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PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE  
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION  
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

convenes

MEETING 3

SUBCOMMITTEE FOR DOSE RECONSTRUCTION

REVIEWS

The verbatim transcript of the 3rd  
Meeting of the Subcommittee for Dose Reconstruction  
Reviews held in Cincinnati, Ohio on April 11, 2007.

*STEVEN RAY GREEN AND ASSOCIATES  
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C O N T E N T S

April 11, 2007

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS	6
DR. LEW WADE, DFO	
MR. MARK GRIFFON, CHAIR	10
MATRIX	14
DR INSTRUCTIONS	258
COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE	295

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-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker failure, usually failure to use a microphone.

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BEHLING, KATHY, SC&A  
BRACKETT, LIZ, ORAU  
ELLIOTT, LARRY, NIOSH  
HINNEFELD, STUART, NIOSH  
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SIEBERT, SCOTT, ORAU

APRIL 11, 2007

9:30 a.m.

P R O C E E D I N G S

WELCOME AND OPENING COMMENTS

1  
2  
3  
4       **DR. WADE:** This is the workgroup conference  
5 room. This is Lew Wade and I, as always, have  
6 the privilege of serving as the Designated  
7 Federal Official for the Advisory Board. This  
8 is a meeting of the subcommittee of the  
9 Advisory Board, the only subcommittee currently  
10 of the Advisory Board, and it's the  
11 subcommittee on dose reconstruction. The  
12 subcommittee is chaired by Mark Griffon;  
13 members Mike Gibson, Dr. Poston, Wanda Munn,  
14 with alternates Clawson and Presley.  
15 In the room we have Mark, Dr. Poston and Ms.  
16 Munn. Might I ask other Board members on the  
17 line to identify themselves?

18                   (No responses)

19 Do we have any other Board members on the line?

20                   (No responses)

21 Okay, that's fine.

22       **MR. GRIFFON:** They might have assumed we'd be  
23 late.

24       **DR. WADE:** Yeah, that's fine. But we have --

1 we have a quorum of the subcommittee. We can -  
2 - we can do business. What I'd like to do is  
3 do introductions here around the table, and  
4 then go out into telephone land and have  
5 NIOSH/ORAU team members identify themselves,  
6 SC&A team members identify themselves, other  
7 feds, workers, worker reps, members of Congress  
8 or their staff, anyone else who would like to  
9 identify. Then we'll have my usual lecture on  
10 phone etiquette -- and we've been very good  
11 about that recently -- and then we'll start the  
12 business of the subcommittee.

13 Again, this is Lew Wade. I serve the  
14 subcommittee and work for NIOSH.

15 **MR. ELLIOTT:** Larry Elliott, NIOSH.

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Stu Hinnefeld, technical  
17 program manager for NIOSH/OCAS.

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** Mark Griffon with the Advisory  
19 Board.

20 **DR. WADE:** Liz Homoki-Titus is not at the table  
21 at the moment, but will be. We were to  
22 introduce her. She's assisting in getting the  
23 paperwork necessary to make this meeting flow  
24 right in everyone's hands, so thank you to Liz.

25 **MS. BRACKETT:** Liz Brackett, the principal

1 internal dosimetrist for the ORAU team.

2 **MR. SIEBERT:** Scott Siebert, dosimetrist for  
3 the ORAU team.

4 **MR. ALLEN:** Dave Allen with NIOSH.

5 **DR. MAURO:** John Mauro with SC&A.

6 **DR. POSTON:** John Poston with the work-- with  
7 the subcommittee.

8 **MS. MUNN:** Wanda Munn, subcommittee/Board.

9 **DR. WADE:** Before we go out, I should say Dave  
10 Allen looks particularly dapper today. We  
11 should get that on the record.

12 **MS. MUNN:** Yes, we should.

13 **DR. WADE:** Thank you for being here.

14 Now might we have other members of the  
15 NIOSH/ORAU team identify themselves?

16 (No responses)

17 Other NIOSH or ORAU folks on the telephone  
18 line?

19 (No responses)

20 We have everyone here. Other members of the  
21 SC&A team on the telephone line?

22 **MS. BEHLING:** Kathy Behling from SC&A.

23 **DR. WADE:** Good morning, Kathy.

24 **MS. BEHLING:** Morning.

25 **DR. BEHLING:** Hans Behling, SC&A.



1           etiquette as you do your business, particularly  
2           on the telephone. Mute the instrument you're  
3           using when you're not speaking. If you are  
4           speaking, speak into a handset. Don't use a  
5           speakerphone. That allows all kinds of  
6           distractions to enter in. And be mindful of  
7           background noises in the place where you are  
8           because while they might be routine to you, we  
9           hear them and they can be very distracting.  
10          All right. So again, we appreciate the  
11          demonstrated etiquette we're going to see  
12          today. And Mark, it's all yours.

13          **INTRODUCTION BY CHAIR**

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay. Just to -- we're going to  
15          do -- and at this type of subcommittee meeting  
16          usually what we are more successful in doing  
17          than at the subcommittee meetings at the full  
18          Board meetings, we -- we get down to some of  
19          the more detailed work at these meetings 'cause  
20          it's usually a smaller group. And with that in  
21          mind, I think -- initially we were going to do  
22          the fourth set of ca-- some -- some written  
23          materials that we expected did not come from  
24          NIOSH and instead of actually going through the  
25          -- a -- a review of some of these findings and

1 discussions, I think we are going to ask NIOSH  
2 and -- and the ORAU team to give us an update  
3 on some of these actions and -- and I guess the  
4 only sort of discussion of the tes-- technical  
5 aspects of any of this is going to be focused  
6 on -- on clarifying the task. So -- so Kathy  
7 and Hans -- I know I talked to you, Kathy, this  
8 morning. You know, we won't get into the  
9 technical discussion 'cause we haven't had the  
10 materials. You -- you just got my e-mail stuff  
11 this morning on -- on this listing where -- we  
12 are going to go through a listing which Liz  
13 just gave us copies of, which is -- is some of  
14 the -- for some of the findings in this matrix,  
15 particularly a few Savannah River cases and one  
16 Hanford case, NIOSH committed to giving us some  
17 written backup materials to clarify -- shed  
18 some light on -- on their response, and we  
19 haven't got those so we're not going to get  
20 into the details, but we do want to clarify the  
21 actions and make sure that, you know, what  
22 NIOSH is going to deliver is what we're asking  
23 for. So Kathy and Hans, I hope -- that's the  
24 spirit of the discussion on those items that I  
25 want to have this morning. So we're -- we're

1 going to do that first.

2 And then after that, I'd like to go through the

3 fifth set and just do at least our first

4 preliminary review of the fifth set. We have -

5 - and I think everyone has a copy of the fifth

6 set matrix, and in that we have NIOSH's

7 response now so we can go through the NIOSH

8 response to the finding and at least get a

9 preliminary path forward on those. And I think

10 a lot of those, in -- in looking at them, my

11 sense is that a lot of them are findings we've

12 seen before. So although it's 40-some pages --

13 or 39 pages, I think we can probably get

14 through a lot of them quickly. Certainly some

15 we'll have to -- some will take a little more

16 time, but I wanted to -- my hope is to get

17 through that in a preliminary fashion today.

18 And then lastly is a -- an initial discussion

19 on these DR guidelines or DR notes that -- that

20 are sort of the -- I guess templates, for lack

21 of a better word, for the dose reconstructors

22 for certain sites. And at least initially I

23 think this is kind of a -- a fact-finding

24 discussion. We want to hear from NIOSH, you

25 know, how are these used; are they used -- it

1 looks like they're used only for the larger  
2 sites, but it -- you know, maybe just a  
3 clarification for the Board on what -- what  
4 role these things play in the dose  
5 reconstruction process, and then some  
6 discussion around that. But that -- that's  
7 last on our agenda.

8 We are hoping probably to get out around 2:00  
9 p.m. today if people want to think about their  
10 schedule, and I think we can get all this in by  
11 2:00 p.m.

12 So with that in mind, any questions on the  
13 agenda? Did -- there is one other thing that I  
14 think that we mentioned at the Advisory Board  
15 last time that I wanted to discuss further, but  
16 I'm not prepared really to discuss it today,  
17 and that's the -- sort of the -- the update on  
18 our protocols for the reviews, including blind  
19 reviews. And I think we wanted to come back to  
20 the full Board with a better sense of how we're  
21 going to conduct blind reviews. And we even  
22 talked about maybe selecting a few of those for  
23 the eighth set. And -- and also the -- what I  
24 called the advanced reviews in the initial  
25 protocol, and I asked everyone to go back and

1 look at our original protocol and maybe come  
2 prepared for some discussion and I -- I  
3 neglected to do that, so I would propose to put  
4 that on the agenda for the May 2nd -- is it May  
5 2nd? -- May 2nd subcommittee meeting, if we  
6 could.

7 **DR. WADE:** And just for clar-- to clarify, I  
8 recently tried to put out an agenda for the  
9 Board meeting on May 2nd that would start in  
10 the morning. That's not going to succeed, so  
11 the Board meeting will start at 12:30, so the  
12 morning of the 2nd is available for  
13 subcommittee if you would like, for your  
14 planning purposes.

15 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, and I think we would like  
16 at least a couple of hours, yeah.

17 **DR. WADE:** Okay.

18 **MATRIX**

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay. So this -- this listing I  
20 got from Stu, I think last Friday, I'm -- along  
21 with an updated matrix for the fourth set. And  
22 -- and the matrix is not really modified that  
23 significantly, from what I can see, but I did -  
24 - I didn't send it out to everyone yet. I  
25 asked SC&A, and they just got it this morning,

1 if they could review it and make sure they  
2 agree with the resolution, and then I'll  
3 circulate it to everyone, but -- so we're not  
4 going to go through the full matrix, but -- but  
5 out of the full matrix, Stu lifted these --  
6 this listing, which is I think the major items  
7 where we were asking -- the work-- or the  
8 subcommittee and SC&A was asking for sort of  
9 written backup materials to support their --  
10 their response, or to clarify their responses.  
11 And I think what I'd like to do right now is  
12 kind of go through and let -- let NIOSH take  
13 the lead and go through these and -- and get  
14 some understanding of what they perceive the  
15 action to be, and make sure SC&A is in  
16 agreement with that action --

17 **DR. BEHLING:** Mark, can I interrupt for a  
18 second --

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, sure, Hans --

20 **DR. BEHLING:** -- before we do that?

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** Sure.

22 **DR. BEHLING:** I think it's important to make a  
23 comment here. That is, it was only really the  
24 beginning at -- with the fourth set that we  
25 encountered for the first time dose

1 reconstructions that were bona fide best  
2 estimate dose reconstructions. And -- and one  
3 of the things that we observed in the fourth  
4 set was several dose reconstructions where the  
5 best estimate ended up with a POC that came  
6 very close to the pivotal point of 50 percent  
7 POC. And in a couple of instances, I believe  
8 those cases were 67, I believe, and 68, or  
9 whichever ones, we came extremely close to the  
10 point where we looked at certain deficiencies  
11 that might make enough of a difference where  
12 the revised dose estimates, if these errors or  
13 deficiencies area corrected, might just bring  
14 the person over the 50 percent value. And --  
15 and what we had hoped to do was to have NIOSH  
16 address these deficiencies or -- or findings,  
17 I'm not going to say deficiencies -- findings  
18 that we identified, and then provide us with a  
19 full explanation that includes a dose  
20 reconstruction that says we have at this point  
21 addressed your -- your findings and -- and we  
22 have rerun the entire dose reconstruction in --  
23 in -- in terms of accommodating those findings  
24 and determined whether or not the new POC does  
25 in fact bring you over the 50 percent value, so

1           that what we were hoping to do is not necessary  
2           (sic) address each of the findings in -- in  
3           isolation, but in context with the entire dose  
4           reconstruction, because in the end there's no  
5           point in addressing a finding without  
6           determining how that finding affects the POC  
7           and the compensability of that claim. And so  
8           what it is that we're asking here is to resolve  
9           the findings, rerun the entire dose calculation  
10          and determine whether or not this new POC is  
11          going to end up over the 50 percent value and -  
12          - and convert a non-compensable case to a  
13          compensable case.

14         **DR. WADE:** I think we have to talk about this,  
15         clearly. Liz to start and also --

16         **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, you're getting a little  
17         ahead of me, Hans, but I was going to ask --  
18         'cause initially one of our -- one of the  
19         resolution columns said "rework entire case" --

20         **DR. BEHLING:** Yes.

21         **MR. GRIFFON:** -- and I was going to ask NIOSH  
22         that -- it -- it seems like they're -- they're  
23         slightly modifying that action and I wanted to  
24         understand what -- you know, the nature of that  
25         action. Maybe Liz can...

1           **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** No, I just need --

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** Oh.

3           **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** -- to remind the Board that  
4 you are not an appeals board --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right.

6           **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** -- and it is not SC&A's job  
7 to bring cases forward individually for rework.  
8 That would be up to NIOSH if they want to  
9 rework the case based on information that you  
10 bring, but the Board is supposed to be bringing  
11 forward summarized responses, not individual  
12 case responses.

13           **MR. GRIFFON:** And I thought there might have  
14 been some heartburn with that -- with that --  
15 that term, rework, has -- has different  
16 meanings, depending on who's using it. So I  
17 think --

18           **DR. WADE:** It's very important that roles are  
19 understood in terms of SC&A's role, what it is  
20 and what it is not. I mean SC&A is not in a  
21 position to ask NIOSH to redo dose  
22 reconstructions, and we have to be very careful  
23 about how we move down this path. And the  
24 subcommittee needs to decide what it wants, and  
25 the subcommittee needs to be careful as well

1 about its role, given the Board's charter.

2 **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** Right, 'cause the Department  
3 of Labor has already adjudicated these cases,  
4 and we would have to get them involved if the  
5 Board, for some reason, is recommending that  
6 cases need to be redone because the outcome is  
7 going to change. That was never the charge of  
8 the Board, and I believe if you look back at  
9 the transcripts, the Board agreed that they  
10 would not be bringing forward --

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

12 **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** -- comments to -- on  
13 individual dose reconstructions. They would be  
14 bringing forward summaries. So I'm very  
15 concerned about this path forward that SC&A is  
16 asking for.

17 **DR. WADE:** Right. Now remember, that doesn't  
18 mean that there's not opportunity to see the  
19 right things done right. I mean if, in the  
20 course of the Board's scientific review, issues  
21 are to be raised, and then NIOSH agrees that  
22 indeed there could be a change in their  
23 scientific methodology, then NIOSH would take  
24 the action of reworking those cases and issuing  
25 a -- and I always get the letters wrong, a --

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** PER, Program Evaluation Review.

2           **DR. WADE:** -- PE-- so there is a path forward,  
3 but we have to be very careful about who's  
4 taking what action.

5           **MR. ELLIOTT:** And we have done that. We have  
6 heard and seen, from the reviews, issues that  
7 we have addressed that way.

8           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, the -- just so we're --  
9 we're clear --

10          **MR. GRIFFON:** I think part of the confusion was  
11 the initial responses that we had in the -- in  
12 our resolution was to rework the cases.

13          **MR. HINNEFELD:** And -- and -- and we have to on  
14 some of these cases, the reason being that --  
15 first the -- at least the Savannah River cases,  
16 they were worked originally with a  
17 calculational tool that used the entire range  
18 of triangular DCFs rather than the AP range of  
19 DCFs, and so that is one of our existing PERs  
20 that we know we have to do, and so this case  
21 will be reworked.

22           In the meantime, though, there are a number of  
23 findings that we have not really resolved or  
24 come to closure on, on 67, 68 and 69, many  
25 having to do with the internal dosimetry

1 calculation, that if we were to -- you know,  
2 when we rework these cases for PER, we make all  
3 corrections and all changes that have made  
4 since that time. We just don't correct one  
5 thing, if there are other changes been made in  
6 the meantime. I know that in one of these  
7 cases there was at least some work in a  
8 glovebox for one of these employees, and so  
9 there will be a glovebox adjustment added to  
10 the rework during that -- during that time.  
11 And if I'm not mistaken, there might be a  
12 construction worker in this crowd, and so there  
13 would be the construction worker dose  
14 reconstruction approach would be -- would be  
15 included in the PE-- when we redo this as a  
16 PER, so we address more than one PER when we do  
17 these -- you know, when we do a case. We just  
18 rework it once with all the open PERs, you  
19 know, incorporated into it.

20 So rather than -- I don't think it's timely to  
21 deliver the reworked case, though, until we  
22 have some agreement that -- of the resolution  
23 of the findings. Because if we rework the case  
24 at this point and have not resolved the  
25 internal dose -- I'll call them the internal

1           dose findings; there may be some other findings  
2           -- then -- and the resolution later on causes  
3           an additional change in the internal dosimetry  
4           approach, then we're facing redoing the case  
5           yet again. So I believe it'll be timely to  
6           rework it when we have a resolution on -- on  
7           the issues on these cases and provide it at  
8           that time. That's when I think it would be the  
9           timely ti-- and it's part of the PER process,  
10          Liz. It's not -- we're not doing this because  
11          the Board has asked us to rework these cases.  
12          It's because there have been technical  
13          approaches identified that we would -- as a  
14          normal practice when there's a change in a  
15          technical approach, we go back and evaluate  
16          cases that might change because of that change  
17          (unintelligible) --

18          **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** Okay, I'm just concerned  
19          because what I heard from SC&A was that they  
20          wanted to see the cases back here to the Board  
21          and that kind of stuff, and that's not --

22          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

23          **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** -- the Board's role and  
24          that's not SC&A's role.

25          **DR. WADE:** And I heard the same thing.

1           **MR. ELLIOTT:** If the Board is interested in  
2 looking at claims that have been evaluated  
3 under Program Evaluation Review, you could get  
4 at that by -- one of two ways, perhaps. You  
5 can do that through the -- a review of the  
6 Program Evaluation Reports that have been  
7 completed, and you're going to see a sampling -  
8 - a subset, if you will -- of change. Or you  
9 could ask for us to present to you a number of  
10 claims once they have been -- gone through the  
11 PER process and, you know, we could put a  
12 number of claims on the table that you could  
13 pick up and -- and look up that way. But that  
14 would have to mean they would be already  
15 through the -- you know, the adjudication --

16           **MR. GRIFFON:** Well, that may be --

17           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- process again.

18           **MR. GRIFFON:** That may be a wa-- I mean that's  
19 -- that's not really necessarily relevant to  
20 our fourth set here, but it may be another  
21 thing when we -- we talk about tracking some of  
22 our findings and sometimes, like the AP  
23 geometry comes up a lot and it is a PER. If  
24 it's tagged to a PER, maybe then when -- when  
25 they're complete we can review that report and

1           that -- that closes it out (unintelligible).

2           **DR. WADE:** There are two things the Board has  
3           been discussing that relates directly to this.  
4           One is tracking findings through to closure,  
5           and you just described that perfectly. And the  
6           other is looking at all the work products, PER  
7           being one of those work products. So I do  
8           think it's important that the Board has its  
9           mind around the review function to closure --  
10          to ground, so to speak. But again, we have to  
11          watch how it comes about and where the driving  
12          force is for that.

13          **MR. ELLIOTT:** My comments are not to persuade  
14          the Board one way or the other, but I would  
15          suggest to you if you look hard at looking at  
16          this through an evaluation of the PERs, and  
17          Dave Allen is cringing when I say this 'cause  
18          he's the principal party leading that effort  
19          right now and we have a lot of these. But what  
20          is valuable to understand out of a Program  
21          Evaluation Report is which way the claims swung  
22          after the change was made, which way did the PC  
23          go, and some of these drive it both ways. So  
24          that I think gives you a basis of -- of context  
25          to start looking at -- at what's happened here,

1           so -- in other words, it's already -- a  
2           screening effort's been done and you're seeing  
3           the product of that.

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** Wanda's dying to say something.

5           **MS. MUNN:** Yeah, I'm -- I'm really concerned  
6           about -- about this whole direction. I think  
7           the Board made it eminently clear, time and  
8           time again, that we would not assume any  
9           function that was -- could be conceived as  
10          being an appeals function. And even though the  
11          cases we're looking at here were chosen  
12          randomized, if this -- if the actions that we  
13          take can be perceived by anyone as the back  
14          door to redoing some cases for any reason, then  
15          I think we're on a dangerous precipice. I  
16          would not want that to happen. It's not our  
17          function. We need to be very careful that, in  
18          trying to assure ourselves that the best  
19          science is being used, we're not getting into  
20          the level of detail that is inappropriate for  
21          the Board. We just --

22          **MR. GRIFFON:** Well, but -- yeah --

23          **MS. MUNN:** -- have to watch that.

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I -- two things I think.  
25          One is I think we should probably pursue what

1 Larry's talking about, but I think it's maybe a  
2 separate task, different than what -- what --  
3 than this fourth set questions here. And I  
4 certainly agree we're not -- that we're not  
5 into this appeals business. For sure, we don't  
6 want to lead anybody to believe that at all.  
7 On the other -- but -- but the one thing I  
8 think we want to -- or SC&A wants to be in a  
9 position to do is say, you know, would these  
10 findings -- 'cause these cases, as Hans  
11 described, were these borderline cases, and I  
12 think all of us at the Board want to know, you  
13 know, would -- would these findings together,  
14 'cause you have maybe several PERs in one case  
15 and maybe some issues different than -- than --  
16 than have been assessed in PERs previously,  
17 would these findings together likely trip the  
18 case -- you know, could it likely affect the  
19 outcome of the case, 'cause we --

20 **DR. WADE:** I think that's something the board  
21 needs to discuss.

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- 'cause we've constantly had  
23 fin-- you know, findings that, you know, that -  
24 - the finding unlikely to affect the outcome of  
25 the -- the POC. And I think here we're in a

1           situation where SC&A is saying you know what,  
2           so far we see that -- that it may affect, you  
3           know -- and I think they're trying to -- to  
4           find out, one way or the other, so they can  
5           make either a stronger finding in that regard  
6           or -- or say, you know, no, we're convinced  
7           it's not going to --

8           **DR. WADE:** I think this is something the Board  
9           needs to discuss. I think the Board was fairly  
10          clear when it set up its review function for  
11          DRs that it didn't want to go to the issue of  
12          compensability. I mean it really wants to  
13          conduct a scientific review of the product --

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right.

15          **DR. WADE:** -- and I think that's what really  
16          needs to be focused on.

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

18          **DR. WADE:** I think it perfectly reasonable,  
19          when that review is complete, if the chair of  
20          the subcommittee or the chair of the Board  
21          wants to say to NIOSH what did you do with this  
22          result -- there's a result here that in our  
23          mind raises a question as to whether or not  
24          there needs to be a rework of this case, what  
25          have you done; tell us about that. I think

1           that's quite reasonable.

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** I think we were care-- I -- I  
3           think we -- we should re-examine the -- the way  
4           we phrase it 'cause I think we were careful  
5           this -- to talk -- we didn't want to talk about  
6           POCs necessarily, but you know, I -- I also  
7           remember very vividly many comments on the  
8           Board after the first several sets were done  
9           that, bottom line, you know, none of these  
10          cases would have been changed as far as the  
11          decision (unintelligible), you know, so -- so -  
12          -

13          **DR. WADE:** And if it happened --

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- you know, and -- and here  
15          we're in possibly a different scenario. I'm  
16          not saying, you know, that -- that we are, you  
17          know, but, you know, these are ones that may be  
18          affected so I think we need to at least explore  
19          the science enough to know --

20          **DR. WADE:** All right, but I don't think it's  
21          SC&A's role to offer an opinion on that.

22          **MS. BEHLING:** Excuse me, Mark, this is Kathy  
23          Behling. I'm sorry if I'm interrupting. I --  
24          I do have to add a little bit here because at  
25          the end of all three of my presentations to the

1 Board on I guess maybe the first three sets,  
2 the final question was as Mark is indicating,  
3 so have any of the findings had enough of an  
4 impact to overturn any cases. So I guess that  
5 always was something that was asked of me at  
6 the end of the presentations.

7 **DR. WADE:** Wait for it to be asked -- wait for  
8 it to be asked of you again and answer it when  
9 it's asked.

10 **MS. BEHLING:** Okay.

11 **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** And that's a generalized  
12 question. That's not a discussion on specific  
13 cases, which is what's being proposed here and  
14 which is what I'm concerned about.

15 **MS. MUNN:** Yes.

16 **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** Could you pass  
17 (unintelligible)?

18 **MS. MUNN:** Of course --

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** But -- but these -- these were --  
20 yeah, yeah, you know.

21 **MS. MUNN:** I mean the questions really are the  
22 general questions with respect to is this -- is  
23 the science that's being applied to these  
24 cases, as shown by the ones that we have  
25 reviewed, adequate science.

1           **DR. WADE:** That's all the Board is tasked to do  
2           is review the quality of the science, and  
3           that's really what you need to do. Once that's  
4           done, I think it's quite reasonable for the  
5           Board as a whole, or the subcommittee, to say  
6           what are the impacts then of this; we'd like  
7           NIOSH to speak to that. And that would be  
8           fine.

9           **MR. GRIFFON:** I -- I think it's more than the  
10          ade-- adequacy of the science. I think it's  
11          did they get it right, you know, and that  
12          doesn't necessarily mean the POC. Did they do  
13          the dose reconstruction correctly. I mean with  
14          the best estimate, I think that's --

15          **DR. WADE:** We'd have to go -- I don't have the  
16          charter in front of me.

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

18          **DR. WADE:** Does anyone have the Board charter  
19          with them? We just need to look at the charter  
20          of the Board and what the Board is tasked to  
21          do. I don't think it precludes your wanting to  
22          do anything you want to do, but I think it's  
23          very --

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right, right, and as far  
25          as identifying individual cases, I think that's

1 why we don't have case numbers on these.

2 **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** Right, but if we go to  
3 litigation --

4 **MR. GRIFFON:** I mean we're not talk--

5 **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** -- and this is pulled up --

6 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

7 **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** -- in discovery --

8 **MR. GRIFFON:** I understand.

9 **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** -- that's individual cases  
10 that you all have basically taken as an appeal.

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right, right.

12 **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** And that's my concern and I  
13 can assure you that's going to be the  
14 Department of Labor's concern if you get into  
15 this.

16 **DR. WADE:** I think it's important the Board  
17 read its charter, I think it's important SC&A  
18 read its contract, and that everyone behaves  
19 consistent with that.

20 **DR. MAURO:** It's important -- we haven't had  
21 this conversation before.

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right.

23 **DR. MAURO:** This is an important conversation.  
24 One of the things that we do in every one of  
25 our reports is we have this checklist. In the

1 checklist we try to give a level of importance.  
2 Ultimately that level of importance goes toward  
3 two issues, I believe, and Kathy certainly  
4 could help me with this, is -- one is, you  
5 know, is this of such -- of a scientific nature  
6 that is -- that has -- is important that may  
7 have cross-cutting effects relative to many,  
8 many cases and therefore it's important. It  
9 may not necessarily be important in this  
10 particular case --

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right.

12 **DR. MAURO:** -- but we think it's important.  
13 But second, I also believe that when we give it  
14 a high importance it's because we're concerned  
15 that we're starting to knock on the door and  
16 because we're starting off with a POC of some  
17 high number 'cause we always report the POC in  
18 the checklist and we are -- we identified what  
19 we perceive to be a finding that might be  
20 important here because we're knocking on the  
21 door of the -- the POC. Now, if that -- in  
22 light of this conversation, it sounds like  
23 that's something we should not be doing. I'm  
24 starting to think that our -- we -- we are just  
25 one element that's making certain observations

1           regarding dose reconstructions, which is  
2           feeding into a system where you folks have your  
3           own internal process that feeds in. So in  
4           other words, there's a process where there's  
5           multiple for-- quality assurance checks going  
6           on all the time, feeding into a machinery that  
7           -- that -- that -- that kicks you into a PER or  
8           not, the material we provide in our checklist  
9           is just one of those, so that's -- so perhaps -  
10          - well, I guess I'll put this on the table for  
11          the Board to consider. Perhaps the checklist,  
12          in terms of trying to give level of importance  
13          for particular findings for a particular case  
14          may start to move in on this area of  
15          adjudicatory issues that maybe should not be  
16          here. I -- I guess I'm going to put that on  
17          the table.

18          **MR. GRIFFON:** Well, we -- and -- and we did  
19          clarify -- I'm just pulling up the matrix  
20          'cause we -- I think initially -- and we have  
21          these two differing columns that we've reported  
22          on. We have case impact and program impact --

23          **DR. MAURO:** Right.

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- and oftentimes we as the  
25          workgroup or subcommittee have tried to weigh

1 in on that program impact column and -- and  
2 SC&A's focused on the case-specific impact.  
3 And in the -- in that -- when you have low,  
4 medium and high --

5 **DR. MAURO:** Uh-huh.

6 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- the rankings, if I remember  
7 correctly -- Kathy, correct me if I'm wrong,  
8 but I think initially we had some language  
9 related to the POC in there and we modified  
10 that to say that it -- a low means that the  
11 deficiency has only a marginal impact on dose,  
12 so --

13 **MS. BEHLING:** That's correct.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- we're looking at dose  
15 reconstruction. We're not looking at --

16 **DR. MAURO:** Okay, that's --

17 (Whereupon, multiple participants spoke  
18 simultaneously, rendering transcription of  
19 individual comments impossible.)

20 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, so that -- that's okay. I  
21 think where we're going to have to stop is --

22 **DR. MAURO:** Okay.

23 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- is that the finding -- you  
24 know, if it's a high finding, then -- now --  
25 now I guess we can't stop that questioning of

1 Kathy after the --

2 **MR. ELLIOTT:** But that -- that questioning  
3 should come to NIOSH. The questioning about  
4 has the audit findings impacted the program in  
5 a way that -- that dose reconstructions changed  
6 to the point they become compensable, was --  
7 was there a shift in -- in the outcome, that  
8 should come to us. We should be able to -- to  
9 respond --

10 **DR. WADE:** I think this is all clear and I  
11 think it's important that we reflect on what's  
12 been done. I'm well aware of your two columns,  
13 John, and I find both columns appropriate. One  
14 column was "was there a broad impact" and the  
15 other "was there a likely impact upon dose in  
16 this case". You say high, medium, whatever and  
17 you move on. But now to say SC&A thinks that  
18 this case would go to compensable, that's a  
19 whole different place now.

20 **DR. MAURO:** That's good. No, then we're okay.  
21 I just want to make sure.

22 **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** And I -- I'm concerned with  
23 the second. I'm okay with your  
24 (unintelligible).

25 **DR. WADE:** Okay, everything we've done to this

1 point has been fine. That's why I've been  
2 stressing on the last calls to the Board that  
3 the Board needs to have mechanisms in place to  
4 track these things through to -- to final  
5 impact, which might be the PER, but you've got  
6 to watch how it's done. I mean we're not  
7 trying to avoid that final test, it just has to  
8 be done very carefully because now we're into  
9 legal grounds, and also the rights of -- of  
10 claimants.

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay. Well, Kathy and Hans, what  
12 I -- what I propose is we just -- we -- we go  
13 through this action list, we see where -- you  
14 know, and -- and we'll just see what the --  
15 NIOSH is proposing to give us in writing and  
16 we'll move these cases as -- as far as we can.

17 **DR. BEHLING:** Mark, let me just make a final  
18 comment here. I -- first, I do withdraw my  
19 comments made earlier. I stand corrected in --  
20 in -- in being told that we cannot ask for a  
21 rework, and I will, however, say that my  
22 comments earlier were prompted by the most  
23 recent Board conference meeting that we had a  
24 couple weeks ago where -- where we were  
25 basically trying to understand how to somehow

1 or other track certain things that -- that have  
2 a history of -- of not being resolved and --  
3 and so I -- I just want to justify my comments.  
4 On the other hand, I withdraw my comments that  
5 I made earlier. I -- I realize now, in -- in -  
6 - in comments made by the legal people, that --  
7 that I should not have said those things.

8 **DR. WADE:** Well, Hans, we applaud your desire  
9 to help the process through to completion. We  
10 applaud that, we welcome it. It's just  
11 important that we do it just right and --

12 **DR. BEHLING:** I understand.

13 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay, then I -- I -- then let's  
14 let NIOSH start with this listing and then  
15 we'll go from there.

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. This is Stu Hinnefeld,  
17 for those of you on the phone. The -- the  
18 table that I distributed to Mark late last  
19 week, and I believe he then sent to the  
20 subcommittee members that no one has really had  
21 time to look at, I compiled from reviewing the  
22 findings matrix for the fourth set and  
23 identifying findings where I felt it would be  
24 helpful to deliver written material for  
25 consideration in advance of a technical

1           discussion, and hadn't done this earlier  
2           because it -- it hasn-- you know, candidly, it  
3           hasn't been the practice of the subcommittee on  
4           dose reconstructions to exchange that, while it  
5           has been on the site profile reviews and other  
6           various workgroups. So to my detriment, I  
7           didn't realize it would be a good idea to  
8           exchange this ahead of time. So -- but I --  
9           once Mark and I talked about or exchanged e-  
10          mails about the issue then -- or about the  
11          exchange of information, I began to look --  
12          well, there are certain items that lend  
13          themselves -- certain findings lend themselves  
14          to that and -- and certain findings that either  
15          -- that -- that I think essentially have been  
16          dispositional. You know, that's kind of how I  
17          selected these cases.

18          And so I can start down the list that's been  
19          distributed to the people here in the room of  
20          what I called additional analysis for fourth  
21          set of DRs, the first item being from case  
22          number 65, finding number four, which comments  
23          on the ingestion intake used in that claim not  
24          -- maybe not being claimant favorable. This is  
25          -- case number 65 was a Chapman Valve case, and

1           in reality -- I mean there is -- that is an  
2           outstanding, you know, overarching technical  
3           issue that's on the table already is ingestion  
4           approach, and that description is being  
5           prepared outside this subcommittee. So I mean  
6           there is going to be a generic ingestion  
7           approach presented as part of the overarching  
8           issues resolution. So I think it's probably --  
9           you know, I wasn't going out on a limb by  
10          offering to submit written information for  
11          that. The rest of them maybe I -- I did a  
12          little bit.

13          Moving on to the second -- actually the next  
14          three items relate to case number 67, which is  
15          a Savannah River case. And -- and these relate  
16          to how internal doses of various natures were  
17          incorporated in the dose reconstruction, and --  
18          and they followed, essentially, the technical  
19          approach that NIOSH has adopted for the  
20          Savannah River internal dosimetry, you know,  
21          dose reconstructions. So these do in fact --  
22          you know, they would relate to very many  
23          claims, you know, these issues and the  
24          resolution of these issues. So I -- I've  
25          brought in the internal dosimetry folk-- we

1 thought -- you know, I thought originally we'd  
2 be discussing, but I don't think it would -- I  
3 guess we won't go into a significant technical  
4 discussion about that, but if we have a brief  
5 discussion or somebody give us a -- you know,  
6 Dave or somebody give us a brief description of  
7 what -- what the basis is for each of these  
8 approaches, then that might be able to shape  
9 what product we would want to bring when we  
10 bring the written material.

11 **DR. WADE:** Good.

12 **MR. HINNEFELD:** So Dave, the first one is about  
13 failure to account for all internal doses from  
14 fission products. And if you give me a second,  
15 I can actually read -- you know, the finding  
16 won't say much more than that, but there'll be  
17 a description in here that says more. It says  
18 for missed fission product internal doses,  
19 NIOSH's doses, which were limited to barium-140  
20 and lanthanum-140, are incomplete. On the  
21 basis of MDA values, NIOSH needs to determine  
22 the internal doses in behalf of all other  
23 fission products and activation products that  
24 showed net positive counts, as well as  
25 strontium and yttrium-90, and perhaps others

1           that (unintelligible) reasonably be assumed  
2           have been internalized. So that's the basis of  
3           the finding is that a single nuclide was  
4           selected for the dose calculation when there  
5           were -- clearly you don't get one fission  
6           product if you get a fission product, so --  
7           Dave, did you want to -- can you talk about  
8           that a little bit or --

9           **MR. ALLEN:** Yeah, I think there's actually  
10          several issues and that's one reason we didn't  
11          want to try to guess and supply some sort of  
12          information. We needed to have a conversation  
13          with -- Hans I guess is probably the commenter  
14          here.

15          The first issue is that when you have fission  
16          products you don't have simply one. You're  
17          going to have a whole mixture of fission  
18          products, and that is a struggle as to what  
19          group of fission products do you account for  
20          and how do you account for them. The whole  
21          body counter tends to grab or detect gamma  
22          emitters and at various MDAs depending on the  
23          yield, the energy, et cetera. And you can --  
24          for example, cesium is fairly easily detected  
25          and you can pretty much count on cesium --

1 cesium-137 always being there, so the technical  
2 approach would -- the best technical approach  
3 would be to determine how much cesium you have  
4 and the ratio all the other possible fission  
5 products off of that, which gets to be an  
6 overwhelming problem very quickly with all the  
7 potential fission products.

8 What we did early on and in these cases was to  
9 use a chooser program to where we took the  
10 worst fission product we can come up with as  
11 far as detectability -- and by worst I mean  
12 based on the MDA and the dose consequences of  
13 that isotope -- and we assumed all the fission  
14 products would come from that worst one and  
15 that -- emphasis on that one, didn't -- not  
16 accounting for all the other potential fission  
17 products there. Based on some preliminary  
18 calculations, we were thinking this was an -- a  
19 favorable approach and the best one we had at  
20 the time.

21 Currently we're working on more detailed  
22 analysis for that and getting it into an OTIB  
23 where we're assessing various reactor burn-up  
24 rates and decay times since the reactor fuels  
25 come out for reactor operators or people

1           working around a reactor, as well as the  
2           canyons or dissolving fuel later, you know,  
3           depending on how much time since the fuels come  
4           out of the reactor, the ratios will change, you  
5           know, based on all those situations. And we've  
6           got it narrowed down to a handful of categories  
7           that would seem -- that we believe are  
8           bounding, what the ratios of those are, and  
9           that will allow us to more accurately determine  
10          a dose reconstruction from fission products for  
11          the various sites, the various exposure  
12          scenarios.

13          That's not quite complete yet. It's a very --  
14          as you can imagine, it's a very complicated  
15          situation. It has been discussed, I believe in  
16          Hanford TBD or SEC, one or the other -- it's an  
17          overarching issue. It's not going to just  
18          affect Savannah River. It's not going to just  
19          affect this case. And personally, I'm thinking  
20          we're better off saying this is an overarching  
21          issue. It's already being discussed in another  
22          working group and -- and let it all be a --  
23          very consistent across the --

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** Which --

25          **MR. ALLEN:** -- complex.

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** Is it in the Hanford working  
2 group being discussed, or where is it --

3           **MR. ALLEN:** One of the Hanford working groups,  
4 I'm not sure which one. There's a TBD and an  
5 SEC we're --

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, but isn't it the same  
7 working group on both?

8           **DR. WADE:** Yes.

9           **MR. HINNEFELD:** It's the same working group on  
10 -- for both.

11          **MR. ALLEN:** It's definitely being discussed  
12 there and I don't know if it's being discussed  
13 in the -- is there a Savannah River working  
14 group now?

15          **MR. HINNEFELD:** There is a Savannah River  
16 working group --

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I think they --

18          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- but I don't think it's on  
19 the -- on their --

20          **MR. GRIFFON:** I don't think we got it on there  
21 yet.

22          **MR. ALLEN:** But it's clearly a complex-wide  
23 type of issue that --

24          **MR. ELLIOTT:** Is this on Jim's list of  
25 overarching issues, though?

1           **MR. ALLEN:** I don't believe it is, but I -- I'm  
2 kind of proposing here we take it out of, you  
3 know, individual dose reconstruction and put it  
4 on that -- that realm so it's consistent,  
5 rather than trying to deal with this case-by-  
6 case type of thing.

7           **DR. BEHLING:** Dave, this is Hans. I just want  
8 to make a comment, and I -- let me just preface  
9 the thing that is most important by saying that  
10 we fully understand that fission products and -  
11 - and so when we talk about -- I'm very  
12 familiar with whole body counting, their --  
13 their level of sensitivity for gamma emitters,  
14 and -- and we also recognize that the likely  
15 contribution of doses from fission products  
16 that are at the MDA level, or even modestly  
17 above, are not really significant. I -- I  
18 think the only reason I really mentioned it  
19 because of -- I -- in recognizing the  
20 triviality of doses was that it's technically  
21 incorrect because the way it's always stated is  
22 that we have basically taken cerium-144 as the  
23 limiting radionuclide and -- and used that as  
24 an assessment and that's claimant favorable.  
25 The truth is while you've taken cerium-144 and

1           -- and ignored the other fission products that  
2           can be measured and some which can't be  
3           measured, and the assumption's always been that  
4           this is like taking a bioassay data where you  
5           have gross alpha or gross beta and assuming  
6           that 100 percent of the beta is -- is  
7           contributed by the limiting radioisotope.  
8           That's not the equivalent here. You know, when  
9           you, for instance, say we have a urine sample  
10          that has been analyzed and we did a gross beta  
11          and we realized that for this particular cancer  
12          the limiting radionuclide that could have  
13          contributed to the gross beta count was such-  
14          and-such -- let's say it's iodine and the  
15          cancer's thyroid -- I buy into that. That's  
16          clearly claimant favorable when you don't have  
17          a definitive understanding of the radioisotopic  
18          mix in a gross beta count or gross alpha count  
19          in a urine sample. But it is not something  
20          that you can apply that -- that -- that logic  
21          to a whole body count where you can clearly  
22          identify five, six different fission products  
23          and then select cerium saying that is the  
24          limiting radionuclide. Of course it's the  
25          limiting radionuclide, but you're still

1                   ignoring the others. And it's strictly a  
2                   technical issue and I want to emphasize that  
3                   I'm not concerned about doses. I realize that  
4                   even at MDA levels for cesium and iodine and  
5                   others that the doses are relatively modest and  
6                   -- and almost inconsequential and was more or  
7                   less a technical issue and that's the only  
8                   reason I brought it up.

9                   **MR. ALLEN:** Yeah, I -- I realize what you're  
10                  saying, Hans, and I didn't try to -- I don't  
11                  know if I said it or I certainly didn't try to  
12                  imply that this was something like a gross beta  
13                  or gross gamma. All I was saying was this was  
14                  the approach we came up with to -- to account  
15                  for all these.

16                 **DR. BEHLING:** And -- and -- and I'm not even  
17                 sure it's worth having these major committee  
18                 studies on a conference (unintelligible)  
19                 because I'm not sure it's -- it's really worth  
20                 the -- the investment in human time and effort  
21                 to do something that is -- that is going to  
22                 obviously consume a lot of work hours on the  
23                 part of a lot of people because at -- at MDA  
24                 levels, these -- these internal emitters are  
25                 probably not going to contribute significantly.

1           **MR. ALLEN:** Don't say that too loud. I got two  
2 people at the table that put a lot of time into  
3 this already.

4           **DR. BEHLING:** I'm sorry to put you through it,  
5 David.

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** It'll -- it'll have -- it'll  
7 have to be resolved in the -- in the Hanford  
8 workgroup anyway. I mean the -- the issue of -  
9 - of -- well, it has to be addressed in some  
10 form, so you know, once -- once the resolution  
11 is out there, you know, it'll be available to  
12 this -- this subcommittee (unintelligible) --

13           **MS. BEHLING:** Can I interject one -- one thing  
14 here? This is Kathy. I -- I think that  
15 everything that you described, David, it sounds  
16 like an appropriate approach to -- in fact, it  
17 may be going overboard on -- although I won't  
18 necessarily say that because you're certainly  
19 going at this particular problem the correct  
20 way and I think we agree with the fact that you  
21 are -- you are looking at this and you're going  
22 to consider all of the fission products.  
23 And this is a little bit contrary to what Hans  
24 just said. Now let me ask if I understand this  
25 correctly. I assume that since this will

1           become a complex-wide issue, this will be  
2           something that ultimately would possibly have a  
3           PER associated with it.

4           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Depending upon the outcome of  
5           the new approach, it may or may not. If -- if  
6           -- if, based on the work that's going on now,  
7           we determine that the technique used previously  
8           resulted in lower doses than the new technique,  
9           then it would give rise to a PER.

10          **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. Okay, very good.

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** So the -- the follow-up is in the  
12          Hanford workgroup, I guess, or -- or complex-  
13          wide? You know, it's a complex-wide issue.

14          **MR. ALLEN:** That's my suggestion, however you  
15          guys want to --

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** The written material will  
17          certainly start with the TIB that Dave  
18          described. That'll --

19          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

20          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- be the starting of it --

21          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right, right.

22          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- and then -- you know,  
23          whether or not additional explanation needs to  
24          go with it to indicate why, you know, this  
25          approach either was okay or was not, that there

1           may be some additional explanation because the  
2           TIB is -- is doing it for a particular purpose  
3           and the resolution of this finding may require  
4           a little more explanation included with --  
5           along with the TIB.

6           **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

7           **DR. MAURO:** Other -- this goes toward then one  
8           of the items that we would call putting in the  
9           parking lot. Remember, one of the things we  
10          said, we were going to create a separate matrix  
11          that keeps track of everything we decided to  
12          put on -- on ice, and this is one of them.

13          **MS. MUNN:** That's great.

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** We have a big parking lot here.  
15          (Whereupon, multiple participants spoke  
16          simultaneously, rendering transcription of  
17          individual comments impossible.)

18          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I know, I know.

19          **MR. ALLEN:** Well, I mean that was just my  
20          suggestion. The Board figures out whatever  
21          they want to do, but I mean knowing it's being  
22          addressed in another -- at least one other  
23          working group, if not others, it just seems  
24          like it's one issue that -- you know, we should  
25          either point to that working group or pull it

1 out of both and put it in an overarching or  
2 whatever the Board wants to do, I just would  
3 like to keep it all consistent across the  
4 complex.

5 **MS. MUNN:** It certainly would ultimately I  
6 think save everybody a great deal of time if we  
7 agreed exactly where these kinds of things --

8 **MR. GRIFFON:** Are we --

9 **MS. MUNN:** -- were going to go and how they  
10 were going to be dealt with.

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** Are we going to have enough to  
12 make a judgment on how the -- how it might  
13 affect the dose in this case, the dose -- I'm  
14 say-- you know.

15 **MR. ALLEN:** This particular --

16 **MR. GRIFFON:** And I --

17 **MR. ALLEN:** Well, I think this particular case  
18 is already in the -- I think Stu mentioned it's  
19 in the PER process for I think --

20 **MR. GRIFFON:** Other things --

21 **MR. ALLEN:** -- at least two different issues,  
22 honestly.

23 **MR. HINNEFELD:** (Unintelligible)

24 **MR. ALLEN:** And -- I mean if it were to --  
25 (unintelligible) is going to kill me here -- I

1 mean if -- if that PER process determines that  
2 this case is -- should be reworked, you know,  
3 we ask DOL for a rework and we think it's  
4 changed in compensability based on these other  
5 issues, it -- this particular issue kind of  
6 becomes a moot point at that -- at that point.  
7 I'm not sure what else to -- I'm not sure --  
8 sure what you're asking on that, but --

9 **MR. GRIFFON:** Well, I'm trying to -- to walk  
10 that line, but I --

11 **MR. ALLEN:** And like Stu said, if it turns out  
12 that --

13 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I guess the -- I -- I -- I  
14 understand we're talking about small doses, but  
15 I also -- I don't have the numbers in front of  
16 me, but I remember this being one of the close  
17 cases, so you know, even the small changes  
18 could -- could affect, you know.

19 **MR. ALLEN:** Well, like Stu said, our standard  
20 appro-- we -- for the PER process we have to  
21 make the change first --

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

23 **MR. ALLEN:** -- to know how we're going to deal  
24 with it, and then we evaluate what that had on  
25 previously completed cases, so --

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** We'll go forward this way, we'll  
2           --

3           **MR. ALLEN:** -- the first step is to solve the  
4           issues --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, we get your written  
6           analysis and understand that this is one of  
7           those global things that's going to be followed  
8           up in the TIB and the Hanford workgroup.  
9           That's the notes I have. Okay.

10          All right. Next one, Stu?

11          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay --

12          **MR. GRIFFON:** Moving right along.

13          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, 67 --

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** We always start slow in this  
15          workgroup (sic) and then speed up toward the  
16          end -- when we look at our flight arrangements.

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** After we get tired and -- yeah,  
18          67 -- 67.9 is the next finding that I think  
19          written material -- and this is fairly  
20          straightforward. The comment was that type M  
21          was not necessarily claimant favorable, that  
22          type S would be more claimant favorable. I  
23          think our initial response was well, type M fit  
24          the bioassay data and while I think maybe the  
25          dose reconstruction said claimant favorable or

1 chose the claimant favorable dose  
2 reconstruction, I don't think -- I don't  
3 remember if it said that or not. The fact of  
4 the matter was that the selection of the  
5 solubility type was based on the bioassay data  
6 available, and the note I made was that we  
7 would develop, you know, the IMBA analysis that  
8 would demonstrate type M fits the data versus  
9 how type S would not. So that's -- that's the  
10 response on that case. That's fairly  
11 straightforward.

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** That's good. And again, we don't  
13 need to discuss these. We're getting -- the  
14 action's correct, that's all we want to do  
15 here.

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 67.11 addresses the uranium --  
17 addresses the --

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** Stu, I'm sorry, before you move  
19 on to that one, you did send a zip file with  
20 some IMBA analysis in it.

21 **MR. HINNEFELD:** That was a different finding.

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** Does it include that one?

23 **MR. HINNEFELD:** It was a different finding.

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** (Unintelligible)

25 **MR. HINNEFELD:** That was -- that was a one

1 finding that occurs later on.

2 **MR. GRIFFON:** All right.

3 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 67.11 has to do with the  
4 selection of the acute intake uranium date.  
5 And again, we can put together an IMBA analysis  
6 to demonstrate that the -- that the intake date  
7 that were reflected are consistent with the  
8 bioassay data. And the default date, which is  
9 like mid-point between sampling periods,  
10 doesn't fit as well as the date selected. So  
11 you know, that kind of analysis would  
12 illustrate -- because the procedure -- you  
13 know, the procedure says that the default  
14 intake date is midway between sampling points,  
15 but it also -- there's wording in the procedure  
16 that allows bioassay data to be used to differ  
17 from the defaults, whether it be in solubility,  
18 intake date or whatever. So based -- you know,  
19 so we felt like we complied with that wording  
20 in the procedure by choosing an intake that fit  
21 the -- that fit the bioassay -- or intake dates  
22 that fit the bioassay for the case.

23 **DR. MAURO:** So you're saying that in this case  
24 you actually have multiple bioassays that you  
25 would fit the data to --

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yes.

2           **DR. MAURO:** -- and you could back-calculate  
3           (unintelligible) three points typically is  
4           (unintelligible).

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** It would be -- this -- this  
6           demonstrates my point from my last agenda item  
7           'cause -- 'cause, you know, looking at these in  
8           retrospect after seeing some of these DR  
9           guidelines, and this is where it would have  
10          been -- and I think it still would be very  
11          beneficial for the workgroup (sic) and SC&A to  
12          have the DR guide that the dose reconstructor  
13          used at the time they were doing the case  
14          included in the case file 'cause then -- you  
15          know, a lot of this decision tree logic is in  
16          there, that they -- you know, if you have this  
17          type of case, you -- you know, I mean instead  
18          of after the fact kind of guessing what the  
19          dose reconstructor did, we'd have more of a  
20          black line, like this is what they were  
21          supposed to do, you know, did they comply with  
22          it, did they not. So there's that quality  
23          control review aspect that we would get that  
24          way and I think we're -- we're kind of missing  
25          that, but we'll take up those DR guides later,

1 but I just wanted to -- this -- this sort of  
2 raises that question because you're saying that  
3 the dose reconstructor had the latitude not to  
4 use that -- that mid-point, you know, if they  
5 had data to fit. And I think that -- that --  
6 in the guides, it probably showed that, that --  
7 you know.

8 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, the procedure -- internal  
9 dosimetry procedure says that.

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** Says that, too? Okay.

11 **DR. BEHLING:** Stu, can I make a comment here?  
12 I think you're -- this is one of the more  
13 critical elements for our concerns here for  
14 case 67, and that was the -- the selection of  
15 exposure dates or intake dates relative to the  
16 bioassay. And I looked at those data very,  
17 very carefully and they were consistently  
18 assigning an intake date that was one or two  
19 days prior to the bioassay when in fact I  
20 looked at the original records and they were  
21 all routine. I will accept the -- the  
22 assumption that the intake may have preceded  
23 the bioassay date by 24 hours, 48 hours, if I  
24 were to see something such as this was a  
25 special bioassay that was prompted by an event

1           that was clearly the signal that says this is  
2           more than likely a -- a urine excretion value  
3           that reflects the recent intake. But those are  
4           not the cases here and -- and there was no --  
5           no justification for always using a very short  
6           time interval between intake and the excretion  
7           values found in the bioassay. And I have to  
8           say, it concerned me that we were not being  
9           fair here and following basic procedures that  
10          says in the absence of -- of -- of compelling  
11          information to state otherwise, the mid-point  
12          between the most recent bioassay and the date  
13          of that bioassay should be the date of intake  
14          if you're going to assume it was a -- an acute  
15          intake.

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, I guess we would --

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** I think Liz wants to say  
18          something, but keep in mind, we -- we said we  
19          weren't going to have the technical  
20          discussions. They are going to provide the  
21          IMBA analysis to back up their position that  
22          this fits the data --

23          **DR. BEHLING:** Yeah, and I -- I agree, Mark. I  
24          think maybe this goes beyond and it's going to  
25          short-change our time --

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

2           **DR. BEHLING:** -- for the fifth set, so maybe we  
3 should just try to minimize the discussion.

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** Did you -- I know Liz -- maybe  
5 Liz has one comment --

6           (Whereupon, multiple participants spoke  
7 simultaneously, rendering transcription of  
8 individual comments impossible.)

9           **MS. BRACKETT:** I have -- I have two comments.  
10 First --

11           **MR. GRIFFON:** She's come all the way from  
12 Connecticut, we've got to get her on the  
13 record.

14           **MS. BRACKETT:** First, I -- I -- first, I do  
15 agree with you. I constantly lecture people  
16 and I think I was ranting to Dave about this  
17 yesterday, that I -- I try to make the dose  
18 reconstructors understand that it's not  
19 appropriate to assign every intake the day  
20 before a -- a positive result.

21           On the other hand, there -- it's not  
22 necessarily -- well, compelling evidence can  
23 also be looking at the other bioassay results.  
24 It sometimes simply is -- it's just very  
25 difficult to fit the results. If you used a

1 mid-point, you may fit that one following  
2 result, but then you're going to over-predict  
3 the later result, so you -- you have to -- you  
4 have to balance it somehow. And -- and like I  
5 said, while I agree that it's -- it's extremely  
6 unlikely that a person -- that they happen to  
7 sample a person routinely every -- every time  
8 they just happen to have an intake. That's  
9 very unlikely. But it -- there's still -- some  
10 alternative method of fitting needs to be done  
11 in order to make sure that you're in agreement  
12 with all of the data.

13 **MR. GRIFFON:** All right, and we'll -- and we'll  
14 get the file so we can examine it further when  
15 we get it.

16 **MS. BEHLING:** Mark, can I just inter--

17 **MR. GRIFFON:** Go ahead, Kathy.

18 **MS. BEHLING:** Just quickly, I'm sorry to  
19 prolong this but as well -- it's on my mind.  
20 Is there a protocol or something in writing,  
21 some procedure or guidelines for the dose  
22 reconstructor with regard to this fitting  
23 procedure that you use for the internal,  
24 because you're absolutely right, it is -- it is  
25 very difficult, and I play with IMBA, too, and

1           -- and make adjustments. But do you have  
2           guidance that we could look at that gives some  
3           instructions to the dose reconstructor,  
4           realizing that there's going to be a -- many  
5           different -- they're going to see a lot of  
6           different bioassays and a lot of different  
7           scenarios, but is there any guidance out there,  
8           written guidance?

9           **MS. BRACKETT:** The internal dosimetry  
10          procedure, which is Procedure 60, touches on it  
11          briefly. It's not detailed. It gives some  
12          guidelines on things to try, but for the most  
13          part -- you know, I --

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** But there is an SRS-specific  
15          guidance document, I think, for internal dose.

16          **MS. BRACKETT:** That's -- that's true, and I  
17          don't know --

18          **MR. GRIFFON:** Guidance, I guess -- yeah.

19          **MS. BRACKETT:** -- if that actually -- I don't  
20          know if that discusses fitting the data --

21          **MR. GRIFFON:** I'm not sure.

22          **MS. BRACKETT:** -- in detail.

23          **MS. BEHLING:** I -- I could not find anything  
24          that gives any definitive guidelines for  
25          fitting that data.

1           **MS. BRACKETT:** But that -- that's because it's  
2           difficult to give definitive guidelines on --  
3           I've --

4           **DR. BEHLING:** Yes, it's very difficult  
5           (unintelligible).

6           **MS. BRACKETT:** -- it's -- I've --

7           **MS. BEHLING:** I understand.

8           **MS. BRACKETT:** I've tried -- I've given  
9           training to some -- to the dose reconstructors.  
10          I go and, you know, try to give them examples  
11          and say, you know, well, you need to try this  
12          and you need to try that. But really it's --  
13          if -- when you have positive results, it's  
14          really -- you just kind of have to play with  
15          the data until you get something that makes  
16          sense.

17          **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. And if I can just add one  
18          more thing, to go back to Mark's comment about  
19          the DR notes, I believe in fact in future cases  
20          where we're seeing more of the best estimates  
21          and we're seeing very complex facilities like  
22          Rocky Flats and Y-12 where we keep introducing  
23          more and more OTIBs in order to -- for the dose  
24          reconstructors to complete these dose  
25          reconstructions, I think it is going to be even

1 more important that we see these notes or these  
2 guidance -- the guidance that the dose  
3 reconstructors are using, along with the cases.  
4 And I believe it would resolve a lot of  
5 questions that we have as we're auditing. This  
6 is -- in fact, one of our first concerns is the  
7 dose reconstruction report sometimes doesn't  
8 give us enough detail, doesn't always reference  
9 everything that was used, and we struggle  
10 auditing. So having those DR notes included in  
11 the case files I think would be very helpful  
12 and it would -- and especially for future cases  
13 that are getting more complex. That's it.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** We'll move on to the next one.

15 **MR. HINNEFELD:** (Unintelligible) we'll move on  
16 to case number 68, which is also Savannah  
17 River; 68.2 talked about angular dependence of  
18 the dosimeter and really it goes -- I think it  
19 goes beyond angular dependence into the various  
20 uncertain factors at the -- considered on the  
21 dosimeter reading. It goes beyond the  
22 laboratory uncertainty of actually reading the  
23 dosimeter. And if I'm not mistaken, this is on  
24 the overarching technical issues, as well. I  
25 mean if we -- we've dealt with it at a couple

1 of individual sites with geometric adjustments.  
2 I know Mallinckrodt (unintelligible) this done.  
3 But I think Jim told me that this is sort of an  
4 overarching issue of dealing with that, that  
5 particular issue. I think one thing to keep in  
6 mind when we talk about -- about dosimeter  
7 uncertainty and -- and how it's accounted for  
8 is that the uncertainty becomes a factor in our  
9 program at the annual level, because you have a  
10 line on the IREP input sheet which is annual  
11 dose of a particular time and -- and  
12 uncertainty associated with that, in -- in many  
13 cases. And so that's where it becomes  
14 important. And so the important thing to  
15 under-- you know, to get right is have we  
16 bracketed or correctly specified the  
17 uncertainty in the annual dose measurement  
18 rather than any specific dosimeter reading  
19 measurement, because the uncertainty -- or the  
20 relative uncertainty will converge as you  
21 combine say 12 -- 12 (unintelligible) --  
22 **DR. MAURO:** But not if you're systematically  
23 using a generic approach which is -- for  
24 example, assumes direct as opposed to angular  
25 exposure. In other words, imbedded in the

1 process is the assumption that the exposures  
2 that the person's experiencing is always  
3 perpendicular to where the badge is facing.  
4 That is sort of a consistent way in which you  
5 interpret the rad or the Roentgen exposure on  
6 your film badge or -- or TLD. Then there's --  
7 there's a systematic bias that will  
8 (unintelligible) --

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Rather -- rather than  
10 (unintelligible).

11 **DR. MAURO:** -- (unintelligible) so -- so the  
12 uncertain distribution in that respect will --  
13 won't properly capture that (unintelligible)  
14 one side.

15 **MR. HINNEFELD:** But like I said, if we just  
16 need -- and I think it's on the overarching  
17 issues list, you know, the approach or --

18 **DR. MAURO:** Right, I got it.

19 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- whatever the basis is for  
20 that -- for uncertainty approaches as  
21 (unintelligible).

22 Okay, 68.3 speaks to the use of -- the finding  
23 was that isotropic geometry was used in -- for  
24 ambient exposures as opposed to the AP geometry  
25 DCFs. And our understanding of the issue with,

1           you know, using AP was that it relates to a  
2           measured -- essentially a dosimeter measured  
3           dose. That's what the AP -- that's what  
4           (unintelligible) when you say AP.

5           **DR. MAURO:** Uh-huh.

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** When an ambient dose is -- is  
7           generated, either by instrument reading or by a  
8           dosimeter hung on a post and it is exposed,  
9           it's actually exposed in an isotropic geometry  
10          --

11          **DR. MAURO:** That's correct.

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- that the isotro-- isotropic  
13          DCF would be appropriate in that circumstance,  
14          so that's essentially -- I mean we can lay out  
15          more -- you know, more in writing on that, but  
16          that's kind of where we're coming from on that.  
17          And we feel like isotropic is probably  
18          appropriate for an ambient dose.

19          **DR. MAURO:** I'm going to agree with that. I  
20          know, Hans, that this is some of your -- but I  
21          think --

22          **DR. BEHLING:** Yeah, let -- let me comment.  
23          Isotropic geometry is -- is clearly the  
24          appropriate choice. However, the DCF is -- may  
25          still be wrong and -- and again, I want to

1           preface everything by saying that we're talking  
2           trivial doses when we talk about on-site  
3           ambient. On the other hand, the TLD that is  
4           hung on a telephone post is basically  
5           equivalent of a human body and -- and I  
6           remember my days in the utilities where we  
7           would always identify locations. We would hang  
8           it on the side of a building, so again, the  
9           exposure is not necessary (sic) isotropic when  
10          you hang it on the face of a brick building or  
11          a thick telephone pole that approximates a  
12          human body. But again, this is relatively  
13          trivial. It was brought up as a technical  
14          issue as opposed to one that would have a  
15          significant impact on -- on -- on individual  
16          dose reconstruction.

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** I guess my experience with  
18          environmental dosimeters is they were hung on a  
19          -- they were -- they were stuck on a post, but  
20          there was a steel post that held a housing,  
21          essentially an air equivalent housing that --  
22          that the TLD was in, so that -- that, in my --  
23          so it was essentially an isotropic exposure.

24          **DR. MAURO:** Well, I -- that's the point. I  
25          mean in -- in essence, if that's the case, then

1 the problem's solved, but if (unintelligible).

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** (Unintelligible)

3 **DR. POSTON:** I'm trying to stay away from a  
4 technical discussion here, Hans, but I didn't  
5 understand what you said. You said that you  
6 accepted the isotropic assumption, but the DCF  
7 was wrong. How do you -- how can you make that  
8 statement? What's your basis for such a  
9 comment?

10 **DR. BEHLING:** Well, as -- as we said, the --  
11 the whole DCF development was based on, as a  
12 starting point, as a dosimeter that is reading  
13 an air dose in -- in -- in free space, and --  
14 and that's really not the case when -- when you  
15 have a person wearing a dosimeter, and that was  
16 the whole issue that led us to conclude that  
17 the AP geometry DCFs were the only ones that  
18 were correct.

19 Now I will go back and say that when we talk  
20 about a -- an on-site ambient dose that is  
21 driven by contamination on the ground, that the  
22 isotropic geometry is the correct geometry.  
23 The question is, is the DCF correct, and -- and  
24 as I said, this is so trivial so as not to  
25 warrant really any extensive discussion because

1           it's not going to amount to anything but it's  
2           strictly a technical issue, in my mind.

3           **DR. POSTON:** Okay, well, that is  
4           (unintelligible) --

5           **DR. BEHLING:** And -- and when you have a -- an  
6           environmental TLD, and -- and I recall from my  
7           -- my days being in that environment, we would  
8           frequently hang it on -- on the side of a  
9           building or a telephone post or a tank or  
10          someplace out in the environment, on-site, off-  
11          site, and -- and that's how we would measure  
12          potential off-site releases and their -- their  
13          dose rates. So technically speaking, I -- I'd  
14          say the issue is -- is one that -- that's -- is  
15          incorrect, but it's so trivial as to really  
16          require no -- no adjustment.

17          **DR. POSTON:** Well, that leads -- I'm sorry to  
18          argue -- be argumentative, but that leads me to  
19          two conclusions. One is, we're talking about  
20          Savannah River; we're not talking about your  
21          experience. So what's the -- have you looked  
22          to see what the situation was at Savannah  
23          River? And two, if it's so trivial, why even  
24          raise the point? I don't understand. I don't  
25          consider it a -- a huge technical problem. We

1 know that -- how to interpret the dosimeter  
2 badges that people wear. We've been doing this  
3 for 50 years, and so I -- I don't understand  
4 what's going on here.

5 **DR. BEHLING:** I -- I -- again, we weren't  
6 looking to belabor this issue at this point in  
7 time and --

8 **DR. POSTON:** (Unintelligible) I won't belabor  
9 (unintelligible).

10 **DR. BEHLING:** -- and I'm willing to sort of say  
11 just scratch it off and -- and not -- not glom  
12 on it any further.

13 **DR. POSTON:** That works for me.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** It's been brought up before many  
15 times, yes, and --

16 **MS. MUNN:** Accepted, okay. Right?

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, the next -- now I have  
18 down here that we're going to provide something  
19 in writing about (unintelligible). Do you want  
20 us to go ahead and do that, Mark?

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I -- I think so, but it's --  
22 -- it's -- basically, that's it and I think --

23 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- I think they're accepting it  
25 or -- I -- I think we said we wouldn't -- we

1                   wouldn't come to final closure on these today -  
2                   -

3                   **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

4                   **MR. GRIFFON:** -- 'cause they just got --

5                   **MR. HINNEFELD:** All right.

6                   **MR. GRIFFON:** -- they just received them, but -  
7                   -

8                   **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, then we'll it -- we'll  
9                   (unintelligible) --

10                  **MR. GRIFFON:** -- it sounds like we're satisfied  
11                  with this and -- but I think close it out with  
12                  something in writing.

13                  **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 68.4 is -- has to do with  
14                  the plutonium internal dose calculations being  
15                  excessively -- excessively complex and then,  
16                  without scientific basis, potentially not  
17                  claimant favorable. I think we agreed that  
18                  they were excessively complex, but -- let me  
19                  see if I can get to another finding here. In  
20                  this case they reviewed the -- SC&A reviewed  
21                  the applicability of the records for chest  
22                  counts and urinalyses. All 17 chest counts  
23                  were identified as routine and which limits the  
24                  credibility in modeling the four chest counts  
25                  greater than MDA as acute exposure

1 (unintelligible) and on the reasonable  
2 assumption that urinalysis for plutonium and  
3 chest counts were administered for the common  
4 objective of assessing lung burden and body  
5 burden for plutonium seems unreasonable and  
6 without basis for NIOSH to conclude that  
7 monitoring for plutonium was discontinuous  
8 based on urine data above. By focusing  
9 exclusively on urine data, NIOSH eliminated  
10 several years of potential intakes and modeled  
11 intakes as three discrete chronic intake  
12 regimes.

13 I don't know if you guys are set to comment on  
14 that or not. I -- and I -- I guess I'm not --  
15 don't have that one ready at hand in my mind.

16 **MR. ALLEN:** Well, the finding here -- the  
17 additional analysis says we'll supply some --  
18 if I'm on the right line here --

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** 68.4, right?

20 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

21 **MR. ALLEN:** Yeah, this -- this one I think we  
22 can give some IMBA analysis and a little short  
23 write-up, you know, just like the other ones.

24 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

25 **MR. ALLEN:** We could -- that's not a problem,

1           owing something on that, I believe. Right?

2           **MR. SIEBERT:** Yeah, we're working on that.

3           But it -- the other thing is the original  
4           assessment did not take into account in-growth  
5           for the americium-241 from plutonium-241. I  
6           know we're not getting technical here, but it  
7           is very claimant-favorable that way. Once you  
8           take that into account, you start over-  
9           predicting the chest counts when you go from  
10          urine, and we're -- we'll -- we'll show that in  
11          our -- our response.

12          **MR. ALLEN:** Yeah, I think most of these IMBA  
13          runs in general that we talk about today  
14          basically just show that if you just looked at  
15          one bioassay, similar to the comment in here,  
16          you find out that you're inconsistent with the  
17          remaining data, and we strove all along to be  
18          consistent with all the data that we have for  
19          the individual. Once you do that, I think you  
20          come back to where we started, so we'll --  
21          we'll produce some IMBA analysis --

22          **MR. GRIFFON:** I'm not --

23          **MR. ALLEN:** -- to -- to show that.

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay. The only confusion I have  
25          with -- with your statement is that if -- if

1           this was a best estimate case -- are there like  
2           degrees of best? Is it -- was it better and  
3           then now you can fine-tune it a little further?

4           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, the --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** I mean --

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- the term "best estimate"  
7           shows up in --

8           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

9           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- dose reconstructions where  
10          the --

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- Monte Carlo tool is used.

13          **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay, so any time --

14          **MR. HINNEFELD:** That's what --

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- a Monte Carlo tool is used.

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- that kind of --

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** All right.

18          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- recently recognized on my  
19          part, but that language shows up in the dose  
20          reconstruction when the Monte Carlo tool is  
21          used, and --

22          **MR. GRIFFON:** So there may still --

23          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- the fact --

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- be out there (unintelligible)

25          --

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** There may be overestimates.

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- overestimating, okay --

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:** It may be an overestimate to  
4 the internal fit --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** All right.

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- so yeah.

7           **MR. GRIFFON:** But you can -- you can show that  
8 in the write-up in the IMBA, and that's fine.  
9 Good. All right.

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 68.5 is -- again, is --  
11 we believe an IMBA analysis showing the -- the  
12 uranium intakes and how they would fit the  
13 bioassay data best would be the best way to  
14 explain the selection of intake dates, so the  
15 IMBA analysis is another -- I mean I think we  
16 should provide that there.

17          And 68.7 I believe is the same as 67.8.

18          **UNIDENTIFIED:** Yes.

19          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, I believe 68 -- case 68  
20 (unintelligible). Case 69 is --

21          **MR. GRIFFON:** This is still Savannah River.  
22 Right? 69 on (unintelligible) --

23          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Still Savannah River.

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

25          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Finding 69 dash 2 -- I think I

1 recognize it from the summary but let me make  
2 sure (unintelligible).

3 (Pause)

4 I believe this is a case where the external  
5 dosimetry was entered as the constant measured  
6 value as opposed to a normally distributed  
7 value, and it was combined with a DCF of one,  
8 which is higher than the entire triangular  
9 distribution of the DCF for the  
10 (unintelligible). That was entered as an  
11 expected -- modest overestimate, not a -- not a  
12 hugely overestimated but is somewhat a modest  
13 overestimate of the outcome. And what we're  
14 doing, and this is sort of a tedious process,  
15 is to develop -- you know, demonstrate the --  
16 you know, what would -- what's the difference  
17 between using the measured and a normal  
18 distribution (unintelligible) triangular,  
19 versus the measured as a constant times one.  
20 That's a fairly tedious thing to do 'cause you  
21 have to do it for different risk models for --  
22 so we're kind of choosing some sample risk  
23 models and show -- and at what point does the  
24 annual uncertainty then maybe make it a factor.  
25 If you have a big enough uncertainty on a

1 normal distribution, it could be that the  
2 normal distribution times the true triangular  
3 DCF may in fact provide -- be more favorable to  
4 the claimant than what intuitively seems like  
5 it would be an overestimate, which is measured  
6 times one, because of the uncertainty it brings  
7 into the POC calculation. So that's underway,  
8 and like I said, it's tedious and it hasn't  
9 been, frankly, on the front burner. Those are  
10 (unintelligible).

11 **DR. BEHLING:** Stu, can I just make a comment?  
12 I -- I fully accept your -- your explanation,  
13 and I think the only thing that I would say  
14 here is that perhaps one of the TIBs or -- or  
15 guidance documents should be modified so as to  
16 say that when we use a default DCF of one, we -  
17 - we consider that claimant favorable enough to  
18 -- to -- to ignore the issue of uncertainty,  
19 just so that it's in the procedure and explains  
20 why that was done. I think that's -- I -- I  
21 fully agree that for certain types of photon  
22 energies and -- and organ doses, a -- a default  
23 DCF of one is clearly claimant favorable and is  
24 likely to offset any uncertainty and -- and all  
25 that needs to be stated in some procedure that

1           that's the case and that's what's being done  
2           and -- and simply provide some documentation to  
3           that effect, that's all.

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** But -- but I thought, Stu, you  
5           said that it may not be intuitively obvious and  
6           that (unintelligible) --

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** (Unintelligible)

8           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- examining this because the  
9           uncertainty affects your IREP (unintelligible)  
10          -- you know, your IREP or (unintelligible).

11          **MR. HINNEFELD:** We're -- yeah, we're examining  
12          -- now once we arrive at that --

13          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, then maybe you can --

14          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- (unintelligible) would make  
15          some sense and under what circumstances does  
16          this make sense and it is a favorable --

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** All right.

18          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- overestimate. And it may be  
19          that it is always -- you know, that -- if your  
20          intuition is correct and it is always --

21          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right, right.

22          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- favorable, it may be that --

23          **MR. GRIFFON:** If you find that out, then you  
24          can --

25          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Once you start worrying -- once

1           you start worrying about, you know, putting a  
2           constant value into IREP versus an uncertain  
3           value into IREP, especially when you're using  
4           the 95th percentile of the outcome -- or 99th  
5           percentile of the outcome -- that you say well,  
6           gee, we'd better check this -- essentially what  
7           we're doing.

8           **MR. ALLEN:** It's intuitively obvious in most  
9           situations with a handful that really need to  
10          analyze some numbers to show that it is.

11          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right, yeah. Okay, let's see,  
12          that was 69.2, 69.3, which we believe is the  
13          same as 69.2 only this time it's expressed for  
14          neutrons as opposed to photons; 69.4 is -- has  
15          to do with selection of the solubility class  
16          not being claimant favorable. Again, we  
17          believe it's -- we chose that class because it  
18          fits bioassay data. We'll provide an IMBA  
19          analysis to demonstrate that.

20          69.5 talks about the use of a triangular  
21          distribution that goes to zero, I think is the  
22          key element. Let me -- because 69.5 I believe  
23          is couched in terms that the in vivo counts for  
24          -- the in vivo counts for this person has net  
25          positive counts below the MDA. And so, given

1           that situation, is it appropriate to have your  
2           missed dose (unintelligible) by a triangular  
3           distribution that goes all the way to zero. Is  
4           there really a potential that it goes to zero.  
5           I believe I'm paraphrasing the finding correct.  
6           So in that circumstance, we -- I think we can  
7           provide something in writing rather than get  
8           into the discussion here. Recall, though, that  
9           the top end of that triangular distribution  
10          relies on that MDA or that limited detection.  
11          I mean that's how you arrive at that top end  
12          because it's based on that LOD. So if the LOD  
13          then becomes meaningless in terms of detection  
14          and then you start worrying -- then you would  
15          have to consider well, what -- is it really  
16          meaningful for the top end. And if -- and in  
17          addition, there are -- you know, it's not like  
18          there's one detection or one bioassay that just  
19          was missed. There could be a collection of  
20          bioassay and so it becomes very favorable to  
21          start considering the -- even with a collection  
22          of bioassay, you were always -- you always just  
23          missed it. You know, every case was right  
24          below detection --

25          **DR. MAURO:** Uh-huh.

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- that that becomes -- becomes  
2           -- which is sort of the assumption that's made,  
3           and that's going to be quite favorable in -- on  
4           -- you know, in (unintelligible) -- fact quite  
5           improbable because (unintelligible) --

6           **MS. MUNN:** (Unintelligible) totally improbable.

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** So there is some other stuff  
8           going into this. We think we can put together  
9           a -- you know, a written explanation  
10          (unintelligible) --

11          **DR. BEHLING:** Yeah, Stu, and -- and I guess I -  
12          - I think you probably stated things that I was  
13          going to say, too, here. And that is, when I  
14          look at a collection of datapoints where --  
15          let's assume we're talking about urine data  
16          analysis for tritium or something, and 60  
17          percent are clearly above MDA, measurable --  
18          the things, then I would clearly want to say  
19          perhaps the zero value as the triangular  
20          distribution for those that are below MDA is  
21          maybe not necessary (sic) claimant favorable.  
22          On the other hand, if I saw 50 bioassays for  
23          tritium and not one was measurable, then I  
24          would say it's clearly appropriate to use the -  
25          - the -- the triangular distribution that has,

1 at the low end, zero because it's --  
2 statistically speaking, you would -- you would  
3 be amiss not to assume that.

4 **MR. ALLEN:** Yeah, Hans, this is Dave. I think  
5 there might be one more issue with this  
6 particular one, and that is -- based on the  
7 Savannah River in vivo results -- that the  
8 column that says "net counts" is not directly  
9 related to the isotopic concentration in the  
10 body. That's actually the counts -- the gross  
11 counts in a region of the spectrum minus the  
12 empty chamber background is that net counts --

13 **DR. BEHLING:** Uh-huh.

14 **MR. ALLEN:** -- and then the -- the count column  
15 shows how that is mirrored when you actually  
16 have a person in there with the potassium being  
17 smeared into the cesium region, et cetera.

18 **DR. BEHLING:** Yes.

19 **MR. ALLEN:** So the -- the one column that is  
20 used for calculating isotopic concentration is  
21 the column that says "dif", which I guess is  
22 "difference", you know, and it's not  
23 consistently positive or negative for the  
24 individual here. They're -- it bounces back  
25 and forth between positive num-- positive

1 counts and negative counts, which pretty much  
2 demonstrates that it should be zero on the low  
3 end.

4 **UNIDENTIFIED:** Uh-huh.

5 **MR. ALLEN:** I just -- I just recently -- I  
6 think last night -- came to the realization  
7 that I think we were talking about the net  
8 column when we should be looking at the dif  
9 column in this one.

10 **DR. BEHLING:** I agree, I agree.

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

12 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, let's see, I believe  
13 we're ready for 69.7, which I (unintelligible)  
14 again, the internal dose from fission products,  
15 which I believe is the same or -- or certainly  
16 similar to 67.8. We'll read -- make sure we  
17 read the entirety of the findings and if  
18 there's any different nuances -- we want to  
19 make sure we --

20 **MR. GRIFFON:** All right.

21 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- address any other nuances in  
22 the various findings. And 69.8, I believe it's  
23 similar to the earlier one.

24 **DR. MAURO:** Correct.

25 **MR. HINNEFELD:** This is a different

1 radionuclide, I believe, or a different  
2 bioassay scheme.

3 70.2 is the next thing that we can provide --  
4 or 70.2 was a Hanford case. This finding was  
5 that the external dose didn't include  
6 uncertainty, and I think in this case it was  
7 not a case of using a one as a DCF as an  
8 overestimate, because the triangular  
9 distribution goes above one. I believe they  
10 just didn't include the uncertainty in the  
11 measured dose and applied the -- the  
12 appropriate DCF, but with -- they didn't  
13 account for the uncertainty in the measured  
14 dose, so I believe this actually was an  
15 oversight and the uncertainty should be in here  
16 and that -- that's a relatively straightforward  
17 --

18 **DR. MAURO:** You're talking 70.2?

19 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 70.2.

20 **DR. MAURO:** I guess I -- my understanding was  
21 there was actually some photon dose that was  
22 not accounted for. There was some -- in other  
23 words, there were some zeroes where -- and  
24 please clarify -- help me out with this, but I  
25 thought that -- now I remember talking about

1           this when it was being done, that in going back  
2           to the records there were some zeroes that were  
3           treated as if they were zero. In other words,  
4           as opposed to assigning the MDA over two. I'm  
5           -- I'm not sure, but I just -- I want to make  
6           sure we didn't miss that.

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, that's a --

8           **DR. MAURO:** As opposed to an uncertainty issue.

9           **MR. HINNEFELD:** There were some -- there were  
10          some cases where there were some questions  
11          about the count of the number zeroes used in  
12          the (unintelligible).

13          **DR. MAURO:** That may be what I'm thinking  
14          (unintelligible).

15          **MR. HINNEFELD:** There -- there were some issues  
16          about that, and I've -- we've provided some  
17          explanation in our responses in various places  
18          where -- why we interpreted -- you know,  
19          certain -- certain -- certain sites, if you've  
20          got a blank that means there was no badge,  
21          because they reported zero if they had a badge,  
22          they wrote zero. So I think that explains some  
23          of it. I believe this one -- if I'm -- I'm  
24          clear on (unintelligible) the case was of why  
25          they used the -- the true DCF, even though the

1           -- the dose reconstruction inappropriately, you  
2 know, said -- said they used one, they didn't;  
3 they used -- actually used the DC-- the  
4 triangular DCF distribution, more the top end  
5 of the DCF distribution. They did not include  
6 the uncertainty of the measured dose, so that  
7 is a different issue than taking a constant  
8 times one when the entire triangular DCF is  
9 less than one, so that's a different issue.  
10 And -- and this is -- I mean that's a fairly  
11 straightforward thing to -- to rework and  
12 refigure.

13 **MR. GRIFFON:** And when you -- I -- I just want  
14 to clarify your action here. It says  
15 recalculate POC. I don't think we've --

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. Well, we'll recalculate  
17 the dose.

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** Re-- recalculate dose. Right?  
19 Okay. Recalculate -- you know, I'm not sure  
20 how to phrase that, but I don't think you want  
21 to say recalculate POC. What do you want to  
22 say?

23 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Why don't we just say dose, and  
24 then or say (unintelligible) --

25 **MR. GRIFFON:** Incorporating appropriate

1           uncertainty in recorded dose, recalculating  
2           dose?

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:** We could --

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** Incorporating uncertainty in  
5           dose? I'm not sure that makes sense.

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** (Unintelligible) incorporating  
7           -- evaluate -- or we could just evaluate the  
8           impact.

9           (Whereupon, Mr. Griffon, Mr. Hinnefeld and  
10          other participants spoke simultaneously,  
11          rendering transcription of individual comments  
12          impossible.)

13          **MR. GRIFFON:** Impact, yeah. Okay.

14          **MR. HINNEFELD:** 71.2 is, again, the failure to  
15          account for recorded photon dose uncertainty,  
16          and I believe that's the same as 69.2 -- in  
17          this case it was using one as -- as DCF as a  
18          constant (unintelligible) the triangular.  
19          And 76.2 is failure to assign unmonitored  
20          neutron dose, and again, we will evaluate the  
21          impact of including the unmonitored neutron  
22          dose.

23          Let's see, case number 71 was also a Hanford  
24          case. Case number 76 is a Fernald case. And  
25          our Technical Basis Document calls for a

1 neutron component to be added based on the  
2 photon measurement because of the potential for  
3 (unintelligible) end reactions on the  
4 (unintelligible), especially fluorides, so  
5 there is a -- a judgment was made in this case  
6 that this person wasn't around the fluoride  
7 storage (unintelligible) judgment, you know,  
8 based on the record that was given in his  
9 bioassay, his location when he gave a bioassay  
10 sample, there should have been more cases. The  
11 assumption should have been made -- or maybe  
12 throughout should have been made if he should  
13 have received that neutron component.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** The only --

15 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, that's the end of my  
16 list.

17 **MR. GRIFFON:** The only thing I would say at  
18 this point is if there's other -- and Kathy and  
19 Hans, you -- you just received this material,  
20 so I would say maybe look through the revised  
21 matrix, compare it to this action list, and if  
22 there's anything that -- that you were  
23 expecting as far as a written response, maybe  
24 we can have you work with Stu by e-mail or --  
25 or phone, and if there's a corrected list in

1 any way, you can -- you can circulate --

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, if you just let me know -

3 -

4 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, 'cause I think they haven't  
5 had time --

6 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, I'm sure they haven't.  
7 I'm sure they haven't.

8 **MS. BEHLING:** Right.

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** If you'd just let me know of  
10 other things you feel like where written  
11 material would be appropriate where I thought  
12 the resolution was okay and you thought no, we  
13 need -- really need more on this, you let me  
14 know and I'll modify this list.

15 **MR. GRIFFON:** Seems like this was most of them,  
16 but (unintelligible) --

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** (Unintelligible)

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- opportunity to run through  
19 them (unintelligible) --

20 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I'll admit, this is my --

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

22 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- this is my judgment. You  
23 know, I looked down the list and this is what I  
24 judged it to be and I'm not the final judgment.

25 **MS. BEHLING:** I did keep -- I did go back when

1 we were initially going to have the discussion  
2 on the fourth set and make a listing of the  
3 findings I thought we were supposed to re-  
4 evaluate. And I have to admit, I do have a few  
5 more on my list than I see on this list, so you  
6 and I can discuss that, Stu.

7 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, it'd be easier for you  
8 and I to talk about that.

9 **MS. BEHLING:** That's fine.

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay, good. Would it be okay for  
11 like a ten-minute -- at five after 11:00 let's  
12 call -- call it back in session?

13 **DR. WADE:** Thank you. We're going to take a  
14 ten-minute break, so we're going to mute until  
15 ten minutes.

16 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 10:55 a.m.  
17 to 11:15 a.m.)

18 **DR. WADE:** We're back on line. Any Board  
19 members --

20 **MR. GRIFFON:** (Unintelligible) anyone on the  
21 line -- anyone -- any Advisory Board member on  
22 the line?

23 (No responses)

24 No.

25 **DR. WADE:** Okay.

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay, we're -- we're ready to  
2 reconvene, for those on the telephone. Hans  
3 and Kathy, I assume you're there?

4           **MS. BEHLING:** I'm here. Hans is going to --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

6           **MS. BEHLING:** We're walking on -- working on  
7 something else right now, so I'll be on.

8           **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay, we're -- we're going to  
9 start the fifth set, so I think this is kind of  
10 our preliminary run-through, and I think that  
11 we have a lot of issues that we've seen before,  
12 so we might be able to -- to go through some of  
13 these fairly quickly, but other ones I'm sure  
14 will take a little time. So -- and -- and I  
15 don't know -- well, we'll -- we'll do our  
16 normal thing here. We'll let SC&A and NIOSH go  
17 back and forth, I guess, on -- on -- we'll go  
18 through the findings one by one.

19           **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. Mark, can I just -- I'm  
20 going to start off by saying in this fifth set  
21 we had -- I believe there were about ten AWE  
22 cases, and I put all of these AWEs up front in  
23 our report, and then I do all the DOEs  
24 thereafter, so -- John did the AWEs so  
25 initially I was going to suggest that maybe

1 we'd do an AWE and then a DOE, but I -- I won't  
2 add that level of confusion, but --

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** No, I think we'll just run  
4 through them in order and John's here to take  
5 the lead on the AWEs. Right?

6 **MS. BEHLING:** Right, and I'm just going to make  
7 a suggestion here, and I -- and this is  
8 obviously your call. One of the things, to --  
9 to just remind everyone, when we do look at  
10 these AWEs is we approach them a little bit  
11 different than we do with the DOE facilities.  
12 And with the AWEs, when we see an exposure  
13 matrix that has been used, we also not only  
14 evaluate the case, but we try to evaluate that  
15 exposure matrix and -- and look at, again,  
16 maybe some global type issues that don't always  
17 apply to -- specifically to this particular  
18 case. And as we've been talking all along  
19 about tracking these items, I believe with --  
20 when we come across these particular cases  
21 where we do have an exposure matrix issue,  
22 often we will push things off into a site  
23 profile when we have these issues come up with  
24 the DOE facilities, but might I suggest that we  
25 may want to consider making sure that they

1 don't get -- fall through the cracks and that  
2 they are followed through maybe on this Task IV  
3 matrix and that we do follow through with any  
4 exposure matrix issue within Task IV. It's  
5 just a suggestion. It's something we'll have  
6 to think about as we go through these AWEs.

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** (Unintelligible) and -- and I had  
8 the same no-- and I think it -- if -- if folks  
9 remember, I think part of our selection process  
10 sometimes -- one of our criteria was that, you  
11 know, well, we -- we've -- haven't done any on  
12 this small little AWE site and probably likely  
13 only do one case from that site, so in effect  
14 it's sort of the site profile review, in a  
15 nutshell, is the way we were kind of looking at  
16 it, so I agree, Kathy. And with that, we'll  
17 let -- either one, I don't care what order we  
18 go in. If NIOSH wants to describe their  
19 response or --

20 **MR. HINNEFELD:** That will work for me, yeah.

21 **DR. MAURO:** Well, I would like a 30-second  
22 sound bite on each one because I know that  
23 these AWEs are special because each one has  
24 their own -- in essence, in a 30-second sound  
25 bite -- a story to be told. And I think within

1           that story and understanding of the context  
2           within which we're working, then -- I think  
3           then the -- the NIOSH responses come to life.  
4           I think by just looking at the comment and the  
5           response --

6           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, okay.

7           **DR. MAURO:** -- it's -- it's very -- doesn't  
8           really give the richness of -- of -- the  
9           importance and its relevance. So -- so on each  
10          one, maybe if I can just give a 30-second piece  
11          and then I -- then I can turn it over so I can  
12          sort of set the stage as I -- I see it.

13          **MR. GRIFFON:** Let me -- let me understand.  
14          You're going to do a 30-second --

15          **DR. MAURO:** A 30-second sound bite --

16          **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

17          **DR. MAURO:** -- of what I think the essence of  
18          the problem is, because these are --

19          **MR. GRIFFON:** I was laughing at the 30-second  
20          aspect of that. If you can do it in 30  
21          seconds, I'll be very happy to give you that,  
22          John.

23          **DR. POSTON:** He's Italian.

24          **DR. MAURO:** I'm Italian. It's impossible.

25          **MR. GRIFFON:** I know. We know,

1 (unintelligible) going.

2 **DR. WADE:** (Unintelligible) won't be able to  
3 talk at all.

4 (Whereupon, multiple participants spoke  
5 simultaneously, rendering transcription of  
6 individual comments impossible.)

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** No, but if you can keep it  
8 succinct, all teasing aside -- all right.

9 **DR. MAURO:** Bridgeport -- Bridgeport Brass,  
10 first one, what we have is uranium handling and  
11 extrusion facility. Okay? The approach taken  
12 in reconstructing the doses here was using  
13 OTIB-4. And one of the important issues that  
14 arose, and we've talked about this before, is  
15 that it was -- it was used and it was used to  
16 compensate. Okay? It was our understanding  
17 early on, and it may have changed, that the use  
18 of OTIB-4 as a generic procedure that applies  
19 to all AWE sites across the board. When you  
20 don't have site-specific information, you go to  
21 OTIB-4, which is sort of like the universal  
22 fix, and it -- and by the way, in our opinion,  
23 OTIB-4 is a very good universal fix for AWE  
24 facilities in terms of placing an upper bound  
25 on what the exposures might have been, so I

1 mean -- so we're okay --

2 **MR. ELLIOTT:** For uranium facilities.

3 **DR. MAURO:** For uranium facilities, for uranium  
4 facilities, that's what it's for. And -- but  
5 we -- our big concern with that, we -- it was  
6 our understanding that because it was sort of a  
7 very -- a pretty bounding approach, that -- and  
8 -- and given the introductory words that go  
9 along (unintelligible), we interpret it as  
10 being something that was used for -- for --  
11 only for denial, but (unintelligible) ran  
12 across a case that was compensated.

13 In addition, we ran across -- we found out that  
14 subsequent to this dose reconstruction there  
15 actually was an exposure matrix -- a site  
16 profile -- issued for this site, Bridgeport  
17 Brass. So we find ourselves in an interesting  
18 situation. We have a person who has been  
19 reconstructed, granted, but then along comes a  
20 site profile and then -- and we had the benefit  
21 of that, of course. By the time we received  
22 the audit review, that site profile was out.  
23 So what we did is we reviewed the case using  
24 the site profile for Bri-- and we come in with  
25 substantially lower doses.

1 So in essence -- 30 seconds, not bad --

2 **MR. GRIFFON:** Not bad.

3 **DR. MAURO:** -- we -- our problem is, what do  
4 you do when you have this situation? And --  
5 and with that, I guess we could -- I could turn  
6 it over to you folks.

7 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, in response to that  
8 question, what we do is nothing unless DOL asks  
9 us to. DOL is aware of these cases. I mean we  
10 -- we discussed these. These are -- some of  
11 these were on the fourth set and we talked  
12 about it. (Unintelligible) some of them down  
13 here was October or something, we talked about  
14 these at some length is that, you know, this --  
15 this approach was used for a short period of  
16 time, I think 2005, at the urging of -- push to  
17 get cases done. It was applied more broadly  
18 than it should have been applied and DOL is  
19 aware of the cases that were done in this  
20 fashion. If they want us to do something about  
21 it, they'll reopen the case and send it back.  
22 And if they don't reopen it and send it back,  
23 then we won't do anything about it.

24 **DR. MAURO:** For the benefit of the Board, the  
25 difference in the doses are extremely large --

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

2           **DR. MAURO:** -- a 30-fold difference in the  
3 internal dose, and I don't -- and I'm not quite  
4 -- I'm quite sure what the external dose  
5 differences are, but they're -- it's not that  
6 they're small differences --

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

8           **DR. MAURO:** -- between the realistic and the  
9 OTIB-4.

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

11          **DR. MAURO:** Okay?

12          **MR. GRIFFON:** All right, let's go into the  
13 findings on (unintelligible) --

14          **DR. MAURO:** All right, we'll go on to the  
15 findings, sure.

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Number one is exactly that, is  
17 -- you know, use of OTIB-4 is inappropriate for  
18 compensable claims and that's true, it was used  
19 more broadly (unintelligible) was modified even  
20 to say this approach is also acceptable if you  
21 can't do any better, we can do the bounding  
22 dose. It wasn't modified to say that and it  
23 also was applied more broadly than it should  
24 have been (unintelligible) claimant  
25 (unintelligible). You know, I kind of -- kind

1 of (unintelligible) mea culpa on this  
2 (unintelligible) and -- and covered it and  
3 repeated essentially what we've talked about  
4 these cases before in that response, the NIOSH  
5 response to number one.  
6 Finding number two has to do with the -- not  
7 being able to reproduce the external -- the  
8 model external photon doses that were in the  
9 version -- Rev. 2 of OTIB-4. We couldn't,  
10 either. So -- but Revision 3 has been issued  
11 in the interim. Revision 3 no longer includes  
12 that same table. It includes a different  
13 calculation technique. We've also described in  
14 here the description that Revision 3, since it  
15 uses the correct (unintelligible) and uses some  
16 different -- actually it uses like  
17 (unintelligible) and 30 to 250 and things like  
18 that, the total change from going from Rev. 2  
19 to Rev. 3 was a change downward somewhat and so  
20 there was no need to go back and rework or  
21 reconsider cases that were done with Rev. 2.  
22 **DR. MAURO:** We -- by the way, we have also  
23 independently calculated the extent of doses  
24 using MCMP and agree with you; that is, the  
25 doses go down.

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** Can we -- can we go back to 81.1  
3 just for a second?

4           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Sure.

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** In the middle of your response it  
6 says the bounding estimates would become the  
7 best estimate. At -- at what point do you -- I  
8 mean do -- do you at any point have to evaluate  
9 whether there's sufficient data to do  
10 individual dose reconstructions for that site?  
11 Does it become sort of a question of, you know,  
12 self-identifying SEC situation if you evaluate  
13 --

14          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, I mean, yeah. I mean --

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** Well, you can establish plausible  
16 upper bounds for all workers? I mean it --

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** I guess --

18          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- does it get into that realm  
19 or...

20          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- our going in -- I guess our  
21 position is that TIB-4 is broadly applicable as  
22 a bounding dose for uranium operations. And if  
23 a site falls into that category, the uranium  
24 operation fits within the scope of OTIB-4, that  
25 OTIB-4 provides a bounding estimate. So I

1           guess there could be some situations where we  
2           would not have sufficient data to say we can't  
3           say with confidence that this site fits within  
4           the scope of OTIB-4, in which case we would  
5           have to reach that conclusion, that since we  
6           can't necessarily say it fits within OTIB-4,  
7           that we don't have enough information to be --  
8           to -- to do dose reconstructions. But we can  
9           satisfy ourselves that it fits within the scope  
10          of OTIB-4, then we would believe that we can at  
11          least do a bounding dose reconstruction.

12         **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay. I just wanted a  
13          clarification on that. And then with 81.2,  
14          just so -- this is a question in terms of  
15          follow-up -- there -- there is a PER associated  
16          with this AP review -- right? -- at the bottom?

17         **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well -- 81.3?

18         **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah -- is it 81.3? 81 -- I --  
19          81 2 touches on it, but 81 3 -- yeah.

20         **MR. HINNEFELD:** 81.2 -- 81.2's response  
21          describes how the photon dose --

22         **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

23         **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- that we couldn't reproduce  
24          in -- in Revision 2 was apportioned between  
25          different geometries and different -- different

1           --

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right.

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- energy bands. And -- and in  
4 fact, when you compare Rev. 3 with the correct  
5 dose number, 100 percent AP with 100 percent 30  
6 to 250, you still -- it's still -- the outcome  
7 in terms of POC goes down slightly so we don't  
8 have to go back. And a TIB-4 reconsideration  
9 is kind of an odd one because it's clearly an  
10 overestimate anyway, so it's not like you've  
11 done a best estimate, now you've changed the  
12 technique and you have to back and say, you  
13 know, what's the effect of the technique on  
14 this best estimate when you have a fairly  
15 health overestimate to start with. Even if  
16 there had been some change upward, you think  
17 well, they were overestimated anyway, in all  
18 likelihood.

19           **DR. MAURO:** Well, for the benefit of the Board  
20 -- I mean, OTIB-4 is very simple. It's saying  
21 that you've got a person standing one foot away  
22 from an ingot 20 -- 2,000 hours per year  
23 getting 2 MR per hour, which is the max dose  
24 you can get. You can't get worse than that.  
25 And in terms of inhalation goes, they assume a

1 person's continually exposed to 100 MAC. This  
2 is -- from looking at the literature, this is  
3 up at 90 -- 95th percentile of all the data.  
4 So in other words, yeah -- the only place there  
5 might be an exception, you've run across  
6 Harshaw, it's a pretty nasty place, but -- but  
7 in terms of in general, 100 MAC -- continuous  
8 exposure, 100 MAC is way up there. So that's  
9 why we feel that OTIB-4 is -- is a good  
10 bounding estimate.

11 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, Harshaw was nasty enough  
12 -- or at least early on -- that we said if we  
13 added (unintelligible) --

14 **DR. MAURO:** (Unintelligible) try again  
15 (unintelligible).

16 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right, right, right. So  
17 we -- the only real -- I mean the real thing to  
18 examine here is whether the facilities meet  
19 TIB-4 requirements.

20 **DR. MAURO:** Right.

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** You know, whether they belong in  
22 this group.

23 **DR. MAURO:** Whether they belong --

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, yeah.

25 **DR. MAURO:** Well, no, now that you have --

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, that's the  
2           (unintelligible).

3           **DR. MAURO:** (Unintelligible) not sure. Now  
4           that you have a site profile for Bridgeport  
5           Brass, I guess -- is --

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, we would use that.

7           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, right, right. Now 81.2,  
8           the fol-- just -- I'm trying to capture the  
9           actions so I'm going back to these -- that --  
10          that OTIB-4, the revision, is in the procedures  
11          review, I think, or has been done already, I'm  
12          not sure.

13          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, OTIB-4 has been done. I  
14          don't know if this latest version has been done  
15          or not.

16          **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay, so I'm --

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** I can't remember.

18          **MR. GRIFFON:** I'm putting procedure review for  
19          now.

20          **DR. MAURO:** Is this --

21          **MR. GRIFFON:** I'll check these things.

22          **DR. MAURO:** Is this the third? 'Cause we  
23          reviewed two versions. Is this a third  
24          version?

25          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, Rev. 3 is the currently

1 out one, but --

2 DR. MAURO: Okay, we --

3 MR. HINNEFELD: -- I don't know if you -- you  
4 may have not reviewed every one.

5 DR. MAURO: No, no, I may --

6 MR. HINNEFELD: And in fact, if it's Rev. 3,  
7 it's actually the fourth version --

8 DR. MAURO: It's the fourth --

9 MR. HINNEFELD: -- 'cause there's a Rev. 0.

10 DR. MAURO: 'Cause there's a PC-1 and there was  
11 a P--

12 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I'm not talking about  
13 PCs.

14 DR. MAURO: Okay.

15 MR. HINNEFELD: There's a Rev. 0 --

16 DR. MAURO: I don't know.

17 MS. BRACKETT: It is in revision now, too.

18 MR. HINNEFELD: Oh, good. Thank you.

19 MR. GRIFFON: It's in revision. Okay. Okay.

20 UNIDENTIFIED: Always.

21 UNIDENTIFIED: Always. Constantly.

22 DR. MAURO: Well, as of the last review, we  
23 still had a problem with the external dose  
24 model. That is, when we ran MCMP\* and compared  
25 it to your numbers, we were coming up with

1 numbers a little bit lower than was in the --  
2 the version of OTIB-4 that we looked at.

3 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

4 **DR. MAURO:** Now you're saying that your -- your  
5 numbers have come down, I -- and it was --

6 **MR. HINNEFELD:** No, not -- no, the -- well,  
7 yeah -- I mean but you guys pointed out that  
8 the table numbers were too high.

9 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

10 **MR. HINNEFELD:** That was your finding.

11 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

12 **MR. HINNEFELD:** We said, you know, you're  
13 right; we can't reproduce them, either. But we  
14 looked at Rev. 3 and we said well, Rev. 3  
15 doesn't duplicate that error. It's taken out  
16 and it's already been revised.

17 **DR. MAURO:** Okay.

18 **MR. HINNEFELD:** So --

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** But this -- this is in the proc.  
20 review, I hope --

21 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- it's in that -- it's in that  
23 cycle. Right?

24 **MR. HINNEFELD:** It is in -- it's on the list,  
25 and I don't know where it is, whether it's been

1 reviewed -- whether -- whether this version's  
2 been reviewed or not.

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** I'll def-- we can double-check  
4 this. I can talk to Wanda and we'll check this  
5 off-line.

6 **MS. MUNN:** My memory (unintelligible).

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** And then the only -- okay, then -  
8 - then really -- the one I was talking about,  
9 the PER really is associated with 81.3 more --

10 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yes.

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- than 81.2.

12 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yes.

13 **MR. GRIFFON:** But other than that, for this  
14 individual finding -- just to go back one more  
15 time -- the procedures review of TIB-4,  
16 revision whatever, is going to be in procedures  
17 review. And then -- but otherwise, this  
18 finding would not likely affect -- there's no  
19 further action. Right?

20 **MR. HINNEFELD:** We don't think so.

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** John?

22 **DR. MAURO:** I'm sorry?

23 **MR. GRIFFON:** No further action on this finding  
24 other than procedures review of TIB-4, Rev.  
25 whatever?

1           **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, if that's -- that's what you  
2 would like to do.

3           **MR. GRIFFON:** No, for 81 2 I'm asking if you  
4 agree with NIOSH's response.

5           **MS. BEHLING:** We agree.

6           **DR. MAURO:** Thank you, Kathy.

7           **MR. GRIFFON:** Thanks, Kathy.

8           **DR. MAURO:** Thank you, Kathy.

9           **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay. Then 81.3, I was asking if  
10 there's like a PER number -- you say there's --  
11 there's --

12           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, I mean there is an AP  
13 geometry PER --

14           **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

15           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- that -- and I don't have the  
16 number handy, but it's -- again, this was --  
17 you know, this is a TIB-4 case and it's already  
18 a significant overestimate the way it's done --

19           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

20           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- so it's not clear whether  
21 this change is going to be significant enough  
22 to warrant.

23           **MR. GRIFFON:** And it was compensated, as well.  
24 Right?

25           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, this case would be

1 considered (unintelligible).

2 **MR. GRIFFON:** So I think -- I think no further  
3 action on this case, but -- but the PER -- the  
4 PER -- as far as tracking this through to  
5 ground, as we discussed earlier, I think we  
6 probably want to note that a PER was done on  
7 this whole AP thing, and instead of continuing  
8 to, you know, hash these around in this -- in  
9 this setting, we can take up that AP geometry  
10 PER (unintelligible) --

11 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- in one swath, maybe, and maybe  
13 not in the subcommittee but for the full Board.  
14 Larry, does that make sense to you?

15 **MR. ELLIOTT:** Yeah, but I don't think the AP  
16 ge-- PER is even -- it's not been completed  
17 yet, has it, Dave?

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** I mean when it's -- when it's  
19 comple-- when it's available, I guess, yeah,  
20 yeah. Okay.

21 **MR. ELLIOTT:** I just didn't want us to be  
22 talking like it was already done.

23 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay. But no further action for  
24 this case is what I'm saying.

25 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

2           **MR. HINNEFELD:** 81.4 and 81.5 in the findings  
3 were about the use of OTIB-4 for this case, and  
4 we agree; 81.1 is essentially our -- our  
5 response to that -- that use. So that  
6 completes case number 81.

7           **MR. GRIFFON:** I want to make sure about 81 5.  
8 I just wasn't clear if they were asking about  
9 the data used for reconstruction --  
10 reconstructing dose is adequate for -- again,  
11 for determining POC. But I mean it -- it --  
12 why -- I don't understa-- can you --

13           **DR. MAURO:** It's the same thing. It's the sa--  
14 it's -- it's the same issue there, is can you  
15 use OTIB-4 for compensation --

16           **MR. GRIFFON:** Oh, okay, for comp-- for a  
17 compensable case --

18           **DR. MAURO:** For a compensable case.

19           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- not for -- I thought you were  
20 talking about --

21           **DR. MAURO:** No, not --

22           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- for that site, was it  
23 appropriate for Bridgeport.

24           **DR. MAURO:** No, no, no, just in general across  
25 the board.

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** For compensable cla-- okay, okay.

2           **DR. MAURO:** Right.

3           **MR. GRIFFON:** So it is the same as 81.1.

4           **DR. MAURO:** It's the same exactly as --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** Gotcha, so no further action.

6           Okay, 82 --

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** John, you want to do your 30  
8           seconds?

9           **DR. MAURO:** Okay.

10          **MR. GRIFFON:** 30 seconds.

11          **DR. MAURO:** Harshaw Chemical, we have -- again  
12          it's case, compensated. And in this they also  
13          used OTIB-4 with (unintelligible) assumptions  
14          we described and the person was compensated.  
15          There is no site profile, as I understand it,  
16          for Harshaw -- at least the last time we  
17          checked.

18          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Not yet.

19          **DR. MAURO:** At least not yet. So it's not like  
20          the previous one where you do have a site  
21          profile. I mean it's sort of (unintelligible)  
22          dilemma. In this case we have a -- a -- what I  
23          would argue -- now the only question I have  
24          regarding application of OTIB-4 to a Harshaw  
25          case is keep in mind that the -- OTIB-4 is

1 really exposure to an ingot -- you know, just  
2 pure uranium, a solid, pure uranium. Harshaw -  
3 - Harshaw of course was a much more complex  
4 site where the exposures were to various forms  
5 of uranium. There was all sort-- the whole  
6 chemistry. Now whether or not one would  
7 consider that -- it's still uranium, there's no  
8 doubt that Harshaw was uranium, but it  
9 certainly wasn't the uranium as it has been --  
10 as is described in OTIB-4. OTIB-4 is really,  
11 you know, a solid slab. And -- nevertheless --  
12 nevertheless, I would go on to say that still  
13 you -- you -- you assign an external dose to a  
14 person as if he's standing next to a slab 1,000  
15 -- 2,000 hours per year, I don't care what type  
16 of uranium you're dealing with, that's pretty  
17 conservative for external. And internal, using  
18 100 MAC all the time, well, here we're talking  
19 Harshaw, I think this -- this particular case  
20 might have been during the -- the period where  
21 there is an SEC. And if so, it's almost a non-  
22 issue.

23 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

24 **DR. MAURO:** Is that right?

25 **MR. HINNEFELD:** And in fact, I think TIB-4 --

1           **MR. ELLIOTT:** (Unintelligible) cancer is  
2           esophageal.

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

4           **DR. MAURO:** And -- and it -- and it's  
5           presumptive, right.

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** TIB -- TIB-4 I don't believe  
7           limits itself to uranium metal handling. Isn't  
8           that true?

9           **MR. ALLEN:** It used to be --

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** It used to be uranium metal.

11          **MR. ALLEN:** No --

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Oh, now it -- it's changed back  
13          to uranium metal, so for a time, I believe  
14          probably at the time this was done, it allowed  
15          -- TIB-4 was allowed for not just metal  
16          handling but also for uranium compound work.  
17          (Unintelligible) because the basis of the air  
18          sampling that's used was air data collected at  
19          what they called -- what, the dirty seven or  
20          something, the -- the earliest sites that the  
21          AEC started paying attention to about 1948. So  
22          that would -- that -- since those weren't  
23          strictly metal-forming sites --

24          **DR. MAURO:** Uh-huh.

25          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- it was not strictly applied

1 to metal forming at the time, and so I think  
2 that's probably the case when this was done.  
3 But you're right, this -- this is a presumptive  
4 cancer in the SEC class -- in the SEC period.  
5 So had it not been compensated in this way, it  
6 would have been compensated in the SEC.

7 **DR. WADE:** Yeah, but if it does raise a  
8 scientific issue, SEC issue aside, it should be  
9 fixed.

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, yeah.

11 **DR. WADE:** Tracked and fixed.

12 **DR. MAURO:** I -- I would say that -- 'cause I -  
13 -- I'm -- because I've been doing all these AWEs  
14 and becoming very, very familiar with all of  
15 the sites, all of the assumptions, and except  
16 for Harshaw, you know, I -- the 100 MAC, and  
17 that was -- from an external point of view, you  
18 -- you know, as long as you don't have any ore,  
19 you know, any thorium or radium there --

20 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right, right.

21 **DR. MAURO:** -- and this is the only uranium,  
22 and it's not recycled uranium and it -- you  
23 know, it's not enriched -- you know, you're  
24 dealing with pure uranium, the OTIB seems --  
25 OTIB-4 seems to work -- in terms of external

1 exposure, work very well.

2 The inhalation part, 100 MAC, when I look at  
3 all the dat-- the records, even -- even for  
4 sites that handled -- you know, was processing  
5 uranium, not just grinding it --

6 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

7 **DR. MAURO:** -- 100 MAC is up there.

8 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

9 **DR. MAURO:** It ain't bad. So -- but  
10 nevertheless, there are cir-- some  
11 circumstances where you do go above 100 MAC, so  
12 it sounds like your latest version is going to  
13 limit it -- I guess, am I correct, to --

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** To metal handling.

15 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I've lost track.

16 **MR. ALLEN:** That is where it's at right now.

17 **DR. MAURO:** Only metal.

18 **MR. HINNEFELD:** All right.

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** Now what -- 82 was which site  
20 again?

21 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Harshaw.

22 **DR. MAURO:** 82 was -- the one we just did was  
23 Harshaw.

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** It is Harshaw. So the question I  
25 had was -- you said it was -- was it only

1 uranium, or was it --

2 **DR. MAURO:** No -- yeah, the Harshaw site is  
3 only uranium, but in all different forms.

4 **MR. GRIFFON:** All different forms, right.

5 **DR. MAURO:** Every form you can think of --  
6 brown, yellow --

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right.

8 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, everything's there.

9 **MR. ALLEN:** And I believe OTIB-4 covered that  
10 at that time, and it's been pared back to  
11 metal.

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

13 **MR. ALLEN:** It kind of goes along with what you  
14 mentioned earlier, at what point is the  
15 bounding estimate you're not that sure of.

16 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

17 **MR. ALLEN:** Harshaw ended up being a self-  
18 identified SEC --

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** SEC, right.

20 **MR. ALLEN:** -- (unintelligible).

21 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 83.14.

22 **DR. MAURO:** Now -- now there are a couple of  
23 points --

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** So that's the real bottom line,  
25 is even though we might question the

1 applicability to this site, it doesn't matter.  
2 It fell into this self-identified SEC anyway.  
3 Right?

4 **MR. HINNEFELD:** And bear in mind that this is  
5 one of the population of those cases that were  
6 done with OTIB-4 and compensable with OTIB-4  
7 when we've said that it was applied more  
8 broadly than it should have been --

9 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

10 **DR. MAURO:** Right, so --

11 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- so it's (unintelligible)  
12 that, as well.

13 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

14 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Doing this case today, we would  
15 not have used this technique.

16 **DR. MAURO:** During the course of the discussion  
17 you had mentioned OTIB-4 and you re-- you  
18 revisited the external dose model now in -- in  
19 terms of re-evaluating it. I did have a  
20 problem -- doesn't apply to this case, but  
21 while we're talking about it, one last thing  
22 that would put OTIB-4 to bed is the ingestion  
23 and resuspension/inhalation model. I think the  
24 problem has been solved 'cause I read Bethlehem  
25 Steel recently, the latest version, and Jim has

1           come up with his new method that he described  
2           earlier and now I've had a chance to read it  
3           and I think that this whole issue that I keep  
4           harping on regarding that there -- relat-- you  
5           know, how do you do con-- surface contamination  
6           and inadvertent ingestion --

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Uh-huh.

8           **DR. MAURO:** -- and -- and inhalation. The new  
9           method -- it looks good. I mean I -- you know,  
10          I -- I read it because we had a meeting and I  
11          wanted to be prepared, but it's still here in  
12          OTIB-4. So when I -- so when you're re-looking  
13          at OTIB-4 from an external point of view, you  
14          may want to take a look at the resuspension  
15          model that's imbedded in OTIB-4 and -- and see  
16          -- and bring it up to date with the methodology  
17          that's being used, for example, at Bethlehem  
18          Steel. The -- the -- the problem --

19          **MR. GRIFFON:** So is this an overarching issue -  
20          -

21          **DR. MAURO:** This is --

22          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- that Jim volunteered --  
23          (Whereupon, multiple participants spoke  
24          simultaneously, rendering transcription of  
25          individual comments impossible.)

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** So that covers 82.5. Right?  
2           That's the one you're (unintelligible)?

3           **DR. MAURO:** Yes, yes, I...

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** We're -- we're tracking that with  
5           that global --

6           **DR. MAURO:** Global.

7           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- pol-- now that's not been  
8           issued yet, has it, or -- you said you'd read  
9           something and you're happy with it, I didn't  
10          understand --

11          **DR. MAURO:** Well, no, yeah, I --

12          **MR. ELLIOTT:** You've seen it in the Bethlehem  
13          Steel revised Technical Basis Document, and Jim  
14          --

15          **MR. HINNEFELD:** That might be Bethlehem Steel-  
16          specific.

17          **MR. ELLIOTT:** It is Bethlehem Steel-specific,  
18          but the concept I think is what Jim's going to  
19          --

20          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

21          **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- develop, and -- and you will  
22          hear this -- I believe it's on his science  
23          agenda items for the May meeting. He's  
24          prepared to present the white paper on this to  
25          you and -- so if we can get that -- get your

1 thoughts on that and we can implement this  
2 thing, we would pick up the TIB-4 and any other  
3 of the Technical Basis Documents that call for  
4 ingestion/resuspension modeling and make sure  
5 that, you know, we're -- we're applying this  
6 applicably and implementing after it's -- did I  
7 say that right, applying this applicably?  
8 Applying this appropriately -- appropriately.

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I like that, applicably.

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** All right, so -- so there's --  
11 there's no case-specific follow-up on any of  
12 these, 82 1 through 5, I don't think. Or -- I  
13 haven't looked at 6 yet, but --

14 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 82.6 is -- there is some  
15 discussion in here that's somewhat supportive  
16 of the ingestion that was used, but in reality  
17 this is a generic issue.

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

19 **MR. HINNEFELD:** It would be on the generic  
20 issue list.

21 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, in fact I did want to talk a  
22 little bit about -- this is a -- I guess a  
23 concern I have. I think that the write-up you  
24 have here in terms of your response explains  
25 that well, the way we did the ingestion pathway

1 -- we understand your concerns. Okay?

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Uh-huh.

3 **DR. MAURO:** But you know what? In the end, you  
4 come out with some number, here's the number.  
5 Then -- then in the answer said well, you know,  
6 let's take a look how bad that number really  
7 is.

8 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

9 **DR. MAURO:** And you go to some other sources of  
10 information and says hey, you know, that  
11 number's not that bad when you look at these  
12 other source of information -- and I agree with  
13 that. I mean that's fine. But I -- but I  
14 don't -- I think that side-steps the issue --

15 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

16 **DR. MAURO:** -- if you see what I'm saying. I  
17 think you still have to deal with the fact that  
18 OTIB-4 says this and -- and so thi-- to me,  
19 that wa-- in my mind, that though you may have  
20 been able to find a way to ra-- justify why the  
21 final number that you use might have been okay  
22 after all --

23 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

24 **DR. MAURO:** -- that -- that still doesn't mean  
25 the OTIB-4 method should stand as-is.

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, and -- and we don't say -  
2           - we don't claim it will, because --

3           **MR. GRIFFON:** What I've heard is that we'll  
4           look at this generic paper Jim will present and  
5           if -- you know, if it's accepted -- or, you  
6           know, after review, I guess NIOSH would say  
7           okay, let's reflect on that and does it affect  
8           any of our TIBs and we'll make the changes if  
9           we need to.

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** So I think that's the way we  
12          state it here. I don't think there's any case-  
13          specific action --

14          **MS. MUNN:** No, I don't.

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- on that.

16          **MS. MUNN:** All the issues that have been raised  
17          are being covered elsewhere.

18          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, yeah.

19          **DR. MAURO:** That's the reason why I --

20          **MR. GRIFFON:** Is 82 6 --

21          **DR. MAURO:** -- (unintelligible) 30-second so  
22          you could get the picture.

23          **MS. MUNN:** (Unintelligible)

24          **MR. HINNEFELD:** 82.7 is, again, the use of TIB-  
25          4.

1           **MS. MUNN:** Yeah.

2           **MR. HINNEFELD:** That's what that is.

3           **MS. MUNN:** It still (unintelligible) --

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** I was just stopping at 82.6. Is  
5 there --

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** I think the only action would  
7 be that it's the generic ingestion issue.

8           **MR. GRIFFON:** Generic -- right, okay. Yeah,  
9 got it. Okay.

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** That takes us to 83, 83 is  
11 Herring Hall.

12          **UNIDENTIFIED:** Herring Hall?

13          **DR. MAURO:** Herring Hall, early years, machined  
14 uranium, used OTIB-4 and the person was  
15 compensated. And as I see it, it's the same  
16 old story, you know, OTIB-4 was used. I don't  
17 -- now I don't believe there is a -- there  
18 might be -- site profile for Herring Hall?

19          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Not yet.

20          **DR. MAURO:** Not yet? Now when -- when -- when  
21 and if that does come out, we're going to have  
22 a very similar situation as we did for  
23 Bridgeport Brass. That is, you have a more  
24 realistic treatment.

25          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.



1           it's --

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** What site is this again? I  
3 missed --

4           **DR. MAURO:** Huntington --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** Huntington (unintelligible).

6           **DR. MAURO:** -- Pilot Plant. Now they did use -  
7 - and I reviewed the site profile. This  
8 brought up -- by the way, I won't mention the  
9 person's cancer, but it was denied. The -- I  
10 have certain comments here, criticisms  
11 regarding how the -- the doses were -- I'll --  
12 I'll get -- I'll just paint the picture.  
13 In this facility the person that was working  
14 there was externally exposed because there was  
15 airborne and deposited radioactivities of ur--  
16 uranium on the ground. There were these things  
17 called birdcages, which were these little --  
18 these places where they stored the uranium --  
19 uranium. They took -- they took these -- I  
20 think this is the place where they took the  
21 nickel -- the fusion barrier from gaseous  
22 diffusion plants and they -- it was -- it was  
23 contaminated with ur-- with uranium, enriched  
24 uranium, recycled uranium, so we have a site  
25 here now where the nature of the operation was

1           Oak Ridge would ship these nickel barriers to  
2           this facility to pro-- separate out the -- the  
3           uranium from the nickel -- the fusion barrier  
4           and have -- and now we have the nickel, which  
5           can be recycled and used to make more fusion  
6           barriers, and the uranium, which -- which is a  
7           valuable commodity, which was enriched in some  
8           cases -- of course it was enriched 'cause it  
9           was (unintelligible) of the fusion, some of it  
10          was recycled so it had all the, you know, trace  
11          levels of activation products. And so -- now -  
12          - so now you have a guy that was working there  
13          and -- and what's his exposure? He's exposed  
14          to any airborne radioactivity, any deposit --  
15          uranium that's deposited, and he's also exposed  
16          because he's standing next to these birdcages  
17          where, once you've separated the uranium out,  
18          you put it in these little containers and these  
19          birdcages were set up so that there wouldn't be  
20          a criticality. You're probably familiar with  
21          that.

22          **MS. MUNN:** Yes.

23          **DR. MAURO:** Okay. Now --

24          **DR. POSTON:** The birdcages are large.

25          **DR. MAURO:** They're -- yeah, they had a picture

1 of them, they're large. They're about five by  
2 five -- I think it was five by five -- and  
3 raised. And they're -- and now -- so that --  
4 that's your setting. Okay?

5 Now we -- we -- I looked at that and said okay,  
6 the -- I had a number of concerns regarding the  
7 methods that were used to -- to reconstruct the  
8 external exposure from the material that was on  
9 the ground, the material that was airborne. We  
10 could not match very well your birdcage  
11 external exposure scenario, so we -- we had a -  
12 - we had a -- we checked all these numbers. We  
13 noticed that when you -- here -- so -- so from  
14 a big picture, we had a little trouble matching  
15 your numbers. We didn't get your same numbers  
16 externally.

17 Internal, we had no serious problems. The way  
18 we saw it was the -- this person's working the  
19 early years and he's inhaling this material.  
20 Now think of it like this. Is this -- they  
21 have data where they measured the activity,  
22 airborne radioactivity, and they have the data  
23 for different time periods and different work  
24 activities. Okay? So in other words, we have  
25 a lot of data, so have lots of good data.

1           Problem is, I believe you folks used the full  
2           distribution or the median for all this data.  
3           But we have information from reading the CATI  
4           that this guy had a job that placed him at --  
5           in the refining section, I think it was called,  
6           where he probably was at a location where he  
7           wasn't an average kind of guy. He might have  
8           been located someplace where he probably got  
9           closer to the higher levels because of his job  
10          description. In addition, the data that you  
11          folks used was based on all the data that was  
12          gathered over a number of years, the air  
13          sampling data, when in fact this guy worked  
14          very early on.

15          So what we did is we took all the data and said  
16          well, listen, let's get rid of all the recent  
17          data because that doesn't really apply to this  
18          guy. Let's just look at the early data. And  
19          the early data is a lot higher, so we -- we  
20          came across pretty ser-- we -- we felt that  
21          this was a -- some serious issues here in terms  
22          of how this was done. And the main reason is,  
23          we think that this guy's job was such that he  
24          probably was more at the high end of the dust  
25          loadings as opposed to the average.

1           And two, because of his job description -- and  
2           -- and also we felt that the -- a lot of the  
3           data was -- you used all the data as opposed to  
4           making a segregation by time period. And if  
5           you do segregate by time period, you can get  
6           fairly higher exposures if you just use the  
7           earlier time period.

8           And we had a third problem, you used the data  
9           collectively and didn't make a distinction  
10          between breathing zone versus general air and  
11          you -- you know, from previous experience, if  
12          you look at the breathing zone data, then  
13          generally you get a little higher exposure.  
14          So in the end, we think that -- that you  
15          probably could have been a little bit more  
16          claimant favorable, and that's my -- so now  
17          I'll try to paint the picture.

18          **MR. ELLIOTT:** Wait a minute. Claimant  
19          favorable or more technically accurate?

20          **DR. MAURO:** I think, given the uncertainties, I  
21          would say claimant favorable as opposed to  
22          techni-- in other words, I think that, given  
23          the assumptions that were selected -- in other  
24          words, using the full distribution of all the  
25          data --

1           **MR. ELLIOTT:** Okay.

2           **DR. MAURO:** -- that -- that would have been --

3           **MR. ELLIOTT:** I understand. That helps me to  
4 understand --

5           **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, yeah --

6           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- where you're coming from.

7           **DR. MAURO:** -- yeah, the -- I think that in --  
8 for this particular worker, given when he  
9 worked and his job description, it seemed to us  
10 that he may not have been like the average. He  
11 may have been really a person that may have  
12 been off to the higher range.

13           **MR. ELLIOTT:** Understood.

14           **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Off microphone) What process  
15 was used to take the uranium (unintelligible)?

16           **DR. MAURO:** Well, they had their carbon  
17 (unintelligible) process, they called it, or  
18 carbon --

19           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Carbon (unintelligible).

20           **DR. MAURO:** -- carbon -- I believe the word was  
21 carbon (unintelligible), and it was a special  
22 chemical process that separated the uranium  
23 from the --

24           **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Off microphone) So it was a  
25 liquid?

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** I think it was a gas.

2           **DR. MAURO:** I don't know.

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:** I think it was a gas, yeah.

4           **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Off microphone) That's why I'm  
5 asking.

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, I think --

7           **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Off microphone) If it was  
8 liquid, (unintelligible).

9           **MR. ELLIOTT:** It didn't destroy the barrier, it  
10 just pulled the stuff out of the barrier.  
11 Right? That's my understanding. And then they  
12 reused the bar-- they retooled the barrier and  
13 reused it.

14          **DR. MAURO:** They had --

15          **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Off microphone)  
16 (Unintelligible)

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** Do we -- this gets into a site  
18 profile question while you're looking  
19 (unintelligible) there, but has a site profile  
20 been issued on this yet or is it --

21          **MR. HINNEFELD:** (Unintelligible) there was --  
22 there's been a site profile (unintelligible) --

23          **DR. MAURO:** This is -- yeah, this is --

24 (Whereupon, multiple participants spoke  
25 simultaneously, rendering transcription of

1 individual comments impossible.)

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** And it's in revision.

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** Oh, revision.

4 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, if you recall, there has  
5 been another Huntington case reviewed early on  
6 --

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right.

8 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- and some of the similar  
9 findings were raised there, maybe some  
10 different ones to here, and so the revision now  
11 I'll have to go incorporate -- you know, I'll  
12 have to evaluate the findings from both the  
13 reviews that have been done, so it -- it's --  
14 the revision is not done to that site profile  
15 but it is -- it's on our to-do list and it is  
16 in revision.

17 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay. All right, all right.

18 **DR. POSTON:** But you're -- you think it's a  
19 gas?

20 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I'm -- it's been a long time  
21 since I've looked at that. My understanding  
22 was that it was the gas, that -- and I don't  
23 even remember which way it worked. I think it  
24 essentially reacted with the nickel, and so the  
25 nickel went one way and anything that wasn't

1 nickel --

2 **MR. GRIFFON:** You would have had a nickel  
3 (unintelligible).

4 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- was left behind. I believe  
5 that's -- I believe that's what it is, but it's  
6 been a long time since I looked at the site  
7 profile so I don't remember for sure. And then  
8 the residue, which would have contained uranium  
9 in some concentration, along with anything else  
10 that wasn't nickel, that was stuck there with  
11 the starting material, would be considerably  
12 more concentrated than of course, you know, the  
13 barrier was in terms of uranium per gram. So -  
14 - and if I'm not mistaken, that was -- at least  
15 at some point it was solid in something like a  
16 powder or a granular material. That's --  
17 that's what I've got in my brain, but like I  
18 said, it's been a long time since I've looked  
19 at this.

20 **DR. MAURO:** In fact, how it was done -- they  
21 actually had measured the airborne nickel --

22 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, they measured airborne  
23 nickel.

24 **DR. MAURO:** The nickel, and now on that basis  
25 associated it with -- with uranium that --

1 'cause they knew the specific activity, how  
2 much --

3 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

4 **DR. MAURO:** -- how many -- how many grams of  
5 uranium per gram of nickel --

6 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

7 **DR. MAURO:** -- and there was a distribution, so  
8 there wa--

9 **MR. GRIFFON:** Surrogate, maybe.

10 **DR. MAURO:** -- so there was airborne dust-  
11 loading of nickel, so they measured air, so it  
12 wasn't -- so -- yeah.

13 One last point --

14 **MR. ALLEN:** I think we used an upper end on  
15 that uranium concentration, or enrichment, one  
16 or the other.

17 (Whereupon, multiple participants spoke  
18 simultaneously, rendering transcription of  
19 individual comments impossible.)

20 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, you used 39 percent, which is  
21 very conservative and -- and my outcome on this  
22 was well, you didn't take into consideration --  
23 I believe there was rec-- the recycled, but  
24 that's okay, because you -- if you were to  
25 throw in the recycled components, it would have

1 added a little bit. But by using 39 percent  
2 enrichment across the board, that more than  
3 compensated for the fact that you may not have  
4 used -- explicitly addressed the recycled, so  
5 that's okay.

6 **MR. GRIFFON:** Doesn't that depend on the level  
7 of the recycled isotope? I mean --

8 **DR. MAURO:** But the real re-- the real recycled  
9 number, the average number, was much less than  
10 39 percent, but they used 39 percent 'cause  
11 that was for the upper end, I think, of the --  
12 of the distribution of the amount of  
13 enrichment.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** But I'm talking about the  
15 neptunium/plutonium issues --

16 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, right --

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Their contribution would be  
18 less --

19 **DR. MAURO:** Less than --

20 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- if you --

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** But you examined that, though? I  
22 haven't looked at this profile at all -- yeah.

23 **MR. HINNEFELD:** If you -- if you used a more  
24 realistic (unintelligible) enrichment of  
25 uranium, including (unintelligible) the

1 transuranics, which are (unintelligible) --

2 **DR. MAURO:** I -- I -- I mean we're coming --  
3 we're walking away with this thinking the  
4 internal dose may have been underestimated by  
5 more than a hundred-fold --

6 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Internal or external?

7 **DR. MAURO:** -- so we're not talk-- the  
8 internal, for the reasons I've --

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Oh, based on the air sampling,  
10 not the --

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

12 **DR. MAURO:** For the reasons I've --

13 **MR. GRIFFON:** Not on this issue that we're just  
14 talking about.

15 **DR. MAURO:** No, no, no, I'm sorry, no. But I  
16 mean -- I'm just trying to say that this is not  
17 a small thing.

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

19 **DR. MAURO:** We're not talking 20, 30 percent.

20 **MR. GRIFFON:** Well, now that we have sort of a  
21 big picture, why don't we go through -- you  
22 want to go through one by one or --

23 **DR. MAURO:** Sure.

24 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, I mean --

25 **MR. GRIFFON:** A lot of it -- a lot of it is

1 going to turn back to this -- now we have a  
2 site profile and there's being a revised site  
3 profile. Right?

4 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yes, site profile is being  
5 revised.

6 **MR. GRIFFON:** Because I see several of your  
7 responses say, you know, if our revision --  
8 pending our revision, we would correct this --  
9 this case or -- or adjust this case.

10 **MR. ALLEN:** I think that's going to end up  
11 being the answer on all of those.

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

13 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** The only -- the only dilemma we  
15 have, of course, is that we're not necessarily  
16 reviewing the Huntington Pilot Plant site  
17 profile, other than in this context. So I  
18 think it comes back to this -- this  
19 (unintelligible) --

20 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I think in terms of  
21 (unintelligible) resolving these comments --

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

23 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- that would be a key element  
24 -- you know, that --

25 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- we're looking at --

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- the revised profile would be  
4 a key element to this --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, yeah.

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- (unintelligible) comment.

7           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, yeah, yeah.

8           **DR. MAURO:** So it is a parking lot issue? That  
9 is --

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** No -- no, we'll -- we'll --

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** It's in this parking lot, though.

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- we'll -- we owe a revised --

13          **DR. MAURO:** Okay.

14          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- site profile.

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** And either incorporation  
17 comments or, you know, a resolution attempt at  
18 the comments -- at each of the comments. Now  
19 there are at least two Huntington Pilot Plant  
20 cases that have been reviewed, so a resolution  
21 of all the comments from both those reviews has  
22 to accompany that -- you know, has to be part  
23 of the revised (unintelligible).

24          **DR. WADE:** NIOSH will provide the revised site  
25 profile. The subcommittee can decide if it

1 wants SC&A to review the revised site profile  
2 relative to these comments, but this is the  
3 matrix that will carry.

4 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

5 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

6 **MR. GRIFFON:** Now so -- so having said that,  
7 I'm not sure we have to go through one by one,  
8 unless you want to go through these one by one.

9 **DR. MAURO:** That's why I like --

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

11 **DR. MAURO:** I think -- see what just happened?

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, your 30-second -- I know,  
13 (unintelligible).

14 **UNIDENTIFIED:** A little more than 30 seconds.

15 **DR. MAURO:** 30 seconds, we've got --

16 **MR. GRIFFON:** You've got to work on that 30  
17 seconds. No, no, that was good. That was  
18 good. I'm just -- yeah.

19 **DR. MAURO:** You know -- yeah, yeah, it's almost  
20 like a picture in front of you, you can see  
21 (unintelligible).

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** It works well for the --  
23 especially for the AWEs (unintelligible) --

24 **DR. MAURO:** The AWEs -- it works for the AWEs.

25 **MR. GRIFFON:** So I'm going to say that -- that

1 NIOSH is in the process of revising the site  
2 profile -- everybody's getting ready for lunch,  
3 I think -- revising a site profile and they'll  
4 -- they'll come back with their revision to  
5 this subcommittee and to this process, because  
6 we don't -- it -- it's not a site profile in  
7 the way we think of a site profile review, it's  
8 in this -- it's in this group.

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right, and there are not a  
10 zillion claims from this site, so it would be -  
11 -

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

13 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- probably fairly low on --

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right.

15 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- site profile review priority  
16 --

17 **MR. GRIFFON:** Exactly.

18 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- task.

19 **MS. MUNN:** And ultimately, following that site  
20 profile and the findings on it, it's going to  
21 end up reported out in a PER anyway. Right?

22 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah. Yeah, to the extent the  
23 profile changes and -- and different approaches  
24 are taken and the doses do in fact go up  
25 because of the new approaches, then in fact

1           there would be a PER in the cases that were  
2           done.

3           **MR. GRIFFON:** But I guess -- you -- you use --  
4           I'd have to read through again, but I thought  
5           you said pending that revision of the site  
6           profile, it may go to a PER. Right?

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yes.

8           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, yeah, yeah.

9           **MS. MUNN:** If changes are made.

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yes.

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** So we have to look at that  
12          profile first in here and then it may go to a  
13          PER, yeah.

14          **MS. MUNN:** Yes.

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** One other thing on this and then  
16          we'll -- I think it's -- it would be a good  
17          time to break for lunch, actually. The  
18          question that John pointed out, and I'm not  
19          sure where it occurs in the findings, but the -  
20          - this question of general area air sampling  
21          versus BZAs, I think that was one of our  
22          overarching things, as well, wasn't it? Or was  
23          it not?

24          **MR. ELLIOTT:** I don't think so.

25          **MR. GRIFFON:** The use or treatment of those

1 samples? No? Maybe I'm wrong.

2 **DR. MAURO:** We do have precedent --

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** I know we've discussed it before  
4 many times.

5 **DR. MAURO:** We have, on a particular case --  
6 not case, but there was a particular site  
7 profile on -- where it was agreed that yeah,  
8 we've got to make adjustments. I think it  
9 actually came out of Bethlehem Steel.

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** I thought we had it at Bethlehem,  
11 yeah. I thought --

12 **DR. MAURO:** In other words, when you have --  
13 when you have breathing zone and you -- well,  
14 you have general air samples, there is a  
15 limitation there --

16 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

17 **DR. MAURO:** -- and -- and in the case of  
18 Bethlehem Steel, they actually had data from  
19 Simonds Saw where they had both breathing zone  
20 and general --

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

22 **DR. MAURO:** -- and they saw there was about an  
23 eight-fold difference. So we say okay -- and -  
24 - and it turns out at Bethlehem Steel it was  
25 predominantly --

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** General.

2           **DR. MAURO:** -- general, so -- and --

3           **MR. GRIFFON:** So they added a factor, yeah.

4           **DR. MAURO:** -- so they added a factor in there  
5           and that --

6           **MR. GRIFFON:** But then I thought Jim off--  
7           offered that they might look at this as a  
8           generic issue --

9           **DR. MAURO:** Maybe a generic --

10          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- but maybe I'm wrong, I --

11          **MR. ELLIOTT:** Well, I don't think it's on the  
12          list. I'm not saying it shouldn't be or not  
13          saying it shouldn't be looked at, I just don't  
14          think it's on the list that he's --

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** Well, we -- we can always --

16          **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- reporting --

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- bring that up in the  
18          discussion with Jim at the next meeting.

19          **DR. WADE:** When Jim presents in May, you can  
20          raise this issue.

21          **MR. GRIFFON:** All right. Good enough for now.  
22          Okay then, I think -- let's -- if everybody is  
23          set, pencil it off at 85 and we'll pick it up  
24          after lunch.

25          **DR. WADE:** Just a little bit of housekeeping.



1 continue there. John, 30-second synopsis?  
2 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, 30 second -- Superior Steel,  
3 rolling mill operation, uranium. The person  
4 was denied. Okay? His cancer was denied. We  
5 -- they -- they do have a, you know, site  
6 profile, exposure matrix, that we reviewed  
7 carefully and they basically visualized that  
8 the person's again exposed to activity deposit  
9 on surfaces, dust that deposited, and the way  
10 they -- the approach they used for estimating  
11 that exposure from activity that was sort of on  
12 surfaces we concur completely with because it  
13 was based on air survey data collected at  
14 Simonds Saw where the dust loading on surfaces  
15 was much worse, and so they -- the folks  
16 decided well, let's just use the Simonds Saw  
17 external dosimetry, film badge data, to  
18 characterize that exposure pathway and apply it  
19 here. That -- you know, that certainly is  
20 claimant favorable.  
21 We -- the other exposure this person's  
22 experienced was that -- they produced these  
23 slabs and plates of uranium they rolled, and  
24 the person spent time next to it. We went  
25 ahead and reviewed the model. We have two

1 findings that were regarding how you folks came  
2 at the problem. One is our calculations come  
3 in at a lower dose, so we think you folks may  
4 have overestimated the -- the exposures and we  
5 don't know why. We looked at the X-ray  
6 exposure; everything was fine there. We looked  
7 at the internal exposure that was assumed.  
8 Lots of data, looked at all these data from the  
9 -- during operations dust is being generated.  
10 You have lots of data. Looked at it. You  
11 picked an upper 95th percentile during the  
12 rolling operation as being the dust that this  
13 person was exposed to, right on the button, no  
14 problem whatsoever with that. The other place  
15 we looked at, though, was how you modeled the  
16 res-- internal exposure from resuspension, and  
17 you used ten to the minus six resuspension  
18 factor. I guess we were a little bit concerned  
19 that that strategy -- that ten to the minus six  
20 might be -- given the nature of the working  
21 operation, may not be as claimant favorable as  
22 it could be. Finally, the ingestion pathway is  
23 the same old same old, you know, that recurring  
24 story about how to do the -- you know, the  
25 ingestion modeling. And I think that's my 30-

1 second sound bite.

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. Well, I guess -- now you  
3 say for finding 85.1 your finding is you felt  
4 like our doses were higher than yours?

5 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, in other words, we -- we came  
6 up with -- our model gave 50 percent lower  
7 doses for the small -- oh, for the small plate,  
8 and we came in higher for the large plate.

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

10 **DR. MAURO:** In other words, we didn't match  
11 your numbers and one -- for the -- there was a  
12 large plate and a small plate.

13 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

14 **DR. MAURO:** One we got higher results, and we -  
15 - we (unintelligible) do it differently than  
16 you. We --

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

18 **DR. MAURO:** -- run (unintelligible) and you  
19 folks run Attila, I believe, or -- I'm not sure  
20 --

21 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I'm not sure which one we did  
22 on this. We do have Attila, but I'm not sure  
23 which we used on this.

24 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, well, I mean we run it and we  
25 -- we -- we're close. I mean within a factor

1 of two.

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, as I -- as I recall, we  
3 used existing runs that had been done on a  
4 somewhat different geometry, and you modeled  
5 the geometries as they were at the site.

6 **DR. MAURO:** As best we can tell from the  
7 information in the report.

8 **MR. HINNEFELD:** And we put in -- you know, in  
9 our initial response -- some supporting  
10 information about the magnitude of the doses.  
11 I mean these were pretty high external doses  
12 that were being assigned for a uranium handling  
13 plant, you know, comparing to some other types.  
14 In fact, I even put in Fernald just because I'm  
15 familiar with, you know, a site that handled a  
16 lot of uranium, people were working close by to  
17 -- to a lot of uranium and throughout the 1980s  
18 when there was the production buildup, I don't  
19 think there was ever a reported dose --  
20 certainly it didn't come close to two rem a  
21 year, more -- more on the order of one rem sort  
22 of being the upper bound of what anybody was  
23 exposed to from penetrating radiation in a  
24 year, and this distribution allows -- in the  
25 95th percentile goes up to like four -- four

1 rem a year. So we felt like it was  
2 sufficiently high, you know, despite some  
3 perhaps differences in the model, you know, and  
4 source term starting point.

5 **DR. MAURO:** Well, we just took your -- we just  
6 took your -- what was in your report.

7 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

8 **DR. MAURO:** This is what you did, and we said  
9 okay, let's see if we can match your numbers.  
10 We didn't look -- in other words, what I'm  
11 hearing is that -- that you have other sources  
12 of information regarding what the external  
13 radiation should be --

14 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

15 **DR. MAURO:** -- and it is compatible with what  
16 you found. All we did was take your list of  
17 assumptions regarding --

18 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

19 **DR. MAURO:** -- time of exposure, proximity,  
20 dimensions --

21 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

22 **DR. MAURO:** -- run MCNP, see if we can match  
23 your numbers and we didn't quite get your  
24 numbers.

25 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

1           **DR. MAURO:** As simple as that. If there are  
2 other reasons --

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Uh-huh.

4           **DR. MAURO:** -- why you believe the numbers you  
5 used, from other experience, that you feel  
6 justifies using the numbers you used, that --  
7 that's fine. That would --

8           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

9           **DR. MAURO:** -- might be the answer.

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. Well, we could probably  
11 put something together more than what we have  
12 here in terms of whether -- you know, either in  
13 support -- you know, additional information in  
14 support or an alternative look at this. Okay?  
15 This could be something we could owe a written  
16 product on then.

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** A written product? Is there any  
18 -- for Superior Steel, is there any site  
19 profile or --

20          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

21          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

22          **MR. GRIFFON:** There is a site profile?

23          **DR. MAURO:** That's (unintelligible) we worked  
24 (unintelligible) site profile.

25          **MR. GRIFFON:** And then this description of the

1           -- how this photon dose with the mean of .4 to  
2           a 95th at four rem, that's described in the  
3           site profile?

4           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah. Yeah. That's where I  
5           got it from.

6           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

7           **DR. MAURO:** Okay, I guess -- we didn't come --  
8           it might be correct, but my recollection was  
9           that we were based on -- not on empirical data.

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** No, it wasn't measured -- it's  
11          not based on empirical measured data. It's  
12          based on, as you said --

13          **DR. MAURO:** A model.

14          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- of source term dose rate --

15          **DR. MAURO:** Okay.

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- and some presumptions about  
17          amount of time.

18          **DR. MAURO:** Okay.

19          **MR. HINNEFELD:** You know, a certain -- certain  
20          amount of time was chosen, I think to model the  
21          median, and a different amount of time was  
22          chosen to model the 95th percentile. And based  
23          on that, these were essentially the parameters  
24          of the -- of the distribution of the dose  
25          assigned, and we believe we can come up with

1 supporting information that illustrates, for  
2 uranium handling plants --

3 **DR. MAURO:** Okay.

4 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- these are pretty  
5 conservative estimates of external dose.

6 **MS. MUNN:** So doesn't that essentially mean  
7 your response to items one, two and three are  
8 reasonable and acceptable? Or does that not  
9 mean so?

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** I -- well, I don't -- I -- I'm  
11 just asking where this came -- you know, he --  
12 I think you're saying it's consistent with  
13 other plants, but --

14 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

15 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- I mean I don't -- that's not  
16 in the site profile or not? I think we --

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I mean it's -- it's -- it's --  
18 it would be a straightforward matter for us, I  
19 think, to compile other information that would  
20 support -- or at least support the indication  
21 that these -- this dose rate distribution is --  
22 is probably favorable to the people who worked  
23 at that site. I think we can do that. And the  
24 -- or -- or we could do -- I mean we can do  
25 other things, as well. We'll just have to see

1           what comes out of the (unintelligible)  
2           evaluation of what we provide, but I -- I would  
3           think that we can come up with additional  
4           evidence because when you -- when you model a  
5           source term, you know, we put a source term  
6           dose rate -- you know, MCMP\* or, you know,  
7           correct geometry or incorrect geometry, the --  
8           the real key element of what dose you assign is  
9           what are your presumptions about proximity to  
10          that source. And so we think there's  
11          supporting information from similar type of  
12          facilities, or at least facilities that handled  
13          similar material, uranium metal, that would  
14          support a -- a dose right -- you know, a dose  
15          in the neighborhood of what we  
16          (unintelligible).

17         **DR. MAURO:** There's no doubt, because as I  
18         said, we came in within -- within a factor of  
19         two of your plate and -- and the slab, using  
20         what we understood was your model.

21         **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

22         **DR. MAURO:** Now as far as I'm concerned, that's  
23         one way to come at it. But if you also have  
24         data from -- where other -- out of the sites  
25         where they measured the radiation fields that -

1           - that -- say -- was -- you know, I could  
2           certainly -- the uncertainty in these kinds of  
3           calculations would be met, you know, within a  
4           factor of two.

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** I think it might be useful for  
6           several other sites, too, you have -- to have  
7           that piece available, sort of like we had for  
8           Chapman Valve where all -- all the other  
9           machining references that we had to show that,  
10          you know, these numbers that we calculated for  
11          Chapman Valve intakes were consistent with  
12          other types of uranium machining operations,  
13          yeah, so it's -- it's -- yeah. So you'll give  
14          us a written --

15          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, we'll have a written  
16          (unintelligible).

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- written response.

18          **MR. HINNEFELD:** 85.2 is a dose due to  
19          resuspension.

20          **DR. MAURO:** Uh-huh.

21          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Isn't resuspension one of the  
22          overarching issues, along with ingestion, or is  
23          it just ingestion?

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** I think it's -- I think it's  
25          both, but I could be wrong.

1           **DR. MAURO:** No, in this case -- no, in this  
2 case it was something a little different. You  
3 had two alternative strategies for dealing with  
4 resuspension. One is you had some wipe  
5 samples.

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Uh-huh, yeah.

7           **DR. MAURO:** Okay? You have data. And also you  
8 had information on the radiation  
9 (unintelligible) MR per hour, if you get -- it  
10 was actually the radiation reading. What -- as  
11 I understand it is for the purpose of doing the  
12 external exposure from the positive activity,  
13 you worked with this survey reader reading --

14           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Dose rate (unintelligible),  
15 okay.

16           **DR. MAURO:** -- which if you went with -- didn't  
17 use that, but went with the swipe sample and  
18 then back-calculated over -- given that  
19 activity on the surface, what would -- there --  
20 you know, Federal Guidelines Report No. 12 say  
21 --

22           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Uh-huh.

23           **DR. MAURO:** -- is the airborne dose, you would  
24 have come up with a much lower dose.

25           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

1           **DR. MAURO:** So for the purpose of external  
2 exposure, you went with the survey reading --

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

4           **DR. MAURO:** -- and we're fine with that.

5           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

6           **DR. MAURO:** But then when it came to doing the  
7 resuspension/inhalation exposure, you didn't  
8 use the survey -- see, in theory, you could  
9 have used the survey (unintelligible) then, the  
10 reading, back-calculated what that might mean  
11 in terms of surface contamination --

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

13          **DR. MAURO:** -- and then do a resuspension  
14 model. You didn't do that, and when it came to  
15 the resuspension, you used the wipe sample. So  
16 it's almost like you used two different  
17 strategies and I -- I guess -- and the latter,  
18 based on the wipe sample, does -- would -- does  
19 come up with a substantially lower inhalation  
20 exposure than if you went the other route. I  
21 don't know if you're following all that --

22          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, and -- and -- but in  
23 fact, I mean wouldn't resuspension be more  
24 dependent on a removable --

25          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah --

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- that -- what you'd measure  
2           on a smear than it would with a surveying  
3           (unintelligible)?

4           **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

5           **MR. HINNEFELD:** You know, from -- just on the  
6           face of it from that standpoint, I would think  
7           the removable contamination --

8           **DR. MAURO:** Would be a better --

9           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- would be more contributive -  
10          -

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** Seems more appropriate, yeah,  
12          yeah.

13          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, I can't argue with that.

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, then --

15          **MR. HINNEFELD:** So did you want anything  
16          additional here, or --

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** The only thing I want -- I just  
18          want clarification on -- when you say relying  
19          on survey meters, I'm not -- I didn't review  
20          this case, but relying on a survey meter --

21          **MR. HINNEFELD:** I believe it was there. Right?

22          **DR. MAURO:** Oh, was that -- that's --  
23          (Whereupon, multiple participants spoke  
24          simultaneously, rendering transcription of  
25          individual comments impossible.)

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** So you have site data? Okay.

2           **DR. MAURO:** Oh, yeah, that was what --

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, this is one of the AWES  
4 where there is pretty health site data.

5           **DR. MAURO:** Oh, yeah, absolutely.

6           **MR. GRIFFON:** So you don't have film badge  
7 data, but you have some --

8           **MR. HINNEFELD:** I guess not. I don't -- you  
9 know, there's not --

10          **DR. MAURO:** (Unintelligible) survey meter.

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** (Unintelligible) dose rate  
13 (unintelligible) --

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** I'm assuming from 85 1 that you  
15 don't have any --

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** It sounds like we don't have --  
17 don't have film badge records like we have --  
18 like at Chapman Valve.

19          **MR. GRIFFON:** But you have a lot of maybe  
20 survey data or something like that.

21          **MR. HINNEFELD:** You know, I'm not very familiar  
22 with --

23          **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay, (unintelligible).

24          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, there's (unintelligible).

25          **MR. GRIFFON:** It sounds like we're okay. I was

1 just curious from the -- if it was site-  
2 specific --

3 **DR. MAURO:** I only brought it up in terms of --  
4 well, you're right, if -- if you're going to do  
5 resuspension and you're trying to say okay,  
6 let's forget what might have been resuspended,  
7 if you -- swipe data is probably your  
8 (unintelligible).

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. And then 85.3 is post-  
10 operation inhalation exposure to suspended dust  
11 may have been underestimated. And I guess I'm  
12 at a little disadvantage here 'cause I'm not  
13 completely conversant on this -- on this case  
14 or on Superior Steel.

15 **DR. MAURO:** The only point we're making, again,  
16 is -- okay, let's -- let's say we're starting  
17 with -- there was a two-pronged concern.

18 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

19 **DR. MAURO:** One is you based on a swipe, and  
20 I'm -- I'm okay with that. But then you  
21 applied a ten to the minus six resuspension  
22 factor --

23 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Oh, the ten to the minus six.

24 **DR. MAURO:** Right, and -- and I -- we had an  
25 attachment in the back -- the ten to the minus

1           six, and this is really a judgment call,  
2           probably is -- is not unrealistic, but there's  
3           certain laws of evidence -- you know, if you're  
4           walking around the site and you're -- there's  
5           physical -- people are walking around, keeping  
6           things up, you can easily (unintelligible) ten  
7           to the minus four. Ten to the minus six is  
8           probably toward the low end, and that was the  
9           point.

10       **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. I mean --

11       **MR. GRIFFON:** It may be a generic resuspension  
12       question, too. I think we've had --

13       **DR. MAURO:** Oh, yeah --

14       **MR. GRIFFON:** -- in our generic discussions --

15       **DR. MAURO:** -- DTRA -- DTRA --

16       **MR. GRIFFON:** -- this come up before.

17       **DR. MAURO:** -- just for your information, DTRA  
18       had researched this for their purposes -- you  
19       know, for their veterans, and they settled in  
20       on ten to the minus five. That's outdoors.

21       **MR. GRIFFON:** Outdoors.

22       **DR. MAURO:** Here -- here I would say -- you  
23       know, if you do a deposited uranium dust on the  
24       surfaces and people are walking around and, you  
25       know -- and there's a potential to have a

1           little bit more resuspension -- lots and lots  
2           of literature on resuspension factors. You may  
3           want to take a look --

4           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

5           **DR. MAURO:** -- at that ten to the minus six and  
6           see if you're comfortable with  
7           (unintelligible).

8           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

9           **MR. GRIFFON:** And then --

10          **DR. MAURO:** I felt that --

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- I would propose --

12          **DR. MAURO:** -- you were too low.

13          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- that that be done in that  
14          generic --

15          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, that would be the place to do  
16          it --

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- the overarching -- I believe  
18          we did ask for a response overarching.

19          **MR. HINNEFELD:** My recollection is that  
20          resuspension is one of the overarching --

21          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah --

22          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- issues and --

23          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- I'm pretty sure --

24          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- so is --

25          **MS. MUNN:** Yes, it is, in fact.

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** So we can --

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** Handle that that way.

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- handle that there, probably.  
4           Okay.

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** Now as far -- and John, you're  
6           comfortable with the -- the use of the site  
7           data, though? Seems like they're using -- it's  
8           not really a median, but with a high GSD, you  
9           know.

10          **DR. MAURO:** From the swipes --

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

12          **DR. MAURO:** -- what the -- I thought you took  
13          the high end. I -- I'm not sure.

14          **MR. HINNEFELD:** I don't recall, sitting here.  
15          I -- I'm just not familiar with Superior Steel.

16          **DR. MAURO:** My recollection is you picked a  
17          high value for the swipe data, not the -- let -  
18          - let -- maybe (unintelligible) --

19          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Do you guys know?

20          **MR. SIEBERT:** I believe that's correct, yeah.

21          **DR. MAURO:** You did use the high value. Right?  
22          Or did you use the median?

23          **MR. SIEBERT:** It was -- no, I believe we used  
24          the max removable contamination.

25          **DR. MAURO:** That's what I remember, too, yeah.



1 (unintelligible) -- see if the resuspension  
2 model is (unintelligible).

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** Probably not much.

4 **DR. MAURO:** Zero.

5 **MR. GRIFFON:** Zero, there you go.

6 **DR. MAURO:** (Unintelligible) off to zero.

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** So we're not going to worry about  
8 that.

9 **DR. MAURO:** (Unintelligible)

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** All right. But we still have  
11 that generic question of the --

12 **MR. HINNEFELD:** There's still the generic issue  
13 (unintelligible) --

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- one (sic) to the minus six,  
15 yeah.

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- sure.

17 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

18 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 85 -- 85.4 questions the method  
19 for internal doses associated with inadvertent  
20 ingestion. Okay, this would be ingestion  
21 generic issues.

22 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

23 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

24 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, (unintelligible).

25 **MR. HINNEFELD:** And 85.5 is -- questions the

1 basis for the plutonium-239 and 237 activity  
2 fractions, and I didn't put an initial response  
3 in here, I think in large part because it's  
4 hard for me to believe that they have  
5 (unintelligible). We don't have evidence that  
6 there was recycled uranium sent to this place.  
7 The reason it's included in the site profile is  
8 that the Department of Energy didn't really  
9 track in particular their uranium as recycled  
10 or not recycled, so when they would have a  
11 contractor provide uranium to an AWE, it's a --  
12 **DR. MAURO:** Well, I think you did include --  
13 **MR. HINNEFELD:** We included some.  
14 **DR. MAURO:** -- included it, and without any  
15 reference to why the particular --  
16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Those values were chosen?  
17 **DR. MAURO:** -- (unintelligible) --  
18 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, where'd you --  
19 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I can -- I suppose I could find  
20 those -- those references, and I -- I ga-- I  
21 think I ran out of time is why I --  
22 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.  
23 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- didn't actually get in--  
24 **DR. MAURO:** We -- we -- we -- I didn't tur-- we  
25 -- in theory, I could have asked some of -- you

1 know, we did look at recycled uranium for Y-12.

2 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right, right.

3 **DR. MAURO:** In theory I could have turned some  
4 folks on to take a look, are these good  
5 numbers. I didn't do that. I just simply  
6 said, you know, you gave the percentages or --

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

8 **DR. MAURO:** -- parts per million you used --

9 **MR. GRIFFON:** Where did these come from, yeah.

10 **DR. MAURO:** -- with-- without giving a  
11 reference.

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

13 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** That's all we -- that's all we  
15 need.

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, we should be able to  
17 provide the source information.

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

19 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, then -- that's it for 85  
20 -- 86 is a Linde Ceramics case.

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** John, you're on.

22 **DR. MAURO:** Okay. Ah, this was an interesting  
23 one, and I think that this is a -- what we have  
24 here is a worker that worked at Linde --  
25 there's an exposure matrix for Linde so it's

1 not OTIB-04. Now the work -- now during -- at  
2 Linde you can think in terms of there were the  
3 -- an operation period where there was lots of  
4 stuff going on. You know, they were -- all  
5 sorts of uranium chemistry. But then there was  
6 a cleanup period and then there was a post-  
7 cleanup period. This particular worker was  
8 there during the cleanup period. Okay? And  
9 during that time, he was involved -- and I  
10 don't know if I could speak to this -- he was a  
11 welder, and in effect what happened here is you  
12 had lots of data regarding external exposures.  
13 There was -- there was lots of data. Matter of  
14 fact, there was tables upon tables of data.  
15 And you went ahead and picked some value. But  
16 from reading his CATI -- we're talking external  
17 exposure now -- from reading his CATI, it  
18 appears that he was working very closely with  
19 non-destructive testing people who were  
20 involved in X-rays. You know, this was -- he  
21 was a welder and -- and -- and there -- and so  
22 his job, the way I sort of visualize it, here's  
23 a guy who was up close and personal to the  
24 pipes where he was doing welding operation.  
25 And after the welding operation there's --

1           there's non-destructive testing, sort of like  
2           went hand in hand. And so he may have gotten  
3           exposures which were a lot different than let's  
4           say your typical worker in the plant involved  
5           in cle-- involved in the cleanup operation, I'm  
6           not sure. So my question is, with regard to  
7           the external exposure, using the median value  
8           of the distributions would certainly be  
9           reasonable for a worker that worked on cleanup  
10          and worked throughout the facility and got a  
11          little bit -- some places were high, some  
12          places were low. In this case it looks like we  
13          have a worker, though, his nature of his job  
14          was a welder where he's up close and personal  
15          to the piping doing his job, and I assume --  
16          and I might have assumed incorrectly -- that  
17          hand in hand of goes with welding is non-  
18          destructive X-ray test-- testing, they're going  
19          together. And he may have gotten -- may have  
20          been involved in that part of -- also.

21          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, I --

22          **DR. POSTON:** I would assume --

23          **DR. MAURO:** I don't know.

24          **DR. POSTON:** I would assume there was a  
25          qualified radiographer there.

1           **UNIDENTIFIED:** Yeah.

2           **DR. POSTON:** Welders don't do radiography.

3           **DR. MAURO:** And the wel-- and the welder would  
4           have been -- yeah. But there was something in  
5           the CATI to that effect --

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well --

7           **DR. MAURO:** -- and that's why we brought it up.

8           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- I took a -- I took brief  
9           read of the CATI and I guess I could have  
10          missed something. I didn't see anything that  
11          would indicate to me that he was routinely  
12          engaged in radiographic examination of welds.  
13          I know a lot of welds are done without  
14          radiographic examination.

15          In addition to -- the point that -- since he  
16          was hired in during the cleanup period, when  
17          they were cleaning up the uranium work, a  
18          welding activity in a cleanup -- in my  
19          experience, a welding activity in a cleanup  
20          experience is to cut the metal (unintelligible)  
21          --

22          **DR. MAURO:** Cut the metal and you don't -- and  
23          you're not putting it back together.

24          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- and you're not putting it  
25          back together and you're not worried about the

1                   quality of the weld 'cause you're essentially  
2                   cutting the metal so you can throw it away.

3                   **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

4                   **MR. HINNEFELD:** He did say in his CATI -- or  
5                   his CATI, I don't know if it was his or a  
6                   survivor CATI, but the CATI did talk about his  
7                   work on gas storage cylinders, which is apart  
8                   from the Linde radiological work. So quite  
9                   likely as -- during the cleanup period, or  
10                  after -- 'cause he worked well after that, too,  
11                  at Linde -- he was involved in the installation  
12                  of gas storage cylinders for remaining Linde  
13                  tasks, because I believe it actually turned  
14                  into a -- an industrial gas supplier. That was  
15                  either part of that -- their business or that  
16                  was their later business. Isn't that true?

17                  **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Unintelligible) year.

18                  **MR. HINNEFELD:** But it was -- so it was indus--  
19                  industrial gas supplier?

20                  **UNIDENTIFIED:** Uh-huh.

21                  **MR. HINNEFELD:** And so in all likelihood, if  
22                  there were welding that he did that ultimately  
23                  was examined and tested --

24                  **DR. MAURO:** It wasn't on this.

25                  **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- it would have been the later

1 part --

2 **DR. MAURO:** Okay.

3 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- of the exposure when they --  
4 when they were preparing for that kind of work.  
5 So that was my judgment when I read -- when I  
6 read the case and I read the finding, I said I  
7 just don't see that -- the connection here on  
8 why we should take this person to be exposed to  
9 radiographic examination of welds.

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** Aren't -- aren't there two  
11 Lindes? There -- there -- (unintelligible) --

12 **MR. HINNEFELD:** This is -- yeah, there are two  
13 Linde locations. One's in Buffalo and ones in  
14 -- Tonawanda?

15 **MS. BRACKETT:** Tonawanda.

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- Tonawanda. This is -- Linde  
17 Ceramic is the Tonawanda site. It was the site  
18 that did in fact do --

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** And I thought the other one was  
20 the one that went to gas as -- I -- I may be  
21 wrong (unintelligible).

22 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I thought -- I thought both  
23 did. Am I wrong on that?

24 **MS. BRACKETT:** I'm not certain. I think it's a  
25 very large company, so I don't know --

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** It was a division of Union  
2 Carbide at that time.

3           **DR. MAURO:** It was -- yeah, the ceramics, and  
4 Ton-- Tonawanda was more the research arm, I  
5 think, and Linde was the production arm. Now  
6 (unintelligible) --

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, there was -- there was a  
8 -- at Tonawanda there was a sort of a pilot  
9 plant --

10          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, (unintelligible).

11          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- and then there was a  
12 ceramics plant and -- that -- and they were  
13 already -- Linde was already working with  
14 uranium as coating -- colors -- you know,  
15 colors and glazes --

16          **DR. MAURO:** Right.

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- during World War II. And so  
18 very early on the government relied on Linde as  
19 a uranium product-- producer for Manhattan  
20 Project. So very early on it was -- it got  
21 very quickly involved in the Manhattan Project  
22 uranium work. And then -- but that work kind  
23 of ended. I think they were done with their  
24 uranium work for the government by say about  
25 '52 or something, and this person hired in

1           during the cleanup. There was a -- like a two  
2           or three-year cleanup --

3           **DR. MAURO:** That's right.

4           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- and then -- and then the  
5           site was turned over -- from a government site,  
6           it was turned over to Linde for ownership at  
7           that point. So this person hired in during the  
8           cleanup period and -- and just based on the --  
9           you know, when he was hired, the nature of his  
10          -- and -- and the -- what kind of operations  
11          would have been going on in the radiological  
12          area at that time, they were cleaning it up, we  
13          just didn't see that there's, you know, much of  
14          an evidence for the --

15          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- non-destructive testing.

17          **DR. MAURO:** The -- the post-- he was there for  
18          post-cleanup operations, and there's -- now  
19          there's no doubt that the exposures from the  
20          post-- after the cleanup are just negligible.

21          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

22          **DR. MAURO:** I mean we may have had some  
23          comments here on the methods used. For  
24          example, when -- when you folks modeled the  
25          post-cleanup portion -- let me see, I -- I

1 don't believe you included some of the progeny  
2 -- you know, the -- see, at Linde, unlike a lot  
3 of other sites, you've got the whole litany of  
4 radionuclides. You know, you've got the  
5 raffinates --

6 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yes, yes, early on.

7 **DR. MAURO:** -- you've got -- you've got to have  
8 -- you know, it's not just uranium.

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yes.

10 **DR. MAURO:** And -- okay. All right, let -- let  
11 me go -- give -- give me a second here.

12 (Pause)

13 We just left the external. Sounds like  
14 external -- position being well, listen, he may  
15 have done some cutting as a welder, but perhaps  
16 they -- he was not involved with any non-  
17 destructive testing. That was our only  
18 concern.

19 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

20 **DR. MAURO:** And if that's the case, that's the  
21 case and that's the end of that problem.

22 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

23 **DR. MAURO:** With regard to internal, what was  
24 done was you assumed this person was exposed  
25 chronically to 33 MAC -- 33 MAC is the highest

1           daily weighted average dust loading observed at  
2           Linde amongst a bunch -- a lot of measurements  
3           made, absolutely good number. And it also is  
4           considered to be representative of the  
5           breathing zone, and it also included progeny.  
6           So -- let me see, so 33 MAC, that's -- that's a  
7           good number. We have -- we're fully supportive  
8           of using 33 MAC as your default value for  
9           (unintelligible) as a -- as a plausible  
10          (unintelligible). And including the progeny.  
11          No -- the only thing -- I guess the only  
12          criticism we had regarding the -- that portion  
13          -- that is, during the cleanup and the 33 MAC -  
14          - I think you were silent regarding raffinates  
15          and any exposures he may have experienced from  
16          raffinates.

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

18          **DR. MAURO:** So it may be worth exploring that  
19          but (unintelligible) that could have  
20          contributed -- 'cause this person was denied,  
21          and our experience from other sites is that  
22          sites like this where there are -- there's a  
23          lot of processing going on, there are  
24          raffinates, and very often the thorium and the  
25          radium are separated, concentrated, and could

1 be an important contributor to exp-- intake.  
2 So there's no doubt that the 33 MAC was up  
3 there for uranium, but I think that may be -- I  
4 believe you're silent in this one on --  
5 regarding raffinates.

6 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** Is this the Linde that's  
8 currently in site profile review, or is it the  
9 other Linde?

10 **MR. HINNEFELD:** This is the one site profile  
11 (unintelligible).

12 **DR. MAURO:** This is -- yeah, this is...

13 **MR. GRIFFON:** 'Cause I'm wondering if that  
14 could be taken --

15 **DR. MAURO:** Oh, yeah.

16 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- up there or --

17 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah -- yeah -- yeah, that -- that  
18 was one of our findings in the --

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** Would be appropriate. Right?

20 **DR. MAURO:** That's -- that's an issue, yes.  
21 You could -- this could -- this issue --

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** There's a wor-- there's a  
23 workgroup established on Linde -- right? -- and  
24 there's a -- is there actually -- is there an  
25 SEC?

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** There is an SEC for early years  
2 at Linde.

3           **DR. MAURO:** Early years.

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** Oh, for early years.

5           **DR. MAURO:** And I believe that there --

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Internal monitoring at Linde  
7 started about '47 --

8           **MR. GRIFFON:** Oh, okay.

9           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- or '48, so up until then,  
10 the earlier work is (unintelligible).

11          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, this case --

12          **MR. GRIFFON:** The workgroup's covering the site  
13 profile and the SEC period, I think.

14          **MR. HINNEFELD:** I haven't been to the -- I  
15 haven't -- I think so.

16          **MR. ELLIOTT:** It's a site profile at this  
17 point.

18          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

19          **MR. GRIFFON:** Site profile at this point, okay.

20          **DR. MAURO:** Okay, this employee worked at Linde  
21 from -- oh, early years, starting in '52 -- I  
22 won't give all the dates -- starting in '52.  
23 The -- the SEC that's -- that was gr-- there  
24 was an SEC granted on Linde.

25          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

1 DR. MAURO: That was -- it --

2 MR. HINNEFELD: It only goes up through about  
3 '47 or '48.

4 DR. MAURO: Oh, so -- so -- okay, if he's in a  
5 time period where he's not covered by the SEC -  
6 -

7 MR. GRIFFON: Right.

8 DR. MAURO: -- I guess that's important, too.

9 MR. GRIFFON: But there is a workgroup  
10 reviewing the site profile --

11 DR. MAURO: The site profile.

12 MR. GRIFFON: -- so -- so we could probably --

13 DR. MAURO: Yes.

14 MR. GRIFFON: -- incorporate that in that  
15 review? Does that make sense?

16 DR. MAURO: That would be -- that would be --  
17 that would make sense.

18 MR. GRIFFON: I hate to put it in other parking  
19 lots, but I think it -- it's --

20 DR. MAURO: Well, it makes sense because in a  
21 sense --

22 MR. GRIFFON: -- it's a question of whether  
23 there's other -- other nuclides of interest --

24 DR. MAURO: Right.

25 MR. GRIFFON: -- that, you know, could

1 contribute poten-- you know, significantly to  
2 their exposures. That's...

3 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, in effect, what we have here  
4 is -- this is a good example. This is one of  
5 the places where an exposure matrix was used  
6 for an AWE facility. But as it turns out, this  
7 particular exposure matrix is on the table for  
8 review --

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

10 **DR. MAURO:** -- by SC&A and is being reviewed,  
11 unlike a lot of the others, like Huntington and  
12 -- where -- where it really would be  
13 inappropriate to take --

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** This one we can defer. Right?

15 **DR. MAURO:** We can defer this (unintelligible)  
16 --

17 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right.

18 **DR. MAURO:** We can (unintelligible).

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** And 86.3 says this question --  
20 NIOSH's response says this question is under  
21 review, so I think the site profile review  
22 makes sense to --

23 **DR. MAURO:** Good.

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- to close that out in that  
25 process. Right, Wanda?

1           **MS. MUNN:** Yeah, I -- I think probably so. But  
2 I guess there's some question in my mind  
3 whether the raffinate issue would be one that  
4 would be really applicable to a welder --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** A welder, yeah.

6           **MS. MUNN:** -- in this --

7           **MR. GRIFFON:** I had that same -- yeah.

8           **MS. MUNN:** You know, why would -- I can  
9 understand in other parts of the plant --

10          **MR. GRIFFON:** Like a chemical operator or  
11 something.

12          **MS. MUNN:** -- where you might -- yeah, you  
13 might be concerned about that, but --

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** Well --

15          **MS. MUNN:** -- it seems to me (unintelligible) -  
16 -

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** I guess theoretically, to the  
18 extent that a welder may in fact have been  
19 involved in the cleanup where they would be  
20 likely burning and, you know, cutting metal  
21 pieces to remove, and if they were cutting  
22 piping and so on that carried the material --  
23 sitting here now, it would be hard for me to  
24 say that there's no way that that welder could  
25 have been exposed to contamination due to

1 raffinate or, you know, product or intervening  
2 products, whatever might have been held up in  
3 the pipes during the work, so it's a little  
4 hard to say that (unintelligible) definitely  
5 that they wouldn't have been as a welder. Now  
6 if they were welding new stock, then they  
7 wouldn't have been. But welders are -- are  
8 sometimes used to take things apart in  
9 demolition.

10 **MS. MUNN:** And cut, too.

11 **MR. HINNEFELD:** So...

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, yeah.

13 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, which goes to this first  
14 issue. That is if, as a welder, and he was  
15 cutting up part of -- dismantlement of -- of a  
16 component of this -- piping systems that were  
17 -- had some residual contamination, I guess the  
18 -- begs the question, is he in a situation  
19 where -- and -- and he -- the per-- the type of  
20 cancer -- I don't know if I should mention the  
21 cancer --

22 **MR. ELLIOTT:** Huh-uh.

23 **DR. MAURO:** No -- were such that being up close  
24 and personal is -- if -- and -- if he was up  
25 close and personal to the sources of external

1 exposure, that means the average external  
2 exposures may not apply to him.

3 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

4 **DR. MAURO:** And that was my first finding.

5 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. Well, I mean we can --  
6 well, the second issue, about the -- the  
7 treatment of raffinate or non-uranium progeny,  
8 are -- I believe is on the Linde site profile.

9 **DR. MAURO:** It is on, absolutely, that's  
10 (unintelligible).

11 **MR. HINNEFELD:** The second question of what  
12 types -- is it appropriate to assign median  
13 level doses and --

14 **DR. MAURO:** That's -- that's legit for here.

15 **MR. HINNEFELD:** That -- that one -- okay. So  
16 then we would need some sort of -- something in  
17 writing about --

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** Is that on 86.2 or --

19 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- whether we believe -- that  
20 would be 86 -- that's 86.1, I believe --

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** Or is it --

22 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Wait a minute.

23 (Whereupon, multiple participants spoke  
24 simultaneously, rendering transcription of  
25 individual comments impossible.)

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** No, 86 --

2           **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, they're -- the difference  
3           between 1 and 2, I think in 1 we're talking  
4           about whether he might have got -- been exposed  
5           to radiographic examinations --

6           **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

7           **DR. MAURO:** -- and the argument --

8           **MR. GRIFFON:** And 2 is process --

9           **DR. MAURO:** And 2 is being up close and  
10          personal to the pipe.

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

12          **MS. MUNN:** And first -- number one seems  
13          unlikely.

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** I think number one we disposed  
15          of. Right? You -- you would agree with  
16          NIOSH's --

17          **DR. MAURO:** I'm -- I mean I'm not -- yeah. I  
18          don't -- I don't -- (unintelligible), yeah. So  
19          the --

20          **MR. GRIFFON:** So two you're saying you want  
21          some more --

22          **MR. HINNEFELD:** We can provide a written  
23          product on number two.

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** Written product, okay. Written  
25          response.

1           **MR. ELLIOTT:** While there's a lull, I'd just  
2           like to caution all of us to make sure that  
3           when we're talking about these cases we don't  
4           go too far into too much detail, maybe use a --  
5           apply a rule of three. If you give three  
6           particular characteristics about the claim --  
7           for these AWE sites in particular where we only  
8           have a small number of claims -- you tend to  
9           narrow it down, and we want to be careful that  
10          we don't have too much redacted out of your  
11          transcript here today.

12          **MR. GRIFFON:** (Unintelligible) caution, yeah.  
13          Okay.

14          **MR. HINNEFELD:** 86.4 I believe related, again,  
15          to the welding question, if I'm not mistaken.  
16          Is that right, welding and potential  
17          (unintelligible)?

18          **DR. MAURO:** Right, that was the CATI question,  
19          yeah.

20          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, potential for non-  
21          destructive examination, X-ray examination on  
22          that, so I believe that fits with number one.

23          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** I -- I had a second sort of  
25          little comment here on 86 4. This goes back to

1           one of our old findings, not only whether --  
2           and I didn't know exactly what was said in the  
3           CATI, but we've always had this question of was  
4           it -- was it addressed in the DR report.

5           **DR. MAURO:** Uh-huh.

6           **MR. GRIFFON:** You know, even if -- even if  
7           there wasn't additional exposures, we like to --  
8           -- you know, we've -- and you've agreed to this,  
9           Stu, that the DR report should at least say --  
10          at least acknowledge the comments made by the --  
11          -- by the individual interviewed.

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, we -- we do try to say --

13          **MR. GRIFFON:** And (unintelligible) say that our  
14          technique addresses it or whatever, so I didn't  
15          know if this finding was related to the DR  
16          report --

17          **DR. MAURO:** Yes.

18          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- or the actual numb-- you know.

19          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, it's -- it's related to  
20          the -- the fact that the CATI talked about him  
21          being a welder --

22          **DR. MAURO:** Welder, exactly.

23          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- and working on that.

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** Oh, so just welding in general,  
25          okay.

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** And so it -- it --

2           **DR. MAURO:** That's all. Yeah, you're right,  
3 we've -- very --

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** It wasn't about his speci-- you  
5 know, that he specifically said he was exposed  
6 to these --

7           **DR. MAURO:** X-ray.

8           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- X-rays during --

9           **DR. MAURO:** No.

10          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- the welding.

11          **DR. MAURO:** No, no, no, it was my --

12          **MR. GRIFFON:** All right, that's fine.

13          **DR. MAURO:** -- leaping to -- when I heard  
14 welder --

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

16          **DR. MAURO:** -- I think non-destructive testing.

17          **MS. MUNN:** Yeah.

18          **MR. GRIFFON:** So no further action on that one.  
19 Okay.

20          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, claim number 87 is from  
21 MIT.

22          **DR. MAURO:** MIT, let me just get to that.

23 Okay, this was an OTIB-4, no -- no site  
24 profile. Whether one's in the making or not, I  
25 don't know. This particular -- this is one of

1 the cases where someone was granted. He was --  
2 the cancer was granted, so it is again that  
3 issue of using OTIB-4 for granting. And I  
4 don't think there's anything else that I'm  
5 looking at here that is --

6 **MR. GRIFFON:** Anything new. Right?

7 **DR. MAURO:** -- anything new. It's just --

8 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

9 **DR. MAURO:** -- everything else about this is  
10 really -- the thing -- this is almost a classic  
11 example. You used OTIB-4 to grant it, and --  
12 and all of the commentaries we have regarding  
13 OTIB-4 apply here also.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

15 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

16 **DR. MAURO:** No need to go into  
17 (unintelligible).

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** I don't think we need to go into  
19 (unintelligible).

20 **DR. MAURO:** Exactly.

21 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** Except one question on that. Is  
23 -- is OTIB-4 -- or can you explain to me why  
24 OTIB-4 would be applicable to MIT? I don't  
25 know that much about what -- what they did at

1 MIT.

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, chances are -- chances  
3 are it wouldn't be. It was part of that group  
4 or the application of TIB-4 was broader than --  
5 than it should have been.

6 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

7 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

8 **MR. GRIFFON:** Broader, not only in -- in the  
9 fact that it was a compensable claim, but also  
10 broader in that the facility --

11 **MR. HINNEFELD:** The facility was --  
12 (Whereupon, multiple participants spoke  
13 simultaneously, rendering transcription of  
14 individual comments impossible.)

15 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

16 **MR. GRIFFON:** I was going to say -- okay, 88.

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 88 is -- NUMEC? Yeah.

18 **DR. MAURO:** 88? Yeah, NUMEC. Let's see what  
19 we've got here. I believe that -- I think -- I  
20 -- did NUMEC use --

21 **MR. HINNEFELD:** This case used OTIB-4, again,  
22 it was one of the inappropriately utilized --  
23 utilization for --

24 **DR. MAURO:** Oh, I'm looking at the wrong page -  
25 - 88, got it. Yes --

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** So some of the findings relate  
2 to those --

3           **DR. MAURO:** -- OTIB-4, granted,  
4 (unintelligible) --

5           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- some of the same -- some of  
6 the same findings, but there are some  
7 additional things, too.

8           **DR. MAURO:** Okay. This is a little -- yeah,  
9 this is a case where OTIB-4 was used to grant  
10 and there's another dimension to it. Perhaps -  
11 - and unlike some of the other OTIB  
12 applications where it was uranium, maybe  
13 uranium and, you know, the various forms of  
14 uranium, also --

15           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

16           **DR. MAURO:** -- not only metal. NUMEC was  
17 interesting because they did a lot more than  
18 handle uranium, so it's possible whether --  
19 that you would want to use OTIB-4 for this  
20 (unintelligible).

21           **MR. HINNEFELD:** It wouldn't -- OTIB-4 really  
22 doesn't fit NUMEC, that's true. That's one of  
23 those --

24           **DR. MAURO:** Right.

25           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- inappropriately broad

1 applications.

2 **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, okay. And here's -- and one  
3 last point on this one that --

4 **MR. GRIFFON:** But it was compensated. Right?

5 **DR. MAURO:** I don't -- and this one was  
6 compensated. There was some bioassay data  
7 available. I'm not quite sure how you deal  
8 with this, but in this particular case the  
9 records indicated that he had some bioassay  
10 data but you elected not to use it.

11 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Actually we didn't have it when  
12 the dose reconstruction was done.

13 **DR. MAURO:** Oh, okay.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** You received after  
15 (unintelligible).

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** We received it -- we received  
17 it after the dose reconstruction  
18 (unintelligible).

19 **DR. MAURO:** Oh, okay.

20 **MR. HINNEFELD:** And it -- we didn't -- we  
21 weren't really expecting to receive any 'cause,  
22 you know, DOE doesn't provide us information  
23 for -- for NUMEC. We don't have -- we didn't  
24 really have a point of contact. We didn't  
25 expect to ever get any data, and then we did in

1 fact find companies that had operated NUMEC  
2 before -- you know, and clo-- but something  
3 comes and (unintelligible) company that  
4 operated beforehand and sold it to the company  
5 that closed it, and this data actually came  
6 from that company, not the one the closed it  
7 but the one that operated it before. They were  
8 very forthcoming and (unintelligible) through  
9 their records and providing what they could.  
10 This happened to be contained in medical  
11 records, which they did have some medical  
12 record information. They didn't have the  
13 exposure records but this was in the medical  
14 record.

15 **MS. BRACKETT:** We actually have a lot of  
16 bioassay data for NUMEC now, there's some mas--

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Now we do, because the -- the  
18 company --

19 **MS. BRACKETT:** -- massive data entry  
20 (unintelligible).

21 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- the company that closed it,  
22 we finally got them to provide the information  
23 on the claimants. They did have quite a lot of  
24 bioassay information.

25 **MS. MUNN:** So this is another one of those

1 where there's no action unless --

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Unless DOL --

3 **MS. MUNN:** -- unless DOL --

4 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- asks us to do something.

5 **MS. MUNN:** -- asks you.

6 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yep.

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right. I think we're okay to go  
8 to 89.

9 **DR. MAURO:** That's it for the AWEs, I believe,  
10 and so we're going to pass the baton over to  
11 you and Kathy.

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** Wake up, Kathy.

13 **MS. BEHLING:** Right here.

14 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 89 is a Savannah River  
15 case. Do you want to do a 30-second rundown,  
16 Kathy, like John does, or you want to --

17 **MS. BEHLING:** No, I'll skip that.

18 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

19 **MS. BEHLING:** We've discussed a lot of these --  
20 as Mark has indicated, we've discussed a lot of  
21 these findings before, so let's just dive right  
22 in.

23 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 89.1 is the -- the fact  
24 that the Savannah River -- Savannah River case  
25 used the tool for a while utilized the entire

1 range of all geometries in the DCF as opposed  
2 to just the AP. And as we've stated before,  
3 any case that was done like that will be  
4 subject to the Program Evaluation Report. And  
5 I believe 89.2 is the same, because the missed  
6 dose also I believe utilized that broad range -  
7 - well, this actually -- with Monte Carlo  
8 together, I think you got one number each year  
9 that was a combination of the missed and the  
10 measured, but it either can-- but it used that  
11 full range triangular so it would be part of  
12 what's reworked.

13 **MS. BEHLING:** Stu, can I ask a question on  
14 89.1, in your response you indicate that the  
15 DCFs or distribution parameters complied with  
16 the guidance of the time, and I was just  
17 curious what guidance that was. Because I  
18 guess even when I go back to the implementation  
19 guide, I don't ever see where it indicates that  
20 you should use a min and a max for the -- for  
21 all exposure geometries. I -- even though  
22 there's an example in the implementation guide  
23 that talks about if you have AP geometry you  
24 only use your min and your max for that AP  
25 geometry, as opposed to looking at the entire

1 row and -- and looking at all geometries. So I  
2 was just curious as to what guidance they were  
3 following back at that time.

4 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, the implementation guide  
5 -- you know, that is one example it gives, but  
6 it also describes that -- situations where you  
7 may combine geometries, and in which case you  
8 would do a particular combination of one plus -  
9 - of two geometries or maybe more. And in this  
10 case there was -- I don't think there was any  
11 particular guidance that specifically directed  
12 people to, in certain situations, use a  
13 combination of all geometries, min and max of  
14 all the geometries. But it was essentially a  
15 judgment with -- that was made in the  
16 construction of the tool, the SRS tool at the  
17 time, that people, you know, could be exposed  
18 partly AP, partly rotational, partly isotropic,  
19 however. They'd be -- you know, working in the  
20 plant, there'd be a variety of geometries. Why  
21 not just apply the full range of DCF into the  
22 tool and --

23 **MS. BEHLING:** Okay.

24 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- and essentially the -- the  
25 finding and the resolution of the finding that,

1 based on how some of the DCFs were generated,  
2 we really only have confidence in AP or we want  
3 to use AP for doses that were measured by a  
4 worn dosimeter -- dosimeter worn by a person,  
5 based -- you know, that finding and resolution  
6 came after this -- the building of that  
7 original Savannah River Site tool --

8 **MS. BEHLING:** Right.

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- so that's what's meant by  
10 that.

11 **MS. BEHLING:** And I -- I did recognize that --  
12 yeah, O-- OTIB-12 does correct this.

13 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

15 **MR. HINNEFELD:** And then 89.2 is the same issue  
16 as applied to missed.

17 Okay, 89.3 has a couple of components. One is  
18 that doses less than LOD over two were not  
19 counted as -- in the missed dose component but  
20 rather were counted just as the measured value.  
21 That direction, again, has occurred later --  
22 you know, that resolution and that question  
23 occurred after this (unintelligible) was done.  
24 And the other had to do with what value to use  
25 for -- what was the LOD at Savannah River for

1 various years. And so we have identified a  
2 document here that identifies what -- you know,  
3 our -- why we concluded the LOD was a  
4 particular thing. It's not -- you know, a  
5 particular value. It's not clear to me that  
6 the site profile has actually been revised to  
7 reflect that. So I'm trying to establish with  
8 ORAU if -- if in fact we have values for --  
9 that we have confidence in that are different  
10 from the site profile values for LOD, why  
11 aren't we revisi-- you know, why haven't we  
12 revised the LOD or should we get a revision  
13 that would be -- to incorporate those values  
14 into the site profile, rather than just rely on  
15 some other document and you still have the site  
16 profile with different values than the ones we  
17 intend to use. So -- I mean in terms of  
18 product, I guess we could provide a more clear  
19 delineation of why our LOD values were  
20 different from what SC&A expected to be used,  
21 and we could also provide status of a revision  
22 to the site profile that incorporates why --  
23 you know, what we believe to be the better  
24 value.

25 **MS. BEHLING:** I think that would be

1           appropriate, because I guess the other thing  
2           that I read into your response is it looks as  
3           if you were indicating that Proc. 6 was used  
4           for -- unless I'm misunderstanding this -- for  
5           the missed dose. And here again, I guess when  
6           I look at these various documents, I sort of  
7           assign a hierarchy of documents also and assume  
8           that the site profile, when it is available,  
9           should be used. And in this particular case,  
10          the site profile was available, and I also have  
11          a note here that I wasn't sure why the site  
12          profile wasn't changed if there was some other  
13          document, as you just mentioned, that -- that  
14          disputes the -- the LOD values that are  
15          identified in the site profile.

16         **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah. It may not hurt for us  
17         to describe, just so it's clear to everyone, if  
18         there is in fact a hierarchy in relationships  
19         like that. That may be helpful for all of us,  
20         I think --

21         **MS. BEHLING:** And I believe --

22         **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- (unintelligible) that as  
23         part -- did you hear me?

24         **MS. BEHLING:** Yes, I did. Just excuse me for  
25         one second. I believe also, when I went into

1 the workbook on this particular case, it does  
2 identified, under each of the annual tabs, what  
3 the LOD value is that's supposed to be used.  
4 And I believe I was -- that's where I looked to  
5 see if they used -- if they counted missed dose  
6 as LOD -- values -- the recorded values of less  
7 than LOD over two. So it's also in -- in the  
8 workbooks, so any changes would obviously have  
9 to be incorporated into the workbooks.

10 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** To go back to your hierarchy of  
12 guidance (unintelligible), is that something  
13 that's sometimes in these -- these DR  
14 guidelines or DR notes?

15 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, I think rather than speak  
16 to that myself, I think we should -- I should  
17 go -- make it a part of the written --

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** I agree.

19 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- product and -- and sort of  
20 describe the -- the var-- you know, what -- the  
21 authority levels of the various instruction  
22 things that are provided, rather than say  
23 something here that may turn out to be false.

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

25 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 89.4 -- 89.4 is for

1           neutrons, the -- the AP geometry finding. Is  
2           that correct, Kathy?

3           **MS. BEHLING:** That's correct, it's the same as  
4           I guess 89.1.

5           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

6           **MS. BEHLING:** DCFs.

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 89.5 -- well, I probably  
8           ought to look at the finding. I'm trying to  
9           deduce them from the summary here.

10          (Unintelligible) harder than others.

11          **MS. BEHLING:** Yeah, and I looked at this  
12          response, also, and I wrote a note to myself  
13          that I'm going to have to go back and reassess  
14          since I didn't have the time to go into this  
15          level of detail. But again here I take notice  
16          that you've employed -- and I believe it's  
17          actually OCAS-TIB-7 -- I believe that first  
18          paragraph should say seven as opposed to six --  
19          and site-specific guidance for the Savannah  
20          River site. I didn't -- I -- I did look at  
21          that today and I do have to -- to re-evaluate  
22          this because we were -- we were asking was --  
23          did the -- should they have assigned more  
24          missed dose than was assigned. And I guess,  
25          again -- not to -- to go back to this, but the

1           dose reconstruction report did not reference  
2           this OTIB-7 -- or this TIB-7, and it's not  
3           always one that I quickly go back to. I again  
4           use the site profile. But we were questioning  
5           a couple of things here. Also the fact that I  
6           guess the 200F area was used for -- for various  
7           time periods and, based on the records, it  
8           didn't really look like he was at that 200F  
9           area, and so had he been there, I -- I'm not  
10          sure I would have indicated that that neutron  
11          was a possibility, but I think the records  
12          indicated something different, so I'm going to  
13          have to look at this one a little bit closer,  
14          also.

15         **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 89.6 is inappropriate  
16          organ dose uncertainty assigned for onsite  
17          ambient dose based on procedural guidance.  
18          Well, my reading -- let's see, this is -- has  
19          to do with the instructions in the site profile  
20          that lognormal distribution should be applied  
21          to the values -- the particular set of values,  
22          table of values, with a GSD of 1.3. And the  
23          dose in the dose reconstruction for ambient was  
24          not I believe lognormally distri-- distributed,  
25          or at least wasn't lognormally distributed with

1 a GSD of 1.3. When we -- you know, my reading  
2 of the procedure of the -- of the site profile  
3 is that lognormally distribution is applied  
4 with a GSD of 1.3, the relevant organ dose  
5 conversion factor is applied on an isotropic --  
6 isotropic exposure geometry and a photon energy  
7 of 30 to 250. So you start with a radiation  
8 value that is lognormally distributed, and then  
9 you apply the triangular DCF value to that  
10 lognormally distributed radiation value, and so  
11 the outcome is what the outcome is. There --  
12 you Monte Carlo that, and then the resulting  
13 distribution is fit and you choose the best fit  
14 of the available distributions for that. So in  
15 -- in my reading of the -- of the site profile  
16 -- and at least Scott's nodding at me -- it  
17 would seem that the -- the dose reconstruction  
18 was done in accordance with the directions.  
19 It's that the lognormal distribution is -- is -  
20 - is to be applied to radiation measurement,  
21 but to get to the dose value you still have to  
22 apply the DCF as a triangular distribution.

23 **MS. BEHLING:** I agree. When -- when you  
24 pointed this out and I read through it, I  
25 expected to see in the IREP input sheet the

1 values lognormally distributed. I didn't  
2 realize that they were running a Monte Carlo on  
3 the DCFs in this particular case. I think this  
4 is one of the first cases that I'd seen this.  
5 Typically they will just take the value out of  
6 the table that exists in the Savannah River  
7 site profile and apply the -- use that value,  
8 applying the 1.3, along with the DC-- with the  
9 central DCF value as opposed to running the  
10 Monte Carlo. And I believe now even the  
11 workbooks have -- have the Monte Carlo runs  
12 incorporated into them. And as you indicated,  
13 once they apply that Monte Carlo, it often  
14 results in a normal distribution and -- and so  
15 I agree and I understand now.

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

17 **MS. MUNN:** So SC&A accepts NIOSH response.

18 **MS. BEHLING:** Yes.

19 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 89.7 is about the use of the  
20 isotropic exposure geometry, and we talked  
21 about that earlier on, about ambient doses and  
22 the use of isotropic, and we believe that  
23 isotropic is the appropriate geometry for an  
24 ambient dose that is not measured with a badge  
25 on a person's body but it's measured in a free-

1 hanging badge or maybe (unintelligible), so  
2 we've talked about that already.

3 **MS. BEHLING:** Yes, and I believe that we -- we  
4 do concede that issue, yes.

5 **MR. GRIFFON:** 89.7 that was?

6 **MR. HINNEFELD:** That was 89.7. 89.8 is --  
7 addresses -- let's see, failed to properly  
8 account for all internal dose from fission  
9 products, which is on our additional products  
10 list from the fourth round. So our response  
11 there should also address the issue associated  
12 with this finding. Okay?

13 **MS. BEHLING:** Yes.

14 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, case number 90 is also a  
15 Savannah River case.

16 **MS. MUNN:** So we're okay on -- on .8 as well?

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, on -- on .8 --

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** 'Cause you (unintelligible) --

19 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- we know -- we know what  
20 product on fission product in terms of  
21 dosimetry, and so it will be addressed by that  
22 product that we've already promised as part of  
23 -- of group four, or the fourth set.

24 **MS. MUNN:** Right.

25 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 90.1 is, again, a

1 Savannah River case. I believe it has the same  
2 -- the same findings that 89 had, as long as we  
3 didn't over look something.

4 **MS. BEHLING:** No, it does. Those are a repeat  
5 of the 89 findings.

6 **MR. HINNEFELD:** And so, to the extent that we  
7 owe something, we owe it here.

8 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Or it will address this, as  
10 well.

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** And the other ones are closed  
12 out. Right? Right. Okay.

13 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 91 is a Savannah River case.  
14 Okay --

15 **MR. GRIFFON:** 91's also Savannah River?

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yes.

17 **MS. BEHLING:** It is.

18 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yes, it is. 91, from our  
19 reading, findings one through four are similar  
20 to case 89 findings, and then as we get to  
21 finding five... Finding 91.5 questions whether  
22 we should have considered assigning missed  
23 neutron dose on this claim. And again I'm  
24 having trouble reconstructing the findings by  
25 reading the summary. When you read enough of

1           them, it gets a little (unintelligible).

2           **MS. BEHLING:** I think this is similar to the  
3           previous one, also. And again, here you're  
4           referencing this TIB-7 --

5           **MR. HINNEFELD:** That's the one you said you  
6           wanted to take additional (unintelligible) --

7           **MS. BEHLING:** Yes, and I don't mind -- maybe I  
8           can look at this one, also.

9           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

10          **DR. MAURO:** So let me understand that TIB-7  
11          addresses issues related to work location and  
12          where neutron may be an issue and where it may  
13          not be an issue?

14          **MR. HINNEFELD:** More so occupation than work  
15          location.

16          **DR. MAURO:** Oh, okay.

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

18          **DR. MAURO:** And that's specific to Savannah  
19          River?

20          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yes.

21          **MS. BEHLING:** It's specific to Savannah River,  
22          and it also gives some, I think, interpretation  
23          of the records, how you're supposed to  
24          interpret the records for various years.

25          **MR. HINNEFELD:** 91.6 has to do with not being

1           able to reproduce the ambient -- on-site  
2           ambient dose.

3           **MS. BEHLING:** That's the one that we agree with  
4           --

5           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

6           **MS. BEHLING:** -- like I said, I didn't realize  
7           that you were actually using a Monte Carlo -- I  
8           -- it looked that that's what you were doing,  
9           but I -- I wanted some confirmation on that.

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** 91.7 is, again, the use of the  
13          isotropic exposure geometry for ambient.

14          **MS. BEHLING:** Yes.

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** Same as 89.

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Same as earlier.

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

18          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 91.8 is failed to  
19          properly missed tritium dose based on cite--  
20          cited guidance. And cited guidance, section  
21          4.5.4 of the SRS site profile, isn't there  
22          anymore. Apparently this was a version that  
23          went back quite a ways having included that  
24          section. The site profile -- that section in  
25          the site profile now essentially ends with the

1           overestimating approach. You know, it's 4.5.2  
2           or something like that.

3           **MS. BEHLING:** I guess, however, for this  
4           particular case -- this case was worked under  
5           the Rev. 1 of the Savannah River site profile,  
6           which was in place back in '03 -- 2003 -- and  
7           that section did exist and that's where I was  
8           confused. And I'm -- I'm not even necessarily  
9           challenging the dose. I was -- I believe what  
10          I was con-- there were two guide-- two -- two  
11          separate guidance documents and the -- the --  
12          like I say, the Savannah River site profile is  
13          the one I thought should be used. And if you  
14          use that, I believe that should have been  
15          entered as like a triangular distribution and  
16          it was entered as a lognormal distribution, and  
17          so then I thought well, maybe they used  
18          different guidance. So I went to a different  
19          guidance document where it did specify to use a  
20          lognormal distribution, and if I would have  
21          followed that guidance I would not have come up  
22          with the 71 millirem. And so it was just some  
23          confusion there as to which guidance applied.  
24          But in -- in reality, this section 4.5.4 was in  
25          place at the time this dose reconstruction was

1 done under the Savannah River site Rev. 1.

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. So...

3 **MS. BEHLING:** So I believe -- like I said, I'm  
4 not necessarily challenging this dose. I was  
5 just I guess challenging how it was entered  
6 into IREP as what distribution it should be  
7 entered as.

8 **MR. HINNEFELD:** It -- it might be that the  
9 product we've talked about earlier about  
10 hierarchy or potential hierarchy of the various  
11 --

12 **MS. BEHLING:** Yes.

13 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- documents might be helpful  
14 and maybe taking another look at what -- what  
15 did we follow when we did this kind of approach  
16 and it would be a part of that, that discussion  
17 of hierarchy of different types of documents.

18 **MS. BEHLING:** Yes.

19 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. Okay, 92 -- oh, I've  
20 finished 91. I just want to catch my breath  
21 when I finish one, you know?

22 **MS. MUNN:** (Unintelligible)

23 **MS. BEHLING:** 92 is also Savannah River Site.

24 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. Okay, 91 -- 92.1 I  
25 believe is a finding we talked about earlier,

1 has to do with the treatment of LO-- recorded  
2 values less than LOD over two, isn't it?

3 **MS. BEHLING:** Yes.

4 **MR. HINNEFELD:** And so we will take a look at  
5 the impact of you treating those LOD over two  
6 cases as part of the missed dose as opposed to  
7 part of the recorded dose.

8 **MS. BEHLING:** Right.

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, something --

10 **MS. BEHLING:** And there again, you do cite that  
11 that PROC-6 was used here and I'm not sure why  
12 PROC-6 would take precedent over the Savannah  
13 River site profile.

14 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

15 **MR. GRIFFON:** So at the end of your response on  
16 92 1, that last paragraph, Stu...

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, this change is relatively  
18 small. I mean you -- what you're going to do  
19 is you're going to take -- for a certain number  
20 of badge readings you're going to take a very  
21 small measured dose and take that to zero, and  
22 then you're going to throw in a missed dose  
23 that is a lognormal distribution for the mean,  
24 slightly higher than what you just took out and  
25 it -- you know, a 90-- a 95th percentile it's

1           twice that. So it's a -- it's a fairly modest  
2           -- first of all, the dose number itself will be  
3           fairly modest because, you know, the LODs are  
4           pretty small. And the change is -- is even --  
5           you know, may -- is quite modest, as well. But  
6           then you do have the additional -- the  
7           uncertainty aspect thrown into it, and I think  
8           I wrote that because the POC on this case was  
9           relatively close to 50 percent, so rather than  
10          just say -- if it weren't particularly close  
11          you might say this change will be very small  
12          and so we won't bother about it; we just know  
13          from now on we -- we do it correctly and we'd  
14          count those cases, those LOD over twos, in the  
15          missed dose column -- or less than LOD over two  
16          as a missed dose. But in this case, because  
17          the POC is close to 50 percent, we don't want  
18          to just say well, the effect will be small and  
19          we're not going to worry about it, so we will --  
20          -- we will reconsider.

21          **MR. GRIFFON:** I was just going to suggest maybe  
22          to rewor-- we -- we can say OCAS will --

23          **MR. HINNEFELD:** We ought to (unintelligible) --

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- instead of re-evaluate this  
25          case, I'd say -- I'd say OCAS will re-evaluate

1 the impact of this finding --

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- on the case.

4 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

5 **MR. GRIFFON:** Just so we're not --

6 **MR. HINNEFELD:** We can just take out --

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** We're not suggesting that you're  
8 re-evaluating the entire case. We're saying  
9 you're re-evaluating the impact of this finding  
10 --

11 **MR. HINNEFELD:** The impact of this finding.

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- on the case.

13 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** Just so we don't  
15 (unintelligible).

16 **MR. ELLIOTT:** I presume that implies you want a  
17 report. You want to hear back whether there  
18 was...

19 **MS. BEHLING:** I would assume so, just --

20 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I mean this is Stu's  
21 (unintelligible) --

22 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I think it's part of the  
23 resolution (unintelligible) --

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- response, so yeah. Yeah,  
25 yeah.

1           **MS. BEHLING:** And there are several other  
2 possibly or potentially sig-- significant  
3 findings in this case.

4           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 92.2, reviewer questions  
5 whether DR properly accounted for all missed  
6 neutron doses. Again, we've -- this I think  
7 may follow that OTIB-7 look that you wanted to  
8 take, Kathy, because it was selection --

9           **MS. BEHLING:** Yeah, and I guess the other  
10 question I have on this particular case -- and  
11 maybe you can clarify something here for me.  
12 When I look at the bioassay records on this  
13 case, I see under location that the individual  
14 worked, the reason that he provided the  
15 bioassay was because of location KPC, and when  
16 I read that I say -- I assume that those are  
17 reactors. And so that's also why I stated that  
18 it seemed like there might be some additional  
19 missed dose here for certain years where there  
20 were bioassays where the location was K, P and  
21 C. Am I misinterpreting that location?

22           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, K and P are reactors. I  
23 don't recall right off-hand with C, but I'm  
24 pretty confident that K and P location on a  
25 Savannah River card would indicate those --

1           those -- the K reactor or the P reactor.

2           **MS. BEHLING:**    Okay.

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:**  So that -- that's correct.  I  
4           think OTIB-7 may describe a little bit about  
5           even at the reactor facilities, based upon the  
6           -- the -- the way the reactors were constructed  
7           and operated.  There are just certain types of  
8           job titles, even at the reactor facilities,  
9           where neutron exposure was particularly likely.  
10          Not everybody who was assigned to the -- was  
11          that 100?  Was that where the reactors were?  
12          Not everybody assigned to the reactors at  
13          Savannah River necessarily had a potential --  
14          much potential for neutron exposure.  And so I  
15          think OTIB-7 gets into that, as well.

16          **MS. BEHLING:**    Okay.

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:**  Not OTIB-7 -- TIB-7.

18          **MS. BEHLING:**    Okay, and I will look at that.  
19          But like I said, and particularly the bioassay  
20          records did indicate the reactors and so --

21          **MR. HINNEFELD:**  Yeah.

22          **MS. BEHLING:**    Okay.  I guess, again, when we  
23          come back to cases of unknowns, we should give  
24          the benefit of the doubt to the claimant, as we  
25          all know.

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** So -- okay, so --

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** So what's the -- go ahead.

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well --

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** What's the action on this?

5           **MR. HINNEFELD:** I think the action -- the first  
6           action on this is -- you know, Kathy has said  
7           she wants to go back and look at TIB-7 and --  
8           in terms of -- and what it says about who is  
9           potentially neutron-exposed and in what  
10          situations to see if that lends sup-- you know,  
11          lends support to our discussion or if it raises  
12          a different question. I think that was the  
13          first action. Isn't that right, Kathy?

14          **MS. BEHLING:** That's correct.

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

16          **DR. MAURO:** I'd like to add, though, in terms  
17          of parsing job responsibilities, I -- one of  
18          the recurring themes when we meet with site  
19          experts is that it's one thing that a person  
20          has a job title and another thing exactly what  
21          they ended up really doing.

22          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

23          **DR. MAURO:** So just -- you know, it's not  
24          something -- you know, we're going to be  
25          cautious in (unintelligible) --

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** It may be a broad issue for  
2 discussion. I mean in terms of, you know, what  
3 -- what does TIB-7 -- does it -- you know, I'm  
4 not going to speak like I know exactly whether  
5 -- but it -- it sounds like it may be subject  
6 to --

7           **DR. MAURO:** That's --

8           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- discussion.

9           **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, we hear that a lot --

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

11          **DR. MAURO:** -- you know, from the -- the  
12 workers.

13          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

14          **MS. MUNN:** Well, we hear it at virtually every  
15 Board discussion, too. (Unintelligible) we've  
16 heard it about 44 times.

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 92.3 is the -- I believe  
18 that's the finding we talked about earlier?

19          **MS. BEHLING:** It is.

20          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. And 92.4 is also a  
21 finding we talked about earlier.

22          **MS. BEHLING:** Right, and we concede both those  
23 two issues.

24          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

25          **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.



1           were overestimated, so I'm proposing that we  
2           don't really need to go back and reconsider the  
3           impact of this small change. Because if in  
4           fact it were to move the dose up to 50 percent  
5           or thereabouts, we would have -- we would look  
6           at the other overestimating approaches and say  
7           well, we just can't overestimate to that effect  
8           and we'll -- we'll -- it'll be coming out --  
9           and there essentially doesn't seem to be any  
10          chance for this finding to affect the outcome  
11          of this (unintelligible) --

12         **MR. GRIFFON:** So you don't dispute the point,  
13         you're just --

14         **MR. HINNEFELD:** Don't dispute the --

15         **MR. GRIFFON:** -- (unintelligible) affect the  
16         outcome.

17         **MR. HINNEFELD:** That it's not going to -- it's  
18         not going to have an effect. We don't dispute  
19         the point. We're doing -- you know, now we are  
20         doing dose reconstructions where the LOD over  
21         two -- less than LOD over two doses would be  
22         included in the missed dose, not in the  
23         measured doses, so we just don't see the value  
24         of going back and reconsidering this 'cause  
25         this won't -- this won't change it.

1           **DR. MAURO:** Is that type of clos-- is that  
2           closure and that's something that would be  
3           written up as sort of a final matrix? How do  
4           we -- in other words, in effect --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

6           **DR. MAURO:** -- this -- in the final matrix?

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** I would -- I would -- I would  
8           think that maybe --

9           **MR. GRIFFON:** It's closure to me.

10          **DR. MAURO:** That's what that would be, yeah.  
11          Okay.

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

13          **MS. MUNN:** Small effect --

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** NIOSH -- NIOSH agrees; however,  
15          it would not impact the --

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, we've -- in fact, we've  
17          used that (unintelligible) --

18          **MR. GRIFFON:** We've used that language  
19          (unintelligible).

20          **MS. BEHLING:** Okay, yeah, this is  
21          overestimating, but the POC was over 47 percent  
22          here. How overestimating was this? Because I  
23          do see some cases that are marked as  
24          overestimating. However when I delve into them  
25          a little further, they're not -- they're not

1 quite as overestimating as we saw in the first  
2 three sets. And -- and maybe you're correct  
3 here. I'm just curious 'cause now when I look  
4 at this and I see we're looking at 47 percent  
5 POC, and there are other findings here -- maybe  
6 you're correct. I -- I shouldn't -- just  
7 something that caught my eye.

8 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, I mean if you want, I can  
9 summarize the various overestimating points. I  
10 -- I -- I can't do it right now, but we could  
11 do that.

12 **MS. BEHLING:** No, I don't think we need to do  
13 that. That's okay, I just -- just when I saw  
14 47 percent, it just -- and I don't see that it  
15 was a hypothetical internal that as used. They  
16 used --

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** That's what I looked at first  
18 and it doesn't seem to have been.

19 **MS. BEHLING:** It was -- it was a hypothetical?

20 **MR. HINNEFELD:** No, it does not seem --

21 **MS. BEHLING:** It was not, no.

22 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- based on -- I don't have the  
23 reconstruction in front of me, but just based  
24 on your review of it, it doesn't seem that it  
25 was.

1           **MS. BEHLING:** No, and again -- now here your  
2 on-site ambient was very high --

3           **MR. GRIFFON:** (Unintelligible) Make sure it was  
4 an overestimat-- sorry, Kathy, go ahead.

5           **MS. BEHLING:** Oh, that's okay. Yeah, it is --  
6 NIOSH did mark this as a maximizing case, but  
7 what I'm saying is as I'm looking down my Table  
8 1 in our audit, the only thing that stands out  
9 at me, as I said, is the internal dose was not  
10 a hypothetical internal. It looks like they  
11 did maybe either use OTIB-18 or they used IMBA,  
12 I'd have to look at that. And I know that  
13 Fernald does have high ambient because the  
14 highest dose in here is the ambient of 21 rem.  
15 But I just don't know if I'm too quick to say  
16 that if we had some significant findings, we  
17 wouldn't want to look at this a little closer.

18           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, I mean the -- the  
19 statement was made that we're not going to look  
20 at it further was bas-- related to the missed  
21 dose, LOD over two not being included in missed  
22 dose --

23           **MS. BEHLING:** Okay.

24           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- which we believe is a small  
25 --

1           **MS. BEHLING:** That is small.

2           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- small adjustment.

3           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

4           **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. All right, never mind.

5           **DR. MAURO:** Kathy, I have a question. When  
6 these are reviewed and you find that OTIB-18 --  
7 the OTIB-18/33 was used, is that brought out,  
8 because I know that is one of the concerns that  
9 -- from a -- I guess in the sixth set was  
10 something very important that's going to be  
11 aired when we get to the procedure reviews. So  
12 I guess we're not -- all I'm saying here is  
13 that in any one of the cases that we're looking  
14 at, if -- if that case did rely on OTIB-18/33,  
15 I think that's an important thing to make note  
16 of because that's going to be something that's  
17 going to be revisited during the procedure  
18 review.

19           **MS. BEHLING:** Yes, and I did mark that on the  
20 sixth set, but I did not do that 'cause we're  
21 just really starting to see the use of OTIB-18  
22 -- we're seeing that much more. And now -- in  
23 fact, as I'm going through this particular  
24 case, it looks like they did run IMBA here, so  
25 OTIB-18 was not used, but I did not make

1           mention of that in any of the fifth set. That  
2           was sort of one of those issues that we  
3           identified during the sixth set. But I did go  
4           through all of the sixth set and make mention  
5           that we did take issue with this OTIB-18.

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. Yeah, here's -- here's  
7           the -- Kathy, I'm afraid you won't have the  
8           benefit of this 'cause Scott just pulled it up  
9           on his laptop computer, but --

10          **MS. BEHLING:** Okay.

11          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- he ha-- we have, and this  
12          will be part of what we provide. This is the -  
13          - we have the IMBA fit that was utilized to  
14          generate the input for this dose  
15          reconstruction, and --

16          **MS. BEHLING:** Okay.

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- and so it shows -- yeah --

18          **MS. BEHLING:** I remember --

19          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- you don't have this --

20          **MS. BEHLING:** I remember, I remember now.  
21          You're right. You're right.

22          **MR. HINNEFELD:** It has an excretion pattern  
23          that --

24          **MS. BEHLING:** Yes.

25          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- lies above -- looks like

1 every bioassay pattern.

2 **MS. BEHLING:** I remember that. Now I clearly  
3 remember, yes, bec-- because I ran IMBA and I  
4 couldn't understand how -- how you got these  
5 values. All right. Okay, never mind. Yes, I  
6 agree with that.

7 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

8 **MS. BEHLING:** I guess on -- if we can move on  
9 to this second finding, this had to do with the  
10 occupational medical dose, and I have a  
11 question here. I guess your response to this  
12 was that there were a lot of -- there were a  
13 lot of X-rays in this man's file that were  
14 marked as DISP, not routine. Number one, what  
15 is -- what is DISP?

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Probably means dispensary,  
17 probably stands for dispensary.

18 **MS. BEHLING:** Okay, dispensary, that's what I  
19 thought. And I -- I guess -- and there were  
20 also five lumbar spine radiographs, and I've  
21 got to go back and look to see if they were  
22 marked as routine or how they were marked. If  
23 an individual is injured at his job and he is  
24 told you cannot come back to work until we --  
25 we're sure that you -- that -- that this has

1           healed or that -- that you're okay, and he  
2           needs to have let's say a lumbar spine  
3           radiograph because of that, that does not get  
4           included in the dose reconstruction. Is that  
5           correct or --

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** That -- that --

7           **MS. BEHLING:** -- how does that work?

8           **MR. HINNEFELD:** That's correct. The thought  
9           process behind the medical exposures that are  
10          included are that these were exposures or X-  
11          rays where there was no medical indication for  
12          the X-ray but they were part of a routine  
13          screening program that very frequently the DOE  
14          sites would require of their workers. And  
15          since it was required of the worker without  
16          medical indication to -- to do that, it was  
17          essentially considered a condition of  
18          employment. Someone who's injured on the job,  
19          whether they be at a DOE site or any site, is  
20          subject to those kinds of medically-indicated  
21          X-rays. And so based on that, that was --  
22          that's how we've selected those screening --  
23          routine screening X-rays as being in, but  
24          medically-indicated X-rays as not being in.

25          **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. Hans just picked up. Do

1           you want to say something? Because he -- he  
2           did this case. See what happens when I turn  
3           anything over to him? No.

4           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Meetings get longer.

5           **DR. BEHLING:** Stu, I guess it's been a long  
6           time since I looked at it. Are those lumbar  
7           spine associated with an injury that he  
8           sustained during his working days or was this  
9           part of an employment requirement as are the PR  
10          -- PA chest X-rays? I guess I'm -- I don't  
11          recall.

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** My -- my understanding is these  
13          were medically indicated, that these were  
14          probably as a result of a -- of an injury of  
15          some sort or -- or back or something like that,  
16          so --

17          **DR. BEHLING:** Can that be -- can that be  
18          interpreted from the -- the documentation or is  
19          this a -- is this a subjective interpretation  
20          on -- on anyone's part? I don't have the  
21          records in front of me to -- to -- to -- to  
22          indicate one way or the other so I'm basically  
23          asking. But if I recall, looking at it, it was  
24          not clear as to whether the lumbar spine  
25          radiographs were the result of -- of an injury

1           sustained during his working there or whether  
2           or not those were part of the conventional  
3           requirements for people who are engaged in  
4           heavy lifting.

5           **MR. HINNEFELD:** I think -- I'd have to go look.  
6           I mean I can't speak knowledgeably about it. I  
7           believe they were -- there was an indication on  
8           those records of those X-rays that these were  
9           in fact medically-indicated X-rays. So I --  
10          but I'd have to go back and look 'cause I don't  
11          -- I can't say with -- you know, for sure. The  
12          -- I think that Fernald was not one of the  
13          sites that did lumbar spine as a screening for  
14          employment. There were some sites that did,  
15          but I don't believe Fernald was one of those.

16          **DR. BEHLING:** Okay. I -- I do recall that the  
17          -- the doses that would have been assigned, had  
18          they been part of a re-- employment  
19          requirement, would have been very substantial,  
20          several rem.

21          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

22          **MS. BEHLING:** Although I guess the remain-- the  
23          remainder of your response here indicates that  
24          in calculating that dose we did use OTIB-6, and  
25          actually we should have used the FMPC site

1 profile, which -- based on the FMPC site  
2 profile -- the val-- the doses would have been  
3 quite a bit less than what is specified in the  
4 OTIB-6.

5 **DR. BEHLING:** Well, you're just mentioning  
6 something, Kathy, that suggests that they were  
7 then used as an occupational screening  
8 requirement if the -- the site profile for FMPC  
9 identifies this as one of the medical --  
10 medical exposures.

11 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Our -- our response says that  
12 the Procedure 61 would specify -- it specifies  
13 medical exposures and what it says -- let's see  
14 --

15 **MS. BEHLING:** That's right, they're saying if -  
16 -

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- it says that the -- the RFP  
18 -- the Rocky Flats TBD would be where you could  
19 see -- where you can find lumbar spine AP and  
20 lateral doses.

21 **MS. BEHLING:** Right. We -- we -- we put an  
22 example in our audit, and they were just  
23 commenting that, based on that example, we used  
24 an incorrect --

25 **DR. BEHLING:** Yeah, yeah, yeah.

1           **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. See what happens if I  
2 don't watch over him all the time?

3           **DR. BEHLING:** I'm being judged unfairly here.

4           **MS. BEHLING:** I'm sorry. Okay, so --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** Separate rooms now.

6           **DR. BEHLING:** You don't know what's going on  
7 here behind the scenes.

8           **MS. BEHLING:** Okay.

9           **MR. GRIFFON:** We're going to have to cut off  
10 the line soon.

11          **MS. BEHLING:** Okay, on --

12          **MR. GRIFFON:** Hey, one question on this,  
13 without saying the job title, do we have any  
14 indication that this person might have been  
15 engaged in a job requiring heavy lifting --  
16 don't -- I don't want to hear the job title  
17 'cause I think we said --

18          **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. I'm not sure, can -- can  
19 we look at this finding again? Can I reassess  
20 this again?

21          **MR. SIEBERT:** Just to let you know, I just  
22 looked it up real quick and at least some of  
23 the lumbar spines are marked as DISP, as well  
24 as the chest, so the con-- the consistent  
25 thought process would -- would be there.

1           **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. And then I guess quite  
2           hon--

3           **MR. ELLIOTT:** That they were job-required?

4           **MR. SIEBERT:** That they were not.

5           **MS. BEHLING:** That they were not.

6           **MR. ELLIOTT:** Okay.

7           **MR. SIEBERT:** It was not (unintelligible) --

8           **MR. GRIFFON:** But as far as the job title, do  
9           you have --

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Job title would lead me to  
11          believe that he would have been involved in --  
12          in heavy labor. It -- it's -- without getting  
13          too far into it, it's maintenance/craft, so  
14          chances are he was involved in some -- at least  
15          occasionally on relatively heavy labor.

16          Okay --

17          **MS. MUNN:** So the action then is?

18          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well --

19          **MR. GRIFFON:** Do we need to --

20          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- I'm -- we're going to go  
21          back and look at -- at the dis-- at the records  
22          of the X-rays and see if we are -- have really  
23          confidence in -- and maybe put together any  
24          other indication why we feel confident that the  
25          lumbar spines were not routine screening --

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** I mean I agree --

2           **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- (unintelligible).

3           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- with your rationale as long as  
4 they -- they didn't do a screening program at  
5 Fernald. If there was a screening, I -- you  
6 know, (unintelligible) concerns, but otherwise  
7 I think it's appropriate what you did. I think  
8 we need to determine that, though.

9           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah. Okay, that finishes 93,  
10 too, or -- yeah, 93.

11           Okay, 94 is also a Fernald case. 94.1  
12 questions whether -- complete monitoring  
13 records from the -- from the '50s. Person  
14 started working at the site before their  
15 external dosimetry record starts, and so the --  
16 the issue or the finding was are we sure that  
17 the person didn't in fact have some exposure  
18 prior to the -- the badging started. Speaking  
19 from what we've seen in the records from this  
20 site, it seems like we -- we have pretty  
21 complete records of -- of the badge reads. We  
22 have many people who were monitored regularly,  
23 even weekly in the -- in the early years at  
24 this site, and so if -- since this person  
25 doesn't have that record, it's likely that they

1           were not in fact badged until their monitoring  
2           record starts, and therefore would have -- and  
3           had little potential for exposure. Again --

4           **MS. BEHLING:** I guess it --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** Go ahead, Kathy.

6           **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. I guess in this particular  
7           case, however, there was -- there was  
8           urinalysis records back from -- in '55, 57, 58,  
9           also some chest X-rays back then. I guess  
10          that's what made us wonder why he didn't have  
11          external monitoring records for back in the  
12          '50s.

13          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, the -- the bioassay  
14          records were like terminations, and by and  
15          large they were annuals, which occurred at the  
16          annual physical. And I believe everybody got  
17          annual physicals at that time, which -- you  
18          know, at that time would have included the X-  
19          rays.

20          **MS. BEHLING:** Okay.

21          **MR. HINNEFELD:** The code on the bioassay record  
22          tells what kind of bioassay it is. Now these  
23          particular -- you know, some of the earliest  
24          bioassay records in this case, as I recall,  
25          were in the medical record, on a medical record

1 card, so they don't necessarily carry that code  
2 that later bioassay records carried, but they  
3 looked like -- there was a short period of  
4 employment. There was like a hire and a  
5 termination bioassay sample there, and in  
6 general -- I think a couple of them were marked  
7 A, there was an A, which I think might mean  
8 annual, meaning it was an annual sample.

9 **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. And in fact I'm looking  
10 back at our checklist and this case was  
11 compensated, so it's -- it's a --

12 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

13 **MS. BEHLING:** We can move on.

14 **MR. GRIFFON:** Just -- just one -- one -- one  
15 other thing on that, and that -- the fact that  
16 it's compensated may make this less of a  
17 concern, but the -- the question of did -- is  
18 this consistent with -- this is more of a site  
19 profile question actually and that it's  
20 compensated makes this probably irrelevant, but  
21 you -- you make this conclusion about, you  
22 know, that they didn't have data. Is that  
23 consistent with the monitoring policies before  
24 '60?

25 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well --

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** In other words, was it --

2           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Because --

3           **MR. GRIFFON:** It does say the job title  
4 suggests that -- that --

5           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Because of --

6           **MR. GRIFFON:** It makes sense, but --

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Because of my conflict at this  
8 site --

9           **MR. GRIFFON:** Oh, yeah.

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- information I know because  
11 of conflict at that site, I know that early on  
12 at that site there was a policy that women --  
13 this is a woman -- women were not allowed to go  
14 in the production area and therefore were not  
15 badged.

16          **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 94 -- yeah, this is a  
18 compensable case. 94.2 is a finding about not  
19 being able to reproduce the on-site ambient  
20 dose, and in fact --

21          **MR. GRIFFON:** Can I ask -- just -- is there any  
22 action on that one? I just wanted --

23          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Oh, on 94.1?

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** Kathy, was there any follow-up  
25 action needed on that one?

1           **MS. BEHLING:** No, not --

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** On 94.1?

3           **MS. BEHLING:** -- for this particular case.

4           However, you did bring up an issue that it is -

5           - this is something that should be looked at in

6           the site profile, and maybe there should be

7           some follow-up, I'm not sure. Did I not

8           understand your response -- Stu's response?

9           **MR. GRIFFON:** Well, we do have a site profile  
10          review underway.

11          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, there is one underway,  
12          and I believe -- what I tried -- I tried to  
13          give a reason for why this person did not have  
14          a monitoring record at the beginning of her  
15          employment.

16          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

17          **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. So -- okay, so it's not  
18          necessarily a site profile issue.

19          **MR. HINNEFELD:** I don't believe so, and -- and  
20          again, because of my conflict --

21          **MS. BEHLING:** Okay.

22          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- and the knowledge of what's  
23          done when we get a record from Fernald --

24          **MS. BEHLING:** Okay, this --

25          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- I'm pretty confident what --

1 we get each badge reading that was done there.

2 **MS. BEHLING:** Okay then, Mark, I would say no  
3 further action on that.

4 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Each -- each badge reading on  
5 an employee that was done there. No con-- if  
6 you have a contractor that worked at Fernald, I  
7 won't guarantee that what we get from Fernald  
8 is every badge worn by that contract-- by that  
9 subcontractor, construction subcontractor.

10 Again, information from my conflict.

11 94.2 questions the ambient dose that we  
12 assigned to this case, saying that it might be  
13 too high based on this person's work location.  
14 And we felt -- we used the site average, and  
15 there's some areas where -- that are lower than  
16 the average. Our view is this site was  
17 relatively small. Other than not being able to  
18 go into the production area at certain times,  
19 people would generally move about the other  
20 areas of this site and that we didn't feel that  
21 -- we didn't feel comfortable saying a person  
22 could have only been exposed to the ambient in  
23 this one area when in fact we believe that a  
24 site-wide average is a better approximation of  
25 what they may have been exposed to during their

1 work (unintelligible).

2 **DR. MAURO:** And this is Fernald?

3 **MR. HINNEFELD:** This is Fernald.

4 **DR. MAURO:** To the extent that it's any value,  
5 I know that the -- one of the issues on the  
6 Fernald site profile review is the methodology  
7 used to reconst-- to represent outdoor  
8 exposures to, for example, emissions from the  
9 silos.

10 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

11 **DR. MAURO:** We -- we do -- I know we do have a  
12 -- several issues on the table that's  
13 undergoing review. Now if -- I don't know  
14 whether this plays into that or not. Looks  
15 like -- other words, some question came up of  
16 how the ambient dose was calculated. Answer is  
17 well, we think it's okay. However, right now  
18 there is an issue being aired on Fernald. I'm  
19 not quite sure how best to deal with that in  
20 this context.

21 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, this case was a  
22 compensable case --

23 **DR. MAURO:** Okay, so --

24 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- so if something changes, we  
25 wouldn't try to go back and get this one.

1           **DR. MAURO:** Sure, gotcha, okay.

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I -- I don't think this  
3 necessarily refers to that same issue. It's on  
4 -- it's on the matrix --

5           **DR. MAURO:** It's on the matrix.

6           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- for Fernald anyway. Right?

7           **DR. MAURO:** Yes, it is, absolutely.

8           **MR. GRIFFON:** And I don't think thi-- this is  
9 really questioning -- given that this person  
10 was in one location, maybe they shouldn't have  
11 -- apply at all. Right?

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Maybe we shouldn't have used  
13 the site average --

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** You were more conservative than  
15 they -- that --

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, maybe shouldn't have used  
17 the site average, maybe should have used what  
18 was published for the ambient for that  
19 location.

20          **MR. GRIFFON:** So I don't think it's a follow-up  
21 site profile. I think it's a no -- no action.

22          **MS. BEHLING:** Right.

23          **MR. GRIFFON:** Let's close out as many as we  
24 can.

25          **MS. MUNN:** Let's do, please.

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, that takes us to number  
2           95, which is a Hanford case. 95.1 questions  
3           whether we accounted for all the missed neutron  
4           dose. Our response here -- our initial  
5           response kind of speaks to site practices and  
6           identification of, at least in some places, of  
7           a work location associated with this person  
8           that would indicate it was not a neutron  
9           exposure area.

10          **MS. MUNN:** (Unintelligible) unlikely.

11          **MR. HINNEFELD:** So it's a fairly -- I mean this  
12          -- this response was just provided, and I don't  
13          know, Kathy, did you want time to -- to look at  
14          this or --

15          **MS. BEHLING:** Yeah, I have not digested this  
16          one yet because we had a number of -- we had  
17          four or so reasons that we thought this  
18          individual may have been exposed to neutrons --

19          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

20          **MS. BEHLING:** -- and I haven't had a chance to  
21          look at -- to assess all of your responses.

22          **MR. HINNEFELD:** I think the response tries to  
23          speak to those four.

24          **MS. BEHLING:** To each four, okay -- to each of  
25          the four. All right, if I could look at this

1 and get back to you.

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** 95.2 (unintelligible) response  
4 (unintelligible) ambient. Is that right?

5 **MS. BEHLING:** Yeah, this is the same issue with  
6 the Monte Carlo -- applying the Monte Carlo to  
7 the onsite ambient.

8 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, so it's okay then?

9 **MS. BEHLING:** It's okay, yes.

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** Can we -- I'm just -- 95.2 is  
11 okay.

12 **MS. BEHLING:** Uh-huh.

13 **MR. GRIFFON:** Can we -- Ray's requested a --

14 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, yeah --

15 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- break here at this point.

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- man, I could use one myself.

17 **MR. ELLIOTT:** We're going to take a -- oh, go  
18 ahead, Mark.

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** We're just going to mute you and  
20 we'll be back in ten minutes.

21 **MS. BEHLING:** Okay.

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

23 (Whereupon, a recess was taken from 2:28 p.m.  
24 to 2:40 p.m.)

25 **MR. GRIFFON:** Where are -- we're losing people

1 but that's all right. Okay.

2 **MR. ELLIOTT:** We're still with a quorum.

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** All right. Kathy and Hans?  
4 You're probably the only two with us, but are  
5 you back on? Kathy or Hans?

6 **MS. MUNN:** Anybody?

7 **MS. BEHLING:** I'm here.

8 **MR. GRIFFON:** We're ready to reconvene here.  
9 We're almost through the matrix, though.  
10 That's good.

11 **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. Now can I start out with a  
12 comment?

13 **MR. GRIFFON:** Sure.

14 **MS. BEHLING:** I have to clear Hans's name.  
15 During your break --

16 **MR. ELLIOTT:** You had a sidebar during the  
17 break.

18 **MS. BEHLING:** Yes. If we go back to finding  
19 93.2 that we were discussing these lumbar spine  
20 radiographs at Fernald, we did go back and  
21 Hans's comment -- I -- I -- that he made and I  
22 misunderstood it, he indicated the fact that if  
23 the site profile actually has values for a  
24 lumbar spine, then it would indicate that they  
25 have a lumbar -- that they have a program for

1 screening. And we looked at the site profile  
2 and there is a statement in here that states  
3 that it was also noted in reviewing claimant  
4 files that lumbar spine X-rays were taken  
5 primarily for construction workers and  
6 laborers. So it -- it -- so we're going to  
7 have to reassess these lumbar spine cases.

8 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, we -- I think we took an  
9 action to make sure that we were confident in  
10 our determinations. So we will provide --

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** So that is -- that is an action?

12 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

13 **MS. BEHLING:** Okay. But I -- I wrongly accused  
14 him so I apologize.

15 **MS. MUNN:** So both NIOSH and SC&A are going  
16 to...

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, we -- certainly we will.  
18 We'll go back and assess our (unintelligible).

19 **MS. MUNN:** (Unintelligible) --

20 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

21 **MS. MUNN:** -- working for.

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay, so now we're back up to  
23 96.1. Right?

24 **MS. BEHLING:** Yes.

25 **MR. GRIFFON:** All right.

1           **MS. BEHLING:** And John, I -- is John still  
2           there?

3           **DR. MAURO:** Yes, I am.

4           **MS. BEHLING:** John Mauro? Okay. John, you can  
5           maybe help me out on this one a little bit. I  
6           looked closely -- I believe that you -- you  
7           worked on this case.

8           **DR. MAURO:** Which -- which -- which site is  
9           this?

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Portsmouth.

11          **MS. BEHLING:** Portsmouth.

12          **DR. MAURO:** Portsmouth?

13          **MS. BEHLING:** Portsmouth.

14          **DR. MAURO:** Okay.

15          **MS. BEHLING:** So you can look through this.

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, 9--

17          **MS. BEHLING:** Go ahead.

18          **MR. HINNEFELD:** You want me to start again?

19          **MS. BEHLING:** Yes, please do.

20          **MR. HINNEFELD:** 96.1 is failure to properly  
21          convert recorded photon dose to organ dose.  
22          Let me make sure I read the finding here.  
23          Okay, the finding questions the use of the --  
24          the photon -- or the exposure to organ dose,  
25          DCF value, as I read this. That the DCF that

1           was used is the one that related to AP 30 to  
2           250 keV photons and that the -- and the DCF  
3           that's cited is the one that converts exposure  
4           to organ dose, when in fact the site's  
5           dosimetry records reports the dose in rem or  
6           dose -- well, implying that you could not -- if  
7           that were the measured value, then it would be  
8           a different DCF. It would be the dose  
9           equivalent or --

10          **DR. MAURO:** HP-10.

11          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- HP-10 to organ dose DCF.

12          **DR. MAURO:** That was the concern.

13          **MR. HINNEFELD:** I guess our view was, even  
14          though it's convention for a number of sites to  
15          report those doses in rem, if it was measured  
16          with a film badge -- based on the use of the  
17          film badge and likely calibration operations at  
18          that time -- you should use the Roentgen or  
19          exposure to organ dose conversion, despite the  
20          fact that they would say in their records it  
21          was a rem because people -- people expect --

22          **DR. MAURO:** It was really a Roentgen.

23          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- it was really a Roentgen as  
24          measured, and they called it a rem 'cause it  
25          was a convention -- a rem's a Roentgen when

1           you're working at the site --

2           **DR. MAURO:**    Okay.

3           **MR. HINNEFELD:**  -- and so people expected their  
4           doses to be in rem, and so that's why it's  
5           reported that way.  That's why it's reported  
6           that way, but we believe -- see, being that it  
7           was measured with film, Roentgen is the  
8           appropriate DCF to use -- and it is higher.  
9           The Roentgen DCF is higher than the rem.

10          **DR. MAURO:**   (Unintelligible)

11          **MS. BEHLING:**  And I do agree with that.

12          **DR. MAURO:**    Yeah.

13          **MS. BEHLING:**  With NIOSH's response.

14          **MR. HINNEFELD:**  Okay.

15          **MR. GRIFFON:**   Okay.

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:**  Okay, 96.2 as to do with  
17          inappropriate methods used for derived recorded  
18          skin dose.

19          **MS. BEHLING:**  I guess in this particular case,  
20          if I can interject here, what we felt would be  
21          the correct method -- method for calculating  
22          the skin dose, at least based on the external  
23          implementation guide, is since the shallow dose  
24          in this case was reported, that you just take  
25          the shallow dose and that becomes your skin

1 dose and you do a DCF of one -- and that is in  
2 Appendix B of the implementation guide. The  
3 only thing that I see that -- now that I  
4 reassess this case, I believe we were incorrect  
5 in assuming that there should have been a  
6 calibration adjustment factor of 1.165 added to  
7 this. If you go into the site profile, which I  
8 did in preparation for this, it indicates that  
9 that 1.165 calibration factor should be --  
10 adjustment factor should be applied to deep  
11 dose and not the shallow dose. So we were  
12 incorrect in assuming that the calibration  
13 adjustment factor should have been applied.  
14 However, we did question the method that was  
15 used for calculated skin dose. Ultimately  
16 NIOSH did arrive at a higher dose than we would  
17 have. We were just questioning their methods.  
18 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. I know you've just seen  
19 our response, but in -- in -- with relation to  
20 our response and what we've described here in  
21 response, does that answer the question or is  
22 there more information to be generated, or do  
23 you want to -- need time to look -- evaluate  
24 the response in terms of the finding or --  
25 where are we at on that?

1           **MS. BEHLING:** Maybe I'll just look at this  
2           response again, because I'm just questioning is  
3           the -- is -- is this an approach that is  
4           typically used by NIOSH, which we do often see.  
5           And like I said, it is inappropriate based on  
6           the implementation guide and the fact that once  
7           you do have shallow dose reported, just use  
8           that dose rather than applying correc-- DCF  
9           values to the -- to the -- to the deep dose.  
10          Now Hans wants to pick up here because he feels  
11          strongly about this issue, too. It's just the  
12          method used for calculating your skin dose.

13          **DR. BEHLING:** Yeah, I -- I always, and I think  
14          we've repeatedly encountered this. I think in  
15          the implementation guide in Appendix B under  
16          the skin, there's usually -- there's a footnote  
17          there that says if you have a shallow dose, a  
18          seven milligram per centimeter square dose, use  
19          that and there's no need there for to convert  
20          an HP-10 dose into -- by means of a DCF into a  
21          skin dose. And -- and I think we've gone  
22          through that discussion any number of times.  
23          It's probably an insignificant difference, but  
24          it's just a protocol that I can't justify in  
25          doing, especially when we're talking about

1 efficiency measures, that would then force you  
2 to do all kinds of calculations when in fact  
3 all one has to do is look at the 7 milligram  
4 dose or shallow dose and say that's the skin  
5 dose. And -- and I don't recall exactly --  
6 maybe Stu can enlighten me and -- and refresh  
7 my memory as to why one would not use that  
8 approach.

9 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, I don't remember if it's  
10 applicable to this case in general or not, but  
11 as -- as a general rule, for a -- for a skin  
12 dose, you would -- the reason that you would  
13 divide it into its beta and photon components,  
14 particularly if you're using a 30 to 250 keV  
15 photon, if that's the energy of the photon, is  
16 that the radiation effectiveness factor for  
17 that range of photons is higher than the  
18 radiation effectiveness factor for -- for beta  
19 particles. So that even though you have a  
20 shallow dose that's say 480-some millirem,  
21 that's 430 millirem comes from the deep or the  
22 photon dose and 60 millirem comes from a non-  
23 penetrating or beta dose, that if you just used  
24 that 490 and applied it as a beta dose, for  
25 instance, and the photon exposure was in the 30

1 to 250 range, the REF for your dose will be  
2 lower than it would be if you applied the -- if  
3 -- if you broke it into the various components.  
4 Conversely, if you used the shallow dose and  
5 applied -- called it 30 to 250 keV photons, you  
6 would use the higher REF for the whole portion  
7 as opposed to just using a higher REF for the  
8 photon portion and using the lower REF for the  
9 beta component. So there is -- there's a --  
10 reasons why that shallow dose is -- is broken  
11 into the component doses -- I'm looking at  
12 Scott and he's not giving me too dirty of a  
13 look -- and that's why. I mean despite the  
14 fact that yeah, shallow dose is shallow dose,  
15 and I guess if you were -- if the -- if the  
16 photon dose were from photons greater than 250  
17 keV, that -- that REF is in fact equivalent to  
18 the beta REF. So in that case it would in fact  
19 be -- as -- a meaningless exercise to divide it  
20 into those component doses and then put an R--  
21 'cause you could just put it in as one or the  
22 other and get the same outcome. So that's --  
23 that's the reason why frequently a skin dose is  
24 broken into a shallow -- or a beta component  
25 and --

1           **DR. BEHLING:** Well, I -- I understand and --  
2           and I guess if -- if that's the case, then  
3           maybe that footnote should be stricken in the  
4           implementation guide that suggests that if  
5           there is an available recorded shallow dose, a  
6           skin dose, for -- for the person to use that  
7           because it does become a conflict where you  
8           have to understand that there are now multiple  
9           options in which this skin dose can be  
10          calculated, break them apart or just simply  
11          using the shallow dose as it stands.

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

13          **MS. MUNN:** So there we need to change the  
14          footnote in the implementation guide.

15          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

16          **MS. MUNN:** Is that what I'm hearing?

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** That's what I hear.

18          **MS. BEHLING:** Uh-huh.

19          **MR. GRIFFON:** Kathy, did you still want time to  
20          review that or -- or --

21          **MS. BEHLING:** No. No, that -- that resolves  
22          it.

23          **MR. GRIFFON:** It's just -- okay, that'll  
24          resolve it. Good.

25          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay, that finishes 96.

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** Can I ask one question? At the  
2 bottom of 96 there's a mention of neutrons.  
3 What's that all about? Since doses from  
4 neutrons...

5           **MS. BEHLING:** I don't know.

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** I don't know what that -- I  
7 don't know what I was thinking.

8           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I just didn't understand  
9 that at all. Did that get cut and pasted some-  
10 - inadvertently or...

11          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Oh, I think I know what it is,  
12 is -- is 96 a greater than -- greater than 50  
13 percenter?

14          **DR. MAURO:** Oh, you didn't bother  
15 (unintelligible).

16          **MS. BEHLING:** It is greater than 50 percent.

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. So if there is in fact a  
18 mistake here and our dose was higher than what  
19 it should have been, there's a component of the  
20 dose that was not included, so that since it  
21 was an underestimate we don't feel like it  
22 would be necessary (unintelligible) to go back  
23 and (unintelligible) compensated, we  
24 (unintelligible) go look at it anyway, we  
25 wouldn't necessarily pull it back.

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** All right.

2           **MR. HINNEFELD:** That's -- that's why I put that  
3 in there.

4           97 and 98 are my favorite numbers in this -- in  
5 the set because there are no findings.

6           **MR. GRIFFON:** Can you do those quickly?

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** 97, in case anybody's  
8 interested, was Lawrence Livermore and 98 was  
9 the Elk River Reactor Site.

10          99 is Pantex. Okay, 99.1 is our favorite OTIB-  
11 8 finding. Correct?

12          **MS. BEHLING:** That's correct.

13          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay. We've addressed that  
14 several times. OTIB-8 has in fact been revised  
15 --

16          **MR. GRIFFON:** Could -- is that --

17          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- since that time.

18          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, OTIB-8's been revised. Did  
19 that result in any PER or -- or...

20          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, no, because this was a --  
21 this was a clarity issue and it was  
22 consistently -- the -- it was consistently used  
23 higher, the dose was consistently higher --

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** That's right.

25          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- than the -- what I believe

1 the correct reading of it should have been.

2 **MS. BEHLING:** That's correct.

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** (Unintelligible) a refresher on  
4 that. Okay.

5 **MR. HINNEFELD:** And 99.2 is that same category.

6 **MS. BEHLING:** That's right.

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** So no -- no further action on  
8 these?

9 **MS. BEHLING:** No.

10 **MS. MUNN:** (Unintelligible)

11 **MS. BEHLING:** In fact what I've been doing on  
12 our dose reconstruction reports is putting an  
13 asterisk in and identifying the fact that this  
14 is an issue that's being -- these are issues  
15 that have been resolved.

16 **MR. GRIFFON:** Resolved, right. Yeah.

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 99.3 is improper organ dose  
18 selected for estimating occupational medical  
19 dose. Yes, that's true. The dose  
20 reconstruction notes that it was an intentional  
21 overestimate. And granted, it's hard to say  
22 that it's more efficient to choose one rather  
23 than another. We have since instructed our  
24 contractor and adopted the approach that  
25 overestimates are -- should be used only when

1           it provides clear efficiency, not just because  
2           you can. (Unintelligible) the findings we've  
3           been through as well.

4           99.4 is the use of improper hypothetical intake  
5           model. Again, I believe this is -- yeah, goes  
6           to the colon was used rather than the actual  
7           target organ. That -- that's the same -- we've  
8           addressed that a number of times. That  
9           finishes 99.

10          100 is from Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

11          Number -- findings number one and .2 are the  
12          OTIB-8 findings again, same -- like 99.1.

13          Finding 100.3 is the same improper selection of  
14          organ dose for occupational medical, the same  
15          issue that was raised in 99.3.

16          100.4, reviewer questions whether NIOSH  
17          properly addressed CATI-identified dose limit  
18          issue. And here we have a bit of an involved  
19          response. It has to do with the investigation  
20          -- site investigations that were done. And I  
21          guess I'm a little bit at a loss here on the  
22          specifics of this case, so I'm a little bit at  
23          a loss as to what exactly the CATI said and --

24          **MS. BEHLING:** Yeah, and I didn't get a chance  
25          to go back to the CATI report on this one,

1           either.

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** (Unintelligible) pocket  
3           dosimeters or...

4           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, NIOSH -- did NIOSH  
5           properly handle the issue related to  
6           potentially reaching a dose limit as described  
7           below. There are numerous dosimetry records  
8           that lack dates and dose results. Due to this  
9           lack of information on the data provided, SC&A  
10          also questions whether DOE has provided all the  
11          available dose data. In addition, there are  
12          records in the file indicating that meters were  
13          lost or not turned in. The doses -- meters in  
14          question mark or in paren-- quotations. The  
15          doses associated with these events were  
16          assessed as zero. However, no explanation for  
17          this assessment is included. Based on these  
18          questionable dosimetry records and  
19          identification of missing dosimeters, SC&A is  
20          recommending that NIOSH attempt to collect  
21          additional dosimetry data that may help to  
22          clarify the state-- claimant's statement.

23          **MR. GRIFFON:** There wa-- di...

24          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well --

25          **MR. GRIFFON:** I mean is this an early time

1 frame for this employee?

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I think this is a pretty early  
3 one. Let's see --

4 **MR. GRIFFON:** 'Cause I know -- I know for sure  
5 in the early years there were a lot of  
6 questions about pocket dosimetry and the  
7 results at X-10 in the locked -- they were --  
8 at least from interviews I did down there,  
9 there was a lot of accounts of wearing pocket  
10 dosimeters but not having a -- a badge on at  
11 the time and the pocket dosimetries were logged  
12 but they never became part of their permanent  
13 record (unintelligible) -- I know that  
14 allegation's been out there and this might be  
15 related.

16 **MR. SHARFI:** This person -- this person --

17 **UNIDENTIFIED:** (Unintelligible) coworker issue  
18 --

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** I don't know. It says meters,  
20 though. I don't know what meters means.

21 **MS. MUNN:** (Unintelligible) too, but --

22 **MR. HINNEFELD:** This person didn't start till  
23 1975.

24 **MS. MUNN:** (Unintelligible) --

25 **MR. GRIFFON:** Oh, '75, no, that's -- that's

1 after that --

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I think meter -- meter, to me -  
3 - I think at Oak Ridge, meter was a  
4 colloquialism for the badge, for film badge or  
5 whatever badge you were wearing.

6 **MS. MUNN:** (Unintelligible) '70s?

7 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, good ol' boys down there.  
8 They -- as I understand it, the -- the  
9 instances of the -- the badge not returned or  
10 meter not returned or meter loss were instances  
11 that were investigated. As I understand the  
12 situation, there were investigation reports in  
13 the -- in the file from ORNL about how they  
14 arrived at suggested dose. And if in fact they  
15 -- they recommended a zero be put in places, it  
16 was probably due to whatever they considered in  
17 their investigation, which may have been  
18 previous and post months exposures or previous  
19 months' exposures and similar work -- you know,  
20 however people do dosimetry investigation. So  
21 I believe, though, that the missing or not  
22 returned issues were investigated. At the Oak  
23 Ridge sites as a general rule, if we have -- if  
24 we've sent them the right Social Security  
25 number, we generally get what they had. And

1 additional requests later on, especially if we  
2 get anything, we generally get a complete  
3 response. That's kind of --

4 **MR. GRIFFON:** Kathy --

5 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- been our experience at --

6 **MR. GRIFFON:** Kathy, it sounds like you may  
7 have to look at this a little closer and see if  
8 there's -- come -- maybe come back with  
9 specifics if --

10 **MS. BEHLING:** Okay, I can do that.

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- if there is -- if there's  
12 times when they had these quote, unquote, lost  
13 meters and you can't -- can or cannot identify  
14 investigation reports in the -- in the file,  
15 maybe can -- you can come back with specifics  
16 on that.

17 **MS. BEHLING:** Okay, I'll do that.

18 **MR. GRIFFON:** Otherwise, it sounds like a  
19 reasonable response, but we should --

20 **MS. BEHLING:** I -- I think so, too.

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- take it -- take it to ground,  
22 yeah.

23 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

25 **MS. BEHLING:** No, I agree with that. And like

1           Stu indicated, the individual did work -- start  
2           working in the '70s and so -- but I -- but I'll  
3           look at this a little bit closer.

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** And that's the end of the matrix.

5           **DR INSTRUCTIONS**

6                         We have one -- one more agenda item. I  
7           -- I don't think it'll be a -- I really just  
8           wanted to get a preliminary discussion on this  
9           and I don't know if, Mike or Wanda, if you have  
10          these things with you, but Stu did mail out  
11          some -- some examples of these -- I don't think  
12          -- calling them everything, dose -- dose -- DR  
13          instructions, DR guides. I think they -- they  
14          have various notes, depending on the site -- or  
15          various titles, depending on the site. So the  
16          -- I guess the -- the reason I -- I raise this  
17          as an issue for the subcommittee and for the  
18          Board is that I -- I found some of these on the  
19          O drive and -- when we were looking at Rocky  
20          Flats, actually, it really came to my attention  
21          that they were very instructive on -- on --  
22          instead of trying to -- to guess what the dose  
23          reconstructioner (sic) thought process was, you  
24          actually sort of have this template there.  
25          It's not -- it's not completely prescriptive --

1           correct me if I'm wrong. It's not completely  
2           prescriptive, but it does give you a sense of  
3           if you have this, then you have these options;  
4           if you have this, then you have these options.  
5           And it -- in some cases it steps you through  
6           what TIBs or what -- and -- and it might even  
7           give sort of a sense of the hierarchy to -- to  
8           --

9           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, to be honest, I am not  
10          very familiar with them at all. Maybe --

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- Scott might have some  
13          familiarity with them.

14          **MS. MUNN:** Well, when did you send those out?

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, yeah, so I -- I just  
16          wondered if -- if these were used as part of  
17          the dose reconstruction, my sense would be that  
18          -- that -- and what -- from what I heard from  
19          Mutty Shafi (sic) at the Rocky meeting, and he  
20          was saying -- and I think Jim's saying, also,  
21          that these aren't procedures necessarily.

22          These are -- these are updated on conference  
23          calls sometimes with the dose reconstructors  
24          and you might have several versions of them in  
25          -- you know, real-time corrections to these

1 things, and they're really used in-house. The  
2 on-- and I wouldn't suggest that we need to  
3 review them as procedures by the Advisory  
4 Board. But what I was thinking is -- is why --  
5 why aren't they part -- it would be nice if  
6 they were part of the claimant file.

7 **DR. MAURO:** Absolutely.

8 **MR. GRIFFON:** That way there's none of this --  
9 'cause sometimes I think we run into these  
10 cases where we have sort of a gray line. I  
11 mean I even -- and this is nothing against any  
12 of the work we're doing here, but you know,  
13 sometimes we're -- we're looking at these and  
14 we're saying well, we think the dose  
15 reconstructioner (sic) might have been doing  
16 this or might -- you know, and -- and it seems  
17 consistent with the earlier protocols. Well,  
18 if we had this in there, I think we -- it might  
19 still not be a black and white -- it might not  
20 be a sharp line, but it's a sharper line, I  
21 think, to --

22 **MS. MUNN:** Yeah.

23 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- sort of evaluate the --

24 **MR. ELLIOTT:** It gives you a better  
25 understanding --

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- the cases.

2           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- of the thought --

3           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

4           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- process that the reconstructor  
5 used, but I've --

6           **MR. GRIFFON:** Well --

7           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- already cautioned you that  
8 these came about in the -- that evolution and  
9 development relatively recently. The first and  
10 second set of claims that you guys reviewed  
11 probably didn't have any of those --

12          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, that's fine.

13          **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- kind of guidelines or  
14 instructions. They probably dealt with the  
15 site profiles, Technical Basis Documents and  
16 whatever training occurred --

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

18          **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- to implement the use of those.  
19 So just keep those in mind that if you pick  
20 from the pool of claims --

21          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, right, right.

22          **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- randomly, you may find some  
23 that --

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** Well, I gue-- I --

25          **MR. ELLIOTT:** But you're point's well taken.

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** I guess that.

2           **MR. ELLIOTT:** Maybe we should put that into the

3           --

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

5           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- to the -- to the file that you  
6           folks --

7           **MR. GRIFFON:** I guess --

8           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- are reviewing and see how it  
9           goes.

10          **MR. GRIFFON:** I guess there were two questions  
11          I had, and one was -- one thing I think is a  
12          lot easier for us to offer as a recommendation  
13          for the -- for the full Board to -- to give to  
14          NIOSH, which would be to recommend that -- that  
15          for all cases going forward, that these things  
16          be added to the -- to the claim file.

17          The second one's a little more -- a little more  
18          labor, and may not be doable, and that would be  
19          to do it retro-- retroactively. And that would  
20          be probably complicated. I'm not sure --

21          **MR. ELLIOTT:** I would be a little reluctant to  
22          --

23          **MR. GRIFFON:** I'm not sure if you can do it,  
24          right.

25          **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- agree to take that on.

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

2           **DR. MAURO:** Well, this goes back to a while  
3 ago, one of the points we made was the road map  
4 --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

6           **DR. MAURO:** -- whereby one of the first  
7 challenges we encountered was my god, we can't  
8 figure out -- and it was taking us a lot of  
9 time --

10          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

11          **DR. MAURO:** -- to figure it out.

12          **MS. MUNN:** (Unintelligible)

13          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, and -- and to the extent to  
14 which your folks now -- of course the ones  
15 they're doing right now could get -- insert  
16 that road map, but --

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

18          **DR. MAURO:** -- with an eye toward oh, there's  
19 going to be people looking at this, who are  
20 going to try to reproduce the numbers.

21          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

22          **DR. MAURO:** Also the extent to which the cases  
23 are being assembled at this time, the next set  
24 of 32, for example, which will be coming down  
25 the pipeline. I don't know how difficult it

1 would be for someone to say okay, did we really  
2 tell the story or did we leave a lot to the  
3 imagination.

4 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Okay.

5 **DR. MAURO:** I know that -- I know that our  
6 folks -- I work with them all the time.  
7 Someone's saying my god, I've been working on  
8 this thing for three days, I can't figure out  
9 what they did. And -- and in fact, I could --  
10 I posed this question to the Board, is there  
11 any problem with our people calling up your  
12 dose reconstructors and say listen, what did  
13 you do here?

14 **MR. ELLIOTT:** You need to go through us to do  
15 that.

16 **DR. MAURO:** Need to go through -- but I think  
17 that would -- that might be a fix. That might  
18 --

19 **MR. ELLIOTT:** I think we should look at this  
20 and get back to you on --

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, yeah, I'm not --

22 **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- what -- what it's going to  
23 take --

24 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- asking for an answer today,  
25 but --

1           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- what it's going to take for us  
2           to make sure that, as we go forward in the  
3           review of dose reconstructions that have been  
4           completed, we add that thing to it. Whether or  
5           not we need to -- we should look at also  
6           whether we -- it would make sense to -- any  
7           claim that gets completed from this point on,  
8           we should --

9           **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

10          **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- include that in there, the --

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** That -- that recommendation --

12          **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- the analysis record. I don't  
13          know.

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- seems a lot easier, obviously,  
15          in the -- yeah.

16          **MR. ELLIOTT:** Let us look at that and we'll get  
17          back to you.

18          **DR. MAURO:** Early on --

19          **MR. GRIFFON:** Wanda, and then --

20          **DR. MAURO:** I'm sorry.

21          **MS. MUNN:** I just -- just wanted to make sure  
22          that I'm looking at the same thing I think  
23          you're talking about.

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, yeah.

25          **MS. MUNN:** March 15 --

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** A zip file.

2           **MS. MUNN:** -- a zip drive -- a zip file. It  
3 started off with dose reconstruction notes  
4 (unintelligible) Mound and --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** (Unintelligible)

6           **MS. MUNN:** -- then basic guidelines, Amchitka  
7 guidelines, FMPC dose reconstruction notes --  
8 that's it?

9           **MR. GRIFFON:** That sounds like the one, yeah.  
10 Yeah, sorry.

11           **MS. MUNN:** That's all right, I just wanted to  
12 make sure I had that.

13           **MR. ELLIOTT:** Those are examples.

14           **MR. GRIFFON:** Examples, right.

15           **MR. ELLIOTT:** They're not to be considered --

16           **MR. GRIFFON:** Exhaustive.

17           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- all-inclusive or exhaustive  
18 type of guidance or --

19           **MR. HINNEFELD:** I -- I don't know for sure.

20           **MR. ELLIOTT:** (Unintelligible)

21           **MR. GRIFFON:** No, no, they're not exhaustive.  
22 Okay? I didn't expect it to be. I wanted to  
23 examine it just to (unintelligible) --

24           **MR. ELLIOTT:** They're relevant to those --

25           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

1           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- case situations.

2           **MS. MUNN:** Those specific cases, yeah.

3           **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

4           **MS. MUNN:** That's what I had interpreted at the  
5           time I read them, that they were  
6           (unintelligible).

7           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, so I think if -- if -- I --  
8           I don't think we need to take the discussion  
9           much fur-- I just wanted people to understand  
10          what these things were, have a couple of  
11          examples to kind of look at and say oh, yeah, I  
12          see what -- you know, I see what these -- how  
13          these could help in the audit process. I mean  
14          I think it -- I think it would actually  
15          expedite some of our -- you know, our review  
16          process.

17          **MR. ELLIOTT:** I think it would minimize  
18          confusion.

19          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, exactly. Exactly. So I'm  
20          not...

21          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, how about --

22          **MR. GRIFFON:** But to do it retroactively, I  
23          think, Larry, you're right. You need to  
24          examine that 'cause I -- I'm sure it would be  
25          difficult. I'm not even sure it's achievable.

1           You know, I -- I know Muttu said that they  
2           don't -- they don't, as a course of practice,  
3           keep revisions of these things. They just  
4           update them. So it might be really hard to  
5           figure out, for different time frames, which  
6           ones were used, you know. And I don't know  
7           that we need to go there, but --

8           **MS. MUNN:** Seems unlikely that we could do  
9           that.

10          **MR. GRIFFON:** But going forward, I think it  
11          would be nice to have them added, so -- so  
12          we'll hold off and maybe hear --

13          **MR. HINNEFELD:** So we're talking about going --

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** Can you give us somewhat of a  
15          report at the morning meeting in May -- May --

16          **MR. ELLIOTT:** I think we can do that.

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- at the subcommittee in May --

18          **MR. HINNEFELD:** In terms of the do-ability of  
19          this or in terms of cases --

20          **MR. ELLIOTT:** Going forward. Not looking back,  
21          but going forward.

22          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Not even back to the seventh  
23          set, but the last set --

24          **DR. MAURO:** Just going -- just move forward.

25          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Just go with the eighth.

1           **DR. MAURO:** Yeah, we're already  
2           (unintelligible) --  
3           **MR. ELLIOTT:** On the eighth set --  
4           **DR. MAURO:** Although we're --  
5           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- that we deliver and any  
6           completed dose reconstructions --  
7           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.  
8           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- from this point on.  
9           **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.  
10          **DR. MAURO:** Or I would point --  
11          **MR. ELLIOTT:** What would it take to put -- put  
12          this into the --  
13          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Into the AR, the analysis  
14          record?  
15          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, the AR, right.  
16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, I'll have to get back  
17          with you.  
18          **MR. GRIFFON:** So for all cases going forward --  
19          **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** (Unintelligible) the actual  
20          dose --  
21          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- but just for the selected  
22          cases --  
23          **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** -- record, I'm a little  
24          concerned about --  
25          **MR. ELLIOTT:** Not in the dose report.

1           **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** Okay.

2           **MR. ELLIOTT:** But in the --

3           **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** But don't you send the dose  
4 record overall to DOL as well?

5           **MR. ELLIOTT:** Yeah.

6           **MS. HOMOKI-TITUS:** I want to talk about that  
7 'cause I'm concerned about internal documents  
8 that don't normally be made public all of a  
9 sudden becoming...

10          **MS. MUNN:** Yeah, I --

11          **MR. ELLIOTT:** Okay.

12          **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay, (unintelligible).

13          **MS. MUNN:** -- I haven't absorbed all the stuff  
14 that's in here. I just glanced at them when  
15 they came in and -- and I have some concern as  
16 to how you would do that in a way that would be  
17 helpful to anyone other than probably --

18          **MR. ELLIOTT:** Our people.

19          **MS. MUNN:** -- your people, yeah.

20          **DR. MAURO:** The reality is --

21          **MS. MUNN:** As long as you had access to --

22          **MR. GRIFFON:** But we don't, that's the point --

23          **MS. MUNN:** Yeah, yeah --

24          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- so, you know, yeah, yeah.

25          **MS. MUNN:** -- but if you had access to this

1 information --

2 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right, so how do we keep -- I  
3 didn't think about (unintelligible) --

4 **MR. ELLIOTT:** Well, maybe we don't do it for  
5 the analysis record but we do it for what gets  
6 rolled up for your review.

7 **MS. MUNN:** Right, yeah.

8 **MR. ELLIOTT:** Whatever gets put on the CDs for  
9 your review, let's -- that's where  
10 (unintelligible) --

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I didn't think about this -  
12 - this factor of -- of being in the public  
13 realm, but yeah, you're right, Liz, so...

14 **MS. MUNN:** Yeah, internally and in terms of --

15 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I -- I don't think anyone  
16 outside the process --

17 **MS. MUNN:** (Unintelligible) review --

18 **DR. MAURO:** I mean in a way right now we have a  
19 process whereby, for example, site profile  
20 reviews, we do have steps in the process where  
21 after our folks read the site profile we  
22 collect some questions, we inter-- interact  
23 with you folks, clear up a lot of things, makes  
24 life real simple and we zero in on the places  
25 where -- to me it's -- on a mini-scale, maybe

1 we should be doing a little bit -- I mean maybe  
2 the easiest way is just sort -- allow for this  
3 kind of interaction. I know our dose  
4 reconstructors (unintelligible) especially some  
5 of the newer folks, the ones that haven't  
6 benefited from three years of experience, you  
7 know, they're -- we're coming up to speed, but  
8 the extent to which -- if they could pick up  
9 the phone, say I don't understand, for example,  
10 you know, why you did this here but you didn't  
11 do this here -- I don't know if that's --

12 **MR. ELLIOTT:** Well, you can bring that to us.

13 **DR. MAURO:** We'll bring that to you.

14 **MR. ELLIOTT:** These are our dose  
15 reconstructions. I mean I don't want to slight  
16 Scott --

17 **DR. MAURO:** No -- no, I understand.

18 **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- and the ORAU team, but you  
19 know, OCAS and --

20 **DR. MAURO:** Sure.

21 **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- NIOSH folks sign off on these.  
22 We should be able to answer your questions. If  
23 not, we should be able to turn to our  
24 contractor and get a -- get informed response  
25 to answer --

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** I also think there's a benefit to  
2 staying a step away, you know, 'cause if you  
3 start --

4           **DR. MAURO:** Getting too close.

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- having those discussions --

6           **DR. MAURO:** Yeah. Yeah, that's true.

7           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- you know, and you're -- you  
8 can start to not think outside the box and not  
9 ask questions that you -- you know, so I -- but  
10 at least to know -- I think this is kind of the  
11 template that -- that would help us to be able  
12 to audit the case better. And I agree, it's  
13 not much -- not much benefit to other people.  
14 But for the internal people reviewing the cases  
15 --

16          **MS. MUNN:** Well, and being able to reduce the  
17 number of items that --

18          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

19          **MS. MUNN:** -- actually appear on the matrix is  
20 beneficial to all of us.

21          **MR. GRIFFON:** Exactly.

22          **DR. MAURO:** Could I make a suggestion? We're  
23 in the process of doing the -- the seventh set  
24 -- okay? We're going to be done -- we're going  
25 to get to the point where we have our draft

1 material assembled, then we're going to go on  
2 to the one-on-one discussions we have with each  
3 of the two-group -- at that point we have sort  
4 of come to where we are on it and have gotten  
5 some feedback from you folks. If at that point  
6 collectively we say, you know, there are still  
7 like several items related to this case or that  
8 case that we're really not quite sure and  
9 almost -- so it's almost a collective thing.  
10 Perhaps we could just simply feed back to you,  
11 say listen, we're at this point in the process,  
12 we notice that we have about four or five  
13 questions on this collection that maybe we  
14 could move them out easy, and maybe at that --  
15 then you could make a judgment at that time,  
16 yeah, perhaps setting up a quick conference  
17 call with the right people and we could clean  
18 up those (unintelligible).

19 **MR. ELLIOTT:** It's okay with us if it's okay  
20 with the working group.

21 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, as long as you -- you know,  
22 we have to be -- I mean I think -- I don't want  
23 to speak for the whole Board, either. I mean  
24 there's a reason that we have these on the  
25 record --

1           **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- in the public forum, so --

3           **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- I think we -- we've certainly  
5           -- I think we all certainly understand the need  
6           to -- to sort of expedite some technical  
7           issues, but we don't -- you know, we don't want  
8           to -- you know, we have to -- to keep the  
9           discussions in the public, as well, yeah, yeah,  
10          so --

11          **MS. MUNN:** That's certainly understandable,  
12          what you're saying. But by the same token,  
13          it's very clear from this seat that the  
14          technical issues often could be resolved very  
15          easily by one or two phone calls by --

16          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, and I -- I think --

17          **MS. MUNN:** -- the people who are looking  
18          specifically at the technical issues.

19          **MR. GRIFFON:** And I think a way to alleviate  
20          it, and we've done this in some of the site  
21          profile reviews -- I mean we're -- we're doing  
22          this with Rocky on an ongoing basis. If we  
23          have a technical phone call, we -- we just ask  
24          that the parties keep min-- and John, you've  
25          been good at this, that you -- you say I -- I

1           talked with -- or our people talked with their  
2           people and here's what we discussed and here's  
3           what we came out with, and you put that on --  
4           you bring that back to the subcommittee and  
5           that's fine, so --

6           **MS. MUNN:** A brief memo, the working group has  
7           it, it's on the record, yeah.

8           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I think we could do this  
9           and I think --

10          **DR. MAURO:** It could even be -- it could even  
11          be -- 'cause my guess is that by the end of  
12          that process it may be just a limited number of  
13          things that we could probably clean up pretty  
14          easily --

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** But I think --

16          **DR. MAURO:** -- we could actually send it to  
17          you. We say listen, here's some questions that  
18          we -- that we think if we can get some quick  
19          answers to, it would help us resolve -- and not  
20          only -- you know, 'cause they're -- you notice  
21          they repeat. You know, we have this initiative  
22          (unintelligible) --

23          (Whereupon, multiple participants spoke  
24          simultaneously, rendering transcription of  
25          individual comments impossible.)

1           **DR. MAURO:** Might use it to sweep those away.  
2           Perhaps a memo -- I mean it'll all be on the  
3           record, say here's some issues that we're  
4           concerned with, we put them out to the working  
5           group and it may be beneficial to air these out  
6           and it'll all be in the sunshine.

7           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah. And I -- and I think --  
8           yeah, I think -- I think we should encourage  
9           that. I think also use your judgment on --

10          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- when you think well, wait a  
12          second, this is -- this is a little bigger and  
13          I think we need to bring it to the full  
14          subcommittee or Board, whatever, you know --

15          **DR. MAURO:** Yeah.

16          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- so -- but I think we need to  
17          encourage that -- a dialogue, you know.

18          **MS. BEHLING:** Mark, at this point in time I  
19          wouldn't anticipate that we would need to have  
20          too many discussions with the dose  
21          reconstructors, and I know when we started this  
22          process we had asked that question and we were  
23          discouraged from doing that. And quite  
24          honestly, I think that it has helped us in our  
25          auditing process because we also, by not being

1           able to just run to the dose reconstructor or  
2           run to somebody to get answers, it also has  
3           brought to our attention that maybe there's  
4           some deficiencies in some of the procedures or  
5           maybe things are not clearly spelled out in the  
6           dose reconstruction report. So I think there's  
7           been some benefit from having to work through  
8           some of these issues on our own. And so at  
9           this stage in the game, I personally do not  
10          feel I would need to -- hopefully would not  
11          want to discuss details -- possibly some  
12          technical issues, but I -- I wouldn't -- I  
13          wouldn't make a point of calling them on a  
14          routine basis, I can assure you of that.

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** That's sort of my point I made a  
16          few minutes ago is that --

17          **MS. BEHLING:** But -- but what I --

18          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- keeping -- keeping a little  
19          independence and separation there I think is  
20          useful because it makes you -- it makes SC&A  
21          maybe -- maybe you're coming at an issue from a  
22          little different perspective and if -- if  
23          somebody steps you right through you say oh,  
24          yeah, that makes sense, you know. But if you  
25          come at -- you might see something different

1 (unintelligible) --

2 **MS. BEHLING:** Absolutely.

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- yeah, I think that's useful  
4 for the (unintelligible).

5 **MS. BEHLING:** I agree, but what I do feel would  
6 be very beneficial is these notes that walk you  
7 through the -- as you said, if you don't have  
8 this information or if you do have this, follow  
9 this TIB or follow that TIB. That I think  
10 would be very useful for us.

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay. We're going to --

12 **MR. ELLIOTT:** So if I can -- can I sum this up  
13 so we can make sure we're all -- with the same  
14 understanding.

15 We would be receptive to technical discussions,  
16 if you come up with an issue or so that seems  
17 to be thematic or that maybe is not thematic  
18 but you just don't have a clear understanding  
19 of what we did, how we did it, what we meant or  
20 whatever, and you think that maybe you -- just  
21 hearing from us will -- will elucidate that and  
22 clarify it, we're welcome -- we're receptive to  
23 that. We'll accommodate that. However you  
24 want to work that out, that's fine.

25 **MR. GRIFFON:** And I -- I think that -- I think

1 we should work that out in a way that --

2 **MR. ELLIOTT:** But the intent here is to make  
3 sure that we keep as much of this in the  
4 public's view as possible --

5 **MR. GRIFFON:** Just keep a record -- if you have  
6 that kind of discussion, just give us a record  
7 of it and bring it back to (unintelligible)  
8 that, you know, we -- in between meetings we  
9 had this dialogue with the -- you know. I  
10 think that's fine. Wanda, do you...

11 **MS. MUNN:** I think that'll probably do it. I  
12 just -- you know, looking through these  
13 documents again, I can see how it would have  
14 illuminated SC&A's process enormously to have  
15 had access to this information and -- but I  
16 also agree that Larry's absolutely correct in  
17 his position that the request needs to come  
18 through NIOSH. It's a NIOSH decision. I think  
19 your statement about keeping arm's length  
20 between the parties is quite reasonable. You  
21 know, I think you've got it, Larry.

22 **MR. GRIFFON:** All right. And then as far as --  
23 as a report back for the -- I keep saying May  
24 4th, is it May 2nd or --

25 (Whereupon, multiple participants spoke

1 simultaneously, rendering transcription of  
2 individual comments impossible.)

3 **MR. ELLIOTT:** The next meeting of the  
4 subcommittee, Lew wanted to make sure I did  
5 this little dance for him, is scheduled for May  
6 2nd --

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

8 **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- 2007 in Denver from 9:00 a.m.  
9 to 11:30 a.m. --

10 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

11 **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- before the real -- full Board  
12 meeting starts.

13 **MR. GRIFFON:** So maybe a -- at that -- Stu, if  
14 possible -- at least give us an update, even if  
15 it's not a complete evaluation, but you know,  
16 just of the feasibility of providing these for  
17 the --

18 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Eighth set.

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- eighth set of cases, you know,  
20 can you -- can you include it and incorporate  
21 these DR guides if -- if they're available.  
22 They may not be for some cases. And then the  
23 feasibility of -- of including them -- well, I  
24 guess -- I guess --

25 **MR. ELLIOTT:** That answers it.

1           **MR. GRIFFON:** I guess that's it.

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** If we can do it for the eighth,  
3 we can do it for the 10th --

4           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I was --

5           **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- or the ninth.

6           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- just saying including them on  
7 all cases, but that gets into Liz's issue, so I  
8 guess -- I guess we're just saying for all  
9 reviewed cases.

10          **MR. ELLIOTT:** I think that's where we ended up  
11 a minute ago.

12          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

13          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Speculating here --

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** So just the feasibility of that,  
15 yeah.

16          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- it will probably be -- can  
17 we do it will probably be case-specific, that  
18 when a case is selected for review, at that  
19 point we will know if we have, you know, a --  
20 an instruction or a guide that was utilized in  
21 the development of that.

22          **MR. ELLIOTT:** For that time frame.

23          **MR. GRIFFON:** For that time frame.

24          **MR. ELLIOTT:** That (unintelligible).

25          **MR. GRIFFON:** That's the hard part.

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, for -- for that -- what  
2 was utilized for that case, will we have it, I  
3 don't think we'll know until the case is  
4 selected from this point forward, you know.

5           **DR. MAURO:** (Unintelligible)

6           **MR. HINNEFELD:** So it'll be case-specific, but  
7 I will -- I think that, but as -- that's  
8 largely speculation, so let me speak to the  
9 ORAU team in the meantime and make sure that --  
10 that, you know, there is nothing that I don't  
11 foresee -- you know, anything that I don't see  
12 here that would interfere with the ability to  
13 do that.

14           **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay. So we'll just get an  
15 update on it when you check with ORAU to make  
16 sure -- you know.

17           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

18           **MR. GRIFFON:** And it may -- it's probably going  
19 to be case-specific, but --

20           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

21           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- you know, the indication seems  
22 to be that you -- you can do that, it's just  
23 the -- that some cases may not be able to find  
24 either one for that case because there was --  
25 there weren't any, or -- or you can't nar-- you

1           can't find one for that time frame.

2           **MR. HINNEFELD:** For that time frame.

3           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, yeah.

4           **MR. SIEBERT:** That's the biggest issue.

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, that -- I think that's the  
6           biggest issue. Right. Yeah.

7           **MR. HINNEFELD:** The -- I don't know if you want  
8           to get into this, Mark, of -- there was  
9           discussion about the selection of the eighth  
10          case -- the eighth set of DRs.

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah, I think we just -- we  
12          talked before, I think we're -- Stu and I  
13          talked about the selection of the eighth case  
14          and what we were -- what I was proposing is use  
15          the same criteria as we did for the seventh  
16          set, which is that Stu is going to generate a  
17          list of the best-estimate cases, bring them  
18          back to us for the May meeting, and then we can  
19          do a preliminary selection and then he's going  
20          to go find that refined criteria and come back  
21          with a -- for those selected cases, you're  
22          going to come back with that more detailed  
23          information --

24          **MR. HINNEFELD:** (Unintelligible)

25          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- that we had asked about.

1 Right?

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** So do that same two-step process,  
4 and I think that's okay. Right?

5 **MR. ELLIOTT:** And the number being 40 or --

6 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 38.

7 **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- 38?

8 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 38.

9 **DR. MAURO:** That's what I was going to say --

10 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Or 32.

11 **DR. MAURO:** -- 38 -- 30-- I'm sorry, 32, 'cause  
12 28 was the last batch --

13 **MR. HINNEFELD:** 28 were selected for the  
14 seventh.

15 **DR. MAURO:** -- and -- and then -- right.

16 **MR. GRIFFON:** So 32 cases for the eighth set --

17 **DR. MAURO:** So 32 will do it, and that will  
18 close out our fiscal year 2007 --

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** Okay.

20 **DR. MAURO:** -- obligations.

21 **MR. ELLIOTT:** So from 32 you're going to  
22 select...

23 **DR. MAURO:** Well, from -- from the batch --

24 **MR. HINNEFELD:** From -- from some 400 or 500  
25 best estimates --

1 DR. MAURO: Picked in --

2 MR. HINNEFELD: -- they will select --

3 MR. ELLIOTT: And these are all best estimates.

4 MR. HINNEFELD: -- somewhat more than 32 --

5 DR. MAURO: Yeah.

6 MR. HINNEFELD: -- in order to get --

7 MR. ELLIOTT: Down to --

8 MR. HINNEFELD: -- more detailed information on  
9 that subset of -- and then from that subset, 32  
10 will be selected.

11 DR. MAURO: And delivered to us, that's --  
12 we're looking to get -- receive CDs with 32 on  
13 them.

14 MR. ELLIOTT: All best estimates.

15 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, my proposal was to start  
16 by running all of the best est-- full internal  
17 and external and -- and come up with that  
18 population 'cause I suspect it may be -- come  
19 up with 400 or 500 by now.

20 MR. ELLIOTT: Okay.

21 MR. HINNEFELD: And from that, my thought was  
22 we should --

23 MR. ELLIOTT: (Unintelligible) be 1,000.

24 MR. HINNEFELD: -- be able to find a subset of  
25 -- we should be able to find a subset that is

1 robust enough and big enough to get the  
2 additional information that we can select 32.

3 **MR. GRIFFON:** So you think you're up to 400 or  
4 500 (unintelligible)?

5 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I'm thinking we must be. I  
6 think it was over -- it was over 200 last time  
7 we ran it, and --

8 **MR. GRIFFON:** The only thing i--

9 **MR. ELLIOTT:** And we're talking adjudicated  
10 cases, too, so you've got to --

11 **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

12 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Well, that's right, we're  
13 talking adjudicated cases.

14 **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- screen that down a little  
15 further.

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

17 **MR. ELLIOTT:** And at the last Board meeting, I  
18 -- I'm trying to recall the slide I presented  
19 on the different approaches to dose  
20 reconstruction and what the percentages was on  
21 the best estimates internal/external. I -- I  
22 don't know that I -- well, I don't -- I don't  
23 want to say.

24 **UNIDENTIFIED:** We may not be at 400.

25 **MR. HINNEFELD:** What -- what I will do -- what

1 I can do --

2 **MR. ELLIOTT:** It's definitely not going to be  
3 (unintelligible) analysis --

4 **MR. GRIFFON:** The only thing I was going to say  
5 is --

6 **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- (unintelligible) 400 or --

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** What I was going to say is --

8 **MR. HINNEFELD:** What I can do is --

9 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- sort randomly, too.

10 **MR. HINNEFELD:** All those lists -- all that  
11 list and provide that list to the -- to the  
12 subcommittee members ahead of time, and --

13 **MR. ELLIOTT:** I think that's a good idea.

14 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- and then you guys can  
15 converse however you want and decide --

16 **MR. GRIFFON:** 'Cause my -- one --

17 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- do we think we have enough  
18 here or do we want to get some randomly-  
19 selected cases as well.

20 **MR. GRIFFON:** 'Cause one concern we might have,  
21 even if you have a lot of cases, if they're all  
22 from Savannah River and Hanford, you know, we -

23 -

24 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Uh-huh.

25 **MR. GRIFFON:** -- we might have to say no --

1           **MR. HINNEFELD:** Right.

2           **MR. GRIFFON:** -- we can't do these -- more of  
3 these, you know, or whatever.

4           **MR. HINNEFELD:** So I think --

5           **MR. GRIFFON:** So we might -- if we -- if you  
6 get these out to us early enough, we can maybe  
7 -- via e-mail, let you know and come to the  
8 Board meeting with a selection of random, too -  
9 -

10          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, and however many --

11          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- to see --

12          **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- however many randomly-  
13 selected you want.

14          **MR. GRIFFON:** And I think we can do that by e-  
15 mail --

16          **MS. MUNN:** I think so.

17          **MR. GRIFFON:** -- with the four subcommittee  
18 members, you know.

19          **MS. MUNN:** Yeah. You up for that, Mike?

20          **MR. GIBSON:** Uh-huh, yeah.

21          **MR. ELLIOTT:** For -- for planning purposes and  
22 -- and speaking of timing, your ninth -- ninth  
23 round, tenth round selections -- you might want  
24 to consider different kinds or different types  
25 of -- of reconstructed cases. We'll have more

1           partials, as far as classes added and non-  
2           presumptive cases being done with a partial.  
3           You're going to -- you're going to have -- at  
4           some point in time I think you're going to see  
5           more AWEs treated like the set of Battelle  
6           cases where we've asked for a Technical Basis  
7           Document to be developed with an appendix  
8           specific to a type of process. Those are --  
9           they're starting to come through now, so these  
10          are just some of the other things I -- I would  
11          alert you to that you might want to think  
12          through about, you know, your case selection  
13          strategy.

14          I don't know, is there other categories like  
15          that, Stu, than those two?

16          **MR. GRIFFON:** Do you -- can you tell us -- not  
17          right now, but provide us that list of AWEs  
18          that would have that appendix -- process-  
19          specific appendix?

20          **MR. ELLIOTT:** There were originally about 1,400  
21          claims that we carved off, representing a  
22          number of sites. And I don't know -- you know,  
23          they're just now starting to come through, so  
24          they may be not the tenth round or eleventh  
25          round, but it might be the 12th round you might

1 want to think...

2 **MR. HINNEFELD:** I -- I don't -- I don't know  
3 the number of either of those categories. I  
4 can't think of any others that would be  
5 noteworthy, but you're right, those are two  
6 categories that --

7 **MR. GRIFFON:** But maybe --

8 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- just thinking out loud, the  
9 full internal and external will not capture  
10 partial dose reconstructions from people who  
11 (unintelligible) --

12 **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

13 **MR. HINNEFELD:** -- in the SEC class, I don't  
14 believe.

15 **MR. GRIFFON:** (Unintelligible)

16 **MR. HINNEFELD:** So -- I mean we could query  
17 that population specifically. We could do  
18 that.

19 **MR. GRIFFON:** I think let's stick with best  
20 estimate for now.

21 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Stick with what we're doing for  
22 now.

23 **MR. GRIFFON:** But -- yeah.

24 **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah, 'cause you're  
25 (unintelligible) --

1           **MR. ELLIOTT:** That -- that one staged up sooner  
2           -- that -- that you were just talking about,  
3           that staged up sooner -- if we look at  
4           Mallinckrodt, Iowa and the early year classes  
5           that have been added, you know, we started  
6           doing some of those non-presumptive partial  
7           dose reconstructions. But -- and this other  
8           category that I'm talking about about the --  
9           the lot of AWE claims --

10          **MR. GRIFFON:** Right.

11          **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- that's -- that's a little  
12          further down the --

13          **MR. HINNEFELD:** Yeah.

14          **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- down the (unintelligible).

15          **MR. GRIFFON:** Well, all I was saying is that  
16          these -- might be bet-- second population  
17          sounds interesting, can --

18          **MR. ELLIOTT:** Yeah, 'cause it's done under a  
19          whole different --

20          **MR. GRIFFON:** Yeah.

21          **MR. ELLIOTT:** -- somewhat different, I'm  
22          (unintelligible) --

23          **MR. GRIFFON:** In the future can you give us a  
24          listing of those sites that would be covered by  
25          the (unintelligible)?



1  
2  
3  
4

(Whereupon, the meeting was concluded at 3:28  
p.m.)

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**CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER****STATE OF GEORGIA****COUNTY OF FULTON**

I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Court Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the above and foregoing on the day of April 11, 2007; and it is a true and accurate transcript of the testimony captioned herein.

I further certify that I am neither kin nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor have any interest in the cause named herein.

WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 16th day of August, 2007.

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