

# SERIOUS INJURY REPORT

REPORT F2025-10 • January 2026



## **Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire – Texas**

### **Executive Summary**

On September 3, 2025, a career firefighter from Engine 11 was seriously injured and his officer received minor injuries while operating at a residential structure fire. At 10:51 hours, the public safety answering point (PSAP) received a 911 call from a neighbor reporting a fire at the house across the street. At 10:53 hours, the PSAP dispatched Engines 14, 11, 5, 1, Towers 1 and 2, and Battalion 1 and 2. Engine 3 and Truck 14 self-dispatched. At 10:56 hours, Engine 11 arrived on scene. Engine 11 officer gave a size-up of a one-story residence showing heavy fire. He reported that his crew would deploy a hoseline. At 10:57 hours, Engine 5, Battalion 2, and Engine 14 arrived on scene. Engine 11 firefighter deployed a 200 ft 1 ¾-inch pre-connect and began to extinguish fire under the carport by starting on the left side and moving right. Engine 11 officer directed him to the Side Alpha/Delta corner to extinguish a burning car under the carport. Engine 11 firefighter took one step under the carport at the corner and started extinguishing the wood support beam. Seconds later at 10:59 hours, the carport experienced a lean-to-style collapse with the roof remaining attached to the residence. This collapse trapped Engine 11 firefighter under the burning roof. Battalion 2 directed Engine 14 to send their crew to the scene immediately, then called a Mayday stating a firefighter was trapped under the partial collapse of the building on Side Alpha. He requested Truck 14 bring rescue tools and called for the PSAP to dispatch a second alarm. Engine 5 officer and firefighters from other units tried to extricate Engine 11 firefighter from the collapse. They used hand tools and manually lifted the roof enough to pull the firefighter out. At 11:01 hours, Engine 11 firefighter was extricated and put onto a stretcher for treatment and transport. He was airlifted to a medical facility for treatment. Engine 11 officer was also transported for smoke inhalation injuries. After the extrication, multiple hoselines and a defensive strategy were used to bring the fire under control at 11:54 hours.



**Photo 1: View of Side Alpha, post-collapse.**  
*(Courtesy of the fire department)*

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### **Contributing Factors**

- *Structural collapse*
- *Scene size-up and risk assessment*
- *Incident command*
- *Scene access*

### **Key Recommendations**

*Fire departments should:*

- *Ensure firefighters extinguish fires from a relative area of safety when performing exterior fire control as part of a transitional attack.*
- *Educate fire officers and firefighters in building performance under fire conditions and the potential for structural collapse.*
- *Complete an initial scene size-up and risk assessment to inform a risk-benefit analysis.*
- *Train incident commanders how to spot and correct task saturation to quickly refocus emergency response operations.*
- *Coordinate with law enforcement agencies to overcome challenges of scene access for responding fire apparatus.*

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) initiated the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program to examine deaths of fire fighters in the line of duty so that fire departments, fire fighters, fire service organizations, safety experts and researchers could learn from these incidents. The primary goal of these investigations is for NIOSH to make recommendations to prevent similar occurrences. These NIOSH investigations are intended to reduce or prevent future firefighter deaths and are completely separate from the rulemaking, enforcement, and inspection activities of any other federal or state agency. Under its program, NIOSH investigators interview persons with knowledge of the incident and review available records to develop a description of the conditions and circumstances leading to the deaths in order to provide a context for the agency's recommendations. The NIOSH summary of these conditions and circumstances in its reports is not intended as a legal statement of facts. This summary, as well as the conclusions and recommendations made by NIOSH, should not be used for the purpose of litigation or the adjudication of any claim.

For further information, visit the program at [www.cdc.gov/niosh/firefighters/ffffipp/](http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/firefighters/ffffipp/) or call 1-800-CDC-INFO (1-800-232-4636).



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## ***Career Firefighter Sustains Serious Burns and Another Injured in Carport Collapse at Residential Structure Fire – Texas***

### **Introduction**

On September 3, 2025, a career firefighter from Engine 11 was seriously injured and his officer received minor injuries while operating at a residential structure fire. On September 25, 2025, the fire department notified the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) of this incident. Between September 26–November 17, 2025, two investigators representing the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP) initiated a virtual investigation into this incident. The NIOSH investigators conducted interviews with command officers, fire officers, and firefighters who were on scene during the incident. The investigators reviewed fire department standard operating procedures (SOPs), training records, dispatch records, witness statements, and investigation documents.

### **Fire Department**

The career fire department in this incident has a 400-square-mile jurisdiction, serves a population of approximately 1 million residents, and provides emergency medical services (EMS) at the advanced life support level. The fire department operates 45 stations and has three shifts (A, B, and C). It is staffed by single-role EMS personnel and dual-role firefighter/EMS personnel. Single-role EMS personnel operate 35-65 ambulances daily on 12-hour shifts for 24-hour coverage. Dual-role firefighters operate with 242 personnel on duty per shift. Shifts operate 24 hours on, 48 hours off. The department holds an Insurance Services Office Public Protection certification Class 1 rating. The fire department's leadership includes a fire chief, assistant chiefs, deputy chiefs, battalion chiefs, captains, and lieutenants.

### **Training, Education, and Professional Development**

The fire department provides initial recruit training through an in-house academy for EMS and firefighter programs. Dual-role firefighters graduate as certified firefighters by the Texas Commission on Fire Protection, National Registry Emergency Medical Technicians, and NFPA 1072 Hazardous Materials Responders at the awareness level. Officer development is conducted in-house through a dedicated battalion chief academy, supplemented by continuing education breakout sessions and on-the-job training. Battalion 2 (incident commander) had 25 years of total fire service experience at the fire department. Engine 11 firefighter (seriously injured) had 3 years fire service with the department. Engine 11 officer had 24 years of total fire service, with 14 years as a lieutenant with the department.

### **Apparatus, Staffing, and Communications**

At 10:53 hours, the following units were dispatched for a fire:

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Apparatus	Staffing	Arrival On Scene
Engine 11	3	10:56
Engine 5	4	10:57
Battalion 2	1	10:57
Engine 14	4	10:57
Truck 14	4	10:59
Tower 1	4	10:59
Engine 3	4	11:00
Tower 2	4	11:00
Engine 1	4	11:00
Battalion 1	1	11:02

The fire department operates a PSAP that dispatches for all emergency and non-emergency fire and EMS response calls.

### **Building Construction**

This incident involved a type V, wood-frame constructed, residential structure that was built in 1916 (see **Photo 2**). It was one-story with 1,020 sq ft of living space that was built on a 4,791 sq ft lot. The structure included an attached wood-frame carport with a roof supported by 3-inch steel support posts. To enclose the carport, there were 31 gauge corrugated galvanized steel panels surrounding the carport (see **Photo 3**). The structure had steel security coverings on all doors and windows (see **Photo 4**).



**Photo 2: View of Side Alpha, pre-incident**  
*(Courtesy of the fire department)*

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**Photo 3: View of Side Alpha, carport with corrugated steel panels.**  
*(Courtesy of the fire department)*



**Photo 4: View of security bars on windows, Side Alpha/Bravo corner.**  
*(Courtesy of the fire department)*

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### **Incident Timeline**

The following timeline is a summary of events that occurred as the incident evolved beginning at 10:51 hours on September 3, 2025. Not all incident events are included in this timeline. The times are to the minute and from the fire department's *National Fire Incident Reporting System* (NFIRS) fire reports, dispatch log, on-scene accountability documentation, and interview notes.

Time	Fireground Operations, Response, and Details
September 3, 2025	
10:51 Hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>PSAP received a 911 call from a neighbor reporting a fire at the house across the street. They reported seeing a large volume of fire on the side of the house.</li></ul>
10:53 Hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>PSAP transmitted full alarm assignment for a residential structure fire.</li><li>Engines 14, 11, 5, 1, Towers 1 and 2, and Battalion 1 and 2 were dispatched. Engine 3 and Truck 14 self-dispatched.</li></ul>
10:56 Hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Engine 11 arrived on scene.</li><li>Engine 11 officer gave a size-up of a one-story residence showing heavy fire, reporting his crew would deploy a hoseline. He requested the next arriving unit lay into them for water supply.</li></ul>
10:57 Hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Engine 5, Battalion 2, and Engine 14 arrived on scene.</li></ul>
10:58 Hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Battalion 2 radioed to Truck 14 to access the scene from the opposite side of the street.</li></ul>
10:59 Hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Carport experienced a lean-to-style collapse and trapped Engine 11 firefighter under the burning roof.</li><li>Battalion 2 directed Engine 14 to send their crew to the scene, then called a Mayday stating a firefighter was trapped under the partial collapse of the building on Side Alpha. He further requested Truck 14 bring rescue tools and called for the PSAP to dispatch a second alarm.</li></ul>
11:00 Hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Battalion 2 directed Engine 5 to establish a water supply and requested a second hoseline on Side Alpha to get water on the fire immediately.</li><li>Engine 3 was directed to deploy a 2 ½-inch hoseline upon arrival.</li></ul>
11:01 Hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Engine 11 firefighter was extricated and put onto a stretcher for treatment and transport. He was airlifted to a medical facility for treatment.</li><li>Engine 11 officer was transported for smoke inhalation.</li></ul>
11:02 – 11:54 Hours	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Multiple hoselines and a defensive strategy were used to bring the fire under control.</li></ul>

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### **Personal Protective Equipment**

At the time of the incident, both injured firefighters were wearing full structural firefighting turnout gear and a NIOSH Approved® SCBA. No evidence was identified to suggest that the structural firefighting turnout gear or SCBA units contributed to the serious injury.

### **Weather Conditions**

At 10:53 hours on September 3, 2025, the outdoor temperature was 83°F, dewpoint was 61°F, the wind was out of the North Northwest at 10 mph, there was no precipitation in the last 24 hours, and conditions were fair [Weather Underground 2025].

### **Investigation**

At approximately 10:51 hours, the PSAP received a 911 call from a neighbor reporting a fire at the house across the street. They reported seeing a large fire on the side of the house. At 10:53 hours, a full alarm assignment was dispatched for a residential structure fire. The PSAP dispatched Engines 14, 11, 5, 1, Towers 1 and 2, and Battalion 1 and 2. Engine 3 and Truck 14 self-dispatched.

At 10:56 hours, Engine 11 arrived on scene and positioned short of the structure on the Side Alpha/Bravo corner. Their positioning was delayed due to a law enforcement vehicle blocking access to the street. Engine 11 officer gave a size-up of a one-story residence showing heavy fire. He reported that his crew would deploy a hoseline (see **Photo 5**). He requested the next arriving unit lay into them for water supply. Engine 11 firefighter deployed a 200 ft 1 ¾-inch pre-connect.



**Photo 5: Arrival conditions on Side Alpha.**  
*(Courtesy of the fire department)*

At 10:57 hours, Engine 5, Battalion 2, and Engine 14 arrived on scene. Engine 5 positioned at the intersection near Engine 11. Engine 5 officer proceeded to Side Alpha of the structure to begin a 360 size-up, while the rest of his crew began to search for a hydrant to establish a water supply. Battalion 2 also proceeded to Side Alpha and radioed to Truck 14 to access the scene from the opposite side of the street due to Engine 11's position and a street-parked car. As he approached the structure, he saw another law enforcement vehicle blocking the side of the street where Truck 14 was directed to enter. Battalion 2 looked for a law enforcement officer to move the vehicle.

Engine 11 firefighter began exterior fire control, extinguishing fire under the carport on the left side and moving right. Engine 11 officer directed him to the Side Alpha/Delta corner to extinguish a burning car

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under the carport. Engine 11 firefighter took one step under the carport at the corner and started extinguishing the wood support beam (see **Photo 6**). Seconds later at 10:59 hours, the carport experienced a lean-to-style collapse with the roof remaining attached to the residence. This collapse trapped Engine 11 firefighter under the burning roof. His entire body was covered, except for one leg. He tried to reach for his radio mic but was unable to with his arms pinned.

As he began to key up his mic to establish command, Battalion 2 looked toward the structure and saw the reflective stripes of Engine 11 firefighter's turnout pant. He immediately directed Engine 14 to send their crew to the scene and called a Mayday, stating a firefighter was trapped under the partial collapse of the building on Side Alpha. He requested Truck 14 bring rescue tools and called for the PSAP to dispatch a second alarm. Observing fire conditions worsen, he directed Engine 5 to establish a water supply and requested a second hoseline on Side Alpha to get water on the fire immediately. Engine 3 was directed to deploy a 2 ½-inch hoseline on arrival.

Engine 5 officer and firefighters from other units tried to extricate Engine 11 firefighter from the collapse (see **Photo 7**). They used hand tools and manually lifted the roof enough to pull the firefighter out. At 11:01 hours, Engine 11 firefighter was extricated and put onto a stretcher for treatment and transport. He was airlifted to a medical facility for treatment. Engine 11 officer was also transported for smoke inhalation injuries. After the extrication, multiple hoselines and a defensive strategy were used to bring the fire under control at 11:54 hours.

### Fire Cause and Origin

The fire department cause and origin investigation classified the fire as incendiary and indicated that the area of origin was Side Charlie of the carport.



**Photo 6: Engine 11 firefighter stepping under carport.**  
*(Courtesy of the fire department)*



**Photo 7: Extrication operation.**  
*(Courtesy of the fire department)*

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### **Cause of Serious Injury**

Engine 11 firefighter sustained significant burn injuries on over 20% of his body surface, including 15% 3rd degree burns and spotted 2nd degree burns. He sustained trauma to his ribs, collar bone, left knee, and separation of his left shoulder. Engine 11 officer sustained smoke inhalation injuries due to his facepiece dislodging during extrication operations.

### **Contributing Factors**

Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in injuries or fatalities. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately led to the serious injuries:

1. Structural collapse
2. Scene size-up and risk assessment
3. Incident command
4. Scene access

### **Recommendations**

#### ***Recommendation #1a: Fire departments should ensure firefighters extinguish fires from a relative area of safety when performing exterior fire control as part of a transitional attack.***

At this incident, Engine 11 firefighter began a transitional attack with a 1 ¾-inch pre-connect, extinguishing fire under the carport by starting on the left side and moving right. Engine 11 officer then directed him to the Side Alpha/Delta corner to extinguish a burning car under the carport. Engine 11 firefighter took one step under the carport at the corner, extinguishing the wood support beam before it collapsed.

While conducting external fire control as part of a transitional attack, firefighters should be aware of their surroundings' potential of collapse. NFPA 1700 [2026] provides the following tactical considerations for exterior control – transitional attack:

- Coordinated to support other fire operations
- Operate from an exterior position
- Flow rate appropriate with heat release rate and area of involvement; balanced to avoid excessive water damage
- Rapid interior control following/concurrent with exterior control crucial to limit regrowth and maintain tenability
- Limited on-scene resources, large fire volume, delayed entry time/access for direct fire control may require multiple or longer applications; more time equals more water.

Although this incident involved an attached carport, tactical considerations for garages in Chapter 12 of NFPA 1700 [2026] are relevant. This includes the potential presence of significant fuel load and fire control hazards due to vehicles, powered equipment, ignitable liquids, and various fuels. Storage in and suspended from the overhead supports is also common and adds to a collapse hazard. NFPA 1700

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recommends the use of a handline that flows more than 150 gallons per minute to knock down and extinguish fires in spaces from a relative area of safety. Due to potential collapse, firefighter safety and fire control, in most cases, is enhanced by an exterior stream application [NFPA 1700 2026].

When conducting fire control, fire officers and firefighters should consider apparatus placement in context of water sources and distance from the fire. In this incident, Engine 11 positioned short of the structure on the Side Alpha/Bravo corner (see Diagram 1). Although Engine 11 firefighter deployed 200 ft of hoseline, the apparatus position may have limited their reach as the incident progressed. The position of Engine 11 did not allow for the potential use of a deck gun, which is an alternate technique used for exterior fire control [NFPA 1700 2026].

***Recommendation #1b: Fire departments should educate fire officers and firefighters in building performance under fire conditions and the potential for structural collapse.***

At this incident, the carport had a roof constructed with wood beams attached to the residence which was supported by 3-inch steel support posts. The lean-to-style collapse of the carport resulted in the roof at the Side Alpha/Delta corner falling directly onto Engine 11 firefighter.

Understanding a building's age, design and structural anatomy, construction methods and materials, and vulnerabilities under fireground conditions has been linked to safer firefighting operations and firefighter survivability [NIOSH 2025a]. Knowledge of building construction is critical to help firefighters recognize the potential for structural collapse. During the growth stage, the fire consumes combustible structural members. During the decay stage and post-suppression activities, the structure is further weakened due to the poor state of remaining structural members and the buildup of water. The contents of a building, such as furniture or machinery, also contribute to the potential for structural collapse by [IFSTA 2015; NIOSH 2025a]:

- Adding fuel load into the structure with the potential for generating higher temperatures that weaken structural components.
- Adding weight to the weakened structural members.



**Diagram 1: Apparatus placement on scene.**  
*(Courtesy of NIOSH)*

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- Retaining water, which increases weight of contents and applies more stress on the structural members.

The life expectancy of a building may extend up to 100 years, depending on the level of care and maintenance applied to the building. The structure in this incident was over 100 years old and appeared in poor condition, which may have contributed to the rapid progression of the fire and lack of stability involving the structural members.

### ***Recommendation #2: Fire departments should complete an initial scene size-up and risk assessment to inform a risk-benefit analysis.***

In this incident, Engine 11 officer gave a size-up of conditions on Side Alpha, then committed to fire suppression operations with Engine 11 firefighter. After arrival, Engine 5 officer proceeded to Side Alpha to complete a 360-size-up. He was unable to complete this before the collapse.

One of the most important duties of the first officer on scene is to conduct an initial size-up and risk assessment. This information lays the foundation for the entire operation. A risk assessment can help determine whether a strategy should be offensive or defensive and help with tactics development to achieve the desired objective(s). Some of the primary considerations in conducting a size-up and risk assessment include fire department assets, life hazard, fire development (and forecasting), time of day, building type/occupancy, and building condition [NFPA 1700 2026; NIOSH 2025b]. Other considerations include an evaluation of factors such as the fire size and location, length of time the fire has been burning, fuel load and presence of combustible or hazardous materials, exposures, and weather conditions. Information on the structure itself can affect whether an offensive or defensive strategy is employed. This includes size, construction type, age, condition (evidence of deterioration, weathering, etc.), evidence of renovations, lightweight construction, loads on roof and walls (air conditioning units, ventilation ductwork, utility entrances, etc.), and available pre-plan information [NIOSH 2009]. It is important to get fire department resources to Side Charlie as quickly as possible. The 360 size-up is essential to determine the possible location of occupants, fire dynamics, and firefighter safety information [NFPA 1700 2026].

A risk/benefit analysis uses hazard identification and situation assessment from the scene-size up to compare potential risks to benefits [NFPA 1670 2017]. Incident commanders can use this analysis to inform effective initial and ongoing actions [NIOSH 2025b]. A sound risk management plan ensures that risks are evaluated and matched with appropriate actions and conditions. NFPA 1550 [2024] states the incident commander should determine the life safety profile of the incident and level of risk consistent with the established principles. Risk management should follow these principles [NFPA 1550 2024]:

- Limit activities that present a significant risk to the safety of members in situations where there is potential to save endangered lives.
- Recognize activities that are routinely employed to protect property as risks to the safety of members. Limit, reduce, or avoid these risks when possible.
- No risk that threatens the safety of members is acceptable when there is no possibility to save lives or property.

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- In situations where risk to fire department members is excessive, limit all activities to defensive operations.

Continuous communication supports effective risk assessments. It also allows the incident commander and all personnel operating at an incident to be aware of changing conditions and adjust to avoid hazards or mitigate risks. A 360 size-up is an important component of the scene size-up and contributes to a complete risk assessment. In fact, the International Association of Fire Chiefs' *Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting* recommends that the first rule for incident commanders is to rapidly conduct or obtain a 360 size-up of the incident. This provides the incident commander and personnel knowledge of the building layout, construction, access/egress points, fire location and direction of spread, and obstacles or hazards [NIOSH 2025b].

### ***Recommendation #3: Fire departments should train incident commanders how to spot and correct task saturation to quickly refocus emergency response operations.***

At this incident, Battalion 2 became briefly task-saturated during the first moments of arrival on scene. He noticed the law enforcement vehicle blocking the street and needed to locate the officer to move it.

Since the inception of the incident command system, the duties and responsibilities of incident commanders have significantly increased. As an incident escalates, it is difficult for one individual to effectively manage a complex emergency operation. The incident commander needs to address issues dealing with situation evaluation, deployment management, strategy, the incident action plan, communications, personnel accountability, firefighter and responder safety, tactical worksheet, and other essential job tasks [NIOSH 2022]. NIOSH has historically recommended that firefighters are trained in situational awareness for personal safety and accountability reasons. It is critical that all personnel remain alert to their immediate surroundings to readily identify unsafe conditions or acts [NFPA 1550 2024; NIOSH 2015]. Fire departments can train incident commanders to employ rapid task delegation or task allocation as a strategy to correct task saturation. This may include assigning tasks to other personnel in the incident command structure such as operations or logistics which would allow the incident commander to refocus emergency response operations [IAFC and NFFF 2024; NIOSH 2022].

### ***Recommendation #4: Fire departments should coordinate with law enforcement agencies to overcome challenges of scene access for responding fire apparatus.***

At this incident, multiple law enforcement vehicles blocked the street and delayed fire apparatus in accessing the scene. This situation created a distraction for the incident commander.

Law enforcement agencies are often tasked with scene access control to prevent uninvolved individuals from entering the incident and potentially interfering with fire department and EMS operations. For incidents with access via roadways, this is usually accomplished by law enforcement physically blocking access with vehicles. However, this vehicle placement can also hinder the ability of responding fire apparatus to access the scene or for EMS units to exit the scene. NFPA 1550 [2024] recommends fire departments develop and maintain written SOPs with local law enforcement agencies that establish a standardized approach for the roles and responsibilities of personnel at incidents. Law enforcement and fire departments can coordinate efforts, including understanding respective needs and roles, to ensure

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effective response [Ortmeyer and Davis 2012]. Fire departments should routinely train with law enforcement agencies to maintain effective joint response procedures. Routine training ensures personnel and resources are prepared to work together and can operate as a functional team [USFA 2017].

### **Post-Incident Fire Department Prevention Actions**

After this incident, the fire department implemented changes to incident response and fireground operations. These changes were based on the department's critique of the incident on September 3, 2025.

- **Post-Incident Analysis**

Per NFPA 1550 [2024], the fire department prepared a written post-incident analysis to document observations, concerns, and recommendations related to this incident. The report included some considerations for department leadership to undertake such as standardizing hose loads for familiarization of all personnel.

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## **Investigator Information**

Incident investigators and report authors were Louis (Rick) Lago, Investigator, and Dr. Wesley R. Attwood, Senior Investigator, with the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch, Division of Safety Research, NIOSH. Frank Burgess, Battalion Chief, Baltimore City Fire Department, and Thomas Coe, Fire Chief, Frederick County Division of Fire & Rescue Services, provided a subject matter expert review of the investigation report. Dan Madrzykowski from the Fire Safety Research Institute, part of the UL Research Institutes, provided an expert review of the investigation report.

## **Additional Information**

### **NFPA 1550, Standard for Emergency Responder Health and Safety (2024 edition)**

NFPA 1550, *Standard for Emergency Responder Health and Safety*, 2024 edition, contains minimum requirements for a fire service-related occupational safety, health, and wellness program and an incident management system to be used by emergency services to manage all emergency incidents.

### **NFPA 1700, Guide for Structural Fire Fighting (2026 edition)**

NFPA 1700, *Guide for Structural Fire Fighting*, 2026 edition, is the first NFPA document connecting fire dynamics research and its application to strategy, tactics, and best practices for firefighters in controlling fires within a structure.

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### **Disclaimer**

The information in this report is based upon dispatch records, audio recordings, witness statements, and other information that was made available to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Information gathered from witnesses may be affected by recall bias. The facts, contributing factors, and recommendations contained in this report are based on the totality of the information gathered during the investigation process. This report was prepared after the event occurred, includes information from appropriate subject matter experts, and is not intended to place blame on those involved in the incident. Mention of any company or product does not constitute endorsement by NIOSH, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In addition, citations to websites external to NIOSH do not constitute NIOSH endorsement of the sponsoring organizations or their programs or products. Furthermore, NIOSH is not responsible for the content of these websites. All web addresses referenced in this document were accessible as of the publication date. *NIOSH Approved* is a certification mark of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) registered in the United States and several international jurisdictions.