Draft

ISSUE RESOLUTION MATRIX FOR
SC&A FINDINGS ON APPENDIX BB TO TBD-6000

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INTRODUCTION

The present document presents an update of the issues arising from the SC&A review of Appendix BB to “Site Profiles for Atomic Weapons Employers that Worked Uranium and Thorium Metals” (Allen and Glover 2007). It is current as of the last NIOSH report issued December 10, 2013. A separate issues matrix pertaining to SC&A findings on the General Steel Industries (GSI) Special Exposure Cohort (SEC) petition and the corresponding National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) evaluation report (ER) was last updated on December 5, 2012. Although the two SC&A reports that form the bases of these matrices have different objectives, there is considerable overlap between the two sets of issues and hence the two matrices.

Time Line of Appendix BB Issues Matrix

- March 17, 2008: SC&A (2008) issued a review of Appendix BB. Errata sheets correcting two tables in the report were sent out on March 20, and a revised version that complied with the Privacy Act was released on April 21.
- May 2, 2008: SC&A distributed the “Issue Resolution Matrix for SC&A Findings on Appendix BB” which listed 13 issues. These issues were taken from the list of 13 findings presented in the executive summary of our review of Appendix BB (SC&A 2008).
- June 19, 2008: NIOSH responded to the 13 issues, inserting its responses in the boxes labeled “NIOSH Response.”
- December 16, 2009: The ABRWH Work Group on TBD 6000/6001 met in Hebron, Kentucky, and recommended action items to NIOSH regarding the Appendix BB issues.
- April 24, 2010: Paul Ziemer, Chair of ABRWH Work Group on TBD-6000, issued a memo summarizing the action items from the December 16, 2009, work group meeting (ABRWH 2010). We have summarized each action item pertaining to Appendix BB in the box labeled “Board Action.”
- October 08, 2010: Allen (2010) prepared the “Path Forward for GSI Appendix and ER Review” in which he presented the proposed NIOSH responses to several of the Appendix BB issues. We have summarized these responses in boxes labeled “Path Forward” in the appropriate locations in the matrix.
- October 12, 2010: The Work Group on TBD-6000 met in Hebron, Kentucky. The work group asked SC&A to update both the Appendix BB and the GSI SEC issues

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1 The “findings” in the earlier report are presented as “issues” in the present document.

2 In March 2010, this work group was divided into two separate work groups—Advisory Board Work Group on TBD 6000 and Advisory Board Work Group on TBD 6001.
matrices to reflect work group recommendations and the NIOSH responses in the “Path Forward.”

- July 25, 2011: SC&A updated the Appendix BB issues matrix, appending an observation or reply to each relevant issue in the appropriate location in the matrix. We also listed the current status of each issue.


- September 20, 2011: The Work Group on TBD-6000, meeting in Hebron, Kentucky, tasked SC&A with interviewing two former GSI workers and a former GSI contractor.


- October 20, 2011: Anigstein (2011b) prepared a white paper: “Update on the Use of Sealed Radioactive Sources at General Steel Industries.”


- March 15, 2012: The Work Group on TBD-6000 met in Hebron, Kentucky. The work group asked SC&A to update the SEC issues matrix to reflect Allen 2012a, Anigstein and Olsher 2012, and discussions of these reports at the meeting.

- March 22, 2012: SC&A updated the SEC issues matrix, incorporating all developments since September 15, 2011.


- March 28, 2012: The Work Group on TBD-6000 met in Hebron, Kentucky and took two votes on recommendations to the full board regarding the SEC petition for various periods. The work group also voted to transfer a number of issues from the SEC issues matrix to the Appendix BB matrix.
May 30, 2012: Anigstein and Mauro (2012b) issued a memo to the work group updating SC&A’s review of occupational internal dose at GSI.

June 1, 2012: SC&A updated the SEC issues matrix, incorporating all developments since March 22, 2012.

June 8, 2012: Allen (2012c) responded to Anigstein and Mauro (2012b).

June 11, 2012: Anigstein and Mauro (2012c) issued a memo to the work group replying to Allen (2012c).

June 14, 2012. The Work Group on TBD-6000 held a teleconference meeting, during which a work group member questioned the use of surrogate data from TBD-6000 (Allen 2011a) to characterize the airborne uranium concentrations at GSI. The work group voted not to recommend action on the GSI SEC petition to the full board, pending resolution of the surrogate data issue.

June 20, 2012. The ABRWH, at its meeting in Santa Fe, New Mexico, tasked SC&A with reviewing the use of Allen’s (2011a) surrogate data to characterize the airborne uranium concentrations during uranium handling operations at GSI.

July 16, 2012. Anigstein (2012) transmitted a report reviewing the use of Allen’s (2011a) surrogate data to characterize the airborne uranium concentrations during uranium handling operations at GSI.

July 25, 2012. Anigstein et al. (2012a) transmitted a memo suggesting an alternative model for the calculation of uranium intakes at GSI.

July 28, 2012. SC&A updated the matrix, including all developments up to the current date.

August 28, 2012. The Work Group on TBD-6000 met in Hebron, Kentucky, and discussed the use of various surrogate data to characterize the airborne uranium concentrations during uranium handling operations at GSI. The work group also confirmed the closure of all remaining issues in the SEC issues matrix and/or their transfer to the present matrix.

September 19, 2012. At the ABRWH meeting in Denver, Paul Ziemer, Chair of the Work Group on TBD-6000, presented a summary of the August 28 work group meeting, followed by Dave Allen of DCAS, who presented a summary of his recent report on the use of surrogate data for GSI uranium dust concentrations (Allen 2012d).

November 6, 2012. Allen (2012e) compiled a list of 37 additional measurements of airborne uranium activity concentrations and evaluated their use as surrogates for GSI uranium dust concentrations.


November 26, 2012. SC&A updated the matrix, transferring issues from the SEC issues matrix, as instructed by the Work Group on TBD-6000.
November 28, 2012. The Work Group on TBD-6000 met in Hebron, Kentucky and voted on four motions. The first motion was to accept the recommendation on the use of surrogate data for the operational and residual periods for internal dose. The implication is that it would be used in conjunction with the TIB-70 procedure to determine the dose during residual period. The motion carried unanimously, with all four members voting. The next motion was to agree that NIOSH could reconstruct both internal and external doses during the “early” period: from the beginning of AEC operations (January 1, 1953, since moved back to October 1, 1952), until the end of the “Radium Era” [the AEC license for the use of 60Co sources was approved on April 18, 1962; however, the sources were not procured until May 21, 1962]. The motion carried with three ayes and one nay. The next motion was to accept the NIOSH recommendation that they can reconstruct doses during the second part of the operational period—from April 1962 to June 30, 1966. There were three ayes and one abstention. The final vote was to accept the NIOSH recommendation that they can reconstruct doses during the residual period: July 1, 1966–December 31, 1992. The motion carried unanimously, with all four members voting.

December 10, 2012. DOE extends the beginning of the period of covered operations at GSI to October 1, 1952.

December 11, 2012. At the ABRWH meeting in Knoxville, Paul Ziemer, Chair of the Work Group on TBD-6000, summarized the actions taken by the Board at its previous meeting, summarized the November 28 Work Group meeting, and reviewed the status of the 10 SEC issues (as distinct from the 13 issues in the present matrix). He was followed by Dave Allen of DCAS, who presented a summary of the current status of the use of surrogate data for GSI uranium dust concentrations. Following a discussion, the Board voted on the SEC petition, with seven votes to deny, six votes to grant, and four members absent.

February 4, 2013. Allen (2013a) compared SC&A and NIOSH estimates of doses from external exposure to the skin and to the whole body for various periods.

February 7, 2013. During the ABRWH teleconference meeting, Ted Katz, DFO, announced the votes of the Board members absent from the December 11 meeting. The final vote was 9 to 8 to deny the SEC petition.

February 12, 2013. Anigstein and Mauro (2013a) responded to Allen (2013a), indicating substantial disagreement with the NIOSH dose estimates.

February 21, 2013. The Work Group on TBD-6000 met in Hebron, Kentucky. NIOSH proposed a triangular distribution to characterize doses from external exposure to penetrating radiation during the radium era. The Work Group, NIOSH, and SC&A agreed to an upper limit of 12 or 15 rem, which were the AEC dose limits for various years during this time period. The mode was 9.69 rem, while the lower limit was ~6.3 rem. The rest of the discussion centered on which workers would be assigned this dose distribution, and which ones would receive a different dose that was not yet decided on. NIOSH and SC&A acknowledged differences in external dose estimates during the 1963–1966 time period, but these differences were not resolved.
April 1, 2013. Allen (2013b) used exposure rates measured during a survey of the radiography facility in No. 6 Building to estimate the dose rates of 868 mrem/y to nonradiographers during the Radium Era. He also reviewed 284 claimants and found that 26 of them could be assigned to the radiographer category, based on their job descriptions. He then listed intakes of uranium dust, based on the previously agreed upon distributions of airborne dust concentrations derived from surrogate data.

April 23, 2013. Anigstein and Mauro (2013b) responded to Allen’s (2013b) estimates of external doses. We disagreed with his calculated dose rates to nonradiographers during the Radium Era, his criteria for classifying claimants as radiographers or nonradiographers, and his dose estimate for the layout man following the Radium Era. We also documented the change in the annual AEC dose limit from 15 to 12 rem as being implemented on January 1, 1961.

April 24, 2013. Anigstein and Mauro (2013c) responded to Allen’s (2013b) estimates of internal doses. We disagreed with the assignment of exposure times and of the use of a $10^{-6}$ m$^{-1}$ resuspension factor during the residual period.

April 26, 2013. The Work Group on TBD-6000 met by teleconference. In the course of the discussion on external doses during the Radium Era, NIOSH agreed to assign the radiographer doses to all workers who cannot be proved not to have primarily worked in the plant (i.e., the production areas). The actual dose to be assigned to such administrative workers was to be determined by NIOSH. During the following discussion of internal exposure, the Work Group instructed NIOSH and SC&A to schedule a technical call to achieve a better understanding of their respective models of uranium intakes.

May 6, 2013. Allen (2013c) proposed that an external dose of 571.5 mR/y be assigned to administrative personnel.

May 28, 2013. NIOSH and SC&A staff, together with Paul Ziemer, Chair of the Work Group on TBD-6000 and Ted Katz, DFO, participated in a technical conference call. NIOSH and SC&A clarified their positions regarding their respective models of exposure to uranium dust.


June 7, 2013. Allen (2013d) demonstrated that the NIOSH model of airborne concentrations of uranium dust during uranium handling operations could be represented by a square-wave function.


June 20, 2013. The Work Group on TBD-6000 met by teleconference. Paul Ziemer, Chair of the Work Group, stated his understanding that the external exposure of 571.5 mR/y be assigned only to administrative personnel who did not routinely work in the production areas, regardless of their job description. Jim Neton, Associate Director
for Science, concurred with that opinion and stated that a review of the claims showed very few cases that would qualify for that category—all others would be assigned the radiographers’ doses. He also stated that NIOSH would expand the width of the square wave (along the time axis) assigned to each uranium-handling period interval to encompass the entire period of uranium handling hours in a given year. SC&A agreed with that concept.

- August 21, 2013. Allen (2013e) listed revised intakes of uranium during the operational period, based on exposure to the 95th %ile concentration during 100% of the uranium handling hours. He also listed the triangular distributions of radiographer external doses for two periods during the Radium Era, and the external doses from penetrating radiation and β rays to the layout men and the betatron operators following the Radium Era.

- October 6, 2013. Anigstein and Mauro (2013d) responded to Allen’s (2013e) revised dose estimates. We were in substantial agreement with Allen’s uranium dust intakes during the period 7/1/1958–6/30/1966. We disagreed with Allen’s assignment of uranium handling hours during 10/1/1952–6/30/1958, which leads to an underestimate of intakes and is at variance with the agreement reached during the June 20, 2013, Work Group meeting. We did not agree that an RF of $10^{-6}$ m$^{-1}$ is applicable to the residual period.

- October 10, 2013. Allen (2013f) reconstructed β doses to skin, using MCNPX input files furnished by SC&A in 2010. He then compared these results to those presented by Anigstein and Mauro (2013d) and found differences that could not be accounted for.

- October 11, 2013. The Work Group on TBD-6000 met by teleconference. SC&A proposed revising the changeover from the 15 rem to the 12 rem annual limit, the upper limit of the triangular distribution of radiographer doses during the Radium Era, to occur on January 1, 1961, the date the revised 10 CFR 20 went into effect. Also, SC&A observed that NIOSH had extended the Radium Era through 1963, whereas GSI had discontinued the use of radium in 1962. Due to different assumptions and exposure scenarios, the NIOSH external dose from penetrating radiation to the layout man dose was about one-half the dose calculated by SC&A. Jim Neton (NIOSH/DCAS) agreed to use the uranium handling hours for 10/1/1952–6/30/1958 proposed by SC&A for the calculation of internal exposure and for β dose from uranium handling. Dave Allen (NIOSH/DCAS) agreed that the changeover from the 15 rem to the 12 rem annual limit will occur on January 1, 1961, and that the Radium Era should end at the end of 1962. SC&A cited an unreleased analysis that indicated that an RF of $10^{-5}$ m$^{-1}$ during the residual period, together with the exponential decrease of airborne contamination levels recommended by OTIB-0070 (Sharfi 2012), was consistent with measurements in the Old Betatron Building made during the FUSRAP cleanup in 1993. We were asked to present these results in writing to the Work Group and NIOSH, and to exchange files and information with NIOSH in order to reconcile our respective calculations of skin doses from β rays.
NIOSH agreed to contact Craig Yoder, vice president of Landauer, to confirm SC&A’s information that, during the period of GSI operations, the control film badge was reported as $M$, not the actual dose recorded on the badge.

- October 22, 2013. Anigstein and Mauro (2013e) presented an alternative methodology of calculating resuspension during the residual period.

- November 5, 2013. In an e-mail message to members of the Work Group on TBD-6000, Neton (2013a) reported that Stu Hinnefeld, the director of DCAS, had communicated with Craig Yoder, a Senior Vice-President at Landauer. Mr. Hinnefeld confirmed SC&A’s characterization of Landauer’s practice of reporting the control film badge readings during the GSI period of operations. Dr. Neton stated that NIOSH proposes to adopt the limiting value for exposure to betatron operators proposed by SC&A.

- December 5, 2013. Anigstein and Mauro (2013f) presented an updated analysis of doses to the skin of betatron operators.

- December 10, 2013. Neton (2013b) stated that NIOSH will use an RF of $10^{-5}$ m$^{-1}$ during the residual period.

- December 18, 2013. SC&A updated the matrix.

- December 19, 2013. The Work Group on TBD-6000 met by teleconference. During the meeting, David Allen (NIOSH/DCAS) stated that NIOSH was able to reproduce the SC&A skin dose calculations, based on MCNP results provided by SC&A, either exactly or to within one digit, the difference being attributable to round-off error. NIOSH will use these results to assign skin doses to GSI workers. James Neton (NIOSH/DCAS) stated that NIOSH will adopt a resuspension factor of $10^{-5}$ m$^{-1}$ in calculating uranium dust concentrations during the residual period. The members of the work group agreed with that decision. Dr. Neton reiterated his earlier statement (Neton 2013a) that NIOSH agreed with SC&A’s interpretation of the doses recorded on the control film badge dosimeter and thus considers the SC&A model to be more appropriate to estimate worker exposure during the operation of the betatron in the New Betatron Building. The Work Group asked SC&A to update its external exposure calculations and to update this matrix to reflect the latest developments.


Status Summary

- Issue 1 (data sources): In progress, pending NIOSH revision of limiting external exposures (1963-1966), and limiting neutron exposures and skin doses during the entire operational period.
• Issue 2 (period of covered employment): SC&A recommends that this issue be Closed.
• Issue 3 (betatron beam intensity): SC&A recommends that this issue be Closed.
• Issue 4 (underestimate of stray betatron radiation): In progress, pending revision by NIOSH of external exposures and neutron doses to the layout man.
• Issue 5 (other radiography sources): SC&A recommends that this issue be Closed.
• Issue 6 (skin dose): In progress, pending NIOSH revision of skin doses, using MCNPX input files furnished by SC&A on 11/08/13.
• Issue 7 (residual radiation from betatron apparatus): SC&A recommends that this issue be Closed.
• Issue 8 (work hours): Closed —Dr. Ziemer noted that the Work Group, NIOSH, and SC&A are in agreement.
• Issue 9 (work practices): SC&A recommends that this issue be Closed.
• Issue 10 (dose rates from uranium): In progress, pending NIOSH revisions of its earlier calculations of neutron doses from irradiated uranium.
• Issue 11 (doses to other workers): SC&A recommends that this issue be Closed, assuming NIOSH employs a claimant-favorable classification of claimants as production or administrative personnel, and assuming that the most claimant-favorable doses or exposures will be assigned to production (plant) personnel from among the various scenarios for photon exposures and neutron and skin doses.
• Issue 12 (surface contamination and resuspension): SC&A recommends that this issue be Closed.
• Issue 13 (incorrect units): In Progress, pending completion of revised Appendix BB.

Level of Importance
We have assigned four levels of importance to these issues, which we define in the following manner:

• **High**: Capable of having a significant impact on individual dose reconstructions and hence on the probability of causation (POC) for the claimants.
• **Medium**: Could alter the POC for some individuals.
• **Low**: Recommended technical improvements in the accuracy of dose reconstructions, but unlikely to have major impacts in most cases.
• **N/A**: Not applicable because issue was closed by action of the Work Group or SC&A recommends that the issue be closed.

We have assigned the following levels of importance to these issues:

• Issues 1, 4, and 6: **High**
• Issue 10: *Medium*
• Issue 13 (use of correct and consistent units of dose and exposure): *Low*
• Issues 2, 3, 5, 7–9, 11–12: *N/A*


**Issue Resolution Matrix for SC&A Findings on Appendix BB to TBD-6000**

### Issue 1: Completeness of Data Sources

**SC&A Finding:** The authors of Appendix BB have not utilized some key information on the GSI Granite City site. For example, they failed to note the presence of two betatrons, housed in two different buildings, as indicated in the reports by Murray and Uziel (1992), and Murray and Brown (1994), and as was brought out at the General Steel Industries Worker Outreach Meeting on August 21, 2006. Other examples of incomplete utilization of available data are presented in the context of other findings discussed below.

**NIOSH Response (6/19/08):** The information was used in the preparation of the appendix though it was admittedly not well documented. The presence of a second betatron likely would not change the modeled exposure (since a worker could be in proximity to only one at a time), but information that has been refined since the earliest discussions might affect the modeled dose. However, NIOSH has obtained film badge results for the betatron operators and is in the process of comparing this data to the modeled doses.

**Board Action (12/16/09):** Discussed at meeting of the Work Group on TBD-6000/6001.

**Action items:** (4/24/10) (ABRWH 2010):
- Concerning Landauer report on Picker X Ray film badge records, NIOSH is still awaiting a report back from Landauer. (*Reference: p. 125 of the 12/16/09 transcript.*)
- NIOSH is to evaluate new source term information (that had been identified by the petitioner) to determine if Appendix BB needs to be updated/revised. (*Reference: p. 125 of the 12/16/09 transcript.*)

**SC&A Observations (7/23/11):** During a telephone conversation with Robert Anigstein (SC&A), the late former betatron supervisor, hypothesized that since GSI purchased x-ray film from Picker, they might have obtained their film badges from that company before switching to Landauer in November 1963. This hypothesis was buttressed by our learning that Picker had, in fact, offered film badge dosimetry services, and that there were currently one or more file cabinets labeled “Picker” at Landauer. However, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) licensing records indicate that film badges during 1962–1963 were provided by the Nuclear Consultants Corporation (no longer in business).

**7/28/12:** NIOSH should take note of information about external exposures prior to the Landauer film badge program that started in November 1963. Specific data include the exposure records that, together with information obtained by SC&A in interviewing Mr. [redacted], demonstrate that there was a film badge monitoring program as far back as 1957. Additional information is the report to AEC that AEC external exposure limits were never exceeded from 1953 onward.

In calculating internal exposures from intakes of uranium, NIOSH should take note of the contamination survey of the Old Betatron Building prior to the cleanup under FUSRAP in June 1993.

**Board Action (8/28/12):** During the meeting of the Work Group on TBD-6000, an advocate for the GSI workers, participating by telephone, reported that aggressive cleanups of the Old Betatron Building were performed after the shutdown of the facility. The work group decided that, in light of the advocate’s report, the 1993 FUSRAP data cannot be used to back-calculate uranium deposition during the operational period.

**SC&A Observations (12/18/13):** NIOSH utilized information furnished by Mr. [redacted], including his occupational external exposure history, information from the GSI correspondence with the AEC, AEC occupational exposure limits, interviews with other site experts, and the results of SC&A’s MCNPX simulations, to derive estimates of external exposures during the Radium Era. Full use has also been made of information collected on uranium air concentrations from similar operations at other sites and on
resuspension factors, as well as data from the FUSRAP cleanup report (Murray and Brown 1994) and purchase orders from the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, to derive uranium intakes.

We have obtained information from Landauer regarding the reporting of doses to the control badge, which NIOSH has used in modeling the betatron exposures of the layout man. We have also revised our assessments of skin doses from irradiated metals. We are currently re-evaluating the external exposure of the layout man to irradiated metal and the limiting doses from external exposures to neutrons. We will share these results with NIOSH as soon as they are available.

**NIOSH Statement of Position** (12/19/13): During the meeting of the Work Group on TBD-6000, James Neton (NIOSH/DCAS) reiterated his earlier statement (Neton 2013a) that NIOSH agreed with SC&A’s interpretation of the doses recorded on the control film badge dosimeter and thus considers the SC&A model to be more appropriate to estimate worker exposure during the operation of the betatron in the New Betatron Building.


**Status** (1/14/14): In progress, pending NIOSH revision of limiting external exposures (1963–1966), and limiting neutron exposures and skin doses during the entire operational period.

### Issue 2: Period of Covered Employment

**SC&A Finding:** Appendix BB states that the covered activities took place in 1953–1966. It is plausible and claimant favorable to assume that this work began in 1952. We base this assumption on Atomic Energy Commission “Correspondence Reference Form,” with a hand-corrected date of December 5, 1952, that has a summary titled, “Regarding ingots of uranium metal furnished to General Steel Castings Co. for betatron testing.” Since the Army installed the first betatron in Granite City in January 1952, an event that was reported in a local newspaper, it seems likely that Mallinckrodt would have taken advantage of this facility at an early date.

**NIOSH Response** (6/19/08): NIOSH uses the official covered period established by the Department of Labor, and does not have the authority to amend that covered period. It is our understanding that this information was available at the time the period was established for GSI; however, we will forward the information to the DOL for their consideration.

**Board Action** (12/16/09): Discussed at meeting of the Work Group on TBD-6000/6001.

Action item (4/24/10) (ABRWH 2010):

- NIOSH to confirm that DOL received information concerning a possible start date for the covered period (1952 rather than 1953). *(Reference: p. [151] of the 12/[16]/09 transcript.)*

**SC&A Reply** (7/23/11): We have not seen any further communication regarding receipt by DOL of information from NIOSH. We have since found an announcement by the U.S. Army on January 13, 1952, regarding the installation of a betatron at GSI in Granite City, Illinois, reported in the New York Times on the following day. The assumed 1953 starting date is based on a single AEC memo, which is cited by DOE in qualifying the site for inclusion in FUSRAP. DOE would have had no incentive to determine if the starting date could have been 1952, since that would not have affected the eligibility of the site for FUSRAP. DOL should be informed that it is at least equally likely that AEC started utilizing the GSI betatron in 1952 as in 1953.

**Conclusion:** An additional year of covered employment may affect the POC for some claimants.

**DOE Action** (12/10/12): Beginning of period of covered operations at GSI extended to October 1, 1952.

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**NOTICE:** All Privacy Act-protected information in this January 15, 2014, version has been redacted. Future versions of this matrix will require additional reviews for Privacy Act-protected information.
### Issue 3: Underestimate of Betatron Beam Intensity

**SC&A Finding**: Allen and Glover (2007) assume a betatron beam intensity of 100 R/min (without the aluminum beam-flattening compensator) at a distance of 3 ft from the target. They cite an interview with Jack Schuetz as the source of information that the betatron beam had a “design maximum” output of 100 R/min. This value is inconsistent with the material furnished by Schuetz (2007), which lists outputs of up to 282 R/min. It is also inconsistent with the Allis-Chalmers acceptance criteria for the betatron tubes, which required a minimum output of 220 R/min at 25 MeV. We find that assigning an uncompensated intensity of 250 R/min at 3 ft is reasonable and claimant favorable.

**NIOSH Response** (6/19/08): To be clear, Mr. Schuetz indicated

> “Tubes manufactured in the early 1950s produced outputs between 125-150 R/M, the 1960s between 200-275 R/M and by the late 1970s, between 300-375 R/M @ 25 Mv. These levels were only obtainable in my laboratory machine with varying percent reductions depending on individual field locations and whether in-house maintenance personnel or my trained service engineers installed the tubes.”

Mr. Schuetz then went on to list the last 7 tubes purchased by GSI in a table. The shipping dates ranged from 12-29-1969 to 5-31-1973. The output at 25 Mv ranged from 260 to 282. At the 8/11/2006 worker outreach meeting, operators recalled values of 100 R/M from the old betatron and 250 R/M from the new betatron. Based on worker accounts, NIOSH concluded that the old betatron, which dated from the early 1950’s could only develop 100 R/m in use at GSI, while the new betatron could develop 250 R/m. This information, along with other refined information and possible issues with uranium [activation], could affect the modeled dose, but NIOSH has obtained film badge results for the betatron operators and is in the process of comparing this data to the modeled doses.

However, as indicated in the SC&A review, NIOSH has obtained film badge results for betatron operators. We are in the process of comparing this data to the modeled estimates provided by both the appendix and SC&A.

**Path Forward** (10/08/10) (Allen 2010): NIOSH proposes using a value of 100 R/min for the old betatron machine and 250 R/min for the new betatron machine. This is in keeping with recollections of former GSI radiographers that indicate the old betatron had a lower output.

**Board Action** (10/12/10): Paul Ziemer, Chair of TBD-6000 Work Group, confirmed that NIOSH and SC&A agreed that the unmodulated output of the new betatron should be modeled as 250 R/min at 3 ft from the internal betatron target, which is reduced to approximately 160 by the aluminum beam-flattening compensator. It was also agreed that the output of the old betatron should be modeled as 100 R/min, with the compensator in place.

**New Betatron Model** (1/13/12 and 3/23/12): Allen (2012a and 2012b) updated the NIOSH betatron model, which utilized the higher output of the 25-MeV betatron as the limiting case for both the new and the old betatrons.

### Status (11/26/12): SC&A recommends that this issue be closed.

### Issue 4: Underestimate of Stray Radiation from Betatron

**SC&A Finding**: Appendix BB understates the stray radiation during the operation of the betatrons. Our calculations show higher dose rates in the control rooms than the 0.72 mrem/h cited in the Appendix. We calculated effective dose rates of 208 mrem/h on the roof, which was occasionally occupied by maintenance workers, 22 mrem/h in a restroom, and up to 51 mrem/h in other areas accessible to
workers while the betatron was in operation. The Appendix ignores neutrons generated in the betatron target, which make a minor but potentially significant contribution to the effective doses.

NIOSH Response (6/19/08): As indicated in the SC&A review, NIOSH has obtained film badge results for betatron operators. We are in the process of comparing this data to the modeled estimates provided by both the appendix and SC&A. The data includes an area dosimeter from the Betatron control room.

Path Forward (10/08/10) (Allen 2010):

New Betatron Building:

- Develop exposure scenarios for betatron x-ray examination, “shooting scenarios” (shooting angle, duration of exposure, time between exposures, etc.);
- Develop scenarios for potential worker exposures during betatron operations “worker scenarios” (working on the roof, occupying the rest room, etc.);
- Develop a model of the betatron building using new dimension information and “calibrate” the model using the 80 Ci Co-60 source survey;
- Determine dose rate at various locations associated with “worker exposure scenarios” from each of the “shooting scenarios” and include the betatron control room as one location; and,
- Combine dose rates from various combinations of “shooting scenarios” into realistic combinations consistent with a heavy utilization but not to exceed 10 mrem per 168 hours in the betatron control room.

Old Betatron Building:

Similar path forward for the Old Betatron except “worker exposure scenarios” change and there is no “calibration” survey.

SC&A Reply (7/23/11): Before assuming that the dose inside the betatron control room did not exceed 10 mrem per 168 hours, NIOSH needs to establish the following:

- Was film badge No. 001, called “BETATRON CTL,” in fact kept in the betatron control room?
- Since there were two betatrons operating at the time, in two separate buildings, do we know which of the two control rooms housed this badge?

Absent any records or worker testimony, we do not agree that this is a correct, claimant-favorable assumption on which NIOSH should base its exposure model.

We also question the assumed MDL of 10 mrem, based on the following observations by Joseph Zlotnicki, CHP (former Landauer official, currently member of SC&A staff):

Following is my opinion regarding the Landauer film dosimetry MDL for high energy photons. (>250 keV).

While a film dosimeter can readily measure 10 mrem of low energy photons, it is a much more difficult task once the photon energy reaches a few hundred keV or above. The over-response of the film emulsion to x-rays around 40 keV by a factor of 30 was a blessing and a curse for film badge dosimetry and was one of the reasons that film has largely been replaced.

It is very difficult to say what the MDL would be for high energy photons, but it almost certainly was higher than 10 mrem, even on a good day. Below are some of the factors that one would need to consider in deriving the MDL. Note that some items are systematic and some vary day to day and person to person:

- Film type
As can be seen, there are numerous sources of variation. Based on my experience, a single click (i.e. the smallest quantum of dose) on a good densitometer would have been on the order of 15 mrem for high energy photons. Remember, the assigned dose is determined by subtracting two numbers that are derived from the density on the user film and the density on the background or "blank." The subtraction was probably done in terms of dose, not density, however. In other words, the density on the two films being compared was converted to dose and subtracted in the dose, not density, domain.

Other film system reviews have recommended using 40 mrem as the MDL, including the National Research Council report on atmospheric testing and ORAU reports on DOE sites. This might be a little high for Landauer's system, but 20 mrem to 30 mrem might be a better choice than 10 mrem for high energy photons.
interior walls and intervening equipment. This would increase the exposure rate at the location of the rack and thus suppress the calculated exposures of the workers. We found a lack of realism in assigning
doses to the layout man for 1953–1966 based on exposure to stray radiation from the new betatron, since this machine was first installed near the end of 1963.

**Board Action (3/28/12):**

SEC Issue 2: Incomplete Monitoring of Workers, 1964–1966, was discussed at the meeting of the Work Group on TBD-6000 on March 28, 2012. Paul Ziemer, the work group chair, summarized SC&A’s position as “[U]sing reasonable bounding claimant-favorable assumptions and the latest calculations tools, . . . it is possible to reconstruct doses for the period January ’64 to ’66.” Following a suggestion by David Allen and James Neton of NIOSH, with Robert Anigstein of SC&A concurring, the work group voted that this issue should be transferred to the Appendix BB issues matrix. In conclusion, Dr. Ziemer observed: That doesn't preclude an SEC in the later years, depending on how this comes out.

SEC Issue 6: Underestimate of External Exposure of Unmonitored Workers—the work group agreed that this issue should be transferred to the Appendix BB issues matrix.

SEC Issue 8: Incomplete Model Used for Exposure Assessments—the work group agreed that this issue should be transferred to the Appendix BB issues matrix.

**SC&A Observation (10/11/13):** At the October 11, 2013 W-G meeting, NIOSH agreed to contact Landauer to confirm our information that, during the period of GSI operations, the control film badge was always reported as $M$, regardless of the actual dose recorded on the badge.

**NIOSH Communication (11/05/13):** In an e-mail message to members of the Work Group on TBD-6000, Neton (2013a) reported that Stu Hinnefeld, the director of DCAS, had communicated with Craig Yoder, a Senior Vice-President at Landauer. As reported by Mr. Hinnefeld, Dr. Yoder stated that:

- Pieces of film were kept at Landauer from each batch of film to be used as internal controls.
- When a set of customer films were returned, internal controls from that batch of film were included in the development and reading process.
- Optical Density (OD) from internal controls is subtracted from the OD of all customer badges.
- During the 1960s, ODs of customer badges are converted to units of dose.
- The customer control result in mR is subtracted from all customer badges, including customer control. Customer control is reported as $M$.
- For example, if a customer control read 30 mR after subtraction of internal control, it would it be reported as $M$.
- If the customer control read 50 mR or higher, the customer would be told what it read and what value had been subtracted from all customer badges, but the customer control would still be reported as $M$.

Based on Landauer’s practice of subtracting the control badge result from itself, the NIOSH proposed method for bounding exposures to betatron workers at GSI cannot be used. Thus, NIOSH proposes to adopt the limiting value for exposure to betatron operators proposed by SC&A, which does not rely on the use of film badge data.

**NIOSH Statement of Position (12/19/13):** During the meeting of the Work Group on TBD-6000, James Neton (NIOSH/DCAS) reiterated his earlier statement (Neton 2013a) that NIOSH agreed with SC&A’s interpretation of the doses recorded on the control film badge dosimeter and thus considers the SC&A
model to be more appropriate to estimate worker exposure during the operation of the betatron in the New Betatron Building.


Status (1/14/14): In progress, pending revision by NIOSH of neutron doses to GSI plant workers and external exposures of the layout man.

### Issue 5: Failure to Assess Other Radiography Sources

**SC&A Finding:** Allen and Glover (2007) acknowledge the use of other radiography sources, notably $^{60}$Co, but dismiss the doses from these sources, stating that the doses from the betatron would be more limiting. As shown in our analysis, an 80-Ci $^{60}$Co source produced a dose rate of up to 960 mrem/h on the roof of the New Betatron Building, and rates of 12–16 mrem/h in other locations outside the building. Furthermore, stray radiation from a 250-mCi $^{60}$Co source that was used in a lightly shielded structure could have produced dose rates in accessible areas of 9–17 mrem/h.

These rates are one to three orders of magnitude higher than the stray radiation cited in the Appendix.

**NIOSH Response** (6/19/08): As indicated in the SC&A review, NIOSH has obtained film badge results for betatron operators. We are in the process of comparing this data to the modeled estimates provided by both the appendix and SC&A. The data includes operators that indicated they used the sources.

**Path Forward** (10/08/10) (Allen 2010):

**GSI Co-60 sources (1962 on)**
- Develop worker exposure scenarios—both radiography room and open area radiography
- Radiographers reported to wear film badges when working with isotopes
- Divide film badge readings into normal and incident readings (assume over 100 mr in a week is an incident)
- Determine frequency and amount of incident exposures and distribution of remaining doses.
- Reconcile “normal” film badge readings with radiographer exposure scenarios
- Add incident exposure based on frequency and amount of incidents

**X-ray Machines**
- X-ray machine usage described as being infrequent.
- Radiographers wore film badges during betatron operations and source operations (when film badges were issued). A natural assumption is that they would have worn them for x-ray machine operations as well.
- Photon beam from an x-ray machine is directional and pointed at a piece of equipment being examined. It is not realistic to believe it would be routinely pointed at a nearby individual.
- Develop model to determine exposure rate from machine photon leakage and backscatter from steel. Compare dose rates to other sources to determine if further analysis is necessary.

**Ra-226 sources**

SC&A presented a model for exposure from a 500-mg Ra-226 source using a fishpole technique. In the model it is assumed the radiographer holds the source for the duration of the exposure. The technique is sometimes performed in that manner but cannot be performed for very long durations because variance in the position of the source will affect the clarity of the radiograph. Therefore, the technique requires the radiographer to hold the source very steady for the duration of the exposure. The fishpole technique can
also be used as a technique to move the source from the shielded container and placing it in a location for the x-ray. In both cases, a one minute duration is not unrealistic.

A former GSI worker remembered seeing a pole he believed to be the fishpole for radiography and estimated its length to be 12 feet. The purpose of the pole is to increase the distance between radiographer and source. The estimate of the source being 1 meter from the radiographer leaves nine feet remaining and defeats the purpose of using a pole. It is more realistic to believe the radiographer is in the middle of the length of pole or near the opposite end from the source. The middle of the pole would represent a six foot distance and the calculation performed by SC&A would change from 28 rem per year to approximately 7 rem per year. Also, the calculation assumes one person performs all the radiography at the site. It is likely that duties were shared and this dose can be at least divided by two to represent at least two radiographers.

St. Louis Testing Sources

St. Louis Testing was contracted to perform some radiography at GSI. The individual that indicated he did this work discussed using a 10 curie Co-60 source outdoors to examine Westinghouse casings. He indicated the exposures took one week and a half a day (180 hours). He also indicated a boundary was delineated at the 2 m/ hr point and 2 radiographers kept the area under constant surveillance. Lastly, he indicated that 10 of these exposures were performed over a six month period. For a typical work week of 65 hours, a GSI employee would be on site for approximately 69.6 hours of each exposure. If at the radiography boundary the entire time, it would equal 139 mrem of dose per shot. Multiplying that by 10 shots equals 1.39 rem of dose over that six month period. The other radiography remembered by the St. Louis Testing employee was the use of a 50 curie Ir-192 source to perform some repair shots in the repair area. The individual indicated that the Ir-192 showed more detail than the betatron and implied this wasn’t used a lot because it caused more castings to be rejected.

The 50 curie Ir-192 source would produce a dose rate approximately 1.8 times higher than a 10 curie Co-60 source, reducing the duration of the exposure necessary to expose the film. Repair shots would concentrate on a particular area rather than the overall casting. This would allow the source to film distance to be reduced and further shorten the duration of the shot. Lastly, the St. Louis Testing employee implied few shots were performed with this source. Even though the source was stronger, the 2 m/ hr boundary would still be the standard used to delineate an area. Taken together, these pieces of information imply that number and duration of Ir-192 shots should be less than the Co-60 shots while the same 2 m/ hr boundary would be used. It should therefore be a bounding estimate to double the 1.39 rem estimate of the Co-60 source to account for dose from the Ir-192 source.

SC&A Reply (7/23/11): There are no data on radiation exposures from May 1962, when the two ⁶⁰Co sources were procured, until mid-November 1963, when the Landauer film badge monitoring began. Since the latter date coincides with the installation of the new betatron (transferred from the closed GSI facility in Eddystone, Pennsylvania), exposure conditions were most likely different during the Landauer period. For instance, the expanded use of the betatrons might have led to a decrease in the use of sealed sources and thus a lower frequency of incidents. Consequently, it would be inappropriate to apply a model based on the frequency of incidents during the Landauer period to an earlier time.

We agree that workers would not routinely be exposed to the direct beam from the x-ray machines. However, a former GSI betatron operator, reported at least one incident in which the x-ray machine was activated with workers in the room (Anigstein 2010b). Although he was one of the exposed individuals and, as a betatron operator, was presumably wearing his film badge, non-radiographers not wearing film badges could also have been accidentally exposed in this or other incidents of which neither NIOSH nor we have any knowledge.

Allen (2010) is incorrect in characterizing the calculation of exposures of radiographers from ²²⁶Ra sources, performed by SC&A (Anigstein 2010a), as a model. As stated in our report, “Although we cannot construct a plausible bounding exposure scenario for the exposure of a worker performing ²²⁶Ra radiography with the fishpole technique, we can perform a sample
calculation [italics added] to indicate the potential exposure from such a source.” We agree that one former worker recalled walking past the area used for the sealed-source radiography and seeing a pole leaning against the wall that he estimated to be 12-ft long, which he assumed was used in the fishpole technique. More reliable information was provided by Mr., who performed such radiography. He stated that the pole was 4–6 ft long, and that the exposed source was 4–6 ft from his body (Anigstein 2010b). Mr. was interviewed after Anigstein (2010a) performed the sample calculation. Given the range of distances recalled by Mr., we believe that a claimant-favorable distance would be 132 cm (122 [= 4 ft] + 10 [distance from skin to center of torso] = 132).

There is no basis for dividing the exposure among two radiographers. If 10 exposures were performed per shift, these could be accommodated by one worker using a single source if the average exposure was less than, say, 45 minutes. If the exposures were longer, the same worker could set up one exposure, then use the second radium source to set up another exposure in a different location. Distributing the work among two radiographers is not based on factual data and is not claimant favorable.

We do not agree with the estimated exposures of GSI workers from radiography performed by St. Louis Testing. As stated by Anigstein (2010a, PA-cleared version):

Mr. Sinn [of St. Louis Testing] later explained that he meant that there was one radiographer on each shift. . . With only one radiographer on duty, there would have thus been times when the area was unattended while he took necessary breaks. Some GSI workers could have intruded into the exclusion area and received exposures from these sources that were greater than those from the 260 and 280 mCi 60Co sources possessed by GSI.

NIOSH Report (8/10/11): Allen (2011b) calculated the radiation exposures of radiographers and nonradiographers to 226Ra during 1953–1962. The assessment of doses to radiographers divided the radiography among two workers, and used the average distance and exposure duration cited by , a GSI radiographer from that era. The resulting dose rate was 3,573 mrem/y. A maximum dose of 1,353 was assigned to nonradiographers. For 1962–1966, a maximum annual dose of 2,671 mrem/y was assigned to GSI radiographers, based on their working with St. Louis Testing at the GSI site; a maximum dose rate of 1,348 mrem/y—from the use of GSI-owned 60Co sources—was assigned to nonradiographers during the same time period.

SC&A Reply (9/15/11): Anigstein (2011a) estimated the annual exposure of a radiographer positioning and removing 226Ra sources before and after each radiographic exposure to be 9.39 R/y. The analysis assumed that the 226Ra radiography would be performed by a single radiographer. The shortest distance to the source and the longest exposure duration, based on information from Mr., were used in the assessment. However, we had insufficient information to estimate the doses to the radiographer during the radiographic exposures, or to nonradiographers from the use of 226Ra sources. We estimated an exposure of 2.8 R/y of GSI radiographers to St. Louis Testing sources at the GSI site, which is numerically similar to Allen’s (2011b) 2.67 rem/y. However, we did not agree with the lower dose of 1.35 rem/y Allen assigned to nonradiographers.

10/20/11: Anigstein (2011b) interviewed two former GSI workers and two former GSI contractors. Based on the information acquired from these interviews, we updated our assessments of exposures to portable radiation sources. We used three independent approaches to estimate exposures of radiographers to 226Ra sources. First, we extrapolated the 4.5 years of dose records of Mr., who performed radiography only on weekends, to a full-time radiographer and derived annual doses of 9–20 rem/y, depending on how frequently had worked. Next, we performed an MCNP analysis of the exposures inside the radiographers’ office in the radiographic facility in No. 6 Building and added the results to the previously estimated exposure from handling the source before and after radiography, obtaining a total exposure of 9.69 R/y. Finally, we noted the statement in the initial GSI application for an AEC license, that the applicable AEC dose limits during the previous 10 years were never exceeded. These annual limits were 15 rem/y in 1953–54, and 12 rem/y after 1954. Since the AEC limits
encompass or overlap the other two dose estimates, we recommend that these limits be used to bound
the doses during these two respective time periods.

**Board Action** (3/28/12): SEC Issue 3: Lack of Documentation. At the meeting of the Work Group on
TBD-6000 on March 28, 2012, the work group chair, Paul Ziemer, observed: “This has to do with the
bounding in post-radium era. SC&A agrees with NIOSH that bounding can be done and recommend
moving this to Appendix BB and closing.” The work group voted that this issue should be closed and
moved to the Appendix BB issues matrix.

**SC&A Observation** (12/18/13): The Work Group has accepted NIOSH’s proposed triangular
distributions of doses from external exposure to radiographers during the Radium Era, and an exposure
of administrative personnel of 571.5 mR/y. At the 10/11/13 Work Group meeting, NIOSH agreed to
accept SC&A’s finding that the upper limit of the distribution remain at 15 rem/y until 1/01/1961, when the
revised 10 CFR 20 limits went into effect.

**Status** (12/18/13): SC&A recommends that this issue be closed.

### Issue 6: Neglect of Skin Dose

**SC&A Finding**: Appendix BB ignores the skin dose from beta radiation from activated steel. Our
analysis yielded doses of about 2 rads/y to bare skin from beta radiation from irradiated steel.

**NIOSH Response** (6/19/08): As indicated in the SC&A review, NIOSH has obtained film badge results
for betatron operators. We are in the process of comparing this data to the modeled estimates provided
by both the appendix and SC&A. The modeled beta dose and photon dose are linked and so the beta
dose can adjusted to the film badge data by using the model.

**SC&A Reply** (7/23/11): Although Allen (2010) discussed plans for modeling the activation of steel, the
“Path Forward” does not mention calculation of skin dose.

**NIOSH Report** (1/13/12): Allen (2012a) listed the dose rates from natural uranium metal, which were
taken from SC&A 2008, and which included the contribution of activation and fission products. He also
calculated skin doses to the betatron operator and the layout worker from residual activity in HY-80 steel
following betatron irradiation, using the results of earlier SC&A calculations.

**SC&A Reply** (3/12/12): Anigstein and Olsher (2012) recalculated the doses from irradiated uranium,
using the current version of MCNPX—SC&A (2008) had utilized an earlier beta version (26e) released in
November 2007. Our new analysis indicated a slight decrease in the beta dose; the results cited by Allen
(2012a) are claimant favorable and in sufficiently close agreement with our later analysis. However, we
found that Allen’s use of our earlier calculations of residual nuclides in HY-80 steel markedly
underestimate these activities and the resulting doses to the skin when compared to results obtained with
the current MCNPX version 27e.

**Board Action** (3/28/12): SEC Issue 9: Underestimate of Beta Dose. At its meeting on March 28, 2012,
the Work Group on TBD-6000 agreed that this issue should be transferred to the Appendix BB issues
matrix.

**NIOSH Report** (10/10/13): Allen (2013f) reconstructed β doses to skin, using MCNPX input files
furnished by SC&A in 2010. He then compared these results to those presented by Anigstein and Mauro
(2013d) and found differences that could not be accounted for.

**SC&A Reply** (12/05/13): Anigstein and Mauro (2013f) presented an updated analysis of doses to the
skin of betatron operators.
NIOSH Statement of Position (12/19/13): During the meeting of the Work Group on TBD-6000, David Allen (NIOSH/DCAS) stated that NIOSH was able to reproduce the SC&A skin dose calculations, based on MCNP results provided by SC&A, either exactly or to within one digit, which results from round-off error. NIOSH will use these results to assign skin doses to GSI workers.

Status (1/14/14): In progress, pending NIOSH revision of skin doses.

Issue 7: Underestimate of Exposure to Activated Betatron Apparatus

SC&A Finding: Appendix BB assigns an initial exposure rate of the betatron operator of 15 mR/h from activation products in the betatron apparatus, based on a measurement reported by Schuetz (2007) at 6 ft (183 cm) from the betatron target. This exposure rate would apply only if the operator were located 6 ft from the betatron during the setup period. Such an assumption is inconsistent with the calculation of dose rates from the handling of irradiated steel or uranium, which assumes that the betatron operator spent one half of the setup time at a distance of 1 ft (30 cm) from the metal and the rest at 1 m.

Assuming, as we did, that his distance from the betatron target ranged uniformly between 3 and 6 ft (61–183 cm) would double his exposure rate.

NIOSH Response (6/19/08): As indicated in the SC&A review, NIOSH has obtained film badge results for betatron operators. We are in the process of comparing this data to the modeled estimates provided by both the appendix and SC&A.

Path Forward (10/08/10) (Allen 2010): A former Allis-Chalmers employee indicated that the betatron machine exhibited residual radioactivity causing an exposure rate of about 15 mR/hr in front of the machine six feet from the target. He further indicated that dose rate diminished to near zero within 15 minutes and that identical measurement behind the machine showed 1% of the forward readings. To investigate the source of this exposure, activation of several components was explored, as well as the possibility of some residual current in the accelerator causing this effect. No viable explanation for this phenomenon has yet been discovered. However, the Allis-Chalmers employee did not state the conditions that were associated with these measurements. If little air movement occurred it could be possible that the 15 mR/hr exposure rate was caused by air activation. Under those conditions, the activated air would exhibit the highest concentration where the beam was exposing the air and low concentrations behind the machine. The half-life of N-13 is approximately 2 minutes while that of O-15 is approximately 10 minutes. This does not necessarily correlate well with the dose rate diminishing to zero within 15 minutes. However, considering that some air movement would dilute the concentration and lower the dose rate, it appears to be a possible explanation for this dose rate measurement.

Air activation would cause an external dose from the air, not the machine. Operators exposed to this would be exposed in an isotropic geometry. The 511 keV photon would be easily detectable by the film badges worn by the operators. Therefore, residual radiation coming from the machine will not be considered a source of radiation exposure for the radiographers. Instead, air activation will be considered in the scenarios.

SC&A Reply (7/23/11): We do not agree that air activation can account for the residual radiation from the betatron after shutoff that was measured by Jack Schuetz when he was employed by Allis-Chalmers. As was discussed by Robert Anigstein (SC&A) at the October 12, 2010, work group meeting, SC&A had calculated the exposure of the betatron operator from air activation, obtaining an estimated exposure of 6 µR per shift. It is not plausible that the 15 mR/h reported by Mr. Schuetz could be due to air activation.

We disagree with the decision, reported by Allen (2010), not to consider the residual radiation from the betatron as a source of exposure of the radiographers. We note that Mr. Schuetz’s account is corroborated by the betatron instruction manual (Allis-Chalmers 1951), which warns users not to touch the betatron doughnut for at least 15 min after the machine is turned off, stating that the tube becomes...


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<th>Issue Resolution Matrix for SC&amp;A Findings on Appendix BB to TBD-6000 (continued)</th>
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“intensely radioactive” while generating x rays. Although our MCNPX analysis could not replicate this phenomenon, our simplified model of the betatron most likely did not include all materials in the doughnut tube nor did it include the magnets and surrounding structures. Thus, the analysis does not invalidate Schuetz’s data.

The fact that elevated exposures were, for the most part, not found in the film badge dosimetry data also does not invalidate these observations. SC&A (2010) stated:

> The response of film badges worn by GSI workers was highly dependent on the energies and angles of incidence of the photon radiation. This issue assumes particular significance when the exposure is in the posteroanterior (PA) orientation, as was the case for at least part of the time that the betatron operator was setting up the exposure of a steel casting and was exposed to residual radiation from the betatron apparatus. He would have his back to the instrument when he was marking the casting, using the remote controls to adjust the position of the betatron, and measuring the distance to the casting. According to ICRP (1997, table A.22), the ratio between the directional dose equivalent at a depth of 10 mm at 180° to that at 0° \[H'\(10,180°\):H'\(10,0°\)] ranges from zero (i.e., < 0.005) for photon energies \(E \leq 30\) keV to 0.62 at \(E = 10\) MeV.

**NIOSH Report (1/13/12):** Allen (2012a) examined various mechanisms that could explain the residual betatron radiation reported by Schuetz (2007) and concluded that the most likely cause was magnetic interference that could have caused a spurious reading on the survey meter.

**SC&A Response (3/12/12):** Anigstein and Olsher (2012) reexamined the possibility that the residual radiation consisted of low-energy x-rays that were partially shielded by the operator’s body and would therefore not be registered on the film badge, normally worn in front, if his back was to the betatron apparatus. Our analysis showed that, in theory, the operator could have received an effective dose that was slightly higher than the MDA of the film badge, assumed to be 10 mrem/week. However, since the limiting photon dose was to either the layout man in 1963–1966, or to the radiographer using \(^{226}\)Ra in 1953–1962, the bounding photon exposures of GSI workers would not be affected by such radiation.

**Status (7/28/12):** SC&A recommends that this issue be closed.

### Issue 8: Underestimate of Work Hours

**SC&A Finding:** The authors assume that the GSI employees worked an average of 2,400 h/y. This estimate is contrary to the recollection of the workers, who remember working 50–80 h/week. The consensus estimate was 65 h/week, or 3,250 h/y. Such a value is reasonable and claimant favorable, and should be adopted as a default value for dose reconstruction.

**NIOSH Response (6/19/08):** As indicated in the SC&A review, NIOSH has obtained film badge results for betatron operators. We are in the process of comparing this data to the modeled estimates provided by both the appendix and SC&A. Since the film badges measure the dose received over the course of a week, the amount of time taken to receive that dose would no longer be relevant.

**Path Forward (10/08/10) (Allen 2010):** Operators provided an estimate of typical work hours different than that utilized by the appendix (3250 hrs per year). The path forward addresses revising the model taking all new information into account and including the operator’s estimate of work hours.

**Board Action (10/12/10):** Paul Ziemer, Chair of TBD-6000 Work Group, noted that there is agreement on the length of the work week among NIOSH, the WG, and SC&A.

**Status (10/12/10):** Closed
Issue 9: Mischaracterization of Steel Work Practices

SC&A Finding: According to Appendix BB, “The overall estimate for Betatron x-ray of steel is: 30 minutes setup with no dose; one hour Betatron x-ray exposure due to skyshine at 0.72 mR/hr; and, 30 minutes takedown.” Such a description is at variance with a report prepared by former GSI workers that indicates repeated exposures of the same casting, with 12–15 minutes between exposures. Since both the steel and the betatron were activated from previous exposures, there was no setup period with no dose. Furthermore, most exposures were of a few minutes’ duration, which reduced the time in the control room, where the exposure rates were relatively low, and increased the number of times during the day that the operators were exposed to the steel and the betatron.

NIOSH Response (6/19/08): As indicated in the SC&A review, NIOSH has obtained film badge results for betatron operators. We are in the process of comparing this data to the modeled estimates provided by both the appendix and SC&A. Since the film badges measure the dose received while performing this work, the exact exposure scenario is no longer important.

Path Forward (10/08/10) (Allen 2010): The path forward states that NIOSH will revise the model using new exposure scenarios [see Issue 4, above.]

NIOSH Report (1/13/12): Allen (2012a) utilized a mix of long and short betatron radiographic exposures, as well as a layout-man exposure scenario.

SC&A Response (7/28/12): We agree that the timing and exposure durations are consistent with information furnished by former GSI workers.

Status (7/28/12): SC&A recommends that this issue be closed.

Issue 10: Errors in Calculating Dose Rates from Uranium

SC&A Finding: We have found errors in calculations that lead to a significant overstatement of the dose rates from uranium presented in Appendix BB. The Appendix lists a dose of 21.7 mrem during the first 30 min following irradiation. Our model yields a dose of 1.4 mrem, using the same assumptions regarding the duration of the radiographic exposure, the duration of the worker’s exposure, and his distances from the metal. Since the dose rates in the Appendix are not scientifically correct, they should not be used as the basis of dose reconstructions of exposed workers.

NIOSH Response (6/19/08): To the extent modeled doses are used, any errors in this calculation will be corrected. However NIOSH has obtained film badge results for betatron operators. We are in the process of comparing this data to the modeled estimates provided by both the appendix and SC&A.

Path Forward (10/08/10) (Allen 2010):

Uranium activation and fission products
- Assume four one hour shots per uranium ingot or slice
- Determine dose rates from activation and fission products and add to natural activity of uranium metal

NIOSH Report (1/13/12): Allen (2012a) calculated doses from photon and neutron radiation from uranium following betatron irradiation, using an MCNPX input file furnished by SC&A.

SC&A Response (3/12/12): Anigstein and Olsher (2012) reviewed Allen’s (2012a) results and found the following issues with his calculations: (1) failure to adjust the source to object distance, as we did in subsequent calculations (SC&A 2008); (2) the use of 1-minute time steps, which do not properly model the rapidly decaying residual nuclides; (3) the use of MCNPX version 26e, released as a beta version in November 2007, rather than the current version, released in March 2011. These calculations will not
affect the bounding photon dose, since the betatron operator would still not be the maximally exposed individual; however, they could lead to an increase in the neutron dose, since the betatron operator is the only individual addressed by the analyses who was exposed to neutron radiation prior to 1963.

**SC&A Observation (12/18/13):** SC&A is revising its earlier analysis of the betatron operators’ neutron dose from irradiated uranium. We will report the doses in a memo to the work group later this month, and will share our MCNPX and other files with NIOSH.

1/12/14: Anigstein and Mauro (2014) presented an updated analysis of neutron doses to the betatron operator during the radiography of uranium and during the handling of irradiated uranium.

**Status (1/14/14): In progress,** pending NIOSH revisions of its earlier calculations of neutron doses from irradiated uranium.

### Issue 11: Underestimate of Doses to Other Workers

**SC&A Finding:** Appendix BB states that workers who did not work in the betatron building and did not routinely handle steel or uranium within 2 h following the x-ray exposure should be assigned a “dose” rate of 0.72 mR/h. As discussed under Finding 4 (SC&A 2008), there were many situations in which these other workers could have been exposed to much higher radiation levels.

**NIOSH Response (6/19/08):** This finding appears to be a included in finding #4. As noted, NIOSH is in the process of evaluating the affect of film badge data on the exposure models presented by both the appendix and SC&A.

**Path Forward (10/08/10) (Allen 2010):** The path forward addresses developing new exposure scenarios based on all the information that has come to NIOSH since the appendix was approved.

1/13/12: Allen (2012a) stated that, in assessing doses from betatron operations, dose reconstructors will choose the most favorable exposure scenario (i.e., betatron operator or layout man) in each case.

**SC&A Response (7/28/12):** We agree that the most favorable exposure scenario should be applied in all dose reconstructions. The same procedure should be extended to reconstructing the doses from external exposure to sealed sources. If such instructions are included in the revised Appendix BB, we will recommend that this issue be closed.

**NIOSH Response (5/06/13):** Allen (2013c) proposed that an external exposure of 571.5 mR/y be assigned to administrative personnel.

**Board Action (6/20/13):** During a teleconference of the Work Group on TBD-6000, Work Group Chair Paul Ziemer stated his understanding that external dose of 571.5 mR/y be assigned only to administrative personnel who did not routinely work in the production areas, regardless of their job description. Jim Neton, Associate Director for Science, concurred with that opinion.

**NIOSH Reply (8/21/13):** Allen (2013e) proposed to extend the assignment of an external exposure of 571.5 mR/y to administrative personnel until the end of the covered period.

**SC&A Response (10/06/13):** Anigstein and Mauro (2013d) agreed with NIOSH about the assignment of photon exposures of administrative personnel, with the understanding that the resulting doses shall be assigned only if it can be conclusively established that the employee performed administrative functions, that the employee’s work station was remote from the production areas of the plant, and that the employee did not frequently enter the production areas.

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Issue Resolution Matrix for SC&A Findings on Appendix BB to TBD-6000 (continued)

**Status** (12/18/13): SC&A recommends that this issue be closed, assuming a claimant-favorable classification of claimants as production or administrative personnel, as discussed above, and assuming that the most claimant-favorable doses or exposures will be assigned to production (plant) personnel from among the various scenarios for photon exposures and neutron and skin doses.

### Issue 12: Incorrect Calculation of Residual Surface Contamination and Resuspension

**SC&A Finding:** The Appendix uses the same methods of calculating surface contamination and resuspension as were used in the main report (Scherpelz 2006). In SC&A’s review of that report, we pointed out that calculating surface contamination on the basis of a settling velocity of $5 \mu m$ AMAD aerosol particles ignores the sloughing off of much larger flakes of uranium oxide that fall directly onto the floor. We also showed that a resuspension factor of $10^{-8} m^{-1}$ might understate the airborne concentrations by one or more orders of magnitude.

**NIOSH Response** (6/19/08): This finding indicates it is a reiteration of a comment from the Battelle-TBD-6000 review. Therefore the finding should be addressed in that review rather than here.

**Board Action** (6/20/12): The ABRWH, at its meeting in Santa Fe, NM, voted to task SC&A with reviewing the use of Allen’s (2011a) surrogate data to characterize the airborne uranium concentrations during uranium handling operations at GSI.

**SC&A Response** (7/16/12): Anigstein (2012) found that the use of Allen’s (2011a) surrogate data to characterize the airborne uranium concentrations during uranium handling operations at GSI did not meet the five ABRWH criteria for the use of surrogate data.

7/25/12: Anigstein et al. (2012a) issued a memo suggesting an alternate model for the calculation of uranium intakes at GSI that that utilized measurements of uranium contamination performed during the FUSRAP cleanup in 1993 and did not rely on surrogate data from other sites.

**Board Action** (8/28/12): The Work Group on TBD-6000 agreed that Allen’s (2011a) surrogate data to characterize the airborne uranium concentrations during uranium handling operations at GSI did not meet the criteria for the use of surrogate data. An advocate for the GSI workers, participating by telephone, reported that aggressive cleanups of the Old Betatron Building were performed after the shutdown of the facility. The work group decided that, in light of the advocate’s report, the 1993 FUSRAP data cannot be used to back-calculate uranium deposition during the operational period, and requested that NIOSH look for surrogate data from sites that have handled uranium similar to what was radiographed at GSI.

**NIOSH Reply** (11/06/12): Allen (2012e) stated that “NIOSH broadened its search for data related to the handling of cold uranium metal.” After reviewing additional measurements of airborne uranium activity concentrations, Allen compiled a list of 37 actual or implied measurements for seven individual operations at various work sites to use as a surrogate for uranium concentrations during uranium handling at GSI. He evaluated the use of these data against the Board’s five surrogate data criteria and concluded that they satisfied the criteria. He then derived a value of 104 dpm/m$^3$ as the upper 95th percentile of these data, assuming they constituted a lognormal distribution, and assigned this value to the bounding airborne uranium concentration during uranium handling operations at GSI.

**SC&A Response** (11/25/12): Anigstein et al. (2012b) independently analyzed Allen’s (2012e) new surrogate data. We found that, with appropriate adjustments and revisions, such data yield a suitable surrogate for the airborne uranium activity concentrations resulting from the handling and transport of uranium at GSI. The revised and adjusted data satisfy the five Board criteria for the use of surrogate data and are statistically robust, the regression of order statistics (ROS) method and the nonparametric empirical method yielding almost identical values.
### Issue Resolution Matrix for SC&A Findings on Appendix BB to TBD-6000 (continued)

**Board Action (11/28/12):** The Work Group on TBD-6000 voted to accept the recommendation on the use of surrogate data for the operational and residual periods, for internal dose. The implication is that it would be used in conjunction with the TIB-70 procedure to determine the dose during residual period.

**NIOSH Response (8/21/13):** Allen (2013e) listed revised intakes of uranium during the operational period, based on exposure to the 95th %ile concentration during 100% of the uranium handling hours.

**SC&A Reply (10/6/13):** Anigstein and Mauro (2013d) were in substantial agreement with Allen’s uranium dust intakes during the period 7/1/1958–6/30/1966. We disagreed with Allen’s assignment of uranium handling hours during 10/1/1952–6/30/1958, which leads to an underestimate of intakes and is at variance with the agreement reached during the June 20, 2013, work group meeting. We did not agree that an RF of $10^{-6}$ m$^{-1}$ is applicable to the residual period.

**NIOSH Response (10/11/13):** During a teleconference of the Work Group on TBD-6000, Jim Neton (NIOSH/DCAS) agreed to use the uranium handling hours for 10/1/1952–6/30/1958 proposed by SC&A for the calculation of internal exposure and for β dose from uranium handling.

**SC&A Reply (10/22/13):** Anigstein and Mauro (2013e) showed that assigning an RF of $10^{-5}$ m$^{-1}$ to the residual period, and applying the depletion factors cited by Sharfi (2012, Table 4-2), result in an airborne activity concentration in 1993 that is consistent with the concentration calculated by applying an RF of $10^{-6}$ m$^{-1}$ to the average uranium surface activity on the floor of the shooting room of the Old Betatron Building, calculated from the 1993 FUSRAP survey measurements.

**NIOSH Response (12/05/13):** Neton (2013b) stated that NIOSH will use an RF of $10^{-5}$ m$^{-1}$ during the residual period.

12/19/13: During a teleconference of the Work Group on TBD-6000, Jim Neton (NIOSH/DCAS) reiterated his previous statement that NIOSH will adopt a resuspension factor of $10^{-5}$ m$^{-1}$ in calculating uranium dust concentrations during the residual period. The members of the work group agreed with that decision.

**Board Action (12/19/13):** The members of the Work Group on TBD-6000 agreed with the NIOSH decision to use a resuspension factor of $10^{-5}$ m$^{-1}$ for the residual period.

**Status (12/18/13):** SC&A recommends that this issue be closed.

### Issue 13: Use of Incorrect Units

**SC&A Finding:** The Appendix switches erratically between units of mrem and mR. The results of the skyshine calculations are stated as 0.72 mrem/h in Section BB.4.2, then as 0.72 mR/h in later sections. Dose rates are incorrectly stated in units of mR/h, which is an exposure rate. Uranium dose rates are stated in mrem, whereas our review of the output files from the Appendix BB analysis shows that the calculations were of air kerma, which is expressed in mrad. A notable misuse of units appears in the table in Section BB.4.5, where the dose to the skin from beta radiation is expressed as “R/yr.” Beta radiation cannot be expressed in roentgens, which only apply to photons.

**NIOSH Response (6/19/08):** We accept the comment and will correct the units in any future revisions to the appendix.

**Status (7/28/12):** In progress, pending revision of Appendix BB.
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