULBEE, TIM, NIOSH

STAFF/VENDORS

LASHAWN SHIELDS, Committee Management Specialist, NIOSH
STEVEN RAY GREEN, Certified Merit Court Reporter
JONICA MUELLER, Certified Court Reporter

P R O C E E D I N G S

1 (Whereupon, the following occurred after the
2 break. See transcript, Part 1.)

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** Hans, are you still there with
4 us?

5 **DR. BEHLING:** (Off microphone) Yes, I am.

6 **MR. GRIFFON:** All right. We --

7 **DR. BEHLING:** (Off microphone) (Unintelligible)
8 my question is does everybody have a copy of
9 (unintelligible).

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yes, we -- we've got your --
11 we've got the copy now, so --

12 **DR. BEHLING:** (Off microphone) Let me
13 (unintelligible) what I believe is a
14 (unintelligible) of what the problem may be,
15 and I'll (unintelligible) confine myself to the
16 (unintelligible) first set of (on microphone)
17 conversions which (off microphone) converts the
18 HP-10 or (unintelligible).

19 (NOTE: An apparent malfunction of the
20 telephone connection rendered only random words
21 intelligible to the reporter, but were not in a
22 sequence sufficient to provide any context to
23 Dr. Behling's statement.)

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** Well, I -- Jim, if you want to
25 respond now, I -- I think, Hans -- this is Mark

1 Griffon. I feel like this is a task three
2 issue that's going to cut across a lot of
3 sites, and I'm not sure that it really is in --
4 I mean even if -- even if this values are
5 incorrect, I don't think it limits us from
6 being able to do dose reconstruction. They
7 just have to correct them if -- if that comes
8 out of our task three review. But I don't -- I
9 don't know that it holds up -- I don't want it
10 to sidetrack our Mallinckrodt process.

11 Jim, if you wanted to respond briefly --

12 **DR. NETON:** Well, I'm -- we -- we've seen this
13 comment before in the task three report and
14 we're -- we certainly feel that it's -- it's a
15 significant issue that we need to address.
16 We're not prepared at this meeting to address
17 that because, frankly, this is not one of the
18 issues raised in the site profile review. I do
19 agree this is more of a generic issue that
20 certainly demands attention, but I'm -- I'm
21 frankly just not prepared to address it here at
22 this meeting.

23 **MR. GRIFFON:** I think we'll -- we'll save that
24 for our task three review, which I think is
25 going to be sooner rather than later, so --

1 Arjun has one point. Hold on.

2 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** Yeah, Mark and Jim, the -- the
3 reason that John and Hans and I talked about it
4 -- I've -- just going over all the issues and I
5 was trying to get a grip on what all there is
6 to address, is depending on how the Board acts
7 in Mallinckrodt, if the dose reconstructions
8 are going to be done for Mallinckrodt in an
9 expeditious way, then it presumes that this
10 very major issue will be sorted out and if in
11 fact Hans is right that things need to be
12 adjusted and there's another factor of two
13 because of angle and these dose conversion
14 factors need to be changed, then obviously it
15 needs to be addressed reasonably soon and
16 presumably in principle it can be addressed, I
17 don't know. It's -- it came up in that context
18 and that's why -- I don't know, John, if I'm
19 out of turn, but that's why we thought it was
20 appropriate to introduce it here.

21 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, basically it was my call from
22 talking to -- and look -- you know what really
23 triggered it, when we saw the 2.1 adjustment
24 factor to account for the geometry that was
25 part of your TIB, that's when we decided to

1 talk about well, are there any other adjustment
2 factors in this -- said well, yeah, but -- and
3 -- and we thought, given the expedited nature
4 of this particular process, we needed to alert
5 the Board as early as possible to this issue
6 and -- as opposed to waiting until October when
7 our task three expedited review would start.
8 So I -- I -- I think we've accomplished what we
9 wanted to --

10 **DR. NETON:** Right.

11 **DR. MAURO:** -- just simply to alert the Board
12 that we think we have an important issue here,
13 two points that Hans made, the orientation and
14 the dose conversion factors. And I think we --

15 **MR. TAULBEE:** (By telephone) (Unintelligible)

16 **MR. GRIFFON:** Oh, sure.

17 **MR. TAULBEE:** (Unintelligible) couple of things
18 (unintelligible) briefly touch on
19 (unintelligible) we did not (unintelligible)
20 dose reconstruction (unintelligible).

21 **DR. BEHLING:** And I agree with you, Tim, but
22 (unintelligible).

23 **MR. TAULBEE:** (Unintelligible) particular
24 comment and (unintelligible) appropriate
25 (unintelligible).

1 Dave Allen, with my oversight, has put together
2 a -- a workup on this to provide some example
3 cases. We're passing around to the Board --
4 and there's certainly copies available at the
5 back of the room -- these examples, but they
6 really lend themselves to presentation format.
7 I just provide them for -- for the record, and
8 what -- what we've done is -- and I'll set the
9 stage and then I'll let Dave explain the logic
10 sequence behind what we have here.
11 But we tried to take a worker who had a fair
12 amount of bioassay data, and that's what you
13 see presented on the screen here and in Table 1
14 of -- of the handout. Clearly this person had
15 a fairly high amount of uranium excretion over
16 a decade period. This is actually Mallinckrodt
17 data. It's -- I'm wary of using hypothetical
18 data anymore so this is real -- a real worker.
19 And what you see here is a combination of
20 fairly large exposures coupled with some non-
21 detectables, and then some -- you know, much
22 higher exposures by a factor of five or six,
23 these 43 picocurie per day intakes. So this
24 is a mixture of a -- what you might think as a
25 chronic and acute exposure scenario.

1 I think what we have here is scenario number
2 one, which is if NIOSH were to take and model
3 this person's exposure using a complete chronic
4 exposure sequence. In other words, just assume
5 he was chronically exposed from day one, and
6 you see the fit curve through the -- through
7 the analyses. And that -- that results in a --
8 an intake of 1.94 time ten to the seventh
9 picocuries of uranium. Now that's ignoring all
10 of those acute intakes that occurred that are
11 above that line -- it doesn't ignore them, it
12 just -- it just does not model them explicitly.
13 And I think what you'll see is as you try -- as
14 you go closer and closer to reality in modeling
15 this person's intake -- I won't -- don't want
16 to give away the story here, but the intakes
17 actually drop as you start getting closer to
18 reality. Maybe Dave won't have to talk. I'm
19 doing pretty good so far.

20 **MR. ALLEN:** (Unintelligible)

21 **DR. NETON:** He'll be the judge of that. He'll
22 answer any of the questions after I muddle the
23 works here. Oop, I skipped a scenario.
24 All right, scenario number two is an -- is the
25 same urine data where we've said okay, well,

1 what if we do model one of these acutes
2 specifically -- or explicitly, and I think this
3 scenario included an intake on January 15th,
4 1950, which is the mid-point between the
5 highest sample on June 6th and the previous
6 sample, so you'll see that here graphically
7 depicted, the high spike that goes off the
8 scale what the predicted excretion value would
9 be. But we've added -- Dave has added one
10 acute intake into this chronic exposure
11 scenario to model the worker's case. And what
12 you end up seeing here is the intake is 1. --
13 about 1.8 times ten to the seventh picocuries
14 lower than what you'd expect just using a
15 chronic model.

16 Okay, chronic intake number three -- or number
17 three was the same -- and by the way, these all
18 assume a chronic intake, and then we're adding
19 in acute intakes on top of that. So intake
20 scenario number three, we have a chronic
21 intake, but we also had an acute intake -- I
22 think it was -- was it on the first day of
23 employment, Dave, or --

24 **MR. ALLEN:** (Off microphone) Halfway between
25 the start of employment and the first sample.

1 **DR. NETON:** Okay, so halfway, which is the
2 traditional intake analysis. You pick at the
3 midpoint and you -- you model it, and what ends
4 up happening here in scenario three is the dose
5 -- the intake is 1.4 times ten to the seventh
6 picocuries per (unintelligible). Remember the
7 first exposure scenario was 1.9 times ten to
8 the seventh. These are all variants of ten to
9 the seventh, I think.

10 Scenario number four says okay, well, there --
11 there are a lot of datapoints above that
12 chronic line. Let's model two acute intakes in
13 here, and you can see that we're starting to
14 connect the dots more and more, and this is
15 really the ultimate game of bioassay analysis
16 intake is to connect the dots and you get the
17 total intake. As you connect these dots even
18 more with two modeled explicit intakes, the
19 intake now projects to 1. -- about 1.3 times
20 ten to the seventh picocuries, so that's
21 scenario number four.

22 Scenario number five says let's take the
23 chronic intake and I think what happened here
24 is we moved it around to do a little better fit
25 to some of the data. It's a similar situation,

1 but what you end up with is -- let me see here
2 -- again, 1.4 times ten to the seventh.
3 What we're trying to show here is it's fairly
4 insensitive to how you model these -- these
5 intakes -- acute intakes in the middle of these
6 scenarios.
7 Now number six is a little different. We said
8 well, what -- what happens if we just throw
9 these datapoints out? We took the two highest
10 datapoints that are on this graph here in
11 scenario six and said they never even occurred;
12 we didn't even know about them. And then you
13 fit a chronic intake.
14 The first intake, the pink graph that you see
15 on the screen is -- is the first intake that we
16 got, which is 1.9. You throw those two
17 datapoints out completely, you end up at about
18 1.4 picocuries per liter, which is very cons--
19 1.5 -- not per liter, times ten to the seventh
20 picocuries, which is not that different from
21 the intakes when we started to model those
22 separate acute intakes.
23 So the whole point of this analysis, and we can
24 look through it, is -- is the -- this is a
25 fairly -- the chronic intake scenario that's

1 selected is fairly insensitive to all these
2 acute intakes that -- that were modeled.
3 And I think the last part of this presentation
4 speaks to -- the total intake that you want to
5 project from a bioassay analysis is really
6 related to the area under the curve. In other
7 words, if you collected all -- connected all
8 the dots of a person's excretion pattern, you
9 would end up with a unit of picocurie per liter
10 days, that's the -- an integration of the
11 entire person's urinary excretion. That's not
12 exactly what their intake was, but their --
13 their dose is directly related to how much
14 uranium they excreted. So the more you connect
15 the dots, the more accurate picture you get of
16 that person's intake.

17 When you start using and applying these
18 chronics that overestimate a lot of points, you
19 end up over-predicting the intake using the
20 chronic model -- as in this demonstration --
21 rather than connecting all the individual dots,
22 and that's really the point of this Table 2.
23 It shows as the goodness of fit gets better to
24 the individual points, the intake goes down --
25 the projected intake goes down. And that's

1 because these chronic, over-arching values,
2 these little -- the blips of acutes above the
3 chronic intakes are not so significant that
4 they -- they make up massive amounts of extra
5 dose or -- or intake.

6 I think that's it in a nutshell, Dave. If
7 there's anything else you want to say here that
8 -- that I've missed, then please do.

9 **MR. ALLEN:** No, you did a good job, Jim.

10 **DR. NETON:** Thank you.

11 **MR. ALLEN:** I just wanted -- I think Jim
12 pointed it out. I just wanted to basically
13 reiterate, it's that from all the modeling
14 we've done so far in this program it just
15 always seems like the -- the chronic is where
16 the big bang for the buck is, so to speak. It
17 just takes a small change in the chronic intake
18 rate and you're essentially multiplying it by
19 thousands of days 'cause we're modeling
20 careers. So even a small change in the chronic
21 intake rate can make a large difference in the
22 dose. Any time you add an acute intake or an
23 assumption to modeling the urinalysis, that
24 chronic intake rate drops. And even a small
25 drop can make a huge difference in the total

1 dose that this person's getting.

2 **DR. NETON:** Right. In other words, there's
3 competing interests going on here. As you add
4 acute intakes, the assumed chronic model has to
5 drop to accommodate the residual excretion from
6 the acute intake and therefore you're
7 subtracting from your long-term total intake by
8 -- by explicitly adding these chronics. So
9 it's been our experience, and Dave summarized
10 it well, that the -- it really is -- at the end
11 of the day, the chronic models are -- and I
12 think most dosimetrists that you'll talk to
13 that do this on a day-to-day basis would agree
14 with that.

15 **DR. MAURO:** Jim, I have a question, and this is
16 -- when we're in a situation like this I'd like
17 to sort -- I take my hat off and say -- and
18 just step away from our roles and ask ourselves
19 a question. This is certainly a very
20 compelling argument. There's no doubt about
21 it, the example you have here. And I like to
22 ask the question that says well, are there
23 certain circumstances where we could be
24 surprised. In other words, certainly in this
25 example, bulletproof.

1 But as -- let's say a person's sort of
2 exploring the idea of (unintelligible) IMBA and
3 dealing with the real world of people who get
4 exposed to different radionuclides and using
5 the bioassay data, are there circumstances that
6 you -- you -- you folks as experts and they say
7 well, you know, there are certain circumstances
8 where spikes could really result in a surprise
9 and we'd better watch out -- 'cause I don't
10 know of any, but I was wondering if you folks
11 have any thoughts on that.

12 **DR. NETON:** You know, certainly, you can always
13 be surprised. I mean Dave -- Dave might be
14 able -- he's done a lot more cases than I have,
15 but you can be surprised. I think, you know,
16 we need to look at the totality of the picture
17 here. I mean we're talking about a case file,
18 a worker with bioassay. We -- we've done some
19 interviews. Could there have been an intake of
20 -- an acute intake of sufficient magnitude to
21 completely rock this whole premise and -- and
22 make it errant -- I've tried to do that. I
23 tried to think -- and this is -- I got together
24 with Dave. I tried coming up with my own
25 scenarios. One could come up with these in

1 scenarios, but they're extremely implausible.
2 You end up having -- let's say, for instance,
3 we were just showing ten to the seventh, ten to
4 the sixth picocurie per year intakes from a
5 chronic model. That's microcuries per year
6 intakes, huge. For one then to speculate that
7 there may have been a -- an -- a couple acute
8 exposure scenarios that would completely negate
9 that analysis is pretty hard to project. You
10 know, you would -- for uranium, for example,
11 you would have to get into hundreds of MAC air
12 for a very extended period of time, which at
13 some point I'd argue would become chronic. But
14 to have like a one-hour -- what -- what you
15 hear anecdotally from workers a lot is there
16 was an incident that -- and I left the area.
17 Well, there you're talking about a one, maybe
18 two, three-hour exposure. It would have had to
19 have been -- in relation to this ten to the
20 fifth, ten to the sixth, ten to the seventh
21 picocurie intake -- somewhere close to that to
22 even make it -- a huge difference, and we've
23 already demonstrated that even that in itself
24 would bring the chronic model down. So I -- I
25 think it's hard -- it's hard to come up with,

1 but never say never. I mean I'm sure one could
2 -- could finagle some calculation that would --
3 would maybe show this is not perfect, but I --
4 I think it's -- it's reasonable. I think
5 that's as far as I can go.

6 **DR. MAURO:** Thank you.

7 **DR. LIPSZTEIN:** (Unintelligible) I didn't hear
8 everything.

9 **DR. NETON:** Uh-huh.

10 **DR. LIPSZTEIN:** (Unintelligible)

11 **MR. ALLEN:** What we're saying is if you assume
12 there was no acute intake and you model the
13 urinalysis as if it was a chronic, then that
14 chronic ends up being increased because of the
15 -- any samples that were taken after that acute
16 in that chronic modeling ends up giving you
17 more total dose than if you realized you had an
18 acute intake and you modeled that in there with
19 it -- in general. There --

20 **DR. LIPSZTEIN:** (Unintelligible) modeling the
21 results (unintelligible) intake
22 (unintelligible)?

23 **MR. ALLEN:** We're modeling the samples as if it
24 was a constant chronic.

25 **DR. LIPSZTEIN:** (Unintelligible) lower

1 (unintelligible) and after (unintelligible)?
2 **MR. ALLEN:** Well, the example on the -- on the
3 -- I know you can't see it, Joyce, but the
4 example here is basically the individual's
5 urinalysis for his whole career, and we simply
6 threw a chronic intake over his entire career.
7 Some of those spikes are -- are most definitely
8 a chronic -- or I'm sorry, an acute type of
9 intake but we just modeled it as a chronic.
10 Then we started to get a little more exact on
11 this individual and modeled some of these
12 acutes along with an underlying chronic for his
13 career, and as we modeled these acutes the
14 chronic drops because the chronic was driven by
15 all the samples. And now when you throw some
16 acutes in there, the chronic is driven by the -
17 - the lower samples. So with the chronic
18 dropping and multiplying that by an entire
19 career, in this case over 4,000 days, you end
20 up subtracting quite a bit just by adding in
21 the acutes. It's kind of counter-intuitive.
22 And in general what we've seen before is the
23 more exact you get in your fitting, the closer
24 you get to connecting the dots, the -- the
25 lower it's going to get compared to just

1 modeling the entire career as a chronic. It's
2 something that's easier to show than to
3 demonstrate empirically.

4 **DR. LIPSZTEIN:** (Unintelligible) you have to
5 (unintelligible).

6 **DR. NETON:** Sorry, I missed your last sentence
7 there, Joyce.

8 **DR. LIPSZTEIN:** (Unintelligible) I'm saying
9 that (unintelligible).

10 **DR. NETON:** Yeah, and that's what we're saying.

11 **DR. LIPSZTEIN:** (Unintelligible) not sure
12 (unintelligible).

13 **DR. NETON:** Okay. Okay. Boy, does that mean
14 we're down to number five?

15 **MR. GRIFFON:** I think we're down to number
16 five, yeah.

17 **DR. NETON:** Wow.

18 **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Unintelligible)

19 **DR. NETON:** That was -- oh, four, is there
20 another part of four? No, that was done, four.
21 Okay, number five, (unintelligible) of dose for
22 unmonitored workers. Okay, this -- this is
23 related to the site profile evaluation that --
24 that SC&A did where there was some data that
25 indicated there were environmental releases of

1 at least uranium out the stack. And we -- we
2 went back and did locate the -- the report,
3 it's a couple of pages of data that were not
4 air sample data but were stack emissions, I
5 believe. And, you know, like most facilities -
6 - especially uranium facilities -- there are
7 stack emissions and so then the question is do
8 we assign nothing to people who were not
9 monitored, or what do we assign them.

10 And we've looked at that and in discussing this
11 among ourselves, we believe that it's going to
12 be unlikely that we can assign zero dose to
13 anybody. I mean many people walked through the
14 plants. They -- they frequented areas, the
15 controls were not as good, so -- I'm stretching
16 here because I forgot exactly what our position
17 was. I think that we're -- it's -- it's in the
18 document that we provided, but I believe that
19 we're going to provide the distribution of --
20 of exposures for the workers to the unmonitored
21 workers. Is that right, Cindy? Is that what
22 we came to that con-- that would be our -- the
23 distribution itself, because we just don't --

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** Instead of the 95th. Right?

25 **DR. NETON:** Instead of the 95th. We just don't

1 know. We just really don't know in a
2 particular -- a person could be recorded as a
3 secretary one day, but then have an unmonitored
4 period somewhere else and you wouldn't -- an
5 unrecorded -- you wouldn't be able to
6 definitively at least defend what we've done,
7 so we're proposing the best we're going to be
8 able to do, we believe, here is to assign the
9 distribution for the doses for the facility.

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** Did -- did you -- did you in any
11 way consider that proposal against some of the
12 environmental data that Arjun was discussing
13 and whether the --

14 **DR. NETON:** Right.

15 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- you can defend the fact that
16 it --

17 **DR. NETON:** Well --

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- be a claimant-favorable
19 approach compar--

20 **DR. NETON:** Well --

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- comparatively? I -- I -- it
22 seems like if --

23 **DR. NETON:** You know, we haven't done that
24 definitively, Mark. I think you raise a good
25 point. We probably need to do that, although

1 we have stack emission data and it's hard for
2 us to imagine that the stack releases would
3 result in higher doses walking about the site
4 than some of these process air -- you know,
5 data -- intakes that we're projecting based on
6 working with the raw material itself. But we -
7 - you're right --

8 **MR. GRIFFON:** (Off microphone) (Unintelligible)
9 Arjun (unintelligible).

10 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** I -- again, I did a little
11 back-of-the-envelope check because the
12 Mallinckrodt situation was a little bit
13 different than many facilities or the normal
14 stack dispersion modeling that you would do
15 because you've got lots and lots of buildings,
16 and pe-- the workers would be -- when they're
17 outside and therefore susceptible to getting
18 some dose from the stack releases. They'd --
19 they'd be near buildings and so you wouldn't be
20 able to do dispersion modeling. At the
21 institute where I work, Institute of
22 (unintelligible) Energy and Environmental
23 Research, we had -- in the context of a study
24 we did for assessing doses near a building, we
25 had actually the thing modeled with the wind --

1 wind tunnel tests that were done with the
2 building modeled and the stacks and -- and
3 cons-- and dispersion factors calculated very
4 nearby for accidents. So if you have an
5 accidental release that -- you could get pretty
6 high doses because the dispersion factors are
7 very large. Our -- the largest wind tunnel
8 calculated dispersion factor near a production
9 building -- of course different geometries, you
10 had more buildings and, you know -- was 3.9
11 time ten to the minus three seconds per cubic
12 meter. And if you assume even a small release
13 of K-65 type material, you have -- I think you
14 could get pretty significant doses.

15 **DR. NETON:** Right, I guess and that sort of
16 confirms our -- you know, our wariness of
17 trying to model these stack emissions and --
18 and using those to -- to come up with -- with
19 doses, so I think -- you're right, there could
20 be high instantaneous concentrations on-site,
21 but I think if we apply a chronic exposure
22 model for -- for the year to these people and
23 use the distribution for the workers -- I'm --
24 I'm having trouble thinking why that would not
25 be claimant-favorable.

1 **MR. ALLEN:** I think the examples that Joe Guido
2 went over earlier demonstrate that the coworker
3 data is also pretty high and --

4 **DR. NETON:** Right.

5 **MR. ALLEN:** -- I mean when you're talking stack
6 emissions you're talking about the ventilation
7 system removing air from these people were
8 working, so by definition, essentially the
9 coworker data should be higher than what you
10 would get outside the building from the
11 environmental --

12 **DR. NETON:** Well, maybe not.

13 **MR. ALLEN:** -- but it's -- almost by
14 definition, especially when you talk about over
15 the -- the entire year versus a -- you know, a
16 short, episodic event.

17 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** Yeah, I think on the basis of
18 an annual average and annual average dispersion
19 factors, I wouldn't -- in a normal situation
20 with continuous releases, I think that you
21 would be right. However, we do know that there
22 are episodic -- I mean even in November, 1984
23 there was a release of 200 kilograms from
24 Fernald, and that's what started the whole
25 argument about, you know, Fernald and its

1 neighbors found out about -- and so on. So
2 releases of hundreds of kilograms from
3 Mallinckrodt type of facility in -- as an
4 episodic release is certainly possible. And
5 releases of tens of kilograms are certainly
6 possible when you've got a total source term of
7 14,000, 15,000 kilograms that's partial because
8 not all the plants were taken into account in
9 the one sheet that I found. So I -- I'm happy
10 to kind of share some of the numbers after my
11 colleagues have had a chance to look at them
12 because I kind of, you know, just did a back-
13 of-the-envelope calculation preparing for this.
14 But I -- I think -- what goes up the stack and
15 what's in the workplace are not correlated
16 because --

17 **MR. ALLEN:** I would agree with you --

18 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** -- in fact they may be anti-
19 correlated.

20 **MR. ALLEN:** I would agree with you it's
21 possible to get a higher intake rate outside
22 the building from some sort of event like that.
23 But you have to miti-- I mean you're example's
24 a good example, the 1984 Fernald was actually a
25 dust collector that released all this up the

1 stack, a dust collector problem. But you've
2 got to remember, everything that got into that
3 dust collector came from the work area where
4 workers were working. It might have taken
5 months for it to get there and then released in
6 one shot, but it was -- it came from there. So
7 the urinalysis from the people working in Plant
8 -- Plant 9, I believe it was for 1984 -- for
9 that year or so ahead of time, you know, for
10 the few months to that event, should be
11 sampling the same kind of air, just over a
12 period of time versus an episodic event.

13 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** Actually that's exactly what I
14 don't agree with because when you have a well-
15 ventilated workplace, what winds up in the dust
16 bags is what's not in the work area. Because
17 if you don't have a well-ventilated workplace
18 then the workers are breathing it and then it
19 settles on the plant floor. And of course that
20 was a problem at Fernald. It was all caked up
21 and everything. But -- but what com-- what
22 goes in the dust collectors and the stacks --
23 so you could have dust collectors that are very
24 dirty and have a relatively clean workplace,
25 provided you've got good ventilation. And the

1 two things are not necessarily related.

2 **MR. ALLEN:** But I think from the -- the worker
3 interviews you talked to, I don't think there
4 was any hint that there was good ventilation at
5 Mallinckrodt, that they collected -- collected
6 all the dust very well.

7 **DR. NETON:** Can't -- can't have it both ways.
8 But I think -- what I'm hearing you, Arjun --
9 I'm having trouble grasping this -- is that you
10 seem to be contending that the 50th percentile,
11 the average worker assigned intakes, would not
12 sufficiently bound an unmonitored worker who
13 was an administrative -- in administrative area
14 on a full-time basis. Is that what you're
15 suggesting?

16 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** Well, since we're talking about
17 Missouri, this is a Show-Me State issue.
18 Right? So I'm not suggesting that -- that this
19 is the case. I'm saying if -- it's not a
20 priori given that what -- I think that -- that
21 -- that it's important to run some numbers, and
22 I -- I did some numbers and I was surprised,
23 and I'm not ready to share them because maybe I
24 was wrongly surprised. Right? So I mean it's
25 important to put those numbers on the record,

1 and I just -- and I -- so maybe I'm not quite
2 right, but I do think that -- that assuming
3 that coworker data inside the plant covers an
4 outside accident exposure where you've got lots
5 of radium, thorium, so on -- I'm not sure. You
6 may well be right and I'm -- I'm not saying
7 that -- I think some little bit of work needs
8 to be done here, and I don't know exactly --

9 **MR. GRIFFON:** I think -- I think that this can
10 be an off-line discussion --

11 **DR. NETON:** Yeah.

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- but I think that we -- I mean
13 the issue of the environmental samples came up
14 in our prior discussions, so I think you should
15 address it head-on and -- and make the case --

16 **DR. NETON:** Right.

17 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- for why this is more -- I tend
18 to agree with you.

19 **DR. NETON:** Right.

20 **MR. GRIFFON:** I know Arjun has some questions.

21 **DR. NETON:** Right.

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** But I think -- maybe not
23 quantitatively but at least qualitatively make
24 a -- make the case.

25 **DR. NETON:** We -- we can do that.

1 **MR. GRIFFON:** Direct-- directly, instead of
2 saying, you know --

3 **MS. BLOOM:** Well, I think the case is made from
4 the environmental numbers at the DOE sites
5 where we do have monitoring and we do have some
6 DOE sites where we had information in the early
7 years, and you don't have anywhere near the
8 intake rates that you're assuming for workers
9 inside buildings as you do outside buildings.

10 **DR. NETON:** Well, and I also think that Janet
11 Westbrook indicated in our last call there --
12 there are a few, albeit small, number of
13 environmental samples taken in areas where
14 security guards may have been stationed and
15 what-not, and we can look at those.

16 **MS. BLOOM:** (Off microphone) We call them
17 outdoor (unintelligible) samples.

18 **DR. NETON:** Now that would -- those are going
19 to be small and -- and maybe only cover a few
20 day periods, but it would certainly indicate
21 that constant emissions were not well above
22 that of the average plant that we're assigning.
23 I mean we're talking intakes of hundreds of
24 picocuries per day by workers in the plants,
25 and it would be difficult for me to imagine

1 those values to get higher than that outside
2 the plant on a -- on a constant basis. But --
3 but you're absolutely right. I mean, you know,
4 Arjun's a show-me type guy today and I think we
5 need to -- we need to do our homework and
6 demonstrate that.

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** And -- and -- yeah, and I would
8 also -- I mean I think to the extent you can
9 use Mallinckrodt-specific data, it would -- it
10 would be better, right, 'cause we've gone down
11 that path before, too, but...

12 **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Off microphone)
13 (Unintelligible)

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah. Okay, is there anything
15 else on number five?

16 **DR. NETON:** I think there are a couple other --
17 additional points here. The issue was raised
18 about the SLAPS workers and -- and we've
19 investigated that to some extent, and I think I
20 covered this briefly on our last call. The
21 SLAPS workers were not permanently assigned
22 there, so we would -- we propose to use the
23 plant data for SLAPS workers, although we do --
24 are doing some -- some (unintelligible) last-
25 minute refinements on that. Cindy has some

1 data on some SLAPS -- air concentration data?

2 **MS. BLOOM:** That's only the radon, we have --

3 **DR. NETON:** The radon issue.

4 **MS. BLOOM:** -- no air concentrations, though.

5 **DR. NETON:** But again, we believe that the
6 SLAPS, being a storage facility and the
7 material was already drummed -- at least for
8 the radium material, the K-65 material -- it
9 appears to us, and we'll do a better job
10 documenting this -- that these SLAPS workers
11 spent a bulk of their time at the plant. This
12 was not a full-time, assigned position. They -
13 - they moved over there, took care of some --
14 whatever activities they needed to, as far as
15 drumming and -- and maintenance --

16 **MS. BLOOM:** They were actually restricted from
17 being there more than a couple hours a week.
18 Certainly by -- I can't remember the exact date
19 when that happened, it was around '49 and '50,
20 where they were --

21 **DR. NETON:** Right, so --

22 **MS. BLOOM:** -- '48 to '50 where they were
23 changing the requirements, so...

24 **DR. NETON:** We -- we will have a little better
25 detail on the SLAPS workers 'cause they don't

1 necessarily fit into this unmonitored,
2 secretarial/maintenance type -- type workers.

3 **MS. BLOOM:** For the -- for the intakes, those
4 workers are monitored. I mean we -- you have
5 monitoring data. They -- they're included in
6 that population of coworkers.

7 **DR. NETON:** That is true.

8 **MR. GRIFFON:** All right. Anything else on
9 number five?

10 (No responses)

11 You want to do another presentation of the
12 cases? No, I was just kidding.

13 **DR. NETON:** I'm ready if you are.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** How about some new cases? No...
15 Okay, I was just going to try to summarize a
16 couple of things that -- that are going to
17 happen in the next week or so as far as follow-
18 up items, and here what I had and maybe we can
19 just flesh out the final -- I think there's
20 only actually a few issues that we really need
21 to -- to hone in on.

22 One was the issue that we just discussed, the
23 environ-- you know, the justification for the -
24 - for not using the environmental data for
25 those that were outside the plant.

1 The second one that I had is an outline of the
2 approach -- or I guess a -- the argument that
3 the radon breath data will actually bound the
4 radon exposures, as well. It'll be a bounding
5 factor, the argument that Dave made earlier.
6 The third item, which I think is the most
7 critical item -- in my eyes, anyway -- is the --
8 -- the thorium question as Jim has been
9 describing it and the -- the approach that
10 you're going to use to bound I guess the
11 thorium, actinium and protactinium, but -- and
12 whether those -- whether those ratios --

13 **DR. NETON:** Right.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- have to be adjusted or how --
15 yeah, so...

16 And I don't know, I might have missed -- are
17 there other issues on the table?

18 **DR. WADE:** You might put one -- and this goes
19 back to Denise's issue as to the policy
20 question as to an SEC process versus a site
21 profile process. That's an issue that really
22 NIOSH has to take up, and then the Board will
23 have to take up, but I think that's a major
24 issue for us to address leaving this meeting.

25 **MR. GRIFFON:** I agree, yeah, yeah.

1 **MS. BROCK:** (Off microphone) (Unintelligible)

2 **DR. WADE:** We'll discuss it leading up to the
3 August meeting and then at the August meeting
4 NIOSH will have to either present the
5 supplement to the SEC report or not, and then
6 the Board will have to deliberate based upon
7 what NIOSH presents, as well as this working
8 group reporting now. So I think that's the
9 process we'll follow.

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** All right. Arjun.

11 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** Mark, was there anything to be
12 done on the missing radon breath data?

13 **MR. GRIFFON:** Oh, I did -- yes, thank you. I -
14 - I would like -- and I don't know if this is
15 possible, but I still have that issue of the 25
16 to 30 percent either not analyzed or lost
17 datapoints. And it -- it goes to the
18 reliability of the breath radon data and -- and
19 I don't know if there's any documentation in
20 the HASL literature that might give us a good
21 reason why -- why those samples were, you know,
22 quote/unquote, lost or -- and I -- and I agree,
23 it might be a lost in processing kind of thing.

24 **DR. NETON:** Yeah, we'll certainly look -- look
25 into that. I think -- now you're saying that

1 these were indicated as missing or lost on the
2 HASL analysis sheets?

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** Uh-huh, yes.

4 **DR. NETON:** Okay. There's a few things we
5 could -- I could think of to try to do to give
6 you some comfort. I think, you know, looking
7 at possibly the -- if we -- if we could find
8 the job categories of the workers and -- which
9 were lost and to -- to get a feel that those
10 are no different than the ones where we have
11 samples for -- you know, that kind of thing --

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right, right.

13 **DR. NETON:** -- that there was no selective --

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** That's --

15 **DR. NETON:** -- censoring of the information,
16 that sort of thing (unintelligible) --

17 **MR. GRIFFON:** And I should say I did a
18 preliminary look at this and it -- there don't
19 -- there don't appear to be any trends --

20 **DR. NETON:** Right.

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- but that might be something to
22 look at, are --

23 **DR. NETON:** I think that's what we would look
24 at --

25 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- are there trends by job titles

1 (unintelligible) --

2 **DR. NETON:** -- 'cause really --

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- something like that --

4 **DR. NETON:** -- really then what we have is more
5 of a truncated dataset, not many as numbers,
6 but -- but what we have are -- we would -- we
7 could demonstrate possibly that they are not
8 that different than the distribution of the
9 ones that were missing, you know.

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

11 **DR. NETON:** But let's say if we came up with
12 some -- some job category that was just
13 selectively gone, we may -- it may cause --

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** Exactly, or --

15 **DR. NETON:** -- cause reason for concern.

16 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right. And I didn't see that,
17 but I -- yeah, I would ask for a little follow-
18 up on that.

19 **DR. NETON:** We'll do a follow-up on that.

20 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay. I think -- anybody have
21 anything else that I missed that we --

22 **DR. NETON:** No, that's enough.

23 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- we agreed to do? Denise has
24 something else.

25 **MS. BROCK:** I just wanted to maybe ask a couple

1 of questions, if I could, and perhaps read
2 something from the document that NIOSH had come
3 up with, I think it was like the '75 -- yes --
4 notes and summary, a visit by Mont Mason -- or
5 I mean Mason, August, 1975. And I don't know
6 if this actually is relevant, but I -- I found
7 it interesting. It was page 13 and it says
8 number two, I quote, (reading) Exposure to
9 radon in the work space air. There are
10 fragmentary measurements of air radon beginning
11 about 1946 and continuing through about 1955.
12 I view them as having little if any use as a
13 measure of the magnitude of individual
14 exposure. These data can be used to show that
15 certain jobs or job categories did entail
16 possible exposure to radon within a
17 (unintelligible) range. Any interpretation
18 beyond that would be erroneous, in my opinion.
19 I've done nothing to date to organize air radon
20 data for the purpose of entering it into the
21 exposure history as a job stress. Note, these
22 have been taped for future reference. In
23 general the air concentrations did not exceed
24 the range of 0.1 to 0.1 times ten to minus ten
25 Curies per liter of air. Although a few spots

1 were chronically in the 1.0 to 10.0 range from
2 1946 to 1949, occasionally single samples
3 exceeded 100 times ten minus ten Curie per
4 liter.

5 I really don't know what that means, I just
6 thought it was interesting and I don't know if
7 that has to do with the surrounding air -- I'm
8 assuming that's what that means. Oh, I'm
9 learning, that's great.

10 And the other thing I wanted to ask is in
11 reference to the cases that have already been
12 dosed and denied because, if I understand
13 correctly, the methodology of dose
14 reconstruction, if I'm understanding correctly,
15 has changed now, I would assume that the dose
16 reconstructions that have been denied will now
17 be pulled back in for redose. Is that correct?

18 **DR. NETON:** If these approaches are adopted,
19 that is true. Dave Allen has some words of
20 wisdom.

21 **MR. ALLEN:** Before you commit to something
22 there.

23 **DR. NETON:** Okay.

24 **MR. ALLEN:** We've said all along that the TBDs
25 are living documents and there's been minor

1 changes to other TBDs, and our standard
2 approach has been to write a -- an evaluation
3 report. Essentially we're committed to
4 evaluate, which I think is what you want, the
5 previously done ones. But we're not
6 necessarily committed to opening it back up.
7 The last thing we want to do is to take
8 somebody who's been denied, tell them we're
9 going to redo their dose reconstruction, then
10 deny them again. So --

11 **MS. BROCK:** Absolutely. I just want to make
12 sure that the opportunity is there for that to
13 be -- if this is adopted, that that -- that
14 that would possibly be looked at again. I mean
15 --

16 **DR. NETON:** That's --

17 **MS. BROCK:** -- I never --

18 **MR. ALLEN:** Again --

19 **MS. BROCK:** -- want to give anybody false hope,
20 but if there's been a mistake and -- not even a
21 mistake, but if there's another methodology
22 that would allow them to come at a higher POC,
23 absolutely I would like for that --

24 **DR. NETON:** Right.

25 **MS. BROCK:** -- to --

1 **MR. ALLEN:** Yeah, and it very --

2 **MS. BROCK:** -- to happen.

3 **MR. ALLEN:** Our standard approach is to re-
4 evaluate when there's a change, but not
5 necessarily to open it up or even tell the
6 claimant about it.

7 **MS. BROCK:** Oh, okay.

8 **MR. ALLEN:** Like you say, we don't --

9 **MS. BROCK:** Right.

10 **MR. ALLEN:** -- want to do the false hope thing.

11 **MS. BROCK:** Okay. And another thing I'd like
12 to ask, I have -- and I think we've maybe
13 discussed this before. I have obviously
14 certain claimants -- workers, that are in very
15 poor condition and I would hope that possibly
16 those could be expedited, as well. I'm
17 assuming that NIOSH is moving quite
18 expeditiously on a lot of these, so I'm hoping
19 that maybe if -- if you know or somebody from
20 ORAU would know that maybe somebody's not doing
21 real well, that they would be gracious enough
22 to maybe, if they could, push those ahead.

23 **DR. NETON:** Well, our standard approach here is
24 to do dose reconstructions for the oldest
25 claims in our possession first. I mean those

1 are -- it's a first in, first out type of
2 approach. Right now we're working on the
3 backlog of the first 5,000 cases, so any lower
4 numbered cases would be given priority at this
5 time. That's -- that's our approach.

6 **MS. BROCK:** Okay. And I -- I know I had one
7 more. For some reason, I wrote a note and I --
8 I can't find it.

9 **MR. GRIFFON:** I think the -- to speak to your
10 first question, I think Dave's analysis might
11 address some of that concern over the radon
12 data because it sounds like you're not
13 (unintelligible) -- you may not end up
14 assigning radon doses. Right?

15 **DR. NETON:** Right, but I think what -- what
16 Mont -- the Mont Mason reference that Denise
17 was referring -- to which she was referring is
18 really the radon in air concentration data.

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, that's --

20 **DR. NETON:** Oh, I see what you're saying is the
21 radon breath would bound -- possibly bound
22 those exposures. I think what Mont Mason was
23 talking there is the ability to give
24 individually-assigned radon doses would be
25 unlikely, and it's -- that's -- that's why you

1 see us adopting the 95th percentile approach.
2 And in his little statement there he even
3 acknowledges that we -- one can put maximum
4 values on these things, but you'll -- it is
5 very difficult to go and assign Worker A X
6 radon exposure, but we do know what the
7 distribution was and we would assign the upper
8 end of it, lacking any specific information.

9 **MR. GRIFFON:** (Off microphone) But it may all
10 be moot (unintelligible).

11 **DR. NETON:** And Dave's technique may actually
12 end up --

13 **MR. ALLEN:** (Off microphone) For systemic
14 (unintelligible) --

15 **DR. NETON:** For systemic organs. In fact, as
16 we've indicated previously, the lung cancer
17 cases that we've analyzed --

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, that's --

19 **DR. NETON:** -- to date have been over 50
20 percent by Department of Labor, so adding
21 additional radon doses is not really critical.

22 **MS. BROCK:** And I have one more statement to --
23 oh, I'm sorry, Arjun. One more statement about
24 the unmonitored workers. I just know from my
25 experience with some of the workers that I

1 speak with, or maybe even some of the spouses
2 of these workers, that sometimes the job title
3 does not always match the job description. For
4 example, I had a gentleman that was called a --
5 an -- like an office boy or mail clerk, and
6 part of his job description or part of what he
7 did was to actually take open containers -- now
8 I don't know if that was liquid or sol-- I
9 don't have any idea, but he would transport
10 this waste back and forth from downtown to
11 maybe -- I think SLAPS and just back and forth.
12 I don't know that this person was monitored.
13 The case has been denied. The gentleman had a
14 glioblastoma. I haven't got a chance to look
15 completely at the dose reconstruction myself.
16 I don't know if his actual records were used,
17 if they were -- if there were actual dose
18 records or if that was coworker data. But as
19 you read through that -- and again, it puts a
20 spouse at a disadvantage, too, because they're
21 just not really sure what all that job
22 entailed.

23 Another thing that I would like to talk about
24 is a particular claimant that has recently been
25 denied. She was a secretary, had a double

1 masectomy (sic), worked downtown St. Louis and
2 also at Weldon Spring and she actually was
3 within the plant. Now I don't know which plant
4 it was, whether it was Destrehan or Weldon
5 Spring, but she was actually in the plant area.
6 Through the phone interview there was
7 discussion about of course the dust being all
8 over the paperwork and the desk and the floor,
9 stockings coming off her legs -- which I'm
10 assuming maybe have been acid -- but I'm
11 wondering if in fact that's all taken into
12 consideration. And I wonder if someone like
13 that, if they're within that facility and
14 there's -- in the dose reconstruction report it
15 actually states that she had exposure to
16 thorium and radon, and even though that case
17 has been denied, I -- I wonder if that would
18 possibly change the numbers on that.

19 **DR. NETON:** That's difficult to tell. I mean
20 we can't envision, you know, what the -- what
21 the do-- without looking at the dose
22 reconstruction there's no way that we could
23 really make a judgment --

24 **MS. BROCK:** Got it right here. You want to see
25 it?

1 **DR. NETON:** Not -- not during this meeting, but
2 maybe after this meeting we can sit down --

3 **MS. BROCK:** Okay.

4 **DR. NETON:** -- and look at it.

5 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay. All right, Arjun.

6 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** Just a brief follow-up on what
7 Denise just said -- or a little bit earlier.
8 There are a few measurements of like ten to the
9 minus eight picocuries per liter. Are they --
10 are they in your distribution, all of -- and
11 how do you deal with that and to -- ten to the
12 minus eight seems -- it jogged my memory 'cause
13 I'd seen those numbers and I'd forgotten about
14 them.

15 **MS. BLOOM:** We do --

16 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** That's a pretty huge radon
17 concentration.

18 **MS. BLOOM:** It is a huge radon concentration.
19 Those were usually measured either at SLAPS or
20 in the scale house or in the ore house. Some
21 of it's associated with opening drums. There
22 was also a drying oven, I think -- a drying
23 furnace, I believe, that sometimes had high
24 values. For Mallinckrodt they don't actually
25 have -- I didn't see very man-- I think one --

1 one boxcar measurement, but I know from looking
2 at other sites that those can be very high, the
3 radon concentrations can be very high in the
4 boxcars when they're first opened up.

5 **DR. MAURO:** Along those lines, one of the
6 interesting things I've run across with I work
7 with these statistics, sometimes the average
8 actually is higher than the 95th percentile
9 when you're -- I've seen distri--

10 **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Off microphone)

11 (Unintelligible)

12 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, when -- no, and the only
13 reason it's triggered is because -- see, we're
14 talking about numbers on the order of 100
15 picocuries per liter, maybe 1,000. Now ten to
16 the minus eighth is 100,000 or -- 10,000
17 picocuries per liter. Right? So where -- what
18 we're talking about is --

19 **MS. BLOOM:** (Off microphone) 1,000

20 (unintelligible).

21 **DR. MAURO:** Well, it's ten to the minus 12?

22 **MS. BLOOM:** (Unintelligible) Oh, no, I'm sorry,
23 ten to the minus eight --

24 **DR. MAURO:** 10,000.

25 **MS. BLOOM:** I'm sorry, I haven't seen them that

1 high. I've seen 2,000.

2 **DR. MAURO:** 'Cause I've seen ten to the minus
3 eight in one of --

4 **MS. BLOOM:** Yeah.

5 **DR. MAURO:** -- your reports. Now it might have
6 been just one reading. I just rai-- triggered
7 because I've seen the situation arise. When
8 you have a distribution and you have a couple
9 of really big outliers, even individual values,
10 that -- what that does is it drives the average
11 all the way off the scale, and it's higher than
12 your 95th percentile.

13 **DR. NETON:** Right.

14 **DR. MAURO:** I'm not quite sure, what do you do
15 with that?

16 **DR. NETON:** Well, and one needs to look at
17 those huge, huge values and determine whether
18 they're relevant for -- for continuous exposure
19 scenarios or not. I mean that -- that's -- I
20 think we have to apply some reasonableness here
21 to those values. And if they are, if there was
22 positions like that, then you're right, but the
23 likelihood of anyone being in a furnace --
24 drying over for 2,000 hours -- who knows.

25 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** Yeah, but this -- this is the

1 kind -- you know, rail cars, opening drums,
2 there would be episodic exposures, but frequent
3 for the people who were doing that job,
4 presumably. I mean I don't know, because if
5 they were that high, then -- and radon breath
6 is only being taken once every six or eight
7 months -- sorry -- then -- then this whole
8 systemic radon thing -- you wouldn't catch
9 that.

10 **MS. BLOOM:** They -- there -- I misspoke, I -- I
11 did the math wrong in my head. The highest
12 results I've seen are 2,000 picocuries per
13 liter, and that's looking at 1949 forward,
14 which is the period we're talking about. The
15 other part is that if you're having radon
16 concentrations that high, the gamma exposure
17 rates are huge, and so these workers were
18 restricted from being in those areas for any
19 length of time because they were concerned
20 about going over tolerance levels. So there --
21 they were -- the occupancy factors need to play
22 into that, as well.

23 **DR. NETON:** And we also need to look -- you
24 just jogged my memory, this ten to the minus
25 eight may be pre-1949 data. I don't know.

1 **MR. GRIFFON:** (Off microphone) Denise, you have
2 (unintelligible)?

3 **MS. BROCK:** Yes, I do. As far as the workers
4 being restricted, that may have been what
5 should have happened, but when I talk to the
6 workers, that's not exactly what happened.
7 There were many times when these workers were
8 basically put in these positions and had to
9 finish what they were doing, no matter how long
10 it took. And by the own admission of the AEC
11 or the AE standards, I think sometimes we're
12 talking about 15 rem to the lung, and that's
13 different than the radon exposure, but they
14 were actually letting these people get way
15 beyond that, way beyond that before they'd ever
16 even pull them out, but some of them were 600
17 to 1,000 rem to the lung. So I don't
18 necessarily believe that, just because they
19 should have been restricted, they necessarily
20 were.

21 **MS. BLOOM:** And I certainly agree with that,
22 but I think we're looking at the -- the total
23 program to see what was going on there, and we
24 are looking at external doses, as well. And I
25 think for the most part, if they -- and I've

1 read a lot of correspondence for Mallinckrodt
2 on that that indicates that, you know, they
3 might have worked -- if they were only supposed
4 to work two hours, maybe they did work four
5 hours to finish the job. But on the other
6 hand, when we're going to apply this data,
7 we're going to do that in a -- you know, in a
8 claimant-favorable way.

9 **MS. BROCK:** (Off microphone) (Unintelligible)

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** Go ahead, that's --

11 **MS. BROCK:** I promise this is my last one. I
12 want to know if -- because this -- and this is
13 a policy question. If in fact, due to all of
14 the -- the new things that have arisen, will
15 the Board and NIOSH be able to come -- come to
16 a conclusion whether or not this set of workers
17 in this second part of this SEC will be able to
18 be dose reconstructed? Will you know that by
19 the next Board meeting, or does this -- is this
20 going to require additional research? I mean --
21 -- and as far as the policy question, I know Dr.
22 Wade said that it will be discussed whether or
23 not this can even be adopted. Will I be
24 informed prior to the meeting as far as the
25 issue of whether it's adopted, and then by the

1 next Board meeting I guess I'm asking if in
2 fact there will be a decision made.

3 **DR. WADE:** Well, you asked the hard questions.
4 Certainly you'll be informed if NIOSH is going
5 to submit a supplement to the SEC evaluation
6 report. You would be informed of that. And as
7 a courtesy, if we're not, we will call and tell
8 you that. God knows, Denise, if this issue
9 will be resolved at the next meeting. I think
10 it is all of our hope, and I think everyone in
11 this room is working as hard as they can to
12 bring this to closure. I don't think there's a
13 member of the Board that doesn't feel the pain
14 of the claimants as this process goes on and
15 they're weighing that pain against the desire
16 to do a complete job.

17 I think it is all of our expectation -- hope --
18 that this issue will be resolved. Again, none
19 of us can say that for sure until it's actually
20 done and sent on.

21 **MS. BROCK:** I would just like to tell everybody
22 thank you again for including me and thank you
23 for all of your hard work. I know it's -- it's
24 -- it is very hard for everybody involved and I
25 appreciate it.

1 **DR. WADE:** Thank you.

2 **MR. GRIFFON:** And we've got two weeks. No...
3 Arjun?

4 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** That's what I was going to say,
5 we've got -- I've got what, today's August 4th.
6 I've got 12 days. Right? So really I've got
7 ten because two days before I have to send it
8 to Nancy and -- and three days before I have to
9 send it to John, so I've got nine days. And --
10 and so these four issues that we've got --

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

12 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** -- I think obviously have to
13 have a much closer -- I mean just for my own
14 sanity, I'd like -- I'd like some -- some idea
15 of, you know, by when we're going to have some
16 cutoff date that I can start writing about that
17 it won't require -- I don't know what the
18 process is of coming to closure on those four
19 points, and whether there are going to be any
20 dates or -- because for me to really do justice
21 to sending you a report --

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

23 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** -- by the 16th, I -- I've got
24 to have the information much earlier.

25 **DR. WADE:** And let's talk through that.

1 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

2 **DR. WADE:** I mean that -- I want us to talk a
3 little bit about that, so let me paint a broad
4 picture, Arjun, of this and then we can maybe
5 start to get more specific on some of the
6 issues that remain.

7 I think that what's going to happen starting
8 now is that you can expect to see from NIOSH
9 certain augmentation or documentation on
10 selected issues. We'll go back and talk about
11 what those are and maybe we can talk about
12 dates.

13 Then you're going to see a process of dialogue
14 between SC&A and NIOSH. And this working group
15 has asked that we encourage a free discussion
16 between the two parties. We'll try and let the
17 working group know of those discussions. We'll
18 certainly let the petitioner know, but we'll in
19 no way limit the ability of those two groups to
20 work together to bring this to closure as
21 quickly as possible.

22 Then we'll be seeing an SC&A report to the
23 Board on the 16th of August.

24 Then the Board will meet on the 24th and 20--
25 excuse me, the 25th and 26th. Either in

1 subcommittee or in the full Board meeting the
2 issue of the Mallinckrodt site profile will be
3 discussed and the review of that site profile.
4 Then in a full Board action the Board will take
5 up the issue of the Mallinckrodt SEC petition.
6 And as we said earlier, hopefully we'll bring
7 that to closure.

8 So those are how things will -- will play out
9 in the long term. Let's try and deal with
10 Arjun's issue of timing on a -- on a case-by-
11 case, and let me start with the issue of -- of
12 radon breath bounding radon exposures. And
13 Dave, that's your issue. Let me put you on the
14 spot. When might these fine people have
15 something to -- to discuss with you?

16 **MR. ALLEN:** I'm --

17 **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Off microphone)

18 (Unintelligible)

19 **MR. ALLEN:** Yeah, thanks. I'm thinking early -
20 - well, I'm thinking next week, that it might
21 be -- the more I've thought about it, the might
22 -- the best bet might be for me to simply
23 document a few calculations and then I guess
24 send it to John Mauro and if I -- if I feel I
25 can get it documented well enough to put it to

1 bed, and I think I can, then next week at some
2 point.

3 **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Off microphone) The 11th?
4 (Unintelligible) the end of next week?

5 **MR. ALLEN:** The earlier, the better.

6 **DR. NETON:** Early next week, he's saying.

7 **MR. ALLEN:** Early next week.

8 **MR. GRIFFON:** How about the 9th? That's
9 Tuesday. Close of business on the 9th? I mean
10 everything's tight here, so...

11 **MR. ALLEN:** Yeah, I'll commit to that. I'll
12 commit to something by then.

13 **DR. WADE:** Okay, do the most that you can do.
14 And I think there's been a good intellectual
15 agreement reached here. I think this is a
16 matter of sort of documentation, give and take
17 and discussion, so let's move on to the next
18 one.

19 And we sort of categorized this as the thorium
20 or the ratios kind of issue.

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

22 **DR. WADE:** Jim, how do you want to proceed with
23 that?

24 **DR. NETON:** Well, SC&A colleagues are going to
25 have -- or ORAU colleagues are going to provide

1 some support here on this. I don't want to
2 speak for their schedules, but I don't see
3 anything forthcoming until maybe the middle of
4 next week. Is that reasonable?

5 **MS. BLOOM:** I would say at least the middle of
6 next week, and it may be toward the end of next
7 week.

8 **DR. NETON:** That doesn't give you a lot of time
9 --

10 **MS. BLOOM:** I'm happy to --

11 **DR. NETON:** We'll do what we can do.

12 **MS. BLOOM:** I can give you preliminary
13 information, but I know you're going to beat me
14 up on that, so...

15 **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Off microphone)
16 (Unintelligible)

17 **MR. GRIFFON:** I'm -- I'm hoping also there will
18 be some phone calls prior to like a -- a
19 report, so...

20 **DR. NETON:** Well, that's what I'd --

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

22 **DR. NETON:** -- like. I think I'd --

23 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

24 **DR. NETON:** -- like to engage in some dialogue
25 earlier in the week --

1 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

2 **DR. NETON:** -- as -- as we develop our
3 positions, rather than throw something over the
4 bow and then get it back. I think we can sort
5 of get some tentative feelers out as to where
6 we're heading and see if that's going to -- I
7 think some of these dose calculations -- my --
8 my sense is some of these calculations we've
9 shown have helped maybe alleviate some of --

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** And --

11 **DR. NETON:** -- the concern, and --

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** And I'd also -- I mean I'd also
13 maybe recommend that -- that Arjun, you can be
14 drafting a tentative report while they're --
15 you know, while you're doing these phone calls,
16 and -- and -- only to say that, you know, as
17 you iron out issues, then -- then NIOSH knows
18 where you're coming from, too, so you can have
19 these phone calls --

20 **DR. NETON:** I think a report that says we agree
21 would be very easy to write and very quick --
22 very -- very quick to produce. I mean I can't
23 see that to be a very difficult position,
24 but...

25 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** I'd -- I'd be very happy, but I

1 don't sign blank checks, so...

2 **MR. GRIFFON:** Again -- so you said the 10th on
3 the -- that issue?

4 **DR. WADE:** Could -- could -- well, let's say a
5 call -- let's imagine a call on this issue
6 before the 10th.

7 **DR. MAKHIJANI:** Yes, Dr. Wade, that's what I
8 was about to suggest is if -- if Cindy could
9 let me know what the approach is maybe on
10 Monday as you're writing it or something, I'm -
11 - I'm not going anywhere from Washington
12 between now and the 15th, by the time -- by
13 which I imagine I will be done with this, and
14 so that I can be looking -- 'cause I really
15 like Mark's suggestion is that if I can be kind
16 of writing a re-- drafting a report, and then
17 all my colleagues -- see, I have to tell my
18 colleagues what I'm doing and they have to sign
19 off on it, to do some calculations or
20 something, so that would be very useful. And
21 then of course I understand that you could
22 change your mind -- put different data or
23 whatever.

24 **MS. BLOOM:** At the last minute. I -- I don't
25 intend to do that. I do see the beginning of

1 approa-- an approach. I do have more data on
2 the airport cake, and that's really my first
3 place to look. I have been working these
4 issues night and day for the last 14 days, and
5 I have some personal issues that I have to deal
6 with, so that's my concern about meeting your
7 deadline. It's certainly not my goal to impact
8 your dates, but there's just -- I'll do -- do
9 it as fast as I can. I'll let you know my
10 thoughts on it. They -- but actually having
11 the actual numbers, I think the approach that
12 we've taken so far is going to be similar to
13 what I propose, but we will have adjusted
14 numbers in there based on better data.

15 **DR. WADE:** So a contact early next week.

16 **MS. BLOOM:** Yeah.

17 **DR. WADE:** With the only promise being complete
18 -- complete and candid disclosure, and then
19 hopefully a follow-up of information later that
20 week, but we'll see how that first phone call
21 goes.

22 **MS. BLOOM:** Correct.

23 **DR. WADE:** Okay.

24 **MS. BLOOM:** Thank you.

25 **DR. WADE:** Thank you. What about the lost data

1 issue, Mark? The lost data issue?

2 **DR. NETON:** I think -- I think this is
3 something we can address fairly quickly. I
4 would say early next week we can have something
5 out. That's a different set of philosophies --

6 **MR. GRIFFON:** August -- August 9th too
7 (unintelligible) --

8 **DR. NETON:** August 9th I think is fine. You
9 know, we -- we're not -- we're not creating any
10 new models here. We're just sort of reviewing
11 --

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** Just --

13 **DR. NETON:** -- and sort of evaluating.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** Just for the record, it's not
15 lost data necessarily, it's just what was
16 recorded in (unintelligible) --

17 **DR. NETON:** Yeah, missing -- missing -- missing
18 or lost, yeah. I think we can have some --
19 some position or some document on that.

20 **DR. WADE:** Okay. And then what I categorize as
21 the environmental issue?

22 **DR. NETON:** Yeah, that, on the surface, does
23 not seem to be a real tough problem, but we're
24 -- we're going to need to -- to -- you know,
25 there's always surprises when we look at these

1 things, but seems like everything is
2 gravitating towards the 9th, but can we have
3 till the 10th on that, just in case we -- we
4 need an extra day to -- to coordinate the
5 effort (unintelligible).

6 Okay. Well, that -- that's -- that'll be
7 interesting. And that gives Arjun an entire
8 week to generate a report.

9 **MR. GRIFFON:** That says we agree. Right?

10 **DR. NETON:** That says we agree.

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** All right. Lew, did you have any
12 other closing remarks?

13 **DR. WADE:** Only just to thank everyone for
14 their -- their effort, and particularly to
15 thank Denise for her willingness to travel here
16 and to tolerate our processes. Please
17 understand that -- that we understand how
18 important this is to -- to real people who have
19 given their lives and their health to these
20 things, but those real people deserve quality
21 effort on our part and that's what we're trying
22 to give you.

23 **MS. BROCK:** (Off microphone) (Unintelligible)

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** And I'd like to thank everyone
25 around the table, too. I know -- and -- and

1 back at the offices. I know a lot of effort
2 was put into this analysis and I think we're
3 getting there, so we're really close. And I
4 think with that -- are we adjourned? We're
5 adjourned.

6 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned.)

7

8

C E R T I F I C A T E O F C O U R T R E P O R T E R**STATE OF GEORGIA****COUNTY OF FULTON**

I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court Reporter, do hereby certify that I transcribed the above and foregoing from the day of Aug. 4, 2005; and it is a true and accurate transcript of the testimony captioned herein.

I further certify that I am neither kin nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor have any interest in the cause named herein.

WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 23rd day of August, 2005.

STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR

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