

This verbatim transcript of the WTC Health Program Scientific/Technical Advisory Committee, Committee Meeting held in New York City on February 15-16, 2012, has been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a), and personally identifiable information has been redacted as necessary.

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**THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE  
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION  
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH**

convenes

MEETING TWO

WORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH PROGRAM

SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

VOL. I

DAY ONE

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2012

Jacob K. Javits Federal Building  
26 Federal Plaza New York, NY

The verbatim transcript of the  
Meeting of the Scientific/Technical Advisory  
Committee held at the Jacob K. Javits Federal

Building, New York, New York, on February 15, 2012.

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### TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

The following transcript contains quoted material. Such material is reproduced as read or spoken.

In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of word(s) when reading written material.

-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation of a word which is transcribed in its original form as reported.

-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is available.

-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and "uh-uh" represents a negative response.

-- "\*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, without reference available.

-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker failure, usually failure to use a microphone.

## PARTICIPANTS

1 Committee Members

2

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4 Workers:

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12 New York University, New York City.

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25 Representatives of WTC Responders:

26 Stephen Cassidy

27 President, Uniformed Firefighters Association of Greater New York, Local 94 I.A.F.F.  
28 AFL-CIO

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2 Human Resources Analyst, Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of the City of New  
3 York, Inc., New York City.
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6 Health Department, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal  
7 Employees, District Council 37, New York City.
- 8 Representative of Certified-Eligible WTC Survivors:  
9 Kimberly Flynn,  
10 Co-Founder, Director, 9/11 Environmental Action
- 11 Catherine McVay Hughes  
12 Vice Chairman, Community Board 1 World Trade Center Redevelopment  
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- 14 Susan Sidel, J.D.  
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18 Professor, Community and Family Medicine, Duke University Medical School,  
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- 20 Toxicologist:  
21 Julia Quint, Ph.D.  
22 Research Scientist Supervisor II and Chief, Hazard Evaluation System and  
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- 25 Epidemiologist:  
26 Elizabeth Ward, Ph.D.  
27 National Vice-President for Intramural Research, American Cancer Society, Atlanta.  
28 (Advisory Committee Chair-Person)
- 29 Mental Health Professional:  
30 Carol S. North, M.D. M.P.E.  
31 Professor, Department of Psychiatry, University of Texas Southwestern Medical  
32 Center, Dallas.

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Environmental Health Specialists:

Glenn Talaska, Ph.D.

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Leonardo Trasande, M.D., M.P.P.

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Paul J. Middendorf, Ph.D., CIH

Senior Scientist

CDC/NIOSH/Office of the Director

Cincinnati, Ohio

P R O C E E D I N G S

(12:08 p.m.)

**WELCOME**

1  
2  
3 DR. MIDDENDORF: Good afternoon. If the committee members will  
4 come to the table, appreciate it, we'll get started. I have a few  
5 administrative details that we need to take care of here at the  
6 beginning. I'd like to extend a warm welcome to the members of the  
7 public who are here in the room and also those who are on the phone.  
8 We very much appreciate your interest in these proceedings and look  
9 forward to your participation. For those who have signed up who would  
10 like to make comments, we do have public comments scheduled to  
11 begin at 3:45 this afternoon and then we'll have another public  
12 comment session tomorrow morning.

13 For those of you who are here in the room, I'll point out the emergency  
14 exit routes. If you look around the room, you'll notice that there are  
15 three doors that have exit signs above them. You need to ignore two of  
16 those exit signs. The exit sign back here behind me to the left is not an  
17 exit door. Please don't go out that way.

18 The double doors in the back far corner of this room are not exit doors.  
19 Please do not go out of those either. If, for some reason we need to  
20 evacuate the room, this door that's about three quarters of the way  
21 down here on my left is the door to go out. And the quickest way to get  
22 out is when you go through that door, turn to your right, go until you  
23 see two double glass doors on your left. Go through those double glass  
24 doors, immediately turn right, go down that hallway, and you'll see a  
25 door that says Fire Exit on it, and that's the way you get out of the  
26 building. So please, that would be the best way to do it.

27 For those of you on the phone, I suggest that you look around, figure  
28 out the evacuation route for your buildings. I need to point out that we  
29 do have copies of the agenda for this meeting. They are on the back  
30 table, and they're also available on the committee's website for anyone  
31 who is on the phone. You can download the agenda from our website.  
32 We also have copies of the public comments that were received as of  
33 about 11 on February 13<sup>th</sup>. They have been offered, filed to the  
34 committee before the meeting, and they're here on the back table. If  
35 you don't want to haul around a lot of paper with you, these comments  
36 will be posted on NIOSH's docket, which is docket number 248 for this  
37 committee and that's also available through the committee's website.

1 We need to do a quick roll call, and so we'll go around the table first  
2 and I'd ask each of the members to identify themselves and state  
3 whether or not there have been any changes in their employment or  
4 interest that would affect their conflicts of interest, and then we'll go to  
5 the members on the phone.  
6 This is going to be a little difficult because we only have two working  
7 microphones.  
8 MS. MEJIA: Good afternoon. Guillermina Mejia, no changes.  
9 DR. QUINT: Julia Quint, no changes.  
10 DR. ROM: Bill Rom, no changes.  
11 MS. FLYNN: Kimberly Flynn, no changes.  
12 MS. HUGHES: Catherine McVay Hughes, no changes. I'll bring the mic  
13 over.  
14 DR. TRASANDE: Leonardo Trasande, no changes.  
15 DR. MARKOWITZ: Steven Markowitz, no changes.  
16 MS. DABAS: Valerie Dabas, no changes.  
17 MR. CASSIDY: Stephen Cassidy, no changes.  
18 DR. NORTH: Carol North, no changes.  
19 DR. TALASKA: Glenn Talaska, no changes.  
20 DR. ALDRICH: Tom Aldrich, no changes.  
21 DR. HARRISON: Bob Harrison, no changes.  
22 DR. WARD: Liz Ward, no changes.  
23 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay, and -- oh, I'm sorry.  
24 MS. SIDEL: I'm Susan Sidel, no changes.  
25 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you, and on the phone?  
26 DR. DEMENT: John Dement, no changes.  
27 DR. WEAVER: And Virginia Weaver, no changes.  
28 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay, thank you all very much. To those of the  
29 members who are on the phone, please let me know when you leave  
30 and when you return so we can be certain that we continue to have a  
31 quorum.  
32 Also, I want to remind everybody that there may be some topics which  
33 come up that present a conflict of interest for members. And when  
34 these topics come up, I'll ask each of the members to state that they are  
35 recusing themselves so we have that on the record. That's just the best  
36 way to handle that.  
37 I also ask everybody to -- we have a couple of issues; one is the  
38 microphones. We only have two microphones available in this room.

1 Tomorrow we will be moving into conference rooms A and B, so we'll  
2 have more microphones in there. We're going to leave this microphone  
3 turned on so we don't have that problem with the lag time that we had  
4 before, and then we'll just pass it around. I just wanted to point that  
5 out.

6 One of the microphones will be up at the podium until we're done with  
7 presentations, or if presenters want to present from their table, they  
8 can do that and we'll just give them that one from the podium. I think  
9 that's all I need to handle right now, so I will turn this over to our chair,  
10 Dr. Ward.

11 DR. WARD: Good afternoon. The first speaker today will be Dr. John  
12 Howard. He will give us introductory remarks.

13 **INTRODUCTORY REMARKS**

14 DR. HOWARD: Can you hear me? Good afternoon. Welcome to the  
15 second meeting of the Scientific Technical Advisory Committee for the  
16 World Trade Center Health Program. It is with sadness that we begin  
17 our meeting. Today, not only noting the passing of responders and  
18 survivors since September 11th, 2001, but also the recent passing of  
19 **[identifying information redacted]**, Professor of Preventive Medicine at  
20 the Mount Sinai School of Medicine.

21 For over 40 years, **[identifying information redacted]** treated, counseled,  
22 and fought for thousands of patients who were ill because of hazardous  
23 exposures in their workplace. As Co-director of the World Trade Center  
24 Worker and Volunteer Medical Screening Program at Mount Sinai, he  
25 was an early and prominent figure fighting for a long-term health  
26 program to identify and treat individuals who worked or volunteered at  
27 the former World Trade Center site.

28 For all of his tireless work on behalf of the World Trade Center Health  
29 Program during its earliest and most difficult time, we honor him and  
30 his service to his patients, to the City of New York, his country, and to  
31 all of us. Please join me in a moment of silence to honor the recent  
32 passing of responders, survivors, and **[identifying information redacted]**.

33 (pause)

34 I have four items for you today before we begin the meeting. The first  
35 item is the teleconference meeting on January 24th. I apologize for the  
36 technical problems which caused the cancellation of the 24th January  
37 teleconference meeting of the committee. We are taking steps to  
38 ensure there will be no repeat of the technical problems if the

1 committee should want to hold another teleconference meeting in the  
2 future.

3 Second, during this meeting, you will hear a report regarding scientific  
4 findings and support for establishing the statutorily required criteria for  
5 Pentagon and Shanksville responders. Commander Robert McCleery of  
6 the NIOSH Division of Surveillance, Hazard Evaluations and Field Studies  
7 in Cincinnati, Ohio has provided a report which you have already  
8 received and today will make a presentation regarding his research on  
9 the potential eligibility criteria for these groups of responders.

10 I want to thank you in advance for your consultation on this important  
11 issue. Please note that no formal written communication from the  
12 committee on eligibility criteria is required. The meeting transcript will  
13 suffice.

14 Third, I also appreciate the committee's continuing consultative  
15 thoughts on research needs for the World Trade Center Health Program.  
16 Your thoughts to date have been extremely helpful. And in addition to  
17 the formal research funding announcement from the NIOSH Office of  
18 Extramural Programs, the committee's views about important  
19 knowledge gaps and research needs will be placed on the World Trade  
20 Center Health Program's website for potential researchers to review.

21 Again, thank you in advance for your consultation on this important  
22 issue. Please also note that no formal written communication from the  
23 committee on research needs is required. The meeting transcript will  
24 suffice.

25 Fourth, as you continue your discussion of Petition 001 to add cancer or  
26 types of cancer to the list of World Trade Center-related health  
27 conditions, please keep in mind that the Zadroga Act in Section  
28 3312(a)(6)(C) notes that the advisory committee must submit their  
29 recommendation on the petition to the administrator within 60 days or  
30 by a date specified by the administrator, not to exceed 180 days from  
31 the date of the administrator's request.

32 A request for a recommendation on Petition 001 was made to the  
33 committee on October 5<sup>th</sup>, 2011. The maximum 180-day period for the  
34 committee's consideration of Petition 001 ends on April 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2012. I had  
35 asked the committee to provide its recommendation by March 2<sup>nd</sup>,  
36 2012, in order to provide enough time for the committee chair to  
37 prepare the committee's advice to the administrator.

38 However, since the opportunity for the committee to meet on January

1 24<sup>th</sup>, 2012, was cancelled, I would consider modifying the due date for  
2 the committee's recommendation. If the committee believes that more  
3 time is necessary to reach a recommendation, I would ask you to discuss  
4 that issue at this date and for the chair to send a written request to me  
5 for more time by the close of this meeting on 16 February.  
6 Any additional discussion on Petition 001 after 16 February, 2012, must  
7 occur in another public meeting, so please keep in mind scheduling  
8 issues when determining whether additional time would be beneficial to  
9 the committee. In any case, the April 2nd due date for a  
10 recommendation is a statutory requirement; and therefore, no  
11 extension beyond April 2<sup>nd</sup> can be approved.  
12 I thank you again for your service. I wish you a successful meeting.

13 **RESEARCH NEEDS**

14 DR. WARD: Okay. So, Rob McCleery has not dialed into the call yet, so  
15 we're going to go on and discuss research needs and then go to Rob  
16 when he dials in.  
17 So, I hadn't really planned a lot of discussion around the research needs  
18 since I think you've all seen the letter that we prepared. But I didn't  
19 know if there were any topics that any of you wanted to discuss  
20 regarding the research needs or the conflict of interest.  
21 Oh, sorry, he's just gotten on the line, so we'll proceed as planned with  
22 Rob McCleery's publication -- I mean presentation.

23 **PENTAGON AND SHANKSVILLE, PA ELIGIBILITY**

24 MR. MCCLEERY: I apologize for that. I didn't have this particular  
25 number, so I, again, I apologize. So, good afternoon everyone. Again,  
26 my name is Robert McCleery. I'm an industrial hygienist at NIOSH here  
27 in Cincinnati, Ohio. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you this  
28 afternoon concerning the Pentagon and Shanksville, Pennsylvania  
29 responses to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11th,  
30 2001.  
31 Next slide, please. As it pertains to the Pentagon and Shanksville sites,  
32 the World Trade Center Health Program administrator is required,  
33 conditioned to other responsibilities to 1) determine the end dates of  
34 cleanup at both sites and 2) determine eligibility criteria relating to an  
35 increased risk of developing a World Trade Center-related health  
36 condition resulting from exposure to airborne toxins, other hazards, or  
37 adverse conditions resulting from the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
38 In the following slides, I will provide information that addresses both of

1                   these required determinations for the four responding groups listed in  
2                   the Zadroga Act for the Pentagon and Shanksville sites: fire department  
3                   employees, police department employees, recovery or cleanup workers  
4                   and contractors, as well as volunteers.  
5                   Next slide. At the Pentagon, fire department personnel arrived on  
6                   scene very shortly after the aircraft crashed. Personnel within the  
7                   Arlington County Fire Department served as the incident commanders  
8                   during the fire rescue phase of the response.  
9                   Numerous other fire departments responded to the incident by  
10                  backfilling other fire stations or responding directly to the Pentagon.  
11                  This was set into action by mutual aid agreements previously  
12                  established between these fire departments.  
13                  On September 21<sup>st</sup>, Arlington County Fire Department transferred  
14                  control of the site to the FBI. The site now entered into the crime scene  
15                  phase of the response. At this time, one firefighter company, a  
16                  technical rescue team, and paramedics remained at the site until the FBI  
17                  turned it over to the Department of the Defense on September 26<sup>th</sup> or  
18                  28<sup>th</sup>.  
19                  The literature differs as to the date of transfer of this command. From  
20                  September 26<sup>th</sup> or the 28<sup>th</sup>, the available literature does not provide any  
21                  information as to what period of time fire department personnel were  
22                  on site until the end of the demolition and cleanup phase of the  
23                  incident on November 19<sup>th</sup>, 2001.  
24                  Next slide. The police departments. The lead law enforcement agencies  
25                  on site included the Arlington County Fire Department, with jurisdiction  
26                  of areas surrounding the Pentagon, Defense Protective Services, federal  
27                  law enforcement agencies within the Pentagon, with jurisdiction of the  
28                  Pentagon, and the FBI.  
29                  Many other police departments respond -- responded either at the  
30                  Pentagon or by backfilling police stations, by way of the Northern  
31                  Virginia Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Agreement or the Northern  
32                  Virginia Sheriffs Mutual Aid Agreement.  
33                  The available literature indicates that the Pentagon response had a  
34                  police department presence until the FBI turned the site over to DOD on  
35                  September 26<sup>th</sup> or 28<sup>th</sup>, 2001. The literature suggests that while the  
36                  Pentagon site was under DOD control, services typically provided by  
37                  police departments were handled by military police or Defense  
38                  Protective Service personnel.

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However, the literature does not provide additional information as to what period of time police department personnel were on site until the end of the demolition cleanup phase of the incident on November 19th, 2001.

Next slide. The Pentagon response and initial cleanup of areas of the Pentagon surrounding the incident site as employees began returning to work on September 12th, 2001. The demolition cleanup of the incident site itself was delayed until after a memorial service recognizing the one-month anniversary of the 9/11 attack on October 11th, 2001.

The demolition and cleanup activity of the most severely impacted area began on October 18th, 2001, and concluded on November 19th, 2001.

Next slide, the volunteers. The information in the literature does not provide a comprehensive list of all of the volunteers onsite for the time frames of participation of those that did respond. Literature indicates that there were many volunteers that played a role in the response, with specific mention of the Red Cross and Salvation Army.

It is reasonable to conclude at least some volunteers were onsite through the FBI relinquishing the site to DOD on September 26th or 28th, 2001. The literature does not provide additional information pertaining to volunteers remaining onsite through the demolition and cleanup phase of the response.

Next slide. So the available information concerning the Pentagon response does have limitation. The information has uncertainties as to when each of the responding groups faced increased-risk activity at the Pentagon site.

Next slide. For the Pentagon response to the September 11th terrorist-related aircraft crash, the recommended concluding date is November 19th, 2001. To ensure that each of the groups that did respond are provided adequate opportunity for medical monitoring and treatment benefits, the World Trade Center Health Program eligibility is recommended for the period covering September 11th, 2001 through November 19th, 2001.

The available literature indicates that documented air and wipe sample monitoring conducted through September 28th, 2001, did not reveal any exposures of concern. However, no information is available on exposures during the demolition of areas directly affected by the aircraft crash.

The next few slides will cover the Shanksville, Pennsylvania response.

1 Next slide, please. At the Shanksville site, fire department personnel  
2 arrived onsite shortly after the aircraft crashed. The FBI controlled the  
3 site from the onset of the response. Most of the fire department  
4 personnel left the site after the FBI turned the site over to the Somerset  
5 County coroner on September 24th, 2001.  
6 There was a limited fire department presence until the conclusion of the  
7 final sweep of the crash site which took place on September 29th and  
8 30th, 2001. The available information does not indicate whether fire  
9 department personnel were onsite during the site restoration activity  
10 from October 1st through October 3rd of 2001.  
11 Next slide, Shanksville Police Department. Law enforcement personnel  
12 were also on site quickly after the aircraft crashed. Like the fire  
13 department, most police department personnel left the site after the  
14 FBI relinquished the site to the county coroner. Police department  
15 presence was limited at the Shanksville site until the conclusion of the  
16 final sweep of the crash site for aircraft parts and potential human  
17 remains on September 29th and 30th, 2001.  
18 The available information does not indicate whether police department  
19 personnel were on site during the site restoration activities from  
20 October 1st through the 3rd of 2001. The literature does suggest that  
21 law enforcement personnel remained at the Shanksville site for a  
22 number of years to provide security.  
23 Next slide. For the recovery or cleanup contractors, the literature  
24 indicates that environmental restoration contractors restored the site  
25 as close as possible to the original appearance as they could from  
26 October 1st through the 3rd, 2001.  
27 This included backhoeing the crater with soil, adding topsoil to the  
28 crater area as well as the forested area near the site and seeding the  
29 area with flowers and grasses.  
30 Next slide, volunteers. The available information does not provide a  
31 comprehensive list of all of the volunteers onsite or the time frames of  
32 participation of those that did respond. The Red Cross and Salvation  
33 (sic) are cited as responding to the Shanksville site. Like fire and police  
34 personnel, most of these volunteers left the site on September 24th,  
35 2001 and had limited presence until the final sweep of the site on  
36 September 29th and 30th.  
37 The available information does not indicate whether volunteers were on  
38 site during the October 1st through the 3rd site restoration activity. As

1 with the Pentagon, the Shanksville site has limitations in the  
2 information and that information has uncertainties as to when each of  
3 the responding groups ceased increased risk activity at the Shanksville  
4 site.  
5 Next slide. The Shanksville response to the September 11th terrorist-  
6 related aircraft crash, the recommended concluding date is October 3rd,  
7 2001. And to ensure that those who did respond were provided  
8 adequate opportunity for medical monitoring and treatment benefits,  
9 the World Trade Center Health Program eligibility recommended for the  
10 period covering September 11th, 2001 through October 3rd, 2001.  
11 Environmental monitoring at the site indicated that surface soil,  
12 subsurface soil, and groundwater did not exceed Pennsylvania  
13 Department of Environmental Protection health standards.  
14 Remediation was not required at the site. No indication that surface  
15 water contamination was attributable to the crash.  
16 Next slide. The following is proposed eligibility criteria for the Pentagon  
17 responder: being a member of the fire or police department, whether  
18 fire or emergency, active or retired or worked for a recovery or cleanup  
19 contractor or was a volunteer who performed rescue, recovery,  
20 demolition, debris cleanup, or other related services at the Pentagon  
21 site for terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11th, 2001 for at  
22 least one day during the period beginning September 11th, 2001, ending  
23 on November 19th, 2001.  
24 Next slide. The following is the proposed eligibility criteria for the  
25 Shanksville responder: member of a fire or police department whether  
26 fire or emergency, active or retired or worked for a recovery or cleanup  
27 contractor or was a volunteer who performed rescue, recovery,  
28 demolition, debris cleanup or other related services at the Shanksville,  
29 Pennsylvania site for the terrorist-related aircraft crash of September  
30 11th, 2001, for at least one day during the period beginning September  
31 11th, 2001, and ending on October 3rd, 2001.  
32 This concludes my presentation for this afternoon.  
33 DR. WARD: Are there questions for Rob? So, does anyone on the  
34 committee want to ask any questions or make any comments about  
35 Rob's presentation?  
36 DR. HARRISON: Thank you very much for all the comments. I think it's  
37 very reasonable.  
38 DR. WARD: I agree. Is that the general sense of the committee, that it's

1 reasonable? Okay, well, we'll record that for the record.

2 **RESEARCH NEEDS**

3 So, now we'll go back to the research needs and where we were on that  
4 was I was asking if anyone had any questions or felt the need for more  
5 discussion on the research recommendations or the document that was  
6 circulated regarding principles for handling conflict of interest within  
7 this committee.

8 **PETITION ON CANCER**

9 Okay, hearing none, we'll move on, and I guess our next topic is the  
10 petition on cancer. For those on the phone, I am going to be moving to  
11 the podium so that I can present some slides I prepared, and that will  
12 take -- that transition will take just a minute. It will be another minute  
13 because Paul is conferring on something. Are we okay to proceed?  
14 Well, I think as most of the committee members know but possibly  
15 some members of the public may not, we had hoped to discuss -- is this  
16 on? Is that better?

17 DR. MIDDENDORF: Would you prefer to use this one or that one?

18 DR. WARD: Maybe we should use the other one, and probably we  
19 should turn this one off. Thank you. I do have a small voice, so this will  
20 be very helpful.

21 As most of you know, when we had to -- when we weren't able to have  
22 our last meeting by teleconference, one -- the plans for how we were  
23 going to address the petition on cancer was one of the things that we  
24 were going to discuss as a committee, so in the absence of having that  
25 meeting, I really thought hard about how we could approach this topic  
26 in a way that we could really have meaningful discussion at this meeting  
27 despite that circumstance.

28 And as you all know, we received a letter from Dr. Howard subsequent  
29 to a letter he received from several congressmen asking us to review  
30 the available information on cancer outcomes associated with exposure  
31 resulting from the September 11th terrorist attacks and provide advice  
32 on whether to add cancer or a certain type of cancer to the list of World  
33 Trade Center-related conditions.

34 And as we discussed that at our last meeting, I think we realized that  
35 there were a number of very complex and difficult questions embedded  
36 in that -- in that request. And one of them was basically whether, based  
37 on what people were exposed to at the World Trade Center, do we  
38 believe it's possible, probable, or not that the exposures could cause

1 cancer.

2 And it's -- whatever our recommendation is, we would need to provide  
3 a scientific rationale. Now there's a second topic. There's at least one  
4 other really complex topic that came up at our last meeting, which was  
5 what are the criteria for having a health condition?

6 And so my idea was to focus today's presentations and discussion on  
7 the first question: Do we believe it's unlikely, possible, probable, et  
8 cetera, that exposure to the dust may cause cancer, and then depending  
9 on where the committee stands at the end of the day, we'll decide how  
10 best to use our time tomorrow.

11 And I think it's important. My boss says -- at the American Cancer  
12 Society -- says this all of the time, so I guess he's implanted it in my  
13 head. I think when we talk about the scientific rationale, it's really  
14 going to be important to talk about what we know, what we don't know,  
15 and what we believe, because I think that, you know, we'll all -- in all  
16 the presentations today, one recurring theme will be we wish we had  
17 more data; we wish we understood the exposures better; we wish we  
18 knew more.

19 **EPIDEMIOLOGY AND OVERVIEW OF MECHANISMS OF CARCINOGENESIS**

20 So what I'll be doing is just reviewing the epidemiologic studies that are  
21 completed and ongoing. I am going to talk about the potential  
22 carcinogens present in the World Trade Center dust, and then I am  
23 going to give a quick overview on mechanisms of carcinogenesis, really  
24 focusing on those issues that I think pertain most to our discussion  
25 today.

26 So with respect to the epidemiologic cohorts, we had several  
27 presentations on them at our last meeting and we also have access to  
28 published information on them. So I am just going to go through them  
29 very quickly.

30 Among the cohorts that are under study, there are -- there's studies  
31 going on of the Fire Department of New York, and I think these studies  
32 probably from an epidemiologic point of view are the most -- are going  
33 to be the most complete and informative because we know that they  
34 really have a well-defined population and a population that is, you  
35 know, highly exposed, a comparison group.

36 And they also have a separate set of EMS workers that has not been  
37 published on. They're also doing an employer-based medical screening  
38 program, which will provide additional information.

1                   The second large cohort that can be studied is the New York -- is from  
2                   the New York and New Jersey World Trade Center Clinical Consortium,  
3                   and I think that will also be a very informative study. It will suffer from  
4                   the limitation that it essentially was a self-referred group of people.  
5                   The third one, which I'm not sure is actually being studied for cancer or  
6                   not. I'm sure someone in the room knows. It's the cohort that's been  
7                   identified through the World Trade Center Environmental Health  
8                   Center, and this population is unique because it includes some children.  
9                   And then there's the very large World Trade Center Health Registry  
10                  that's being run by the New York Health Department. And that one is  
11                  clearly the largest in terms of sample size. Probably the most severe  
12                  limitation is that about 70 percent of the cohort is self-referred rather  
13                  than identified from the list or records, and that group is being followed  
14                  both by surveys and by linkage with cancer registries and mortality data.  
15                  So in the first publication of cancer incidence data from the firefighters  
16                  cohort, the incidence ratio for all cancers combined was 1.10 compared  
17                  to the general population. And depending on particular adjustments  
18                  used, it was 1.19 to 1.32 in comparison to non-exposed firefighters.  
19                  There are also some excesses for particular cancer sites. The findings  
20                  differed a little bit based on which adjustment was used, but basically,  
21                  there were significantly elevated or borderline excesses observed for  
22                  stomach, colon, melanoma, prostate, thyroid, and non-Hodgkin  
23                  lymphoma compared to the general population rates.  
24                  And I think one thing that's important to note here, because it's been  
25                  noted by others in the literature, is that there are a number of these  
26                  cancers that no -- are likely to be detected by screening or by just  
27                  access to medical care, and the paper did attempt to control for that  
28                  bias in the analysis.  
29                  But with respect to other epidemiologic studies, in the first publication  
30                  from the World Trade Center Health Registry study, there was no excess  
31                  of all cancers combined or eight major organ systems reported. There  
32                  have also been case reports suggesting the possible excess of multiple  
33                  myeloma in the literature.  
34                  So I think one of the things that it's important to understand before we  
35                  move on from the epidemiology studies is that epidemiologic studies in  
36                  general have their strengths and their weaknesses. One of the  
37                  strengths is that you're actually studying the events, not animal systems  
38                  or models.

1                   On the other hand, it's often very difficult in epidemiologic studies to  
2                   accurately estimate exposure, and I think that applies even more so in  
3                   these studies; although, I think there have been really good attempts to  
4                   use surrogates of exposure, like in the firefighter cohort, kind of  
5                   developing exposure classifications based on when people arrived at the  
6                   site, for example.  
7                   So I think that the existing studies are doing the best job that they can,  
8                   but ideally, you know, what you'd love is an exposure matrix for each  
9                   person so that you knew, you know, this person was very highly exposed  
10                  and they didn't work well. And that's probably not going to be present.  
11                  And so, when you don't have good exposure information, you may not  
12                  be able to see some of the things that you tend to look for when we  
13                  look for causal association, so we may not see a strong dose response,  
14                  because we don't have good exposure data. We may not see the trends  
15                  that one might expect to see.  
16                  Another criteria for causality that's considered is consistency between  
17                  studies, and again, I think, especially in this case, we may not see that  
18                  level of consistency because we don't have one exposure. We have  
19                  many exposures, and we have different populations and individuals who  
20                  were exposed to different things, so I would not be surprised at all with  
21                  the different studies that they show increased risk for cancer. They may  
22                  see increases at different sites, so I think we have to be really cautious  
23                  about especially making negative conclusions about the findings of  
24                  these studies.  
25                  And the last -- well, the last one on this slide is even though many of  
26                  these populations are sizable, they're still, in many cases, small enough  
27                  or early enough in the follow-up period that there are not very many  
28                  cases expected based on population rates.  
29                  So if we don't see an effect, we really need to be careful in interpreting  
30                  that because it may be -- the studies may be too small to rule out small  
31                  risks or risks for rarer cancers. One of the most important things, and I  
32                  know it came up in our discussions last time, and I'm sure it will come  
33                  up again today, is that, you know, I think when we all were trained in  
34                  occupational health, those of us who were, we all thought, well, you  
35                  know, usually solid tumors you're looking for at least 20 years between  
36                  the onset of exposure and disease and hematologic cancers, the latency  
37                  period is shorter.  
38                  And -- but I guess what I wanted to emphasize is the issue of latency

1 period is most relevant in epidemiologic studies early in the follow-up  
2 period when we have negative results and follow-up may be too short  
3 to see a positive effect.  
4 It's not necessarily relevant in the sense of saying, well, this cancer  
5 can't be related to exposure because, you know, the exposure only  
6 occurred five years ago. I'll get more into that later, but I don't think  
7 you can make those kinds of assumptions based on what I'll present to  
8 you about the mechanisms of carcinogenesis.  
9 So, if -- I think we got the -- I got the sense in the discussion last time,  
10 and this doesn't probably represent everyone's viewpoint, but I did get  
11 the sense from the discussion that many people felt that they could not  
12 make a decision on the cancer petition based on the epidemiologic data  
13 alone.  
14 Obviously, the strongest study is the firefighter study, but I don't -- I  
15 didn't sense an overwhelming consensus that the findings of that study  
16 were so definitive that it would be the basis for a recommendation. So  
17 then the question was, what can we learn from looking at the exposure  
18 data, but I think we have to acknowledge at the outset that it's  
19 incredibly difficult to interpret the -- especially air sampling data from  
20 the World Trade Center study.  
21 And one critical limitation was that there's almost no data from the first  
22 week after the attack. A lot of people said that last time, and I think,  
23 you know, I think we all understand that. I'm puzzled about some of the  
24 air data, because it really seems like the low air levels measured in  
25 some of the personal air sampling studies done on the workers seems  
26 really inconsistent with the extent of respiratory symptoms that we're  
27 seeing.  
28 And so I don't know how to answer that question, but it's my belief that  
29 it's, you know, I don't see it fitting together well. So, one approach to  
30 looking at the cancer hazard which I thought we could take today is  
31 really to focus on the composition of the initial dust and smoke as  
32 reflected in the mass dust samples that were collected.  
33 And those samples were collected and analyzed by more than one group  
34 so at least we have some -- we can look at consistency of their findings.  
35 And the other benefit, I think, of looking at the dust and smoke is that  
36 there were a lot of populations exposed to that.  
37 So, for example, we know that there were fires at the site, and we knew  
38 that -- we know that firefighters and police officers who were on the

1 site itself were exposed to combustion products from the fires, but just  
2 for the purposes of having a simpler discussion today and a discussion  
3 that kind of encompasses exposures to all of the groups, I thought we  
4 could first focus on the dust and smoke, recognizing that there's more --  
5 there's more to the story that we'll have to get to later.  
6 So, in poring through the literature and, you know, all of the exposure  
7 papers, I have to confess, I am not a chemist; I am not an industrial  
8 hygienist, and it's not easy to read these papers. But, you know, one of  
9 the things that I got out of it was really, you know, what went into the  
10 buildings is really what came out of the buildings.  
11 So, if you look at, you know, there was a lot of light-weight concrete;  
12 there was asbestos; there was gypsum; there was drywall; lots of glass.  
13 There was glass fragments and man-made vitreous fibers from  
14 insulation. We know that there were polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons  
15 measured in the bulk samples. We know that there were metals  
16 measured in the bulk samples.  
17 And then, we also know that there were volatile organic compounds in  
18 the mix. Now those probably, looking at the dust, is not the best way to  
19 look at exposures to those, which is why I have them in blue, because  
20 we know they were there. In the dust, though, they may have been  
21 absorbed onto particles and fibers and other things, so they may be  
22 there, but it's probably not the best way to measure them.  
23 So, what, I mean, what -- so, two of the reasons I focused on these  
24 particular exposures is one, that they were pretty substantial. So, for  
25 example, the asbestos was, you know, in a few of the bulk samples was  
26 from .8 to 3 percent of the total weight of the sample. So that's pretty  
27 significant. The other thing is a number of them are -- have been  
28 recognized as human carcinogens for which, based on epidemiologic  
29 data, so they are substances for which we have fairly strong  
30 epidemiologic data.  
31 So that's why we're focusing on these particular exposures. It doesn't  
32 mean that there aren't other classes of exposures of concern, and you  
33 know, we're not talking today too much, at least in the presentations,  
34 about PCBs and furans and, you know, TCDDs, but again, you know, we  
35 have a limited amount of time, and I wanted to focus on the things  
36 where I thought there was the clearest data to talk about.  
37 So, now shifting gears a little bit, and I want to thank both Julia and the  
38 National Cancer Institute for these slides. Julia pointed out to me that

1                   there was a slide set on the National Cancer Institute website that we  
2                   could use for this presentation because I think that a picture is worth a  
3                   thousand words.  
4                   So all of the slides in blue come directly from that website and have not  
5                   been modified. So basically, what is cancer? So, when a cell becomes  
6                   cancerous, basically, it loses the ability to control its own growth and to  
7                   organize itself appropriately in tissues. And this -- one of the key things  
8                   in that process is the damage to the DNA of the cell.  
9                   So this is a slide that summarizes a number of different characteristics  
10                  of cancer cells, and it's really, at least historically the way that cancer  
11                  has been recognized is pathologists look under a microscope at the  
12                  appearance of the cells from the tumor. So the cells will be different.  
13                  They'll have larger nuclei. They will not organize themselves into neat  
14                  structures the way they're supposed to.  
15                  So that's a real quick review of that, but you, typically, you know, for  
16                  our classic carcinogens, both tobacco and asbestos, we see a 20-year  
17                  latency period, and that's -- but what that means is in 20 years from the  
18                  onset of exposure to the peak of disease in the population, so in this  
19                  case, men started smoking in the United States soon after 1900, and we  
20                  saw the peak in lung cancer in the 1970's.  
21                  So the -- so as I mentioned, the key, you know, the critical step in  
22                  carcinogenesis is an interaction of exogenous or an endogenous  
23                  substance with DNA within the cell, and that can be a chemical, it can  
24                  be a virus, it can be radiation. So there is a component where there is  
25                  an interaction with DNA.  
26                  And typically, what happens, and this is grossly oversimplified, but  
27                  basically the DNA is the cell's mechanism that basically codes for the  
28                  production of everything a cell needs to grow and sustain life. So, what  
29                  happens is when there's a chemical damage, for example, that might  
30                  change one of the -- and so, and the code is really in the three -- it's in  
31                  three, you know, it's in three chunks.  
32                  So, CAA codes for a particular thing, and if you substitute one of its --  
33                  one of the chemicals, it changes the whole, that whole code. So,  
34                  basically, three things can happen. You can change a single base. Those  
35                  things are called bases, and the three together are (indiscernible).  
36                  You can change a base. You can put an addition in a base, or you can  
37                  make a deletion from the base, but in any case, it basically messes up  
38                  the code such that the gene is not effectively doing what it's supposed

1 to do.  
2 And there's really three kinds of genes that are involved in the process  
3 of carcinogenesis. One type -- and you know, this is large categories.  
4 One type is oncogenes, and what oncogenes do is they -- when they're -  
5 - they accelerate cell growth and division. Tumor suppressor genes  
6 enable the cell to put a brake on that kind of uncontrolled growth and  
7 DNA repair genes allow the cell to repair errors or mutations in the DNA  
8 itself.  
9 So what happens, if you're exposed to a carcinogen and you have a  
10 mutation and in any of those three types of critical genes, if the cell  
11 does not repair that mutation before it divides, that mutation is going  
12 to be passed on to the daughter cells.  
13 So typically what we see in cancers is multiple mutations, and it's kind  
14 of, it's thought that these mutations occur over a period of time, so  
15 possibly, you know, when you're 25, you get a mutation in a tumor  
16 suppressor gene, and if that is maintained, then as those cells divide  
17 and proliferate, they accumulate additional mutations, and in that  
18 process, though, you're not just -- the changes in, the mutations in the  
19 genes is not the only thing going on to lead to cancer. Other things are  
20 going on that kind of promote the growth of those cells.  
21 So for example, for breast cancer, estrogen promotes the growth of  
22 tumors in the breast because breast tissues are naturally sensitive to,  
23 you know, hormones, for example. So it's not only the genetic mutation  
24 or the interaction with the DNA. It's multiple things going on.  
25 And so, we tend to divide the process of the carcinogenesis into four big  
26 buckets: initiation, which is basically, at least an initial mutagenic  
27 effect; promotion, which is, you know, encouraging those abnormal  
28 cells to grow; malignant transformation, which means that the cell has  
29 kind of passed beyond the point where it can revert back to a normal  
30 cell. It's accumulated enough damage that it's essentially destined  
31 never to go back to normal. And then ultimately that tumor gets larger  
32 and invades other tissues beyond where it arose and it can metastasize  
33 to other parts of the body.  
34 So the reason I'm emphasizing the promotion and progression is, is that  
35 it's important in the context of the exposures we're discussing today  
36 because inflammation is one of many -- it's one of the important  
37 mechanisms of carcinogenesis. And inflammation actually can do a  
38 large number of different things, but basically inflammation is a normal

1 response to tissue damage that can result from infection, chemical  
2 irritation, and/or wounding.  
3 However, when it becomes chronic and it becomes chronic in a number  
4 of known diseases, it can damage the body and lead to illness. So, for  
5 example, we've all heard of Crohn's disease, which is kind of an  
6 inflammatory condition of the bowel, cirrhosis of the liver, which is an  
7 inflammatory condition of the liver. Many of the diseases, especially  
8 the infectious diseases that result in inflammation also result in cancer.  
9 And inflammatory processes can also occur as a result of chronic  
10 chemical and mechanical inflammation, but it's important to know that  
11 inflammation in general can really lead to cancer in a multitude of ways.  
12 Its increasing cell proliferation and turnover is actually generating  
13 mutagenic substances from some of the reactions that release oxygen  
14 and nitrogen species, and it's also producing cytokines and growth  
15 factors and other biologically active chemicals that are influencing the  
16 microenvironment around the area where the potential tumor is  
17 developing.  
18 With regard to mechanism, I guess the other things I wanted to mention  
19 are that -- one of the things we have to consider is that for many of the  
20 people in the exposure group, the duration of actual exposure is  
21 relatively short, but I think it's important to note that at least in some  
22 of the populations studied, inhaled fibers and dust can remain in the  
23 body for a very long time. And so, in fact, a short-term environmental  
24 exposure can lead to a long-term biological exposure, and we've seen  
25 that in some of the bronchial lavage studies.  
26 The other thing is, you know, we've talked about this average latent  
27 period for solid tumors, but I think it's important to recognize that it all  
28 depends on what stage in the cancer process an exposure occurs. So,  
29 for example, we see this curve in the population when in relation to  
30 onset of smoking in the population at large, you know, and then the  
31 lung cancer epidemic following 20 or 30 years later.  
32 But when a person stops smoking, their lung cancer risk goes down  
33 dramatically within three to five years. So, what, you know, one thing  
34 that's probably happening there is that essentially tobacco smoking  
35 contains practically every carcinogen known to man, and some of those  
36 substances actually are promoting or, you know, causing the tumor to  
37 progress, so they're both initiators and promoters.  
38 And so you see this much more rapid effect in an individual that stops

1 smoking than you would expect from the long latency period for the  
2 initiation, and we've seen something similar recently in breast cancer  
3 and this is really interesting.  
4 So, in 2002, the Women's Health Initiative published a study showing  
5 that use of postmenopausal hormone therapy was associated with an  
6 increased risk of breast cancer and the surveillance epidemiologists  
7 noted in that year's data that there had been a dramatic drop in breast  
8 cancer incidence virtually the same month that those studies came out.  
9 And at the time, you know, everybody was saying it can't be related to  
10 HRT, it's not biologically plausible that something could act that fast.  
11 Well, if, you know, there's pretty good consensus now. I don't think  
12 anyone disagrees that one of the major factors or the major factor in  
13 that abrupt decline is that, you know, on a population basis, a lot of  
14 women stopped taking HRT, and HRT was really promoting or causing  
15 tumors to progress in the women.  
16 And since that time we've actually seen a flattening out of rates. It's  
17 not continuing to go down, which further supports the hypothesis that  
18 it was that one time decline in HRT.  
19 So, we'll be moving on. I have a few more things I'd like to present, but  
20 then we'll be moving on to the presentations that I asked people to  
21 prepare regarding specific exposures of concern. But before I wanted to  
22 go on, I wanted to mention that I think there is an opportunity to learn  
23 more about the potential health effects of the World Trade Center dust  
24 exposure that maybe we haven't explored as fully as we could.  
25 So, one of the things I noticed in looking through the literature is that,  
26 you know, there was a lot of concrete in the buildings and concrete is a  
27 -- you know, two of the main components of concrete are cement dust  
28 and silica. Silica, as I mentioned, is an accepted lung carcinogen and it's  
29 also associated with autoimmune diseases and stage III lung disease.  
30 Pulverized concrete also contains a material called Portlandite, which is  
31 highly caustic and not shown in this slide, but I know many people in the  
32 room are aware of it. People who work with wet concrete often get skin  
33 sensitization because of hexavalent chromium in the cement mix. And  
34 many European countries actually regulate the content of hexavalent  
35 chromium in their cement, but the United States does not.  
36 So -- but it appears, and again, this is very preliminary -- it appears that  
37 maybe the hexavalent chromium content of concrete once it's set would  
38 not be as high as the mesolithic form. But again, that is something of

1 concern.  
2 But in fact, there have been a number of studies of cement dust  
3 exposure, many of them done, interestingly, in developing countries,  
4 but many of these studies, and again, some are small, but actually a few  
5 are, you know, large enough and well designed, at least on the surface.  
6 And many of the studies, not all, find increased respiratory symptoms  
7 among people who work in the production of cement, and they also  
8 demonstrate reduced lung function among people with long-term  
9 exposure.  
10 What I found most interesting is that there was one study that actually  
11 found an increased risk of GERD-type symptoms among people exposed  
12 to cement dust. And by the way, all of these studies are on the FTP site  
13 under the folder that says cement.  
14 Of even more concern is there have been some cohort case controlled  
15 studies that have suggested associations between cement-exposed  
16 populations -- and that could be either in the manufacture or in the  
17 construction industry -- in cancer of the lungs, stomach, colon, head and  
18 neck, pharynx and larynx.  
19 So cement dust that has not been reviewed by IARC or NTP and the only  
20 kind of official review I could find of it on it popped up on the web, and  
21 it seems to have been done by the Health and Safety Executive of the  
22 UK, but the version of the document online is a little odd because it  
23 does not have a publication date. It has a number, but no date, but I  
24 think it was -- it looks like it was published in 2006.  
25 And basically, their synthesis of the cancer literature at that time was  
26 that the epi data was not convincing, but that they felt that some of the  
27 associations that had been seen were biologically plausible in large part  
28 due to the known inflammatory responses associated with exposure to  
29 cement dust.  
30 So one of the ways I thought -- I mean, I thought I had a pretty  
31 reasonable way to frame the discussion today and get into depth on  
32 some of the most important issues, but I think tomorrow, the agenda is  
33 wide open, and one of the things I thought that might help us frame an  
34 agenda would be to -- at the end of the presentations, we'll kind of poll  
35 the committee and ask each person to check one of these words and  
36 turn them in -- so, this is not a vote, it's just a poll.  
37 And then what we'll do is we'll summarize the distribution of the  
38 results, just kind of arranged by the exercise. So, we'll summarize the

1 distribution of the results and that will help us know, do we have two  
2 really different viewpoints? Are some people really on the side of  
3 probable proof and are other people way off on unlikely, possible, or do  
4 we have, you know, a distribution centered at the middle?  
5 And then we can really see, you know, how can we use our time  
6 tomorrow to, you know, to see if the group has a consensus or not or to  
7 figure out what issues are of most, we're most uncertain about. And  
8 again, we are all prepared to tabulate these result in such a way that  
9 you --  
10 MS. HUGHES: I have a quick question. On the slides --  
11 DR. MIDDENDORF: Wait a minute.  
12 MS. HUGHES: Hi, I have a quick question. On the last slide, it says is the  
13 blank that exposure World Trade Center may cause cancer. Can we also  
14 use slash smoke, because not all of the exposure was dust --  
15 DR. WARD: Yes.  
16 MS. HUGHES: Because not all of the exposure was dust.  
17 DR. WARD: Yes.  
18 MS. HUGHES: Because then it would be more consistent with some of  
19 the other slides.  
20 DR. WARD: Yes.  
21 MS. HUGHES: Okay, great, thanks.  
22 DR. WARD: We can make that -- yeah. So, anyway, I think this will be  
23 helpful in framing tomorrow's discussion and, you know, and these are  
24 various options that we could discuss tomorrow. There may be -- it may  
25 be that people feel that there's critical evidence that we didn't cover  
26 today that we should go into in more depth tomorrow.  
27 It may be that there are clearly opposing positions that we should try to  
28 address tomorrow. If we're -- if there's apparently a high degree of  
29 consensus, then we can start talking about the rationale for the  
30 position.  
31 If we are leaning towards saying probable, then we can discuss the issue  
32 of what sites do we think are probable, and then hopefully have  
33 whatever -- wherever we are, and certainly we can discuss the  
34 possibility of needing to have another conference call or meeting before  
35 we can make our recommendation.  
36 So, with that, along with my presentation, are there any questions?  
37 DR. MARKOWITZ: So just a couple of comments. One is I don't really  
38 favor taking a poll before we have the public comments. We have the

1 public comments at the end of today and beginning of tomorrow  
2 morning, because that would add to the discussion, influence our  
3 thinking, so I would advocate doing a poll after that.  
4 I would also like to have, you know, do some discussion before we do a  
5 poll because I want to hear what people think. So if you want to do a  
6 poll, we could do it. We could change the time, though, until tomorrow  
7 after public comments and after there's at least some initial discussion.  
8 I assume the purpose of a poll is to sharpen further discussion.  
9 Another comment I have is about the choices of unlikely, possible,  
10 biologically plausible, probable, definite, and that is that actually I think  
11 biologically plausible stands with both possible and probable, and so I'm  
12 not sure that these are exclusive categories. And I understand that it's  
13 preliminary, a rough way of getting a sense, and I wonder whether one  
14 alternative approach would be to consider reasonably anticipated as a  
15 substitute for one of the categories.  
16 DR. WARD: Maybe probable?  
17 DR. MARKOWITZ: Well a --  
18 DR. WARD: I guess, that's the thing, it sounds like probable to me but,  
19 so I guess if -- we can make any changes that you all want to make. It  
20 did occur to me that maybe the timing was wrong, but again, the timing  
21 was kind of thinking about how can we tabulate these results so that we  
22 could leave people thinking about how we're going to use our time  
23 tomorrow.  
24 And some people may even want to, you know, think about ideas that  
25 they'd like to present or do literature searches tonight, or, you know,  
26 people could prepare to argue the main points overnight and so I did --  
27 well, I did bring enough paper ballots that we could have more than one  
28 poll, so that's one option. Valerie?  
29 DR. MIDDENDORF: I think Catherine had a --  
30 MS. HUGHES: Yeah, I had a quick question.  
31 DR. MIDDENDORF: So, Catherine, then Tom, then Valerie.  
32 DR. WARD: I think I need to have my eyes transplanted so --  
33 MS. HUGHES: I know we're all -- we're looking at actually what was in  
34 the dust and what was in the fumes. Are we going to look at also the  
35 impact of the temperature, because it wasn't as though the  
36 temperature was the temperature of the day, because it was just so hot.  
37 It was like 1000 degrees -- if people were close would have been  
38 impacted and how the items could have changed due to the

1 temperature, too.  
2 DR. WARD: Yeah, and I think, you know, that would fall under the  
3 category of things where there's something that where there are critical  
4 issues that we haven't discussed. I don't know if anyone is prepared to  
5 talk about the temperature today or, you know, has really looked into  
6 that issue, but if you feel that that's an important issue, we can see if  
7 there's anyone who wants to comment on that further or we can put it  
8 on a list of things.  
9 Again, I guess the question is do we feel like we have enough  
10 information to make a recommendation now, or are there things that  
11 we feel are so important that we need to wait until, you know,  
12 somebody really studies them well enough to talk about them.  
13 I mean, I certainly couldn't talk about that today, and I don't know if  
14 anyone else could.  
15 DR. ALDRICH: I was going to suggest, if there's going to be a poll, maybe  
16 two questions: biologically plausible, yes or no; and then the other  
17 four, pick one.  
18 DR. WARD: Good.  
19 DR. MIDDENDORF: We forgot Valerie.  
20 MS. DABAS: Just because I am not a scientist, I just want to get the  
21 definition of biological plausibility just because I've seen so many  
22 different ones on the websites.  
23 DR. WARD: That's a good question. My definition of it is that when you  
24 look at the exposure and what was -- when you look at the dust and  
25 smoke and you look at what was in the dust and smoke, and you look at  
26 what the toxicity of the, of that we've already observed in the events  
27 and, you know, when you look at all of those elements of data, it makes  
28 sense that this exposure could cause cancer based on what we know  
29 about the cancer process and the components in the material.  
30 Now, that's my definition. Someone else may have a better one. Julia?  
31 DR. QUINT: I think I agree with most of what you said except I'm not  
32 limiting it to humans, because I -- the animal data that shows that  
33 something is carcinogenic, to me, means I don't think -- there are only a  
34 few cancers in animals that are not biologically plausible in humans, so I  
35 think the animal data is a plausible mechanism in humans as well.  
36 DR. WARD: Yes, and I totally agree with that, and --  
37 DR. QUINT: I thought you did.  
38 DR. WARD: Yeah. I am going to return to my seat until we are done

1 with --  
2 MR. CASSIDY: Thank you. You've discussed a lot of topics, and one that  
3 I think is interesting when you look at this is, you know, is it blank that  
4 the exposure to World Trade Center dust may cause cancer, and I think  
5 it's hard to, you know, may be hard for some people to answer that  
6 unless you're talking about a level of exposure, right?  
7 So you were talking about cigarette smoke, and I would think that the  
8 studies show if you smoked one cigarette and stopped before you had  
9 an exposure to tobacco that the likelihood of developing something  
10 from that would be different if somebody smoked five packs a day for  
11 ten years, right?  
12 So I think it's important that the part or at least part of the discussion  
13 to the level of exposure, and I tie that in to when you said that the air  
14 sample data seemed to be inconsistent. Well, the question is where  
15 was that air sample data taken? And, you know, my personal  
16 recollection is I didn't see anybody standing on the Pile taking it.  
17 So, I don't know where -- if they took it five blocks away or ten blocks  
18 away or where they took it. And on that note, the air sample data, I  
19 would remind everyone that is -- there was much discussion about  
20 whether or not that was a political decision to say quote, unquote, the  
21 air was safe because they wanted to open up Wall Street. You know, we  
22 had to get back to business, the country was shut down. So, I just  
23 wanted to raise that point.  
24 I think people that were there working at the site knew the air wasn't  
25 safe no matter what [identifying information redacted] witnessed, so.  
26 DR. WARD: Yeah, and I do want to, I mean, I fully acknowledge those  
27 issues and I didn't want to spend a lot of time on them today just  
28 because I really feel like, you know, both the committee discussions and  
29 the published literature both, you know, essentially give that same  
30 information. But it's really trying to come up with other approaches  
31 that maybe can be a little bit more revealing and make -- help us make a  
32 decision.  
33 But I think, you know, there's at least, there's a couple of exposure  
34 scenarios and I think we should acknowledge that too so we have  
35 people who were -- we have a very heavily exposed group that was  
36 working directly on the Pile, especially in the early time period. We also  
37 have the potential for the community residents and the workers to have  
38 prolonged exposure to the dust that entered the homes and office

1 buildings.

2 Now, again, I don't know that you would expect to see exactly the same

3 health effects in those two populations, but they're both populations

4 that may have significant exposure, possibly to different substances and

5 different concentrations.

6 DR. MIDDENDORF: It's easy to forget that we have some committee

7 members who are on the phone, out of sight, out of mind, so I just want

8 to ask if any members on the phone have any questions or comments.

9 DR. WEAVER: I don't, but we're moving along fairly quickly and I just

10 want to point out that I'll be teaching from 1:30 until 2:50 and I'm

11 scheduled to talk at 3:10, so, you know, we can just juggle when I talk

12 around class, but when I am in class I'll have my cell phone, so I can

13 listen in.

14 MS. SIDEL: I just want to say that because we don't have air samples

15 from, you know, from the day 9/11, that's why Officer Harris's uniform

16 is so fascinating, because it's like a snapshot in time of what, what was

17 there, and I believe that this also -- another study of what FDNY, I think,

18 equipment that I've seen that are also from the actual day 9/11 from

19 people that were working. So, you know, I feel as though there's a lot

20 of different air samples and they sort of collectively say the same thing,

21 and that is that there were a lot of carcinogens down there.

22 And then we start talking about, you know, different zones of exposure,

23 but you're never going to get -- that's never also going to be firm and

24 there's definitely people that were super-exposed, but then there's also

25 other things that can happen, you know, you can just be in your home

26 and, you know, cleaning up your bed and there's a big pile of dust, so is

27 that the same as working on the Pile the first day? What difference

28 does it make?

29 Because if you get one little drop of asbestos, then you get that whether

30 you get it on the Pile on the first day or you get it while making your

31 bed, you know, three months later, so it's kind of, I understand from

32 scientifically for us to have all of these categories but working in real-

33 time in what actually happened to people, I think you have to be more

34 open-minded.

35 DR. WARD: And I think we are trying to do that.

36 MS. SIDEL: Oh yeah.

37 MS. FLYNN: I, you know, I have to agree with Steve Cassidy and with

38 Susan Sidel. I mean, a lot of us were involved in the EPA World Trade

1 Center Expert Technical Review Panel where the flaws and inadequacies  
2 of all of the government data were, you know, pored over at great  
3 length. Unfortunately, the public record of that panel has been  
4 removed from the EPA's website and Congressman Nadler's request that  
5 it be restored as a resource for this committee and for the public has  
6 gone unheeded.

7 But, you know, there have been many, many observations made in that  
8 process about the ways in which, for instance, when a monitoring  
9 instrument picked up benzene spikes on the Pile, the instrument was  
10 shut down and moved to another site.

11 The errors in the, in the asbestos air sampling for lower Manhattan  
12 residences that was conducted by ATSDR and the City Health  
13 Department were reported by residents who were eyewitnesses to the  
14 fact that fans were turned to the wall, that leaf blowers were not  
15 turned on. I mean, it almost borders on the level of sampling fraud. So,  
16 first of all, they were, you know, we don't have really good sampling  
17 data to fully characterize exposures in exposed populations. And  
18 second of all --

19 DR. WARD: But didn't I say that? I mean --

20 MS. FLYNN: Yes. No, I just -- I think it really bears reemphasizing and  
21 also to -- I know that some people saw this article that I sent in by David  
22 Newman, the industrial hygienist with the New York Committee for  
23 Occupational Safety and Health, and but I -- he said in this article, under  
24 the category of exposure assessment:

25 If just one thing is to be learned from the WTC response experience, it  
26 should be that an exclusive reliance on environmental sampling data  
27 can be misleading and even dangerous. There has been a fundamental  
28 disconnect between what the majority of the sampling data would seem  
29 to indicate and the breadth of health issues that have arisen. WTC-  
30 related illnesses manifested despite reassuring results that came from  
31 traditional methods of data collection and assessment. Tens of  
32 thousands of WTC responders, area workers, and residents incurred  
33 significant and persistent respiratory and other chronic and  
34 incapacitating illnesses.

35 And I just want to make one more comment, which is that, you know,  
36 not to further complexify (sic) the polling language, but in fact, the  
37 Zadroga Act sets a criterion for linkage of illness to World Trade Center  
38 substantially likely to have been a significant factor in causing,

1                   exacerbating, or contributing to, so is there a way actually to map that  
2                   language on to the polling language? Because I think we're looking at a  
3                   real -- I think we're looking at contributing to may get us where many of  
4                   us feel we need to go much more quickly.  
5                   DR. WARD: So we can definitely change the language with the poll. I  
6                   guess I remember at the last meeting there was a little bit of confusion  
7                   about the criteria for listing something as a World Trade Center-related  
8                   condition versus the criteria for determining that a particular person's  
9                   illness was World Trade Center-related. So I don't know if the language  
10                  that you quoted was -- which one that was. I don't know if it matters,  
11                  but I think we can certainly change this.  
12                  I think it really -- what I was -- what we were trying to do is come up  
13                  with a way to express it where we can understand the diversity of  
14                  opinions among the group so that we can figure out how we can have a  
15                  more productive discussion tomorrow. Whether the, you know, if we  
16                  have general agreement on the overall issue of the potential for  
17                  carcinogenicity, then we can move on and discuss other things. If not,  
18                  we need to stick on that point until we understand why different people  
19                  have different views.  
20                  DR. HARRISON: Thank you. I wanted to say something else, but I  
21                  wanted to thank you because I am going to change what I was going to  
22                  say, I think, because I was not aware that there was the language.  
23                  And I would ask, maybe, if we could clarify that point because I think, at  
24                  least in terms of my thinking about whether or how or what we would  
25                  recommend as a committee, if we need to use certain criteria that is  
26                  legislatively mandated, I think it's very -- it's significant, pardon the pun.  
27                  So, if we could just clarify that because there are -- because it actually  
28                  ties in with the comment that I was going to make. I think there's all  
29                  sorts of perspectives on how to come to a recommendation in terms of  
30                  cancer causation.  
31                  There's the individual patient that some of us, including myself, bring to  
32                  that perspective when I see an individual in my office with an  
33                  occupational or environmental cancer, what criteria do I use. There's  
34                  workers compensation criteria. There are civil litigation criteria. There  
35                  are cancer presumption law criteria. There are many different  
36                  frameworks that I personally am familiar with and bring to this  
37                  discussion.  
38                  If there are other specific criteria that in the legislation that directs us

1 to consider, then I think we should at least understand what that is and  
2 come to whatever straw poll with a reasonably common set of  
3 understanding so that -- and this is my comment -- it's sort of agreeing  
4 with Steve. It's that if you do a straw poll before we have some  
5 common framework may just give us, you know, 15 different ideas  
6 about what we are voting on but not a common set of criteria to guide  
7 our vote.

8 DR. QUINT: Yet another frame is a public health frame and the  
9 prevention frame that I come from and also the toxicology frame. I just  
10 wanted to tie some of this back to Liz's presentation where she talked  
11 about mechanisms because one thing to consider, when she talked  
12 about mutations is one -- a lot of these carcinogens are thought to have  
13 no threshold, so that when you're talking about amount of the  
14 carcinogen or substance that the person was exposed to, it's thought to  
15 be linear, so it's going through zero, so any amount could trigger a  
16 carcinogenic response.

17 Of course, you know, normally we talk about some risk above  
18 background, but to do that, you have to know the potency of the  
19 carcinogen plus you actually need to know exposure information and  
20 something about the exposure profile: how many days a week, how  
21 many years, et cetera, that the person was exposed to it; and we don't  
22 have those data.

23 So and the -- there's an article in our file, the folder, Guyton, et al, in  
24 Mutation Research which is very compelling because it talks about these  
25 carcinogens operating through many modes of action, so it's not just  
26 one. It's not just that they cause a mutation. They can act on, you  
27 know, promotion and different aspects of the carcinogenic process.

28 So read by my count have 72 carcinogens in the dust, at least the ones  
29 that NIOSH listed. Some of these are human. Some of these are animal,  
30 so I think, you know, we have to keep all of these things in mind when  
31 we talk about biological plausibility.

32 There are a number of in vivo and in vitro articles where people have  
33 actually demonstrated with very short exposures, you know, a  
34 triggering, mostly the carcinogens that act on an inflammatory process,  
35 but, you know, have initiated a process that ends up, you know, that  
36 goes through all of the steps and so -- and in very short time periods,  
37 some acute and some sub-chronic exposures.

38 Again, they're in mice, and they're in human epithelial cells, but I think

1 all of this enriches our understanding of the mechanisms of  
2 carcinogenesis and argues that this is a very complex process when you  
3 add, you know, high exposures, very high exposures with a multitude of  
4 carcinogens, you add to that complexity.  
5 And also ingestion. You can't forget about the fact that some of the  
6 exposures probably occurred through ingestion when you have dust on  
7 surfaces, especially in offices and homes, you probably have added to  
8 that probably also with the firefighters as well, given the amount of  
9 contamination on their uniforms. So it's not just the air levels. It's a,  
10 you know, very rich mix of information that we have to consider.  
11 MS. SIDEL: Just in terms of ingestion, my supply tent was right on the  
12 Pile and we were serving coffee and food and all sorts of things, so I'm  
13 sure that things were flying in there.  
14 DR. WARD: So are you -- oh, Steve.  
15 DR. MARKOWITZ: I just want to follow up on what Dr. Quint was saying.  
16 So we don't have a lot of experience with people with short exposures  
17 and long-term follow-up and cancer in particular, so could you just  
18 discuss a little further what experience there is with animals about  
19 certain carcinogens with acute or a very short term exposures  
20 subsequently relating to cancer?  
21 THE COURT REPORTER: Can I say something real quick? If you'll get  
22 that microphone real close to your mouth it helps me a lot. I will  
23 appreciate it. Thank you.  
24 DR. QUINT: I agree with you. Dr. Markowitz said that there isn't a lot of  
25 data. I was actually looking for some dose rate data in animals to sort  
26 of understand better whether or not we had those models, but there is  
27 a paper by Beaver et al that -- let's see, I have it right in front of me  
28 here. And actually, she was looking at the exposure to chromium and  
29 looking at lung inflammation and injury and then a proliferative -- or  
30 from repetitive exposures.  
31 And I think in that situation, she was able to expose one kind and then  
32 get a response. There's also some information where people are  
33 looking now for other than animal models, and so the Hammer Institute  
34 had a study where they actually had a training set of carcinogens, NTP,  
35 and exposed after 90 days and was able to -- they looked for a marker  
36 which was a -- it was a gene expression biomarker, and they were able  
37 to see that within 90 days. I think other people have seen it within 24  
38 days, so they're looking at different -- they're not looking at the

1                   cancers, but they're looking at markers for carcinogenicity, very specific.  
2                   There's the other study that I mentioned was the -- a study in human  
3                   epithelial cells, and I have -- in that study, they were looking, I think, as  
4                   short a period as 24 hours or maybe shorter than that, and they were  
5                   looking at -- they compared both silica, crystalline silica and amorphous  
6                   silica and were able to get a difference again in the whole process, you  
7                   know, leading that was carcinogenic-like process.  
8                   So, no, animal models, I don't know of any in the regular bioassay  
9                   models that would mimic -- that we could look at with this.  
10                  DR. WARD: There's also a lot of data on the cancer patients who were  
11                  treated with radiation and chemotherapy, and there's very good data on  
12                  their development of second neoplasms, and in some cases, you will,  
13                  you know, there's enough data, let's say if someone -- there's a lot of  
14                  data, for example, on young women treated for Hodgkin lymphoma with  
15                  high-dose radiation to the chest who subsequently developed breast  
16                  cancer.  
17                  So you could look at age and dose if that's -- but those are -- those  
18                  agents are very strong carcinogens, but it is a very rich resource if  
19                  you're into understanding how relatively short-term high exposures can  
20                  result in carcinogenic effects, but...  
21                  Sorry.  
22                  DR. MIDDENDORF: That's okay.  
23                  DR. WARD: I keep forgetting about this.  
24                  DR. TALASKA: There are a number of studies that were done by  
25                  intertracheal lavage of PAHs that were single-dose were able to bring  
26                  lung tumors, particularly in strains of mice that were relatively  
27                  sensitive, so there is -- there are data. I can't think of the citations off  
28                  the top of my head where lung lavage of PAHs, benzo[a]pyrene  
29                  particularly, has led to a, lung tumors in animals from a single dose, a  
30                  single heavy administration of a material in liquid -- in corn oil or  
31                  another vehicle.  
32                  DR. WARD: Yes, again, I think the other thing to keep in mind is what I  
33                  mentioned in the presentation that for some of these exposures, they --  
34                  if there's a long residence time in the lung and thoracic lymph nodes, a  
35                  very heavy short-term exposure can result in a long-term dose. And so -  
36                  - and I think we have some evidence of that in some populations.  
37                  Okay, so any further discussion before we turn to John Dement's  
38                  presentation on asbestos? Excuse me? Oh, sorry. Folks on the phone,

1 any further comments before we move into John's presentation?  
2 Hearing none, John, would you like to start with your presentation?  
3 Well, Paul will queue up your slides and let you know when they're  
4 ready.

5 **ASBESTOS AND WTC**

6 DR. DEMENT: Okay, very good. Thank you and my apologies for not  
7 being able to be at the meeting today.  
8 DR. MIDDENDORF: They're ready any time, John.  
9 DR. DEMENT: Okay, just move on to the second slide. I'm going to talk  
10 about the dust exposure, so there's clearly the type of dust cloud  
11 presented in this photograph is a major high-level exposure to a mixture  
12 of things that we have already discussed today.  
13 Next slide. There were no measurements done, as we have already  
14 discussed, of concentrations in the initial cloud. I think [identifying  
15 information redacted] and some others have estimated that the  
16 concentrations were likely in excess of 100,000 micrograms per cubic  
17 meter, 100 milligrams per cubic meter.  
18 And I've sampled some industrial operation as a hygienist where dust  
19 levels were consistently in the neighborhood of 20 to 30 milligrams per  
20 cubic meter, not as high as this. So I think this estimation is probably a  
21 reasonable estimation, maybe on the low side for at least the initial  
22 dust cloud.  
23 [identifying information redacted] described what he considered, and I  
24 think is a reasonable consideration, five specific post studies on 911  
25 exposure categories.  
26 Go to the next slide. And clearly the highest exposed were those there  
27 during the initial collapse and the days that occurred afterwards. I  
28 understand there was a rain event like around the third day, which  
29 helped to dampen at least some of the dust exposures, but I think the  
30 scenario is something like this: We have high-level exposures initially,  
31 and then we have continued exposures to the individuals who were  
32 doing the recovery and cleanup longer term, and also exposures to a  
33 much more mixed of (indiscernible) and fires and materials in that.  
34 Let's go to the relative -- next slide, please. One of the relatives to dust  
35 exposure is (indiscernible) based on the plume depicted in this slide. I  
36 think clearly the first day, extremely high exposure, followed by lower-  
37 level exposures during some of the recovery operations; however, if I  
38 could point out here, there were no dust measurements actually made

1 on this first day. So these are reasonably speculative.  
2 I am going to talk about asbestos, and go to the next slide please. And I  
3 am going to talk about some of the measurements that were made.  
4 First, I wanted to talk about the methods that have been used for  
5 measuring asbestos exposures, both historically and currently.  
6 On the list on here is an old midget impinger method developed by the  
7 U.S. Public Health Service in the 1920s. It's been used, really, for  
8 exposure measurement in occupational settings for dust exposures up  
9 until about the mid-1960s. I mentioned that largely because the old  
10 dust measurements and the basis for a lot of the risk assessment for  
11 asbestos are based on the old impinger method.  
12 First of all, it was a method that didn't collect fibers very efficiently.  
13 Secondly, the exposure method actually counted all particles, not just  
14 fibers in the dust and it did it at a low power using low power optical  
15 microscopes.  
16 So there's some -- excuse me -- some severe limitations with regard to  
17 retrospective exposure assessments even in the occupational  
18 environment. The current method used has been used since about the  
19 1960s. It's called phase contrast microscopy. Basically the samples are  
20 collected on a filter, membrane filter, and the particles counted by an  
21 optical microscope that has a special feature which enhances contrast  
22 called a phase enhancer. But still, it's relatively low magnification, 400  
23 times.  
24 There are certain limitations to this method. First of all, the cause of  
25 limitation with regard to being able to count short fibers. Only fibers  
26 longer than five micrometers are counted. Secondly, even if a fiber  
27 were longer than five micrometers, this counting system -- the  
28 microscope has no resolution or ability to actually see small diameter  
29 fibers.  
30 So you could have very long fibers that were small in diameter and not  
31 be detected. Nonetheless, it's used as part of the OSHA, current OSHA  
32 standard, and it's the basis of a lot of the risk assessments. And I think  
33 it's -- the use of the phase contrast microscope has actually enhanced  
34 some misconceptions about the nature of exposures and what's  
35 important. That is, only long fibers or fibers longer than five  
36 micrometers -- I'm going to have more to say about this later.  
37 Moving on to scanning and transmission electron microscopy. Scanning  
38 microscopy is better than phase contrast, but still not capable of seeing

1 the very small diameter fibers in an asbestos dust cloud.  
2 The most useful method is transmission electron microscopy, and some  
3 of the measures of the World Trade Center exposures were done by  
4 TEM. There are different techniques that are used for expressing the  
5 concentrations. Some express structures per centimeter of surface.  
6 Some were expressed as structures for -- as a dust concentration  
7 measurement per cubic centimeter of air samples.  
8 The limitation here is the fact that when you look at samples by  
9 transmission electron microscopy, you look at a very small portion of  
10 the dust cloud, and it's very expensive.  
11 A little bit about the measurements that were done. The range of  
12 asbestos, primarily chrysotile, looks like from a less than one percent up  
13 to about three percent of the mass. And with most fibers being less  
14 than five micrometers in length, which you would expect given the  
15 length -- given the nature of the collapse, the pulverizing of material.  
16 There's more to say about the less than five micrometer criteria as well  
17 because even in asbestos-exposed occupational cohorts, the majority of  
18 exposure is to fibers that are less than five micrometers in length,  
19 typically 90 percent of actual.  
20 Again, no measurements were made of chrysotile during the  
21 extraordinary high dust cloud exposure. There was a range of exposure  
22 measurements done later and reported in the literature, some in peer  
23 reviewed publications, some in -- just in reports.  
24 Most of these seem to show short-term exposures of not in excess of  
25 established criteria; however, there are lots of limitations of these as  
26 we've discussed already. One is reading the samples would be the  
27 preferable method for looking at exposures to individuals on the Pile.  
28 NIOSH did some sampling on these, used PCM and looked at some of the  
29 samples by transmission electron microscopy, and in general, when you  
30 look at the samples by TEM, the concentrations didn't exceed the OSHA  
31 PEL of 0.1 fibers per cubic centimeter of air. Again, that's fibers longer  
32 than five micrometers.  
33 Realizing of course that the majority of fibers in the study are less than  
34 five micrometers in length. I think there is a disjoint, and I think Liz  
35 pointed that out. This dust cloud was extremely high in dust levels,  
36 certainly initially. No measurements, again, but we would expect that in  
37 that dust cloud, given a concentration of one percent or even much,  
38 much less, that the asbestos exposures to total fiber concentration

1                   would be very high.  
2                   I'm going to talk little bit about the types of regulated asbestos because  
3                   many of the risk assessments have just considered asbestos as one  
4                   group of materials; that's a list of them. We're dealing largely with  
5                   chrysotile here which was in the towers.  
6                   I am going to say there may not be amphiboles in there. I had the  
7                   opportunity of being in the World Trade Center a number of years  
8                   before 9/11, and I think there might have been at least some  
9                   amphiboles in the building as well at some point in time.  
10                  Liz has already pointed out, I think, that asbestos is considered a  
11                  carcinogen by both IARC and the National Toxicology Program. That  
12                  includes chrysotile, certainly with regard to lung cancer mesothelioma.  
13                  There's no question with regard to the carcinogenicity.  
14                  IARC also determined that there was sufficient evidence in human  
15                  studies for cancers of the larynx and ovaries and limited evidence for  
16                  colorectal and in the pharynx and stomach. And there have been a  
17                  number of reviews of cancers at sites other than the lungs for asbestos.  
18                  I think this determination by IARC is reasonably consistent with the data  
19                  that exists, largely with regard to cancers of the GI system. Studies that  
20                  show an excess risk of about two for lung cancer tend to show an  
21                  increase, not a two, but an increased risk for GI cancer.  
22                  I'm going to talk a bit about the risk assessments that we have for  
23                  asbestos. Nearly all of the risk assessments are based on populations  
24                  occupationally exposed. Again, as discussed before, the measurement  
25                  method is this phase contrast microscopy where the fibers longer than  
26                  five micrometers in length are counted.  
27                  The typical metric is cumulative exposure expressed as the product of  
28                  duration and concentration measured in fiber-years. I want to point  
29                  this out because a lot of the data upon which risk assessments are made  
30                  is really occupational groups with short exposures which are relative to  
31                  high concentration, including the studies that our group has done of  
32                  chrysotile-exposed textile workers.  
33                  Many of these workers had exposures of just a few months and  
34                  nonetheless showed increased risk. Most of the models, including our  
35                  own, were no-threshold models; that has been discussed already today.  
36                  They seem to fit best to the actual data. And lastly, a point that needs  
37                  to be emphasized is that there's no scientifically justified threshold for  
38                  asbestos-related cancers, none that's been established in the literature

1 by recent studies.

2 Here are the limitations of the risk assessment, moving to the next

3 slide. Historical measurements, as I said before, a lot of them were

4 based on the old impinger method and unless you had some data to

5 make a statistical conversion between the old method and new method,

6 there's lots of misclassification in the data. And in most cases, in these

7 types of studies, that tends to actually dampen the exposure-response

8 relationship. So your effect is likely greater than you are actually

9 showing in your data.

10 Again, the risk assessments were based on the phase contrast method

11 wherein only a fraction, and typically less than ten percent of the actual

12 airborne aerosol was actually measured. And as I said before, that's

13 because of the diameter limitation of the PCM method and because of

14 the decision to count only fibers longer than five micrometers. That

15 decision is really not based on the decision that short fibers are without

16 risk.

17 It's based on the fact that a practical method hasn't been developed for

18 measuring exposures and enforcing standards. And NIOSH, in its 1972

19 criteria document for asbestos pointed out that the reason for the five

20 micrometer cut was for reproducibility of the PCM count.

21 Lastly, mesotheliomas are not well captured in a lot of the mortality

22 data that's been published at least through 1999. There was no code

23 for mesothelioma specifically. Only in ICD-10 do we have a specific

24 code for mesothelioma, so a lot of the mortality studies, including our

25 own, looks at things like cancers of the pleura and assumes that those

26 are mesotheliomas. And that's a reasonable assumption in most cases

27 but likely does not capture well in other cases.

28 Next slide. I wanted to drive home the notion about what portion of

29 fibers are actually counted by phase contrast microscopy. This is

30 actually a slide from some of our data from a textile operation where

31 they're using very long fibers, the best grade chrysotile. And even in

32 textiles, if you look at this distribution of diameter to length, you see

33 that the vast majority of the fibers are short and thin. So that's the

34 nature of exposures, even occupational.

35 Next slide. I wanted, last, to point out two studies that have been

36 published subsequent to the current risk assessments used for the OSHA

37 standard. The two case-controlled studies, and these were for the

38 mesothelioma, one in France and one in Germany, and they are of

1 reasonable size, particularly the France study. And what these studies  
2 are showing is that we now have measured excess risk of cumulative  
3 exposures that is fiber-years. In the France, study in France, less than  
4 one fiber-year.  
5 Likewise, in the study in Germany we have an -- about an eight-fold risk  
6 for fiber exposures that are less than 0.2 fiber-years. There is a, I think,  
7 a legitimate discussion in the literature about the relative ability of  
8 chrysotile versus the amphiboles to produce mesothelioma.  
9 I think, first of all, there's no question if chrysotile does produce  
10 mesothelioma. Whether or not it's less potent than amphiboles is a, I  
11 think, a subject for considerable debate.  
12 Next slide. Lastly, I want to point out that the OSHA PEL, which is being  
13 used as a criterion in some of the assessments of the air samples from  
14 the World Trade Center on 0.1 fibers per cc as an eight-hour time-  
15 weighted average is not without risk. OSHA's risk assessment indicates  
16 that at .1 fibers per cc over a working lifetime, there's an excess risk of  
17 3.4 cancers per 1000 workers, and of those 3.4 cancers, about two-  
18 thirds of them are lung cancers. The other third are mesothelioma.  
19 So, the point is that we don't have a threshold for the cancer-producing  
20 effects of asbestos, including chrysotile. It's open for discussion.  
21 DR. TALASKA: John, Glenn Talaska. Thank you very much. I've got a  
22 couple of questions for you on -- you cleared one up right at the -- in  
23 your last slide. I wanted to know the relationship between the numbers  
24 of lung cancers seen with asbestos exposure documented versus the  
25 number of mesotheliomas, and you said the ratio is about two-thirds to  
26 one-third.  
27 But I also wondered what it was in terms -- if there were any data in  
28 terms of latency time relative to those two diseases.  
29 DR. DEMENT: Well, I think the latency times are as Glenn just pointed  
30 out. Early in the lung cancer, in our own studies, we started to see a  
31 pickup in the relative risk, between 10 and 15 years and it really starts  
32 to escalate after about 20 years.  
33 Mesothelioma has what appears to be a longer latency in many cases.  
34 The peak of that probably, in most states, hasn't occurred until 30-plus  
35 years after a person is exposed.  
36 DR. TALASKA: Thank you, and I have one further question. You didn't  
37 talk about it. I am only going to mention it briefly in the next  
38 presentation, and I hope you will join me in the discussion then of the

1 interaction between things like PAHs and asbestos. Do you want to give  
2 a little -- if you had some information you could provide us right away  
3 or would you -- we could wait until after my talk, because I am going to  
4 just mention it briefly.

5 DR. DEMENT: I'll mention it briefly as well. I think in lung cancer,  
6 there's clearly an interaction with PAHs and particularly smoking. The  
7 question is whether or not that's a multiplicative additive or less a  
8 multiplicative fact, and I think most individuals, it may not be  
9 multiplicative but it's more than additive, so there is an interaction  
10 there. I guess we can discuss it later.

11 DR. WARD: Other questions or comments for John? John, I -- one  
12 question I had was if in the two case-controlled studies with  
13 mesothelioma, it was hard for me to conceptualize, you know, how  
14 small those units were. Can you help, I mean, can you compare it to like  
15 what a typical occupational exposure would be?

16 DR. DEMENT: Well, these levels are, if you look at the fiber-years, most  
17 occupational risk assessments are based on a 40 or 45 year lifetime risk,  
18 working lifetime risk. So if you take the current OSHA standard of .1  
19 fibers per cc over a 45 year working lifetime, that's 4.5 fiber-years.  
20 These data, these case-controlled data, are clearly demonstrating  
21 excess risk at exposures that, cumulative exposures that are much less  
22 than that, which just really adds to the conclusions of the OSHA risk  
23 assessment. That is, these are not zero risk standards.

24 The OSHA standard includes lots of work practices in an effort to try to  
25 get exposures as far below this .1 fibers per cc as possible. The other  
26 thing I like to point out is the occupational cohorts. There are cohorts,  
27 including ours as I mentioned before, that do demonstrate excess risk  
28 with short-term workers at relatively high levels of exposure, of course.  
29 The one that was done in Paterson, New Jersey by **[identifying**  
30 **information redacted]** in Mt. Sinai many years ago demonstrated that  
31 individuals who worked down in that plant with one month of exposure  
32 producing asbestos, they had a significant excess risk of cancers,  
33 including lung cancers and mesothelioma.

34 DR. WARD: John, can you comment on half-life? I mean are the -- I  
35 mean, I know that different types or lengths of asbestos would have  
36 different residence in the lung, but is there -- I mean, there probably  
37 have been studies looking at pathologic specimens of workers exposed  
38 to asbestos. I mean, does it tend to stay in the lung for a long time?

1 DR. DEMENT: What it does -- there is some discussion, certainly in the  
2 literature with regard to the clearance rates of amphiboles versus  
3 chrysotile, and in general I think the amphiboles cleared less quickly  
4 than chrysotile.  
5 There was a study done at Mount Sinai by [identifying information  
6 redacted], who suggests that the clearing of chrysotile from the lung  
7 actually ends up concentrating in the pleura where we actually see  
8 mesothelioma in the study.  
9 I think the studies that have looked at lung burden are sometimes  
10 problematic with regard to chrysotile because of its (indiscernible), and  
11 I think some erroneous conclusions have actually been drawn based on  
12 lung burden studies when you didn't actually have the estimates of the  
13 actual exposures to the individuals.  
14 DR. HARRISON: This is Bob Harrison. Steve Cassidy, earlier this  
15 morning, earlier this afternoon, sorry -- I'm on West Coast time --  
16 suggested that the samples may not have been representative of the  
17 type of exposures or type of activities that people had. I wonder, John,  
18 if you could comment on that.  
19 You said that samples weren't taken, I guess, in the first three days.  
20 And then there were lots and lots of samples taken subsequently, but I  
21 don't have a clear picture of what people were doing, where those  
22 samples were taken, and whether there were other activities where we  
23 think exposures were probably higher that were not captured.  
24 DR. DEMENT: Well, I don't have a good sense of that either. My sense  
25 of the data itself is that most of the personal air sampling that was done  
26 was either done by NIOSH or NIOSH contractors through NIOSH. Those  
27 were represented in the publication, I think, by (indiscernible) through  
28 NIOSH, and in the slide, where we showed (indiscernible) samples.  
29 A lot of these were actually taken during the post-cleanup operation,  
30 but the extent to which they represent exposures of that group is really  
31 not known. I mean, an effort was made to do that, but, you know, I  
32 can't, you know, I don't know all of the cache that were not sampled.  
33 DR. WARD: Any other questions or comments? Susan.  
34 MS. SIDEL: Hi, John. Susan Sidel. Could you just explain again the  
35 different measurements that you used that -- you were saying a TEM is  
36 the -- is like the finest but it's also really expensive and it's not OSHA  
37 standard. So the OSHA standard doesn't pick up the tiniest particles,  
38 and what was used at the World Trade Center?

1 DR. DEMENT: The OSHA standard is based on the space contrast  
2 method.  
3 MS. SIDEL: Right.  
4 DR. DEMENT: So it's an optical microscope with a phase -- a phase  
5 illuminator or phase shift illuminator, and the problem -- just go back  
6 and place yourself in the 1960s. All of the old samples were collected  
7 by methods including (inaudible) with a routine sampling method that  
8 would first of all actually measure fibers, if not all particles, and  
9 measured a reasonable portion of the air samples.  
10 So this method was the default method, and it measures, even in the  
11 asbestos industry, occupationally, it is really just an index of exposure.  
12 It's measuring a small fraction of the air blowing aerosol. Because of  
13 the limitations of the counting with regard to length and the resolution  
14 with regard to diameter.  
15 So, typically, in an occupational setting with chrysotile in particular,  
16 because it tends to be more fine, you'd be lucky if you're counting 10  
17 percent. In most cases, you're counting about five percent of the total  
18 number of asbestos fibers that are airborne that the workers are  
19 actually breathing.  
20 If you move on to electron microscopy, it has the ability to look at these  
21 particles, but because of the high magnification, you're actually looking  
22 at a very small area of the filter, so you have a lot of statistical  
23 variability with regard to the count. It was not chosen as the method  
24 for routine occupational exposure assessment.  
25 MS. SIDEL: So the method that was used in the World Trade Center is  
26 the method from the 1960s?  
27 DR. DEMENT: Sorry, could you repeat?  
28 MS. SIDEL: So the method they were using at the World Trade Center  
29 was the OSHA standard method that you talked about from the 1960s?  
30 DR. DEMENT: No. Yes, most of the samples that were workplace  
31 samples. For example, if you look at the slide, 19,000 air samples --  
32 MS. SIDEL: Uh-huh.  
33 DR. DEMENT: Almost all of those were PCM, so they did not use  
34 transmission electron microscopy. So it's trying to measure these  
35 exposures against an OSHA standard. The NIOSH sampling used PCM,  
36 but they did -- didn't look at the ones that were in excess of the .1  
37 fibers per cubic centimeter and looked at those by TEM. Samples which  
38 were mostly structures per millimeters squared filter area were TEM.

1 MS. SIDEL: Thank you.

2 MS. HUGHES: Hi. I just want to remind people, as a resident that lived  
3 one block away, the chaos that was there for a very long period of time,  
4 there was no electricity. So if you're going to do sampling or testing  
5 and there's no electricity, one of the concerns that some of the testers  
6 had was it could be done on a generator, and then you had to  
7 determine what kind of generator.

8 Would you be using diesel fuel, or would you be using a battery, and  
9 then where you would get that. So there was electricity on the east  
10 side of Broadway but not the west side of Broadway, and so when  
11 people are talking about the proximity of the testing, it took some time  
12 to actually get the machinery into place to actually do the testing.  
13 And then one of the issues that has been argued about over the years  
14 was clogged samples, so the filters were clogged if there was a lot of  
15 material that was actually picked up. So I just wanted to remind people  
16 what it was like early on. Thanks.

17 DR. DEMENT: Those are good points to make. I think given a relatively  
18 low percentage-wise of asbestos in this material and the high  
19 concentrations of dust, one of the issues with regard to asbestos  
20 sampling is trying to optimize the ability to count it, and when you run a  
21 filter for a period of time, accumulation of dust on the filter can actually  
22 obscure the PCM count.

23 DR. HARRISON: This is Bob Harrison. I just wanted to make two points.  
24 I think both of them are probably obvious, but I think for the record, it's  
25 worth stating. One is that I think there's evidence that respiratory  
26 protection was not available, consistently used, and would not have  
27 afforded, in any event, protection against inhalation of potentially  
28 carcinogenic asbestos fibers.

29 I don't -- I'm not sure that there would be any disagreement about that  
30 point, but I think it's worth noting and if there's any, you know, any  
31 additional comment, we need to make that.

32 The second is that based on the lung disease that we've seen from other  
33 lines of evidence, (indiscernible) airways tends to show (indiscernible)  
34 lung diseases. I think we can use that as qualitative evidence that  
35 indeed inhalation of particles and fibers and smoke, et cetera, did  
36 occur.

37 I don't think we can make any correlation between those clinical effects  
38 and the dose of asbestos, but I think just qualitatively, we know that

1                   this population had inhalation exposure, and I just think it's important  
2                   to point that out as well.

3                   DR. MIDDENDORF: John, this is Paul. I just want to ask if you would  
4                   take a minute or so and address the issue of potency related to length  
5                   of asbestos fibers.

6                   DR. DEMENT: Well, I think, Paul, the issue of potency with regard to  
7                   length, it really comes from some animal data. Now if humans are  
8                   exposed to the whole spectrum of fibers, and so when I studied my  
9                   textile workers, they're exposed to the whole dust cloud irrespective of  
10                  how I choose to measure it.

11                  Some of the animal studies suggest longer fibers are more carcinogenic,  
12                  and those studies come from some inhalation, but mostly studies that  
13                  are implantation are injection studies, some of the early studies from  
14                  Merle Stanton at the National Cancer Institute, for example, and **Dr.**  
15                  **Hoch** (ph) in Germany.

16                  So with regard to cancer, I think longer/thinner may be more  
17                  carcinogenic, but in the exposed aerosol, even if you consider an  
18                  asbestos textile, the longer/thinner comprise a very small portion of the  
19                  airborne exposure.

20                  So I think the -- in terms of the actual effect of short fibers in that they  
21                  greatly outnumber the long thin ones, even if fiber for fiber, they were  
22                  a fraction -- had a fraction of the carcinogenic potential, I think the data  
23                  doesn't support leaving those out with regard to risk assessment. We  
24                  just completed a series of studies in the plants that we've looked at for  
25                  many years in South Carolina and in North Carolina, and we did these in  
26                  collaboration with NIOSH where we had the ability to go back and look  
27                  at some of those old filters in the 1960s and to try to estimate a sort of  
28                  size specific exposure measurement for these workers in these two  
29                  cohorts and try to relate that to risk.

30                  And when we did that, we found that all of the size categories by length  
31                  and diameter correlated and predicted lung cancer risk. It's -- the  
32                  longer, thinner fibers, when you look at them had a slightly greater  
33                  impact; but nonetheless, all sizes that we were able to measure,  
34                  including the short thin ones, impacted lung cancer.

35                  DR. WARD: Any other questions or comments on this presentation?  
36                  Thank you very much, John. We hope you can stay on for some more of  
37                  the discussion. We appreciate you coming.

38                  DR. DEMENT: I'll plan on staying on. Thank you.

**PAHs AND WTC**

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DR. TALASKA: Okay, are we ready? How does that sound? Good? Everybody okay? Okay.

Well, I wanted to begin by making a statement about how being able to look at these data in detail, really it changed my mind about something about the exposure with the -- of the first responders at the Ground Zero site.

When I, as a scientist, and as a regular scientist with an interest in the area, but not an acute one, I looked at the abstracts. I looked at some of the tables, certainly of the ones with biological monitoring because that's my field.

And -- but I didn't look at the papers really hard, and the opportunity that I got today to look at them -- today -- in the past two weeks, at least, and certainly since being on the committee has given me a somewhat different -- considerably different perspective than I've had to begin with, and I will begin with this.

What I'm going to talk about today are the polycyclic aromatic compounds. These are the materials that are formed by the burning of any material as a fraction of the total mass of the stuff that's burned. Most of the stuff goes to carbon dioxide, but if there's not sufficient oxygen to go to complete oxidation of it, then these benzene rings fuse and form large plate-like structures that I give you three examples here. These are materials that -- from any kind of burning. I'll show you some pictures. PAHs are very lipophilic materials. They're well absorbed from both the lungs and the skin when they're contacted and from the GI tract, although there is a difference with the GI tract relative to these compounds that I'll get at later.

Just some examples from the occupational world first. You can see from here -- there it is -- that the upper left panel shows a coke oven. This -- the worker here is a topside coke oven worker -- these two workers. One of them is more obscured by the smoke than the others.

These are occupational exposures where we have both the knowledge of what the internal dose was for these individuals and the lung cancer risk, which is at excess. These people are in the worst possible situation because you're trying to make coke, not Pepsi-related coke, but coke which is used in steelmaking out of coal.

So it's burned in the absence of oxygen or almost the absence of oxygen and forms a dense smoke which escapes from the machine. It's a very

1 large structure. The right-hand panel is a foundry. And you can see,  
2 again, the hot metals are producing smokes which can be seen. The  
3 lower right-hand panel is an aluminum manufacturing site. At this slate,  
4 they're pouring.  
5 The left one is extremely interesting from several points of view. One is  
6 it's a food product. Our PAHs are in many of the foods that we like.  
7 Barbecue, smoked foods contain PAHs from the prioritization of the  
8 materials, and we eat them.  
9 But also look at this here. As you can see from closer examination of  
10 the walls of the smokehouse that this guy is in smoking fish, that the  
11 whole structure is coated with a tar-like substance. And those are --  
12 that is often high in the -- very high in the PAHs.  
13 Other examples are shown here. This slide shows an asphalt operation  
14 that we've all smelled. The materials that are coming off the gassing of  
15 the asphalt as we, you know, our body -- I think everyone uses orange  
16 barrels. And so the workers are exposed there.  
17 One of the real advantages of the studies that have been done very  
18 much by NIOSH but with other players as well is that often times they  
19 will take area samples of areas near or around a -- some of these  
20 operations and then conduct personal samples at the same time. And  
21 that becomes important to us.  
22 In the right-hand panel is the classic PAH exposure that causes lung  
23 cancer in cigarette smokers. Seven to ten-fold excess risk, depending  
24 on how many packs are smoked. It goes up with a various dose  
25 response that most of the toxicology is envious of, but it's from a very  
26 sad point of view that this is the major carcinogenic material in the  
27 United States and the world for causing lung cancer.  
28 PAHs are also formed with the burning of any material, so the nasty  
29 smell that you get when the smoke comes your way at the campfire  
30 contains some of those materials and that's the stuff that stays on your  
31 clothes the next day when you realize that, you know, those were in a  
32 bar or where there was smoke.  
33 The lower right-hand panel, of course, shows a more recent disaster  
34 caused by -- during the blowout last year of the oil rig in the Gulf, the  
35 Deep Water Horizon. And you can see -- and this is important from --  
36 for our discussion because you can see two things. One is that here is  
37 where the closest you can get to this thing to do any sampling at all is  
38 the distance, several boat lengths between the fire and the -- and the

1 source of the burning itself.  
2 And then you can also see the huge difference, if you collected a sample  
3 here, what would be the exposure level relative to what it would be if  
4 someone was at or near the plume? I'm not making direct comparisons,  
5 but keep this model in your mind is what I'm saying there.  
6 And now we have the World Trade Center and slides that I have -- a  
7 couple of slides just to illustrate things about the smoke. Here we have  
8 a burning smoke which is -- probably has PAHs in it, almost certainly,  
9 and then the more general smoke that occurred, I believe, right after  
10 the collapse where the -- probably a multitude of materials in this one.  
11 Also important here is that at this point you can see there are civilians  
12 inside of this where they -- where the work is actually being done. Now,  
13 I'm not sure, and I have to tell you I don't know as well where the  
14 monitors were put at Ground Zero relative to the work zone.  
15 And -- but that's extremely important. Even at this point, you can see  
16 your, you know, the smoke is going up. Oh, that was the other thing  
17 with this one. I'll go back a minute. The smoke is rising here very  
18 rapidly. Persons that are in the plume are being heavily exposed, but  
19 persons very, just to the outside of it, outside of the convection  
20 currents that are occurring, are not being exposed to the same levels.  
21 Nor would any monitors that are placed in that area be exposed to the  
22 same level.  
23 Okay. PAH exposures are associated with lung cancer in tobacco  
24 smokers. It's thought that 70 percent of the lung cancer in the United  
25 States and the world is due to tobacco smoking. Coke oven workers are  
26 also at increased risk. Aluminum smelter workers are. And the classical  
27 exposure to -- of soots, dermal exposure on the scrotum in chimney  
28 sweeps was investigated by Percivall Pott in 1776 and associated with  
29 the soots that were -- people, kids mostly, who were exposed to that by  
30 actually being run through the chimneys at the time.  
31 The PAHs are absorbed by the body and they are metabolized to  
32 compounds by the body that combine to DNA. So PAHs themselves are  
33 not carcinogenic. It's the PAH metabolites that are carcinogenic, bind  
34 to DNA, and cause mutations that initiate the carcinogenic process. So  
35 it is biologically plausible that PAH can cause cancer if there is sufficient  
36 exposure.  
37 What are the sources of combustion materials at the World Trade  
38 Center? This has been reviewed in a NIOSH document, and I'm just

1 showing it for you.  
2 There was approximately 90,000 liters of jet fuel, 500,000 liters of  
3 transformer oil, 380,000 liters of diesel and heating oil, and  
4 approximately, although no one knows for sure, the same amount of  
5 gasoline which was burned in the parking structures when the towers  
6 collapsed and over the next several days as those cars heated up and  
7 exploded or were demolished and then the gasoline leaked all over the  
8 place and then burned.  
9 Area samples were collected and for PAHs specifically, not for dust in  
10 particular, but for PAHs in particular, were collected at the fence line  
11 beginning on 9/16 through 9/23/01. There were no personal samples  
12 taken at this time by these investigators. So the first samples seem to  
13 be five days after the exposure. There were biomarker samples  
14 collected once on October 1<sup>st</sup>, approximately, in a study that was  
15 reported by Edelman et al in 2003.  
16 But I think it's also interesting, and I'm going to bring up the set of  
17 studies that I found in the Butt et al 2004, a Canadian group who looked  
18 at the window films and extracted the materials from the films of  
19 windows at various places in New York City and found considerably  
20 different levels of PAHs on them than were collected in the air samples.  
21 So these are the data of Pleil et al at the fence line, and again, area  
22 samples. You can see many samples were collected throughout.  
23 Samples were collected at the perimeter of Ground Zero, not in the  
24 work area, but at the perimeter and again, no samples for the first five  
25 days.  
26 They were also collected distally at Broadway, so away from the site.  
27 And one of the things that you can see clearly is that these two  
28 exposures have parallel curves. They run together down here, but  
29 they're parallel pretty much out here. So we have a difference between  
30 the two of them by at least a factor of two because based upon the  
31 distance.  
32 So -- but again, they were area samples, stationary samples collected  
33 not following any particular worker, not following any particular activity  
34 at all, but sitting at the fence line, some distance from where the  
35 activities were being taken -- taking place.  
36 So all of these samples are -- were air measurements and estimates  
37 based on area samples collected at the fence line, and these types of  
38 samples typically underestimate worker exposure and the differences

1 can be anywhere from three- to 40-fold, that if you take an area sample  
2 at a periphery, depending on how far away it is from the active sites of  
3 the workers, it generally is known to underestimate the exposure.  
4 Now, that difference can be even greater than 40-fold, but it can be less  
5 than 40-fold as well, and the way that it can be less than 40-fold is if the  
6 study design uses an area sample to capture the worst case. So many  
7 times in my career, I've stationed an area sample in the worst possible  
8 exposure place where there are no workers, but to capture the worst-  
9 case scenario to see -- and the idea being if there's no problem at the  
10 absolute worst designed place, then there might not be a problem  
11 where the workers are.  
12 But one has to consciously design their study to do that to be able to  
13 catch a worst-case scenario, and I don't believe that was done in the  
14 studies that were collected. Secondarily -- so we have a difference here  
15 that could be fairly large. Secondarily, only the PAHs that were in the  
16 particulate phase were counted because they captured the 2.5 micron  
17 samples, extracted those samples.  
18 There's also PAHs in the vapor phase. PAHs, if they're heated, turn into  
19 a vapor, like steam, and then that steam rises into the air. And that is --  
20 sometimes it binds to particles and it does bind to particles, but some of  
21 it stays in the vapor phase as well.  
22 And depending on the type of study -- in Burstyn et al there was -- they  
23 found 10 times more PAHs found in the vapor phase than asphalt  
24 workers, but other workers have seen things much lower.  
25 So they have seen 10 times more in this one study, but Quinlan et al, for  
26 example, in coal liquefaction workers saw that the amount that was in  
27 the particulate, bound particulate, was about equal to what was found  
28 in the vapor phase. And there are estimates all over the place between  
29 those extremes.  
30 Okay. So what effects weren't measured? Well, the first question is  
31 what is the impact of being in a plume and how much more would that  
32 be, and how much greater, and again, I refer you back to the picture for  
33 the Deep Water Horizon.  
34 If you're working right above the smoke as opposed to being away from  
35 it at the periphery, then the -- what would be the impact? And I have --  
36 unfortunately, I wasn't there, and I can't tell you.  
37 What is the effect of exercise and exertion, and I'll show you a slide  
38 about how important that can be. But if somebody is working hard,

1                   they are breathing hard and they are breathing several times more than  
2                   what the, on average, if I am working really hard riding a bicycle or  
3                   jogging, you know, the worst place to jog is along city streets.  
4                   Fortunately, the lead's out of gasoline but, you know, the worst place to  
5                   jog is around there because you are breathing several times more and  
6                   that means you are breathing more of this material into your lungs  
7                   where they can be collected.  
8                   So that's an impact that one might want to consider, especially if  
9                   different groups of people were working harder. From what I can  
10                  gather, and I think in the paper, in the Pleil et al paper, they estimate  
11                  that -- the purpose of their sampling was to look at some general  
12                  environmental effects. They weren't looking for what was happening to  
13                  the workers at Ground Zero, okay, so -- and they made no attempt to  
14                  capture the peaks or assess exposed worker exposure, and they stated  
15                  specifically that exposure to the workers at the site could be quote,  
16                  much higher, end quote.  
17                  So there is a big weakness with the best PAH studies that were done at  
18                  the site, and now -- oh, yeah, but here is something that I believe is  
19                  illuminating as I was going through the voluminous literature that was  
20                  provided us.  
21                  Butt et al did a series of studies where they washed windows with  
22                  solvents, and they washed the windows to be able to extract the PAHs  
23                  and other materials. They were looking for PAHs on them, okay? And  
24                  what they saw was that there were different zones and -- as you might  
25                  expect.  
26                  So within one kilometer -- they are Canadian after all -- which is 6/10 of  
27                  a mile, the average was 77,100 nanograms per square meter. We were  
28                  seeing in the other study, in the Pleil et al study that they were talking  
29                  about 35 nanograms per cubic meter, so a meter is three feet  
30                  approximately by three feet by -- a cubic meter is three feet by three  
31                  feet by three feet. A square meter is three feet by three feet, but on  
32                  average, Butt et al were seeing on these window films which admittedly  
33                  collected samples for several days, they -- I forget the day that they  
34                  collected them on -- they were considerably higher, thousands of times  
35                  higher.  
36                  In fact, downwind sites within one kilometer averaged 130,000  
37                  nanograms per square meter. Upwind sites were much lower, averaged  
38                  18,500, still within a kilometer. Upwind sites that were greater than

1 two kilometers away averaged 6000, and this might be considered the  
2 background for New York City windows, okay? More than two  
3 kilometers away, and upwind, so the wind from the site probably wasn't  
4 blowing very often on these windows.  
5 So you can see the types, now, you know, you can't use this for  
6 exposure estimates, obviously, but these are windows that may or may  
7 not have been in the major plumes at all. By luck, they sampled these,  
8 and I don't believe they had any selection other than they had access to  
9 the buildings. So I thought this, this was illuminating to me.  
10 Here's some of the data about work rate. So, if you are working, light  
11 work is what we consider for most of our standards where the work  
12 load in watts is about 50 watts that the alveolar vent -- so, at rest, the  
13 people that are in this room are breathing in about five liters of air per  
14 minute, but someone who is working very hard can breathe seven times  
15 that. So they bring in seven times the amount of air. They pump the  
16 blood around much more efficiently. And so you can see the exposure  
17 metrics can give you another twofold over that if you're worried about  
18 heavy work as opposed to light work in terms of the amount of air  
19 they're breathing in and the potential for absorption.  
20 Okay. So now I am going to change gears a little bit and switch to the  
21 biomonitors data, and I have to tell you I am going to focus on one  
22 compound, pyrene. Pyrene is one of those PAHs that was in the first  
23 slide. It's an important component of PAHs. It -- of -- and it's  
24 representative of the four and five ring carcinogenic PAHs, okay?  
25 So, of all of those type of compounds, pyrene is the most abundant. So  
26 it's oftentimes the easiest measured, and we do have a biological  
27 exposure indices for 1-hydroxypyrene, the major metabolite of pyrene,  
28 which is an ACGIH BEI. That was developed in -- I'm not sure it was in  
29 place in 2001. It may have been. We'll have to go back and check that  
30 when we think of it.  
31 But biomonitors can account for differences in absorption,  
32 distribution, and metabolism and elimination if it's done correctly. It  
33 can take into account both the skin and inhalation exposures and one  
34 very important thing with biological monitoring is that exposure can be  
35 reconstructed.  
36 If you know the material that you are exposed to and you know the half-  
37 life of that material in the body and you know the relative time between  
38 when the sample was taken and when the exposure occurred, you can

1 reconstruct the exposure based upon the half-life.  
2 On the other hand, it is a method that is easily misused, if not in terms  
3 of interpretation, if you don't know exactly what you're doing, so.  
4 Let's look -- and this is an example of a biological monitoring on a model  
5 system. This has nothing to do with the Trade Center. This is just a  
6 model that I made up. So you see if you have exposure on Monday  
7 morning and the exposure during the day on Monday equals to a  
8 hundred, and the half-life in the material in the body is 24 hours, then  
9 the material -- you will increase the amount in the body, and then in the  
10 16 hours the person is off until the next shift on Tuesday, that level will  
11 decrease by a fraction based upon the half-life.  
12 So you can see right that you get a -- with each additional day, you get  
13 an increase, but it's not a doubling. So you don't get 200 on Tuesday;  
14 you don't get 300 on Wednesday and so forth. And then the other thing  
15 to notice is that because of the half-life -- and what is half-life?  
16 Half-life is -- most of you probably know -- is the length of time a  
17 material resides in the body. Most of the materials that are absorbed  
18 by humans as xenobiotics are eliminated. And they are eliminated fairly  
19 rapidly because the body doesn't want to keep these things if they do  
20 nothing for it. I mean, some materials have long half-lives; cadmium  
21 has a 30-year half-life. Lead has about an eight-to-ten year half-life in  
22 the bone. But these materials tend to be eliminated fairly quickly and  
23 with fairly well-defined half-lives.  
24 Notice what happens after work on Friday. So after work on Friday, the  
25 level in the body goes way down before Monday morning, and that's  
26 because there are several half-lives involved here, okay. So when would  
27 be the best time to sample for this material, something with a 24-hour  
28 half-life?  
29 Now you wouldn't want to sample on Monday because the body hasn't  
30 reached steady state yet. Oh, and by the way, this continues every  
31 week. It doesn't get much higher. It never gets above 200 for this  
32 compound as long as that dose is the same.  
33 When would you want to sample? Well, you don't want to sample here.  
34 You really want to wait until the end of the week. Sample in here and  
35 you'll have less variability, and you'll capture the exposure because  
36 that's when the exposure reaches its peak.  
37 You wouldn't want to sample down here at this time because that would  
38 -- without knowing when the peak occurred -- because that would

1                   underestimate exposure dramatically. So let's look at the data. These  
2                   are the 1-hydroxypyrene data from Edelman et al, and this is one table I  
3                   looked at, and I'm only giving the 1-HP data. And I've changed the  
4                   numerals that have been used, and in that I use micrograms per liter  
5                   and I'll tell you why momentarily.  
6                   They use nanograms per liter. Micrograms give smaller numbers,  
7                   fractional numbers, but it's important because the BEI is set at one.  
8                   Okay, so all exposed workers at the site when they were sampled on  
9                   October 1st, 2nd, or 3rd had a level of 0.092 micrograms per liter. The  
10                  controls had a level of 0.062 micrograms per liter, and that seems like a  
11                  small difference, but it could be a significant difference and it was in  
12                  fact significant. It was significantly higher.  
13                  If the firefighters were at the collapse on day one, then their average  
14                  was about .11. If they were -- if they didn't come at the collapse, but  
15                  came after the collapse on day one and two and started working, then it  
16                  was slightly, slightly higher, so maybe if you could say the real fires that  
17                  were happening at ground level didn't happen until here, at least in the  
18                  majority of the -- after the collapse. That's when all hell broke loose.  
19                  There was a subgroup that was studied which was called the Special Ops  
20                  Command, and they were considered to be the highest exposed, and  
21                  indeed, they had the highest average level. Their level was .159.  
22                  Okay, now the reason when I looked at these data initially I thought that  
23                  well, you know, you can see there's a significant difference here but it's  
24                  not a big deal, was because the standard that occupational exposures  
25                  are based on, the level is 1.0, okay?  
26                  So the occupational standard is much lower, but it specifies an end of  
27                  shift, end of workweek sample and as I found out by reading the paper  
28                  hard, one, they did not capture the peak. Samples were collected 20  
29                  some days after the exposure, which would be -- and also they reported  
30                  no variances and other people can maybe reinforce this, but when we  
31                  were worried about people who have exposure, it's the outliers that are  
32                  really important, and the outliers weren't given in the paper.  
33                  Four percent were said to be in the upper five percent of the NHANES  
34                  values, but I wonder how many of the controls were in the same upper  
35                  five percent. It wasn't represented. Because then there's no  
36                  comparison there. But there was no variation given. There was no  
37                  standard deviations, no ranges that were given in the data, and no  
38                  exposure time was indicated or no sampling time was indicated. They

1 did not indicate whether they sampled at the end of the shift, at the  
2 beginning of the shift or when they sampled at all. It's just unknown,  
3 and that really threw me, okay?  
4 So we have a situation where the exposure may have occurred many  
5 days before and also -- and so you would expect them to be relatively  
6 low relative to the decrease in exposure that one might see with that  
7 decrease in the PAHs that were reported.  
8 Going back to the -- if I may, this slide. So, regardless of what the true  
9 levels were if these were just area samples, you can see that the shapes  
10 of the curve are similar. So one may anticipate that if there was a  
11 higher level inside of Ground Zero, then it would follow a similar shape,  
12 so the levels that -- this is when the -- the highest level would have  
13 been reported here. The first samples weren't taken to here, out 25  
14 days, and you can see what the shape of the curve looks like in terms of  
15 the exposure. It's already winding down at least.  
16 Now how can we -- can we do anything with this data and -- okay. So  
17 the sampling time wasn't given. Firefighters -- and this is from my own  
18 experience that firefighters haven't -- in the studies that we've done in  
19 Cincinnati, the firefighters have a higher level after a fire than before,  
20 but generally they are not in the really high exposed level and I'll give  
21 you an idea of what that means here in a moment.  
22 And then the question becomes are -- could absorption from the lung be  
23 complete? What about the large particle masses and the fact that PAHs  
24 might not be absorbed rapidly, and I'll show you some data on that in a  
25 moment.  
26 So first things first. This is what happens in a workplace in an aluminum  
27 plant, and I showed you what those look like. In aluminum plant  
28 workers, and their exposure to 1-hydroxypyrene. These samples were  
29 taken pre-shift, so there was a baseline sample taken every morning and  
30 an after work shift, and you can see that their exposure follows the  
31 model for a 24 -- very similar to what I reported earlier.  
32 But look at the magnitude of their exposures. By the end of the  
33 workweek, these levels are greater than 10 micrograms per liter -- per  
34 liter of urine, which is 10 times the standard. But notice that every day  
35 before the shift, they drop down considerably, so that if this is the peak  
36 -- and what this shows is that like in many workplaces, aluminum  
37 reduction workers don't produce as much on Friday as, you know, it's  
38 Friday.

1 But you can see that after Thursday's peak, that there is a significant  
2 drop in the 16 hours between the next day. So if you didn't sample, if  
3 you sampled in the morning, you would see a much lower sample by  
4 design, much lower level by design. And these are data that were  
5 developed by the BEI committee in running up, in developing the BEI for  
6 1-hydroxypyrene.  
7 And what they show -- it looks complicated, but what it shows is how  
8 exposures could be the sum of all of the different compartments for  
9 these things. It's known that PAHs have three compartments in the  
10 body: the blood, which is cleared very rapidly with a half-life of five  
11 hours; the lean tissues, which are cleared within 24 hours; and then the  
12 -- probably the adipose tissues which are cleared very slowly, just every  
13 -- the half-life is 23 days approximately.  
14 And so what you see is that with every exposure, the major impact on  
15 the urinary levels shown in black is the sum of the three of them, but  
16 it's largely dependent on the lean compartment and the -- and what was  
17 in the blood, and then that rapidly disappears causing a drop in the  
18 urinary levels.  
19 This was an example I found extremely illuminating for this discussion.  
20 This was a group of people, patients in this case, who go to the Mayo  
21 Clinic for what's called the Goeckerman treatment where they have  
22 psoriasis, and their skin is painted with as much as 70 percent of the  
23 total body volume of -- their skin is painted with coal tar in the  
24 treatment of psoriasis. It apparently works.  
25 And what I'd like to focus on -- the slide is more complicated than it  
26 needs to be. I'd like you to look at the -- the values here for 1-  
27 hydroxypyrene. So these are the baseline values in this group of  
28 people. After one treatment, that baseline jumps up to 170, okay? Now  
29 this is applying it on the skin.  
30 After five treatments, because they're given eight hours a day of this  
31 treatment, five days a week, and then it's stopped. After five  
32 treatments, it goes up to 270, approximately, but after one week of no  
33 treatment, this is the level. And it goes down -- remember there's a  
34 break here between 10 and 100 -- and it goes down between 275 and  
35 down to less than 4 within a week.  
36 If you calculate that, that means that the half-life for this is about 24  
37 hours, which is very consistent for a group of people who haven't been  
38 exposed chronically. Their exposure was just five times. So it drops

1 very rapidly with an apparent half-life of about 24 hours.  
2 Why this is important is that if the half-life was indeed 24 hours, one  
3 could back calculate from the levels that are given to the levels that  
4 may have been at the peak on 9/11, 9/12 at Ground Zero.  
5 What this slide shows is the data from Gerde et al, who looked at the  
6 impact on particle size. PAHs were absorbed onto particles and then  
7 they -- and then they modeled it into the lungs based on -- and then  
8 actually did actual measurements in the lungs, and what they saw was  
9 the smaller the particle that the PAH was held on to -- so these are  
10 particles with PAHs on them -- when they were deposited in the lung, a  
11 very small particle had a very short half-life.  
12 So if it was .1 micron, the half-life is approximately less than a minute,  
13 probably 30 seconds; but if it was a very large particle, the half-life  
14 could be more -- much more extensive. So we're talking on the orders  
15 of a month or greater if it was 1000 microns.  
16 Now how might a particle get to be 1000 microns in the lung? Imagine  
17 that -- and what we used to see in tobacco smokers was that you'd get  
18 these agglomerations of tars at the bronchial -- where the bronchia  
19 would split and tars would accumulate, and that makes the particle  
20 much larger and makes absorption from it much smaller.  
21 So the idea is that an exposure even one time can result in a very  
22 prolonged exposure based upon the fact that it comes off a larger  
23 particle much slower.  
24 Then there's the part of how with the amount of deposition, and I'm not  
25 going to go too long in this, but what it really shows is that if you  
26 breathe regularly, you -- regardless of the particle size, this is the  
27 fraction that's collected and deposited in various areas. But if you  
28 breathe a lot faster with a much higher tidal volume, breathing in  
29 deeper, then you're much more effective at collecting particles. So  
30 people who are working harder not only breathe in more air, but they  
31 also deposit much more readily.  
32 So PAHs do absorb on particles. Soot, particularly, so on diesel exhaust  
33 and those types of things, they -- because of their lipophilicity, they are  
34 very much attracted to those soots. But they are also attracted to  
35 concrete particles, and that's been shown in the literature, to a lesser  
36 extent, but still, they're absorbed onto the particles and then deposited  
37 and held in the lungs.  
38 The particles may accumulate in the lung and slow their absorption into

1 the body, and particles may be coughed up, expectorated, spit, or  
2 swallowed, but this, in fact, seems to be more of a detoxification  
3 pathway than an exposure pathway for a complicated reason dealing  
4 with the liver first pass. Okay, you know what I mean, but...  
5 On the other hand, PAHs have known to interact with other exposures.  
6 PCBs and dioxin were found on the site. In fact, the highest ambient  
7 level of dioxin ever measured was measured in the world after 9/11.  
8 Dioxin is known to be used as an enhancer of the carcinogenicity of  
9 some PAHs, so if animals are treated with dioxin, they are more likely to  
10 get tumors than if they're not treated with dioxin and given the  
11 carcinogen.  
12 Silica is something that we haven't mentioned too much, but PAHs are  
13 known to enhance the carcinogenicity of silica exposure. And in this  
14 case, when I'm talking PAHs, I'm really talking smoke. The interaction  
15 seems to be additive or additive plus, and then unlike what John  
16 mentioned, the data that I looked at saw that PAHs, again, smoking,  
17 enhanced the carcinogenicity of asbestos, but at least the studies that I  
18 -- the consensus was that it was multiplicative but I would certainly --  
19 he's much more experienced in this than I am.  
20 So the conclusions that I would make are that exposures to workers to  
21 PAHs within the Ground Zero site was almost certainly higher and  
22 maybe substantially so than was indicated by the majority of exposure  
23 studies. A fuller report of the biological monitoring data is needed to  
24 predict what exposures may have been during the early periods after  
25 9/11 and who may have been at the highest exposures.  
26 The people who are the outliers are the key. If the people who had the  
27 highest levels of 1-hydroxypyrene are the ones who later -- they have  
28 the highest dose, and they may be the ones who are at the highest risk,  
29 and understanding who, not who the outliers are from our point of  
30 view, but what the range of the outliers were and then moving that  
31 back is an extremely important thing, at least in my mind.  
32 And if the effective half-life is 24 hours, then the 1-hydroxypyrene  
33 levels on 9/12 could have been well above the BEI assuming that there  
34 was no exposure, assuming that there was no exposure. Now, that's not  
35 the case. There was exposure afterwards.  
36 The best thing to do would be to model that exposure, and the half-life  
37 would be -- with the curves that were used in the exposure studies.  
38 You'd have to integrate those together. I didn't have the time to do

1                   that, and I -- yeah. It's something that one could do, though. Thank  
2                   you.  
3                   MS. FLYNN: Thank you, Glenn. A quick question. What would the  
4                   exposure metrics be for a 10-year-old child?  
5                   DR. TALASKA: No idea. I'm sorry, I shut it off, and I killed it. I've got it.  
6                   I have no idea.  
7                   MS. FLYNN: Because in general, as I understand it, and maybe Leo could  
8                   comment on this, but children actually take in more air than adults, so I  
9                   wonder --  
10                  DR. TALASKA: Well, again, and you do have to realize that at the fence  
11                  line, they were measuring those exposures and the exposures were  
12                  tending to rise. I can't tell you, but kids weren't inside of Ground Zero,  
13                  okay, so I don't know what the exposure would be because the data are  
14                  so -- but kids tend to breathe more. They have larger surface area  
15                  relative to their body, so they do tend to sometimes take in more  
16                  materials. They do eat things.  
17                  MS. FLYNN: Kids were not inside of Ground Zero, but, we actually, you  
18                  know, do have available -- I'd have to find them on the site, the High  
19                  School Parents Association website, but information that show that on  
20                  days when debris was being dumped on the hazardous debris barge  
21                  outside of the Stuyvesant High School ventilation system, the  
22                  particulate concentrations were comparable to Ground Zero.  
23                  So, I mean, there were lots of -- there was just tremendous potential for  
24                  different kinds of exposures that have not been captured in the data, so  
25                  we just -- this is something that -- I know I sound like a broken record,  
26                  but I think it's really, really important to keep in mind number one,  
27                  number two. Children were caught in the dust cloud in the initial  
28                  collapse cloud, so I don't know if Leo if you want to add anything.  
29                  DR. TALASKA: I didn't look at that. I'll be honest. I was focusing --  
30                  there was more than enough here to cause me to -- so I really didn't  
31                  look at that in a really hard way.  
32                  MS. FLYNN: Can I just make a plea on behalf of the stakeholder  
33                  members of this panel? We actually -- we're not experts and we  
34                  obviously defer to the scientists here, but we're equal members of the  
35                  panel and we know a lot of things because we've been basically engaged  
36                  with, you know, the facts on the ground from the very beginning.  
37                  So if it's possible for us to have in advance the drafts of your  
38                  presentations -- I'm sorry I keep popping my keys -- the drafts of your

1 presentations, that would be tremendously helpful. I know that Susan  
2 Sidel provided extremely valuable information to -- to Virginia Weaver,  
3 and we want -- we didn't want to load you guys up, because we know  
4 that, you know, you're like, you're trying to condense a tremendous  
5 amount of material, but there were times when we actually can bring a  
6 useful perspective and we really appreciate that opportunity.  
7 MS. HUGHES: Also, it seemed like most of the sampling was done at  
8 street level, and if you look at the topography downtown, it's  
9 surrounded by very large skyscrapers. So if the plume actually expands  
10 would the results of the testing might be different higher up? You have  
11 families living in these high rises in very close proximity, so I just  
12 wanted to mention that as an exposure route.  
13 And the second thing is, it wasn't as though the only fire was where the  
14 two towers were. It spread, and you had gas lines feeding -- pardon me  
15 -- but there was gas lines feeding the World Trade Center site. So there  
16 is exposure within the area, and it went on and on and on, so I just  
17 wanted to put that in for the record.  
18 DR. WARD: I suggest -- a suggestion, we are running late, and maybe  
19 we'll take one more comment and then we'll have a 10-minute break  
20 and then resume, because we do have a fixed time when we need to  
21 start the public comments.  
22 DR. MARKOWITZ: So, John, John Dement made a point on discussing  
23 asbestos as there is no known safe threshold. So the question, since  
24 you frame the exposures among the firefighters around the biological  
25 exposure index, what's the relationship between the BEI and cancer risk  
26 for PAHs?  
27 DR. TALASKA: It's not really known. The BEI is based upon specifically  
28 the level that is associated with occupational exposure if you -- and not  
29 with environmental exposure. There wasn't sufficient data to be able to  
30 say that there was any level of -- that was related to disease yet.  
31 There weren't simply enough data there. There are data that shows at  
32 that level since then -- we've put out -- we've done studies showing that  
33 at the level of the BEI of one microgram per liter, there's an increase in  
34 PAH, but we don't know what it is relative to cancer as of yet.  
35 There aren't sufficient data, but -- so that the level was set just so that  
36 it would rule out things like tobacco smoking because you can't get --  
37 smokers don't have levels that are that high, as high as you want. Does  
38 that answer?

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DR. WARD: Okay, we'll take a 10-minute break.

(Recess taken from 2:52 p.m. until 3:12 p.m.)

DR. WARD: Let's start. I think everyone's, virtually everyone's back at the table and we'll start with the presentation by Bill Rom.

**PARTICULATES AND WTC**

DR. ROM: Thank you, Elizabeth. Does Paul have some slides? My task is to talk for five minutes about particles, particulates or particulate matter. My job is to talk about exposure assessment, what were the exposures; second, how bad are these particles, are they really toxic or are they not toxics; and third, what is the evidence for these particles in humans, did they get exposed and how much; and lastly, for gravy, are these particles going to cause cancer, since that's the question we have to address soon.

On this slide you see the particles on the left and then you see the fires on the right. The point I would like to make is that there were two kinds of exposures here, but I don't want to make that point so much as to say that they overlap. This was a fire that was extremely hot, that burned the particles, and we have a particulate exposure that really has never been seen before. This is unique. This is a disaster medicine and these particles really can't be classified basically like coming from the mine or source 'cause they've been altered.

Next slide. So this is a grab sample of the dust particles on the right. This is WTC dust but a third of that dust comes from wallboard. So all this stuff that we're seeing right there. So that's gypsum, and gypsum is calcium sulfate. It's not -- it's what we always call with NIOSH, nuisance dust. We chuckle about that 'cause we wonder what it is. Calcium sulfate is not known to be very toxic; it's mixed in with calcite. Calcite has calcium carbonate and calcium carbonate is not very toxic, but it forms little crystals and when you see it in tissue, can actually be birefringent, and that's important to remember in regard to silica.

Third, there is some cement dust mixed in here and the cement dust is calcium hydroxide. And that is a basic salt and it's alkaline, so we know the pH of this World Trade Center dust was around 11 so it's alkaline and it's irritating. It's irritating to the mucus membranes, to your eyes, to your mouth, to your throat, makes you cough. So is that really something that's going to cause lung disease and cancer?

I had the good fortune of being funded by NIOSH to study trona miners, and trona miners were exposed to a sodium sesquicarbonate that we use for the New York Times and Coke bottles and things like that. And the trona mines are in Wyoming, so I had to go to Cheyenne and have a personal interview and get a medical license, and then spend a couple weeks in Rock Springs and Green River with cowboys, and

1                   they would mine trona.  
2                   So we studied 230 trona miners and we looked at shift studies to see if they would  
3                   have a drop in lung function over shift and any alterations in their breathing, and it  
4                   was really a negative study. So pure trona, sodium sesquicarbonate, is a rather  
5                   benign dust.  
6                   But they all complained of skin itching and dermatitis and irritation, and we got a  
7                   second paper on just trona dermatitis. So that shows you that alkaline dust can  
8                   irritate the mucus membranes. So in its pure form these dusts are rather benign.  
9                   But then you also notice on the left of this slide that a lot of this dust was  
10                  respirable, less than 2.5 microns, that's not mm, it's microns, so there's a lot of  
11                  respirable dust that gets down into the lungs.  
12                  Last week [identifying information redacted] was visiting us at Bellevue, and we spent  
13                  an hour looking at eight lungs that were from open lung biopsies of World Trade  
14                  Center dust exposed people, and we looked for silica and we really didn't see  
15                  birefringent particles sharp and bright like silica, so I'm going to dismiss silica as  
16                  really being a critically important particulate exposure to the workers. And I'll point  
17                  that out by looking at the next slide.  
18                  So we've documented an exposure and now I want to go on to the toxicity of these  
19                  particles. So we had a firefighter who came within the second week of 9/11 to  
20                  Bellevue who was critically short of breath and ended up in the medical ICU, and he  
21                  had bilateral infiltrates and effusions, and we didn't know what he had so he was  
22                  treated with antibiotics and steroids, and was getting better. But since I'm a  
23                  physician-scientist and I'm the boss, I like to yell at my faculty, I said, you need to  
24                  get him consented and do a bronchoscopy, you know, lavage and make a diagnosis.  
25                  So fortunately he agreed to the consent and we were able to get some cells. And  
26                  he had all those red cells on the right, that's acute eosinophilic pneumonia. So he  
27                  had a very unusual disease that may be related to dust exposure. The important  
28                  thing is we got those cells and you can see they're pretty clean. They don't have  
29                  smokers' particles in them, so we sent these cells on the next slide to Victor Roggli  
30                  down at Duke to analyze them for particles. And we said, this is a firefighter  
31                  exposed for two weeks in the Pile, and this is the first lavage, and these are cells  
32                  from his lung and we want to know what particles are down there.  
33                  So first of all, he showed us a fiber, and that's an amosite fiber on the left because  
34                  he did an x-ray dispersive analysis for elements and found iron as well as  
35                  magnesium and silica, and pointed out that that's an eight-micron-long fiber.  
36                  The important thing is it's not coated. It's an uncoated fiber which means it's  
37                  freshly inhaled, which is very unusual. You never see that in asbestos workers  
38                  unless they're from the mines in Quebec.

1                   The middle particle I want to point out to you, is what I think is a really toxic WTC  
2                   particle 'cause that is something that looks like from outer space. I called it fly ash  
3                   particle 'cause it reminds me of a clinker coming out of a coal fire. But I think that's  
4                   a burned particle. And in your packet there's an analysis of particles from the  
5                   Deutsche Bank building, and the analysis shows a lot of these particles are coated  
6                   with other substances from the fire, and that probably enhances the toxicity of  
7                   these particles, so that's a burned particle.  
8                   On the right is what we think is fibrous glass, and you can see it's not parallel on its  
9                   sides. It's probably been exposed to 100 degrees temperature so it's been partially  
10                  burned.  
11                 The fourth thing I want you to look at is on the bottom. There's 305 commercial  
12                 asbestos fibers per ten to the million macrophages. So how much were these  
13                 people exposed to? So in my tenure at the NIH, I lavaged about 500 coal miners  
14                 and asbestos workers and silica exposed workers, and I had to do some normal  
15                 volunteers. So I had eight normal volunteers and they had a mean of 30 asbestos  
16                 fibers per million macrophages. So this firefighter has about ten times the normal  
17                 number of fibers in his macrophages. And the asbestos insulators I would lavage  
18                 would have about a thousand. So he's, you know, just after a couple weeks, he's  
19                 up to a third of the way to what an insulator has in his lung.  
20                 Now, I would say that breathing the air with your nose and your lungs is probably a  
21                 better measurement than the samples that EPA took, and we couldn't find any  
22                 fibers in their samples. So this guy was on the Pile and trying to rescue that -- this  
23                 whatever could be done to save others.  
24                 Next slide. So this is what chrysotile asbestos looks like, and the reason there was  
25                 an amosite particle there, is that in New York, when we put chrysotile asbestos in  
26                 the sprays and on the steel girders, we always threw in about five percent amosite.  
27                 Reasons, I don't know why but they always did that so that's why you find a  
28                 mixture.  
29                 Next slide. So this is from the asbestos insulators and the kind of fibers you  
30                 normally find. That fiber has a coated iron and protein surface and that's what  
31                 those beads look like. So this is a fiber that's been sitting in an insulator for 20 or  
32                 30 or 40 years. And you see the body tries to protect itself by walling off the fiber.  
33                 And the other cells are macrophages, and this is a nonsmoking asbestos insulator,  
34                 and there's no other particles in there. So he's a clean asbestos insulator from  
35                 being nonsmoking, at least. Not clean in terms of fibers.  
36                 Next slide. So **Dr. Selikoff** taught a number of us in this room about asbestos  
37                 insulators, and his very famous study about all of the North American insulators  
38                 showed a five-fold increase of lung cancer and almost 10 percent had

1 mesothelioma.  
2 Next slide. And when I was at the NIH I would spend weekends recruiting patients  
3 for a lavage, and I would sit with [identifying information redacted] at the Baltimore  
4 City Hospital recruiting in study subjects, and he had one of his patients from  
5 Sparrows Point Steel Mill who had silicosis, those are the nodules on the right, and  
6 he also had mesothelioma with the left, if you reverse looking at this patient, with a  
7 big pleural effusion. So mesothelioma is the other disease along with lung cancer  
8 that you get from asbestos. How much asbestos causes mesothelioma, I remember  
9 when I was working for [identifying information redacted] , he had me interview a  
10 55-year-old man with mesothelioma, and he worked in a flower shop in Brooklyn,  
11 and I couldn't figure out any reason he got mesothelioma from flowers. And I  
12 remember that in Tyler, Texas, the flowers came in gunny sacks and maybe the  
13 gunny sacks were used for asbestos. I asked him about gunny sacks, he said I don't  
14 know. I never saw gunny sacks. Then I asked him if he worked in the shipyard, and  
15 he had worked in the Brooklyn Navy yard for one summer in 1942 as a helper, and  
16 had two and a half months of shipyard exposure. So very minimal exposures can  
17 cause this disorder.  
18 Next. The marker for asbestos are pleural plaques, the blue and purple around this  
19 lung are pleural thickenings.  
20 Next slide. And if you have those, Hillerdal in Sweden showed that if you have  
21 pleural plaques, you have a slightly increased risk for lung cancer and an increased  
22 risk for mesothelioma, so this is a marker of your asbestos exposure.  
23 Next slide. And importantly, [identifying information redacted] would take us to  
24 Paterson, New Jersey, where there was an asbestos factory, making fire hoses for  
25 New York, and he followed a hundred men who worked for just two months, from  
26 41 to 45 in this factory, and followed them to the end of the 1970s. And on the  
27 right you can see with the dotted line that 25 years the lung cancer observed rate  
28 increased over the expected, so just for two months of exposure 30 years earlier,  
29 you have an increased risk for lung cancer.  
30 The project that I was involved in was doing lung function on the wives of these  
31 workers. And I did about 300 spirometries showing that they had a reduction in  
32 their spirometry from doing the work clothes washing of their husbands and  
33 hugging them when they came home from work from Paterson's factory. And  
34 among those wives, four of them ended up getting mesothelioma from that  
35 exposure.  
36 Next slide. So Dr. Ward wanted me to go over particles and lung cancer, so the  
37 small burn particles that we have from diesel exhaust have been studied in the  
38 American Cancer Society cohort. The American Cancer Society enrolled over a

1 million adults in 1982 about the risk for cancer. But these people lived in  
2 metropolitan areas throughout the U.S. that had EPA-collected data on particulate  
3 matter of 2.5 microns in size. So almost half of this cohort had data on particulate  
4 exposure through the end of 1998 from 1982.  
5 So in the next slide on the left, you can see the lung cancer mortality. On panel A is  
6 cardiopulmonary mortality; panel B on the lower is lung cancer mortality. The  
7 three circles on the far left are above the line of 1.0 so all three dots are statistically  
8 significant over time for an increased lung cancer mortality of approximately  
9 8 percent from PM(2.5) exposure, which is the burn particles from diesel exhaust.  
10 Next slide. And these are what the particles from diesel exhaust look like in  
11 macrophages from the lung. This is a collection from sputum in children in  
12 England. And these macrophages were looked at under a light microscope and you  
13 see the black particles, particularly in D and E, that are very tiny, less than 2.5  
14 microns.  
15 The next slide, we'll skip and go to the slide after it. These are from families, next  
16 slide, that did not have any smokers in the household and they were on at least a  
17 second level, so they were a little bit away from the street level. And on the slide  
18 on the upper left you'll see a declining FEV-1 in those children as they had  
19 increased numbers of those particles in their macrophages. Next slide. So these  
20 diesel particles cause adverse health effects.  
21 And lastly is cancer. So cancer in the lung starts off as abnormal proliferation and  
22 survival of injured cells in the respiratory epithelium associated with genetic  
23 defects, whether they are specific genes that are up-regulated, down-regulated,  
24 insertions, deletions, mutations, amplifications and so on, that you end up getting a  
25 clone of cancerous cells.  
26 Next slide. And the last point I'll make is that there are now ways to diagnose these  
27 cancers with a blood test. And you can now target proteins in the blood to  
28 diagnose these cancers. On the top in the white are little aptamers, that are  
29 nucleic acids designed to pick out a protein in the blood, and you can make more  
30 than a thousand of those aptamers to pick up specific proteins in the blood.  
31 And next slide. This assay has been looked at in 1300 lung cancer patients and  
32 matched controls, and you can see that a panel of about 13 biomarkers can very  
33 accurately pick out the lung cancers with area under the curve of .9. So in looking  
34 forward at lung cancer and mesothelioma, there are tests at the early and past  
35 research level to identify these people both at risk and of getting the disease. And  
36 this test is about to be commercialized for mesothelioma as the first disease to look  
37 at.  
38 I think that's it.

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DR. WARD: Questions or comments for Dr. Rom?  
(no response)

**METALS, VOCs and WTC**

Okay, is Virginia on the line?

DR. WEAVER (via telephone): Yes, I am.

DR. WARD: Are we ready to...

DR. WEAVER: I am ready. Can you guys hear me if I stay on speaker phone?

DR. WARD: Paul just cautioned me that we only have 14 minutes before the -- before the public presentation -- public comment period. And so why don't we get started and see if we can wrap up your presentation in that time frame and then if necessary, can you come back and we can have questions after the public comment period?

DR. WEAVER: Yes.

DR. WARD: Okay, great.

DR. WEAVER: You have my slides up?

DR. WARD: Yes, we've got the first one up.

DR. WEAVER: So after the title slide, moving to the second slide, I wanted to simply give you some of the thoughts that were going through my mind as I was looking at data related to volatile organic chemicals and metals. And one issue in my mind was the shortest exposure duration that results in a measurable increased risk for cancer, and I've been very happy to hear discussions about increased risk in very short time period. I was not aware. I'm not a cancer expert, and I was not aware about that data, and that's very helpful to us in thinking about risk from exposures that are of -- that occur only when you're actively exposed, which would be the volatile organic chemicals.

The other point that I was thinking about as I prepared these slides are that we are now learning that a steeper exposure rate may result in greater risk, so for the same overall accumulative dose, if you get the exposure faster, the risk may in fact be greater. And so what that means is that the exposure construct for cancer outcome differs from that that's been used in World Trade Center research for pulmonary outcome, so rather than looking at where you were at the time of the collapse and shortly thereafter, we have to think about burning tile, diesel exhaust and carcinogens in dust.

So on the next slide I had simply shown an example of one type of exposure characterization and I know Liz has already showed this type so I'm going to move right on to the next slide on key concepts and questions.

We've already heard that cancer of course varies by time since exposure onset, and so it is the nonsolid tumors that are the ones we could be seeing, even at this point,

1 from World Trade Center exposures but specifically the leukemias. And then a  
2 point that I think others have already made so far is that we have very little data  
3 about chemical mixtures overall, particularly in the World Trade Center yet. This is  
4 a common exposure scenario overall and of course clearly at World Trade Center.  
5 The next slide I simply wanted to show the group 1 and 2A IARC carcinogens that  
6 are in the volatile organic chemical category. I took this from NIOSH's summary. I  
7 want to point your attention to benzene, which has been classically linked to what  
8 we used to call acute myelogenous leukemia but we now call acute nonlymphocytic  
9 leukemia as our ability to analyze these types of cancers has improved.  
10 I also want to point out that there is limited evidence that benzene causes acute  
11 lymphocytic leukemia, chronic lymphocytic leukemia and importantly multiple  
12 myeloma. That is from IARC and it's also supported by a meta-analysis published in  
13 EHP in 2008, again, supporting that. Other VOCs that were of concern from World  
14 Trade Center would include 1, 3-butadiene, which is a combustion product like  
15 benzene, from the Pile and also from diesel exhaust. Again, this has been linked to  
16 leukemia and also non-Hodgkin lymphoma, formaldehyde, nasopharyngeal cancer,  
17 and there's increasing evidence that formaldehyde is linked to leukemia as well.  
18 That's considered strong but not sufficient evidence based on the NIOSH summary  
19 and vinyl chloride. And then I've listed some of the 2A, which are -- Group 1 of  
20 course is known human carcinogens, Group 2A is, I think the categorization is  
21 probable, and it's based on adequate animal data but inadequate or limited human  
22 data.  
23 So in the next slide, the important aspects about exposure to VOCs is that they're  
24 common in combustion products. I think about this a lot in the work I do for the  
25 firefighters union. So you'd think about this from working on the Pile, from the  
26 smoke and exhaust from that, and also diesel exhaust.  
27 In general VOCs, as the name implies, are not persistent in the environment and  
28 they do not accumulate in the body so the exposure duration would have been  
29 while you were actively working on the Pile. But also importantly, these exposures  
30 are associated with some of the shortest latency cancers, ones that we could be  
31 seeing.  
32 Next slide. As far as I can tell, and I'm no expert on World Trade Center exposures,  
33 there are very limited data on VOC measurements. There were grab samples that  
34 were taken on the Pile to try and determine if it was safe for rescue workers to  
35 enter. So Lorber et al noted that when samples showed, quote, extremely high  
36 concentrations of VOCs, end quote, entry was prohibited. I don't have levels about  
37 exactly how high those were. Lorber notes that for a number of the VOCs found  
38 elevated levels outside of Ground Zero but still within restricted zones, and when

1 they used 24-hour samples, which should give a little bit better measure. You  
2 know, generally in a work place we measure eight-hour samples. When they  
3 compared grab samples over four minutes to 24-hour samples, they found that  
4 levels were much, much lower for a number of the VOCs of concern, including ones  
5 from butadiene. However, that was not the case for benzene. The benzene  
6 monitoring showed many more grab samples that were higher and 24-hour  
7 samples that, rather than being a thousand times lower, were about ten times  
8 lower.

9 I'm not sure if I said next slide but I have a separate slide on benzene monitoring.  
10 And on that slide I included the samples for benzene in 24-hour measurements that  
11 were above the detection limit, and so apparently there were only fourteen  
12 24-hour samples that were done for benzene, which doesn't seem like many. Six  
13 were above the detection limit and of those, a few were fairly close to the Agency  
14 for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry intermediate minimal risk level, which  
15 would apply for folks who were working for more than a month, more than 14 days  
16 up to a year.

17 In the conclusion in the Lorber article, which as the data suggests in exposures to  
18 benzene at levels that approach the intermediate MRL were not likely to have  
19 lasted longer than 45 days.

20 There's a few samples from truck drivers, done by my colleagues at Hopkins, that  
21 were not extraordinarily high either. You know, in the low parts per billion  
22 compared to workers are allowed to be exposed a thousand parts per billion.  
23 And I was going to make the point with the text below that the monitoring levels  
24 seem inconsistent with the descriptions and pictures of the site, but I think others  
25 have already made that point more eloquently before me. There is an  
26 inconsistency between monitoring and what was visualized.

27 So in thinking about the potential implications of VOC exposures, in my mind it  
28 would be workers who were on the Pile would be at most risk, and obviously the  
29 longer they worked on the Pile, the more risks they would incur.

30 I was thinking about how much time you would need to work there in order to  
31 have increased or measurable increased risk, and with the understanding that  
32 probably the exposures were much, much higher than any of the monitoring data  
33 that we have. And so I guess it would be a matter of thinking about individuals  
34 near and on the Pile and the length of time that they worked in those capacities  
35 and that would be how we would consider risk relating to VOCs as an important  
36 consideration because this exposure that could be resulting in cancers early on.  
37 And then I'm going to shift gears and talk about metals so that's the next slide.  
38 There are a number of metals that have been associated with carcinogenicity in a

1 variety of different organs. I've listed those for you here, again, from the NIOSH  
2 summary document.

3 On the next slide, I want to step back quickly and thank Susan Sidel for helping me  
4 come up to speed over the course of the weekend on World Trade Center  
5 exposures, and I want to just make a disclaimer that this is totally outside of my  
6 area of expertise so the metals exposure levels are very complex in World Trade  
7 Center. And I tried to, in the next few slides, give you a sense for some of the  
8 concerns but I don't have any kind of a conclusion to the extent that I did for VOC.  
9 So on the next slide, Cahill and colleagues have thought a great deal about the  
10 metals and other exposures generated at the World Trade Center site, and they've  
11 developed an incinerator hypothesis which provides an explanation for the very  
12 fine aerosols that were liberated. And a number -- and just basically it would be  
13 the temperature that would be involved in these very fine aerosols and there were,  
14 his quote, unprecedented levels of several metals. Also, his quote, and this again is  
15 from the very fine aerosol chapter in the American Cancer Society book that Liz had  
16 referred us to, he's commented that the health concerns focus on workers at the  
17 site, as plume lofting protected most of New York City. What I don't know in that  
18 regard is the impact on residential -- residences that were very near the site. I  
19 know others have commented this afternoon on high rises that were right near the  
20 site, so that's something to think about.

21 And the next slide, he comments that some metals, and lists a series occurring at  
22 unprecedented levels in these very fine aerosols, and then goes on to note that  
23 levels dropped off dramatically, even over the course of the month of October and  
24 definitely by the end of May.

25 There are other slides listing a variety of metals that have been found both in dust,  
26 but the concern that dust is present after the fact may not be representative of  
27 what people actually breathed in at the time. I'm told indicating that lead levels do  
28 not appear to be a huge concern.

29 Skipping to the next slide, Lioy's comment. The concern that deposited material  
30 with metals in it could lead to ongoing exposure -- because in contrast to VOCs,  
31 metals are very persistent in the environment. Lioy commented that  
32 concentrations of arsenic and cadmium were relatively low but still in the parts per  
33 million range, so we need to keep that in mind when thinking about dust.

34 Next slide, a little bit of data, some of the small amounts that I found regarding  
35 airborne levels other than in the plume.

36 And then finally metal implications. So the metals data are hard for me to  
37 synthesize in terms of thinking about risk to individual workers. There's been a lot  
38 of characterization of the plume, and I'm not up to speed on all of it at this point,

1 but the thoughts that I have in terms of the metals at this point are the potential  
2 risk for toddlers who spend a lot of time on the floor and do a lot of hand to mouth  
3 activities from persistent metals in dust in residential areas. And then my other  
4 concern is the impact that these metals in dust, these very small particles, being  
5 deposited in the lungs, and I'm wondering, you know, some of these metals do  
6 bioaccumulate. We, you know, lead and cadmium clearly reside in the body and  
7 accumulate but I'm wondering if that very high initial load could change the half-life  
8 of some of these metals in the body, and I'm also wondering about the potential  
9 for interaction with the very high pH, although I don't know that if some materials  
10 that I read commenting that the smaller particle size had a more neutral pH, so I  
11 don't know how significant that concern is. But I did want to mention that.  
12 So that's all I have.

13 DR. WARD: Thank you. Where do we stand on time, Paul?

14 DR. MIDDENDORF: We need to get started.

15 DR. WARD: Okay. We're going to start public comments now and then we'll get  
16 back to Virginia with any questions.

17 **PUBLIC COMMENTS**

18 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay, each of our public commenters has signed up on a first-  
19 come-first-serve basis, and each of them will have up to five minutes to present. I  
20 remind people that it's often surprising how quickly five minutes can go when they  
21 talk about a subject of great importance to you so when you reach four minutes, I'll  
22 let the commenter know that they have one minute remaining, so they can be sure  
23 to make the points that they want to make in that last minute they have.

24 If they get up to five minutes, I'll have to rudely interrupt them and thank them for  
25 their comments. I apologize up front to anyone to whom that happens but we  
26 have to be fair to all of our commenters.

27 We do have one commenter this afternoon who will be on the phone, and just  
28 remind them to keep the phone on mute until I call out their name, and then they  
29 can unmute the phone and they'll have the same five minutes everyone else does.

30 Also want to point out that everyone has the option of submitting written  
31 comments to the docket for this committee. The docket number is 248, and  
32 information on how to submit comments is in the Federal Register Notice; it's also  
33 in the NIOSH docket page, and it should be on our committee web page as well.

34 Lastly, I want to remind our commenters of the redaction policy for public  
35 comments. The policy is stated in the Federal Register Notice for this meeting; it's  
36 also on the committee's web page and it's posted at the registration table if  
37 anybody wants to look at it. And the policy outlines what information will be kept  
38 and what information will be redacted before it's posted to the docket.

1 So when I call your name if you would kindly come up to the podium. We need to  
2 get the microphone up there, wherever it is, handheld mic? Our first speaker is  
3 Micki Siegel de Hernandez.

4 MICKI SIEGEL DE HERNANDEZ: Good afternoon. My name is Micki Siegel de  
5 Hernandez. I'm the Health and Safety Director for the Communications Workers of  
6 America in District 1. Our union represents several different groups of 9/11  
7 responders as well as area workers affected by 9/11 exposures. I'm one of the  
8 designated labor reps on the World Trade Center Health Program Responder  
9 Steering Committee and a member of the World Trade Center Health Program  
10 Survivor Steering Committee and was the sole labor liaison for the EPA World Trade  
11 Center Expert Technical Review Panel.

12 First, regarding adding cancer to the list of World Trade Center-covered conditions,  
13 our union supports that. The time is now and I believe that today's presentations,  
14 thankfully, provide ample support and rationale.

15 Secondly, regarding the research agenda topics, it was good to see such a breadth  
16 of topics suggested by the STAC. We support research on cancer, heart disease and  
17 other chronic conditions, mechanisms of inflammation and disease persistence  
18 which could hopefully lead to more effective treatments, immunological disorders  
19 including autoimmune conditions and nervous system disorders.

20 We would also like community-based participatory research projects involving  
21 affected responders, area workers and residents to be encouraged.

22 While funded research is important, it can't be the sole source of our  
23 understanding of World Trade Center-related disease, and I cannot emphasize  
24 enough the need for improved and continuous disease surveill -- disease and  
25 symptom surveillance in the World Trade Center Health Program. This deserves a  
26 closer look.

27 A couple of examples are headaches, loss of peripheral vision, symptoms which are  
28 nonspecific and can have many causes but are frequently described by responders.  
29 While aerodigestive disorders may be the most common World Trade  
30 Center-related conditions, they are not the only ones. However, if you are not  
31 looking for other illnesses, you will never find them.

32 And then I have some sort of random comments that were taken from the  
33 presentations today regarding exposures. First, in several presentations it was  
34 mentioned that there were no samples that were taken during that critical first  
35 week after the World Trade Center collapse. I think that needs to be revised to say  
36 that no measurements were reported rather than none taken.

37 In a joint statement of the EPA and OSHA on 9/14, they stated that sampling data  
38 for asbestos were below levels of concern, not likely to cause long-term health

1 effects. Christie Whitman's famous statement on 9/17, declared the air and water  
2 safe based on initial sampling. EPA pulled early sampling data from their website,  
3 the New York City Department in Environmental Protection hazmat team was  
4 onsite that first day, took samples that were never reported.  
5 So this is indicative of a stance taken by government agencies that they have stuck  
6 to this day, and in part explains the disconnect between reported sampling, or non-  
7 reports, and actual health effects.  
8 It also, as was discussed in several of the presentations today, it matters what you  
9 sample for, when you sample, where you sample, how you sample and how  
10 samples are analyzed.  
11 This also explains in part the inconsistency with levels being reported as safe and  
12 the health effects. Sampling was not conducted in a consistent or even comparable  
13 way. It was done by several different agencies, much of the sampling was done by  
14 private entities and therefore not in the public record.  
15 I would also argue that a wrong model was used. Individual contaminants were  
16 measured when the World Trade Center dust and fire, the plume from the fire, is a  
17 very complex mixture. There were different standards that were applied that were  
18 not health-based standards, and these were used to make statements about  
19 health; such as the OSHA standards. The PELs are not health standards and they  
20 are also based on 1960s science and knowledge.  
21 Ambient air exposures are also but one part of an individual's exposure. In some of  
22 the articles, there was an article that was distributed about, the **Lioy** article, about  
23 environmental conditions and human exposures at a current post-September 11<sup>th</sup>,  
24 2001, in 2006, --  
25 DR. MIDDENDORF: You have one minute left.  
26 MICKI SIEGEL DE HERNANDEZ: One minute? And in that it said that the second  
27 rain event washed much but not all of the remaining outside settled dust and  
28 smoke away; this is simply not true.  
29 Lastly, the duration of exposures were short-term for many people. This was  
30 repeated in a couple of presentations, the committee should be careful about how  
31 it defines or thinks about short-term exposure, what is known and not known  
32 about exposures.  
33 Is it short-term for responders working up to eight months at Ground Zero for 10-  
34 to 16-hour or more shifts? Is it short-term for responders who continued response  
35 and restoration activities in contaminated areas well after the site was closed? And  
36 you should also know that there is no known end date for any given individual or  
37 for areas since levels of contamination and exposures, particularly in indoor sites,  
38 were not assessed. Thank you.

1 DR. MIDDENDORF: Our next speaker is Bruce Edwards.  
2 BRUCE EDWARDS: Thank you for giving us the opportunity to speak at this  
3 meeting. My name is Bruce Edwards. I am a permanently disabled IBEW Local 3  
4 journeyman electrician. I was asked to work at the Verizon building at 140 West  
5 Street. The building is across Vesey Street from where the North Tower and  
6 Building 5 stood. 140 West Street was severely damaged by falling debris of the  
7 towers on its south side and the collapse of Building 7 to its east.  
8 I arrived at Ground Zero early in the morning of September 14<sup>th</sup>. Our arrival at the  
9 site was delayed due to fear of instability at the site, and we were originally  
10 scheduled to arrive the previous day.  
11 I was employed by an electrical contractor that was known as a Telco contractor,  
12 very knowledgeable in the operations of telephone central offices. We were tasked  
13 with the temporary restoration of electrical power by means of portable  
14 generators. The reason this work was so important was due to the antiquated  
15 underground cabling methods of downtown Manhattan. The Verizon building at  
16 140 West Street was the main path of communications in and out of the Wall  
17 Street business district, and most importantly, the New York Stock Exchange.  
18 The president at the time, George Bush, had ordered Verizon to restore  
19 communications as soon as possible. Due to our efforts, the Stock Exchange was  
20 up and running on Monday September 17<sup>th</sup>, before the opening bell.  
21 We continued working at 140 West to permanize (sic) the temporary work to safety  
22 and then actually repair the building. It was many weeks before Con Ed could get  
23 power to the area at Seven World Trade Center, was the substation, the power  
24 substation, of the area. Our portable generators were needed to operate the  
25 building.  
26 In the first few weeks, we worked 16 to 18 hours per day, seven days a week. And  
27 then as our numbers increased, we went to two shifts, 24 hours a day. As a  
28 supervisor, my responsibility extended to both shifts.  
29 I'm sorry about all the background but I believe that is important to understand  
30 that the reason that I was asked to work there, and believe me, you didn't have to  
31 ask me twice. I felt a bond to the World Trade Center, as my father and brother  
32 had both worked on the construction, and we had been attacked. Nationalism and  
33 patriotism was at an all time high.  
34 Ultimately though, I was a civilian required -- requested to work in a disaster area  
35 with little protection and no knowledge of the long-term problems that could  
36 occur. My original crew on the first day consisted of myself and seven other  
37 electricians, basically an advanced team to lay the groundwork. Within a few days,  
38 we had well over a hundred electricians on site.

1                   Now, if you ask me would I do it again, my first instinct is yes. Like many, I took this  
2                   personally. But in further review, I'm afraid I might not do this because the price I  
3                   paid was steep. In April 2007, I was diagnosed with stage IV, non-Hodgkin's  
4                   lymphoma.  
5                   I spent nearly two years in and out of hospitals for chemotherapy treatments, and  
6                   fortunately I was able to have a stem cell transplant in December 2008. I'm  
7                   currently in remission but remission isn't a cure. I live with the constant thought  
8                   that the next low-grade fever I get is a return of my disease.  
9                   But even then I consider myself lucky because of the original eight, **[identifying**  
10                  **information redacted]** (ph) didn't fair as well. He succumbed to his disease in 2010  
11                  at the age of 50. I was 50 when I was diagnosed also. Now I'm no scientist but I do  
12                  see of our original crew two cancers out of eight. That's a 25-percent disease rate  
13                  in relatively young men.  
14                  I was forced to retire from my career at least ten years early. The financial hit was  
15                  crippling. I had two children in college and practically no money flowing in.  
16                  The next problem was clinical depression from all the problems there. Fortunately,  
17                  with some good doctors, I was able to clear that.  
18                  DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute, please.  
19                  BRUCE EDWARDS: In the time since 9/11, some troubling items have emerged.  
20                  Our government seems to have downplayed, and I use the term graciously, some of  
21                  the conditions at Ground Zero. **[identifying information redacted]** the air is safe  
22                  declaration and the release of some information about the accident exposure. The  
23                  report released around the tenth anniversary showed dioxin levels 1,000 times  
24                  higher than normal, and the highest the EPA has seen. What is especially troubling  
25                  is the sampling began on September 23<sup>rd</sup>. That's almost two weeks after the  
26                  attack.  
27                  The next two months the sampling continued and showed steady decline, so I can  
28                  only imagine what the levels were on day one, or day four for my crew.  
29                  The report from the fire department is also an eye-opener. Here's a segment of the  
30                  population that is generally in good physical condition and well-monitored, and yet  
31                  the cancer levels for those exposed at Ground Zero is well above normal.  
32                  What I have come to learn is that --  
33                  DR. MIDDENDORF: Your time is up --  
34                  BRUCE EDWARDS: Okay. Well.  
35                  UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let him speak.  
36                  BRUCE EDWARDS: I'd just like to let people know here that the cancer rates are  
37                  very high for a young population where normally they would be in an older group.  
38                  And I implore you to add cancer to the bill as the Senate, I should say the Congress,

1 has done with this letter that they sent to you. Thank you.  
2 DR. MIDDENDORF: Our next commenter is on the phone. Rich Dambakly. If you  
3 would unmute and begin your presentation.  
4 RICH DAMBAKLY: Hello?  
5 DR. MIDDENDORF: We can hear you.  
6 RICH DAMBAKLY: Okay. My name is Richard Dambakly. I'm an underground  
7 worker for Verizon, at least I was an underground worker for Verizon. I worked at  
8 Ground Zero from the moment of the disaster, every day for six months straight, 12  
9 to 16 hours a day, no days off.  
10 I developed the World Trade Center cough. And for those of you that are unaware  
11 what this feels like, it's a cough where your chest is exploding out of your body that  
12 doesn't stop.  
13 In March of 2002, it had gotten so bad I had to go to emergency. After being  
14 diagnosed with lymphoma cancer, I started intense chemotherapy treatment that  
15 lasted five months.  
16 Just recently someone mentioned to me that the actor Andy Whitfield from the  
17 television show Spartacus had died from lymphoma, and it was his second  
18 occurrence. And here I am with no CAT scan for three years because I have -- I  
19 can't afford one. I have no medical insurance. How do you think that makes me  
20 feel?  
21 I'm a father of five children, my oldest being 15. My family needs me. I want to be  
22 around to walk my daughters down the aisle and play ball with my son. Should I  
23 become a beggar and maybe raise the money for a CAT scan? Just like our Vietnam  
24 vets, that they were forgotten?  
25 So many have died already from cancer. Their families need help now. This can't  
26 go on. When other countries are in need, we don't waste a minute. Immediately  
27 we send them money. We ask for nothing in return. When President Bush arrived  
28 at Ground Zero, I stood and listened to him speak to us and tell us to stay strong,  
29 stay here, help us, do whatever it takes, whatever you have to do, work any  
30 amount of hours. We need you; we'll be there for you. And we did it, each and  
31 every one of us that stayed strong. Anything we could do in our power. No one  
32 said, I can't help or that's not in my job description. No, we did whatever we were  
33 asked and more. The country needed us and that's all that mattered.  
34 So now that we need the help and when you should be strong for us, instead you're  
35 taking the position that covering us for cancer is not in your job description, and  
36 that's wrong.  
37 On 9/11 terrorists came to our country and were responsible for thousands of  
38 deaths. Don't give them more reason to celebrate by not responding to our

1 country's aid and causing more American lives. Don't allow them more victory than  
2 they already have.

3 We were there when our country needed us, and our country should be there for  
4 us when we need them. God bless all my fellows and other survivors and first  
5 workers in the World Trade. God bless you all. Thank you very much.

6 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you, Mr. Dambakly.

7 Our next commenter is Alex Sanchez.

8 ALEX SANCHEZ: Good afternoon to members of the committee; my name is Alex  
9 Sanchez. This good? I am a 9/11 responder, clean-up worker. On September 11th  
10 I had a very close encounter with terror. I was standing not very far from where  
11 this building is today.

12 On September 13th to March 15, I performed cleanup with other cleanup workers  
13 in the skyscrapers surrounding the pit. Ten buildings in a period of six months.  
14 Twelve-hour days, seven days a week. Some of the buildings I worked in included  
15 1, 2, 3 World Financial Center. I had a ringside seat to what police officers,  
16 firefighters were doing at Ground Zero. When I went past those barricades, as a  
17 citizen, as a New Yorker, I knew what was expected of me.

18 When men and women started getting sick and dying, I also knew what was  
19 expected of me. Since late 2003, early 2004, I've been walking the halls of  
20 Congress alongside many of the men and women who are in this committee and  
21 who are also here today. [identifying information redacted], my mentor, president of  
22 the FealGood Foundation, an officer and a gentleman, paratrooper, United States  
23 Army. We do not leave ours behind. What message are we sending to future  
24 generations and to the international community when we overlook and not  
25 appreciate the work and the efforts of those who served at Ground Zero?

26 Let me give you some facts. Basically you should know these by now.

27 Seventy percent of the men and women who came to Ground Zero are suffering  
28 from lung disease, chronic gastric disease, post traumatic stress disorder. I'll give  
29 you another example.

30 [identifying information redacted]. Both on the same office, Senator Lieberman, two  
31 months later, I asked my assistant director, [identifying information redacted] (ph),  
32 who is this gentleman [identifying information redacted] disintegrated in a period of  
33 two months.

34 We don't need bigger government or smaller government. What we need is  
35 responsible government, government that takes care of the people. Enforce and  
36 enact laws, current laws. I am a single father of an amazing 10-year-old. This is not  
37 the message I want to send to my son, my country cannot get it right. Ten years  
38 down the road cancers are killing the men and women who came to Ground Zero.

1 Exposure science tells us that when you are exposed to high level of toxicity, you  
2 need 15 to 25 years of medical treatment. We only got five. We cannot continue  
3 to play games with human lives. We need to stand up. We need to serve those  
4 who serve our country. We shall never forget and may God bless the United States  
5 of America. Thank you.

6 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you, Mr. Sanchez. Our next commenter is John Feal.  
7 JOHN FEAL: How's everybody doing today? Good? I don't think I need a  
8 microphone. I'll introduce myself when I'm done. This way I can get my five  
9 minutes in.

10 One, I want to thank NIOSH for doing this. I want to thank the STAC committee for  
11 hearing me today.

12 I'm not here to ask you to add cancer to the bill. I'm here to ask you add certain  
13 cancers to the bill. I'm getting a little tired of hearing we need to add cancer to the  
14 bill. You cannot add every cancer to this bill; that's impossible. I get it. I worked  
15 on this bill for eight years, more than most people in this room. But there are  
16 cancers, unequivocally, undoubtedly, that need to be added to this bill yesterday.  
17 I am never the smartest man in the room and I'm not even the smartest man at this  
18 podium probably, but it doesn't take a scientist or a doctor to know that 9/11 and  
19 its toxins have caused these blood cancers.

20 For years when we walked the halls of Congress, we were applauded for the way  
21 we approached Congress to get this bill passed. And when we were lobbying to get  
22 that bill passed, we were lobbying to get cancer added to that bill. But during the  
23 negotiations, that was taken from us. But I am going to use the same zest and the  
24 same energy to help get those certain cancers added to this bill. I will occupy  
25 Ground Zero. Don't worry about Occupy Wall Street. I will do whatever it takes  
26 because at the end of the day, I care about human life. I don't care about what  
27 you're having for dinner, I don't want to go to your house for coffee. I care about  
28 human life. I care about adding cancer, certain cancers, to this bill.

29 And as for epidemiology, let that not be your only role model. Epidemiology can  
30 only do so much, like the cancers that we know that should be added, use  
31 epidemiology on that. 9/11's unprecedented. It never happened before. So use  
32 something else other than an epidemiology. And believe me, I can't even spell the  
33 word, that's how smart I am not. Okay? So I'm asking you guys, with power comes  
34 responsibility. You have a responsibility today, tomorrow and from this day  
35 forward to do what is morally right.

36 I just came from a press conference at City Hall, and I almost threw up on myself  
37 listening to people who do not know what they're talking about. But appreciate  
38 the magnitude of this 'cause I do. I lost half a foot ten years ago. Eleven weeks in

1 the hospital. I'm lucky but I feel guilty that I can go to Sheelar (ph) and say I want  
2 to apply for the Zadroga bill 'cause I lost half my foot. Boohoo. Say that to  
3 **[identifying information redacted]**, who have leukemia and blood cancers. That  
4 should be added yesterday. You're playing God right now. Our fate is in your  
5 hands.  
6 I am the nicest guy in the world. I want to be your friends. But like I told every  
7 member of Congress and every member of the Senate when I met them for eight  
8 years with this bill, I will do whatever it takes to get cancer added to this bill. Thank  
9 you.  
10 DR. MIDDENDORF: The document which you handed out to the committee  
11 members will be added part of the docket. Just wanted to let you know that but it  
12 may be redacted to some extent. We'll have to look further.  
13 JOHN FEAL: Do what you please with it.  
14 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay, our next commenter is T.J. Gilmartin.  
15 T.J. GILMARTIN: Good afternoon. My name is T.J. Gilmartin, and I'm 32 years as a  
16 foreman and a shop steward building high rises in New York City with the union.  
17 Now, I had to go to so many OSHA classes for these high rises of stuff they taught  
18 us was cancerous and, you know, don't do this, don't do that. Everything,  
19 everything I been taught to and told is dangerous and cancer-causing is being  
20 thrown out the window on this World Trade Center. I mean, I know what goes into  
21 building a high rise and one thing that was -- and the Trade Center was built prior  
22 to 1973, when the asbestos was in the pipes, it was in the cement, it was the  
23 silicosis, the heavy metals, the chemicals and the PCBs.  
24 Does anybody know about those electrical vaults in the basements of those trade  
25 centers? You know that's totally cancer-causing chemicals inside those -- the vaults  
26 and the transformers? Okay? All that was there and we never hear of anything.  
27 Anything about any of that.  
28 I mean, all this stuff is concern -- is confirmed as a federal cancer-causing  
29 chemicals. The building was totally filled with all these chemicals. The fire  
30 department, the PDA have done studies showing that their men are dying a lot  
31 more than they are usually dying fighting fires.  
32 I mean, OSHA would lock me up if I was -- if I was grinding concrete on a high rise  
33 and that powder, if I didn't have a battery-operated respirator, I'd be locked up by  
34 OSHA, either thrown in jail or fined for having my men do that. I mean, you had  
35 220 stories of pulverized concrete besides everything else that, God forbid, was  
36 going to happen in another nine years with the asbestos, with that 20-year lag  
37 time.  
38 It's been over ten years since the World Trade Center was destroyed, and that's

1                   been a time so many first responders have paid with their lives. The percentage is  
2                   out of whack compared to how many first responders just tried to help their fellow  
3                   man. It seems to me that this is all about the money. I mean, I understand that  
4                   you'll have everybody claiming that they got cancer from World Trade Center but  
5                   like John said, there were certain cancers from the ears, nose, -- I mean, your  
6                   mouth, your nose or absorption that should be covered by this.  
7                   But it's -- you know, I mean, that's basically what I have to say. I mean, just that I  
8                   been in the business of high rises and I know what causes cancer on these things  
9                   and, you know, you put up a high rise, OSHA's there, you're doing it, you know,  
10                  you're in a lot of trouble if you do it that way. Everything that could get you cancer  
11                  on a new high rise was all down at the Trade Center, and it was a lot worse because  
12                  it was built before 1973 when the world was changed. Thank you.  
13                  DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much, Mr. Gilmartin.  
14                  Our next commenter is Thomas Fay.  
15                  THOMAS FAY: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Is this the speaker here?  
16                  My name is Thomas Fay, and I come from a town at the Jersey shore called Spring  
17                  Lake, New Jersey. On September 11<sup>th</sup> I was getting my wisdom teeth pulled; and  
18                  the planes hit the building and I raced home and proceeded to watch on television  
19                  for about 36 hours. And after the 36 hours, I couldn't take it anymore so being a  
20                  volunteer fireman for over 37 years in the Spring Lake fire company in Spring Lake,  
21                  New Jersey, I decided to go get my gear, jump in my car and race to New York. I  
22                  got there in 50 minutes, which is unprecedented.  
23                  I was directed down to the south end of the city and parked my car on 14<sup>th</sup> Street  
24                  and I walked in. Two other firemen drove by this desolated area of lower  
25                  Manhattan and picked me up. I never knew them before but I know them now.  
26                  Both are very sick.  
27                  They drove me down and they went out to get a camera that day to take pictures. I  
28                  didn't want any pictures taken of me that day; I was there to work, not to have any  
29                  pictures taken. But lo and behold, they took two pictures of me and those two  
30                  pictures ended up being the proof that I needed to show that I was there.  
31                  The disease that I contracted from my 12 hours working on the south tower pile,  
32                  solely on September 13<sup>th</sup>, was non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, stage II, B-cell aggressive.  
33                  The way that was found in me was that I, in 2007, after the disaster, a friend  
34                  advised me that I needed to go get checked out at the World Trade Center medical  
35                  monitoring treatment program they had at Rutgers, which I did.  
36                  I went in 2007, 2008, and in 2009, I noticed a lump in my left leg. I showed it to  
37                  [identifying information redacted] out there. She said you've got to go to New York  
38                  City, Mt. Sinai immediately. Within a week the tumor was taken out. Four days

1 later I was told that I have cancer.  
2 I fought the battle brave and hard. I'm in remission now which is a good thing, but  
3 for people like us that went up there and put our time in, I being a volunteer, I was  
4 paid nothing, I would go again tomorrow because of one thing: I love my country.  
5 That's it, pure and simple.  
6 Being a guy from the Jersey shore, a popular person everyone knows who comes  
7 from down there is Bruce Springsteen. He has a new album out. And he has a song  
8 on it called, *We Take Care of Our Own*. That's the theme song for us first  
9 responders. We want our government to take care of us.  
10 We went in there. We fought hard. I worked 12 hours on that burning pile. If I fell  
11 once, I would have been cut to shreds. But that wasn't on my mind that day. On  
12 my mind that day was to help as many people as I could. That's why I joined the  
13 fire department, to help people. I didn't join the fire department to get cancer.  
14 My cancer's in remission but as of Monday, a recent trip to the doctor, has shown  
15 that I now have skin cancer. I'll fight that battle on my own and take care of that as  
16 I should. But it is my hope that this -- people here, grouped here today, do the  
17 right thing, which is to include blood cancers in the Zadroga bill. Thank you very  
18 much for your time.  
19 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much, Mr. Fay. Our next commenter is Arthur  
20 Noonan.  
21 ARTHUR NOONAN: Hello. My name is Arthur Noonan, retired now but back in  
22 September 17<sup>th</sup>, 2011, I was employed by the Chicago Fire Department. As the last  
23 speaker, we were watching on television nonstop at the firehouse. Finally we  
24 couldn't take it anymore, we saw what a devastating effect this had on the country  
25 as well as to New York, and we decided to come here. I believe there was a group  
26 of 14 of us. We flew in and we spent seven days working here.  
27 I was a pretty healthy guy as well as the rest of the people that came with me. A  
28 lot of young firemen from Chicago, good firemen, and we did everything from  
29 cleaning tools and changing blades and batteries in the tool shed, until we finally  
30 got to work on the actual Pile. Some days we would cut aluminum off of steel  
31 beams so the iron workers could cut the beams in sizes small enough to fit on the  
32 trucks to haul them away.  
33 Eventually we got to work on the Pile. You'd start at the back of the Pile, there  
34 might be a hundred firemen in front of you. You'd pass buckets forward empty,  
35 and backwards full. Finally you'd get up to the point where you were the one that  
36 was digging. You'd be on your hands and knees; what respirators we had didn't  
37 work, they kept clogging up or from the sweat would just turn like a mud on there.  
38 We finally had to take those off. But you kept working because you knew your

1 brother firefighters, policemen and many loved ones of civilians who were also in  
2 that Pile. And all we wanted to do was try to close a part of life for a lot of people.  
3 In December 2004, I became ill at work, was taken to the hospital. Thought I had a  
4 bad touch of the flu; everyone was sick in the firehouse then. It was the day before  
5 Christmas Eve. They let me go home for Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, I had to  
6 come back the following week, and I was diagnosed with AML, acute myelogenous  
7 leukemia.  
8 I went from 210 pounds to about 140 pounds in six months, had several chemo  
9 treatments, and luckily I am now in remission. But remission is not getting better.  
10 It just means they're holding you steady so every day you hear something on the  
11 radio, whether it be a celebrity or sports figure, just recently we had a famous  
12 singer die of leukemia. Every time you hear that word leukemia, it all comes back  
13 to you.  
14 When we came to New York, we did it on our own. We did not expect to get  
15 anything for it. We just wanted to help our country. We wanted to show the world  
16 the support that New York and the United States, how they all come together in a  
17 time of need.  
18 Personally I have taken a tremendous loss on my medical benefits. I've gone  
19 through about three-quarters of what I'm entitled to in my lifetime for myself and  
20 my wife and if this comes back, I probably only have a few hundred thousand  
21 dollars left in my medical plan from the City for treatment. After that, I don't know  
22 what I'll do.  
23 So I'm hoping that cancers, certain cancers, will be included in this so people that  
24 came to help do not have to have that constant worry in their mind if their cancer  
25 comes back, they won't be able to get any treatment. Thank you.  
26 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much. John Walcott.  
27 JOHN WALCOTT: Hi. My name is retired detective John Walcott. Like everyone  
28 else here, I'd like to thank you for this opportunity.  
29 I also was diagnosed at 38 with AML leukemia. As I stand here in front of you I've  
30 had six months of chemotherapy, stem cell transplant, and I have other illnesses  
31 that are recognized in the Zadroga Act. But looks are deceiving. All my nerve  
32 endings are burnt out all my -- in my hands and my feet. There's not a day that  
33 goes by I'm not in constant pain.  
34 The City retired me due to my leukemia, which they said I got from 9/11. Social  
35 Security recognized it. It seems that only the country doesn't recognize it.  
36 Before 9/11, I was approximately 36 years old. I was never sick a day in my life  
37 except for the common cold. I was a very extremely active narcotics detective, well  
38 over 3500 arrests in my career involved in. I was a high school hockey coach. Used

1 to do physical activity, lift, run every day. No longer can do any of that. I was on  
2 the fast track to probably becoming a hockey coach in college. We had an  
3 exceptional team, exceptional record and I turned down many jobs which I planned  
4 to take when I retired. Which, that's been cut short.  
5 On 9/11 itself I wasn't scheduled to work 'til late that evening. I was told what  
6 happened, I was woken up, and I was down there in 93. So without hesitation, I  
7 ran right down there to help my fellow detectives or policemen at the time. Shortly  
8 after the second tower had collapsed, I arrived.  
9 Did -- from recovering bodies, body parts, to Mayor Giuliani even assigned us one  
10 day to VIP tours for all his friends. So I've done everything, cut steel. You weren't a  
11 policeman when you were down there; you were just somebody trying to help.  
12 As I told you before I had the transplant and everything else.  
13 Well, you know, let's talk a little bit why we're down here. We all know that the  
14 benzene and asbestos and all over cancer carcinogens were down there. That's no  
15 secret. I mean, that's been for a hundred years. We don't know what they do if  
16 you mix them all together nor do I think anybody really cares because if they did, it  
17 wouldn't have taken us ten years to get to this point.  
18 We know there's a usually high number of early responders that are diagnosed  
19 with cancer. Yet no one seems particularly interested in trying to corroborate any  
20 of these findings at the site, at the cancer rate. The large population of responders  
21 and workers are being looked at, which I think you guys are doing a study of over  
22 50,000 people. But I think that study's wrong. I think you should study guys and  
23 girls and everybody who was down there the first day, first week, first month. And  
24 if we do that, you're going to see that the 362 PBA Study, that rate is going to be  
25 astronomical. It's probably going to be in your 60s to 70 percent of cancer rate.  
26 There's many reasons. We all know there's many reasons why the City's and the  
27 country's not releasing these numbers. Because they're doing you a 50,000  
28 population rather than a 2500 to 5,000 population. So that statistics are going to  
29 be extremely less and it's not going to prove cancer. But if you did, if there was  
30 actually 2500 to 4,000 that were down there the first week, day or month, it's going  
31 to be astronomical. And then the red flag is going to be up.  
32 But when there's litigation going on and there's hearings about to happen, what do  
33 we do? We have to make the numbers look bad because the City kind of painted  
34 themselves in a corner right now with this.  
35 DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute left, please.  
36 JOHN WALCOTT: Okay. You know, I think that's where we need to concentrate.  
37 We have to concentrate on -- let's concentrate on 2500 to the 3,000 that were  
38 down there versus that. I don't -- there's a part of me that envies you folks and

1                   there's a part of me that doesn't envy you folks. You have to make a tough  
2                   decision. But luckily for you folks you have ten years and weeks of hearings to  
3                   make this decision.  
4                   I had a phone call and I had to rush down. Now I'm sick, my daughter'll never see  
5                   me walk her down the aisle. I can put my head on my pillow and go to sleep at  
6                   night knowing I did something that in the recovery that meant closure for people.  
7                   You folks have that same power now. Twenty years from now if the cancer isn't  
8                   added, and my grandchildren, that I'll never see or hear, do you say you made the  
9                   right mistake? Did you make the right decision? Thank you.  
10                  DR. MIDDENDORF: The next commenter is Reginald Hilaire.  
11                  REGINALD HILAIRE: Hi. Good afternoon. I'm a police officer with the NYPD for 11  
12                  years. I was a rookie when 9/11 happened. I'm currently assigned to PSA 5, which  
13                  is a housing precinct up in East Harlem. I worked over 850 hours combined at the  
14                  World Trade Center and Sandman Landfill.  
15                  In 2005, shortly after my son was born I was diagnosed with thyroid cancer. I  
16                  immediately asked my primary care physician if this was related. He said, he looks  
17                  at my lump and said, what were you exposed to down there? I've seen him since  
18                  1999, before I became a cop. So 2005, I had total thyroidectomy, radiation and  
19                  ever since then I take a pill, a synthroid, and it regulates my thyroid.  
20                  Winter of 2005, I go back to my primary care physician, he noticed my blood count  
21                  was pretty low. He refers me to a hematologist and that hematologist does a bone  
22                  marrow biopsy, and he comes back and he says, the pathology report -- I disagree  
23                  with the pathology because it says you have multiple myeloma but I disagree.  
24                  You're too young to have this. He repeats it in 2006, it comes back multiple  
25                  myeloma. He's still confused.  
26                  I go -- I sent everything to Sloan-Kettering. They do another biopsy, bone marrow  
27                  biopsy, April 2006. They confirmed it. I thought okay, great, treat it. No, we can't  
28                  treat you because you have smoldering multiple myeloma, early stages. So I'm like,  
29                  is there anything out there for me? No, you can't -- there's nothing. We have to  
30                  wait until it gets worse in order to treat you. He says within two to three years, you  
31                  have 50, 60-percent chance of it getting worse.  
32                  Thankfully every four months now I go to Sloan-Kettering, they do blood work,  
33                  urine work, and if I get the phone call, that means it's not good. So far, knock on  
34                  wood, everything's okay.  
35                  I have no family history of cancer. I'm pretty much the healthiest one. I am a son  
36                  of Haitian immigrants. I am the only member of my family that's a police officer. I  
37                  was born and raised here, still work here in Harlem. I can't retire because, even  
38                  though I'm not really sure if I want to, but I can't retire because I'm not sick enough

1 so it's an oxymoron right there.  
2 I have two red cancers. I don't -- I work with a lot of cops in PSA 5. I don't know  
3 why I have it. It's just one of those things I've come to accept it. In 2006 I read an  
4 article in the Post saying that there's other first responders with cancer. I  
5 contacted that reporter who introduced me to one detective who has lymphoma.  
6 He introduces me to others. I got to know about 11, and I'm pretty close to about  
7 four of them. Three of them have multiple myeloma. I never met them before in  
8 my life.  
9 I met one police officer through the PDA who (unintelligible) I did. His name was  
10 **[identifying information redacted]** (ph); he had (unintelligible) cancer. We got to talk  
11 for about a year and then he eventually died in 2010. So I always think about him,  
12 think about his family, I'm still close to his widow.  
13 I don't -- I'm not a scientist; I'm just a cop, I just want to do my job. I think a lot of  
14 us want to do our jobs. I don't think it's coincidence. I never met these people  
15 before in my life.  
16 Someone asked me before if they had to do it again. I, like I said, I'm still with the  
17 NYPD. I'm doing clerical work. I'm pretty now senior now. If it happens, again, and  
18 I'm pretty sure it would, would I do it again? Would I tell my junior cops to go? I  
19 don't know. I love New York City, I love the people here. I'm not fond of the  
20 government. They showed so careless without a doubt.  
21 What's really insulting, I could deal with cancer, I could deal with questions, how  
22 you doing. As a New Yorker, how you doing could mean ten different things. How  
23 you doing or in my case, so how are you doing?  
24 DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute, please.  
25 REGINALD HILAIRE: What I can't stand is politicians, everybody can say, okay,  
26 great, great job; you're heroes but when it comes to treating us, hold back. It's just  
27 too early to step up the study; it's not there yet.  
28 I try to tell the cops in my precinct get yourself checked out. They look at me. We  
29 can handle perps, we can handle perps with guns, we can even handle bosses that  
30 are rough. We can't handle our own mortality.  
31 So I urge all of you, just like us, when they call us heroes, all of you can be heroes  
32 by just saying, adding cancer. You will save lives by putting cancer in the bill  
33 because it will tell first responders to get checked out. You don't know how much  
34 of a difference you guys will make if you add cancers. You will tell somebody with  
35 the public -- when the report comes out, that one person would say maybe I will  
36 get checked out. That can make a difference. Thank you very much.  
37 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much.  
38 Next presenter is R.J. Lee.

1 R.J. LEE: I do want to thank the committee for giving people the opportunity to  
2 testify. I've been asked on behalf of the Policemen's Benevolence Association to  
3 speak on their behalf about the composition of the World Trade Center dust and  
4 some analysis we recently did on the uniform of one Officer Harris.  
5 By way of background, R.J. Lee group worked in New York City for about four years  
6 following the disaster, characterizing, analyzing and characterizing samples of  
7 World Trade Center dust and exposures and things like that.  
8 Today I want to talk about Officer Harris. Laboratory testing of Officer Harris's  
9 clothing worn on the morning of September 11<sup>th</sup>, clearly demonstrates the  
10 presence of what's now referred to as World Trade Center dust. And you can see  
11 the uniform on the first slide that he was wearing that day.  
12 Fortunately, almost by, I don't know what fate, Officer Harris had the presence of  
13 mind to go home that morning and double bag his clothes so we have a virgin  
14 sample of World Trade Center dust. One that hadn't sat out in the rain, whatever,  
15 for months, and one that you could look at as it was created.  
16 As you can see from what's called the World Trade Center well, the World Trade  
17 Center dust is a unique mixture of heavy metals, asbestos, fine cement dust and  
18 chemicals produced by burning, including PCBs, dioxins and furans. The chemical  
19 species found in WTC, chemical and physical species, found in World Trade Center  
20 dust can cause many harmful effects on the body including effects on the nervous  
21 system, kidneys and cancer.  
22 It's, as you've heard it's widely believed that there's been an insufficient amount of  
23 time to assess the potential for increased cancer risk. However, I believe there's  
24 certainly reason to assume that the acute exposure experienced by first responders  
25 are significant and unique.  
26 There are a number of factors to be considered that could play a role in increased  
27 cancer risk to individuals and the potential for more rapid progression than you  
28 would expect.  
29 First of all, the initial dose, acute exposure was enormous.  
30 Next slide? This is the dust we found on Officer Harris's clothing. You'll note that in  
31 something like two or three hours, about 59,000 structures per centimeter squared  
32 had been deposited on his clothes. Chromium was at 347 micrograms per foot  
33 square. That's a lot in a two or three-hour exposure. If you put that cast an  
34 imaginary membrane through the breathing zone, you can translate that kind of  
35 deposition rate into exposures and they're large.  
36 There's an abundance of respirable particles in the dust, far more than ordinary.  
37 What's interesting, and one of the prior speakers mentioned it, in the analysis we  
38 did of these hundred thousand samples, and including Officer Harris, many of them

1 were coated. The asbestos was coated with lead; the asbestos was coated with  
2 mercury. The machines don't analyze for dioxins in the electron microscope but  
3 obviously dioxins and PCBs were there.  
4 DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute, please.  
5 R.J. LEE: The presence of dust on Officer Harris's uniform clearly demonstrates that  
6 the first responders were exposed to extreme conditions. There was reason to  
7 believe that you could postulate a model in which the dust carried, the caustic  
8 cement dust, carried toxins and those toxins and that interaction of the pH 11 or 12  
9 cement dust could well interact with the lungs and deliver toxins much more  
10 rapidly than believed possible.  
11 I think it's important on behalf of the PBA to say that given the service of the first  
12 responders that we've heard about today and the trauma they're going through,  
13 that any potential disease that could be covered should be covered on their behalf.  
14 And secondly the information they're seeking from the City and the government  
15 should be released anonymously so that it can be used scientifically. With that I  
16 thank you.  
17 DR. MIDDENDORF: Our last commenter is Philip Landrigan.  
18 PHILIP LANDRIGAN: Good afternoon, Madam Chairman. I'm Philip Landrigan, I'm a  
19 physician and occupational doctor. Chairman of the Department of Preventive  
20 Medicine, Dean for Global Health at Mt. Sinai School of Medicine. For six years I  
21 directed the Division of Surveillance Hazard Evaluations and Field Study at NIOSH,  
22 so in other words for those six years, 1979 to 1985, I directed the National  
23 Occupational Epidemiology Program for the United States of America. So we, we  
24 know for a certainty from multiple lines of evidence, that you've heard a great deal  
25 of data here today, and I thought that testimony presented just now about the  
26 contaminated police uniform was striking. We know that the responders to 9/11  
27 were exposed to a complex mix of known and suspect human carcinogens. We  
28 know that the air sampling data that were collected undercount the true level of  
29 contamination. I think the testimony just heard substantiates that, but it stands to  
30 logic anyway that there were no sampling units extant in the first hours and days  
31 after the attack when the concentrations were highest, so we know that the  
32 responders were, especially those who were caught in the dust cloud, were  
33 exposed to unprecedentedly high levels of airborne contaminants.  
34 Now, our group at the Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, in partnership with people at  
35 UMBNJ, Stony Brook, Queens College, North Shore LOIJ and Bellevue have just  
36 completed an epidemiologic analysis based on approximately 20,000 responders,  
37 and we looked specifically at cancer in them. This is an analysis that follows on our  
38 earlier studies showing persistence of lung disease and mental health problems and

1 GERD in the responders.  
2 I'm not going to present great detail because it's going to be submitted for  
3 publication in the next couple or three days, but I am going to give you a broad  
4 sketch of the findings.  
5 Overall we found approximately a 14-percent excess in cancer at all sites combined  
6 in this population, and we found statistically significant excesses of thyroid,  
7 prostate and hematolymphatic, hematolymphopoietic cancers, in this population.  
8 In broad outline our findings parallel the findings that were released on  
9 September 10th of this year, that they would present from the fire department.  
10 It's, I think, the 14-percent excess in overall cancer is striking given that in this  
11 population, we had a 58 prevalent -- 58-percent prevalence of never smokers, and  
12 we had sharp deficits for lung cancer and laryngeal cancer and yet despite those  
13 deficits in some of the most common cancers, we had an overall excess incidence  
14 of cancer in the population. These are striking findings.  
15 Going back to your taxonomy this morning of the straw poll, I think we've reached  
16 a point where, to use Steve Markowitz's phrase, we can say with a high degree of  
17 certainty that the exposures that the responders experienced down there at  
18 Ground Zero, and at the other World Trade Center sites, can be said to -- we can  
19 reasonably anticipate that those exposures are going to cause cancer.  
20 So I think, I think it puts you in a very difficult policies (sic), but you clearly don't  
21 have the kind of epidemiologic proof that you would like to have to declare with  
22 95 percent certainty that there's a cause and effect relationship here. We're not  
23 going to be there for some time yet. But you have to bear in mind that in legal  
24 cases, you don't have to get to 95 percent; you have to get to 51 percent. It has to  
25 be more likely than not that the exposure caused the disease. And I think we're at,  
26 or very close to that point.  
27 And what I'd like to ask you as members of this committee to weigh that as you  
28 make your decision. Thank you.  
29 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much, Dr. Landrigan.  
30 You have about 15 minutes left.  
31 DR. DEMENT (via telephone): This is John Dement. I'm going to have to leave the  
32 meeting so I just want to make that note.  
33 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay. Thank you very much.  
34 DR. WARD: So Virginia, are you still on the line?  
35 DR. WEAVER (via telephone): Yes, I am.  
36 DR. WARD: So I did want to give the committee an opportunity if they had any  
37 questions or comments on Virginia's presentation.  
38 (no response)

1 DR. WARD: Okay, so --  
2 DR. TALASKA: Oh, I have one question, if I may. I have one question.  
3 DR. WEAVER: Okay.  
4 DR. TALASKA: You mentioned a statement early on when you were talking about  
5 the VOCs, about that when the levels became, quote, extremely high, that people  
6 were removed from the area. And I just have to ask was the concern -- you know if  
7 the concern for that was because of explosion?  
8 DR. WEAVER: I don't know.  
9 DR. TALASKA: Didn't say it in the paper.  
10 DR. WEAVER: I don't think so but I was reading seriously in the last week and I  
11 could have missed it, and perhaps others on the committee who spent more time  
12 with these data could weigh in.  
13 DR. TALASKA: Thank you, though.  
14 DR. MARKOWITZ: So I have another question for Virginia. So in your experience  
15 working with firefighters from previous studies, how common is it to find benzene  
16 at fires?  
17 DR. WEAVER: It's extraordinarily common. We often use data that's now rather  
18 old but still very valid about the components, the VOCs in smoke; and in one study  
19 conducted by Harvard, benzene was present in about 92 percent of smoke samples  
20 obtained. And it's routinely found at levels well above the OSHA panel. Butadiene  
21 is also very common as a combustion product.  
22 DR. HARRISON: This is not really a question for Virginia, just maybe an observation  
23 and a prelude to further discussion that we'll have. I guess I haven't heard anything  
24 from the presentations today that would lead me to understand that there was a  
25 minimum dose or duration of exposure that we could identify from the knowledge  
26 that we have to draw a line.  
27 I think it gets, you know, back to maybe something that, Liz, you presented earlier  
28 about latency and duration of exposure. I guess I just would throw that out there  
29 just for an observation, that we really don't have, based on the limited amount of  
30 exposure data, you know, that we have from the site, the fact that it wasn't  
31 captured in the first several days, a way to define a minimum length or vocation  
32 related to the occurrence of cancer.  
33 DR. WARD: So there is one question for Dr. Landrigan.  
34 DR. MIDDENDORF: Yes, well, there was one question.  
35 DR. WARD: Is he still there? Dr. Landrigan?  
36 Okay, so would someone like to ask a question of Dr. Landrigan?  
37 DR. TALASKA: Thanks for coming back, Phil.  
38 DR. LANDRIGAN: No problem.

1 DR. TALASKA: I was wondering if you had done any analysis on the subset of  
2 people who were on the Pile early on relative to the whole group.

3 DR. LANDRIGAN: Yeah, we tried to do that. We certainly, in our previous paper  
4 that you've probably seen, the one that was published in September in Lancet, we  
5 saw a very clear gradients in most diseases according to intensity of exposure.  
6 The people who were caught in the cloud had the highest rates of pretty much  
7 every disease we looked at; the people who arrived in the first 48 hours but missed  
8 the cloud were the second highest, and then on down through several more  
9 gradations. We saw that for most types of lung disease, most mental health  
10 problems, for GERD. It was not so striking for cancer. And it may be because of  
11 smaller numbers of cases. Thank you. That's it? Yeah, thank you.

#### 12 **DISCUSSION ON PRESENTATIONS**

13 DR. WARD: So, I guess we're close to the end of our day. And I guess one, it was  
14 suggested earlier that maybe we look separately at the question of biologic  
15 plausibility and the likelihood of cancer but I think one of the issues I'm struggling  
16 with, and I don't know if other members of the committee are struggling with it,  
17 too, is that we are -- whatever opinion we come to, we do have to define a  
18 scientific rationale, and I know that in a lot of the presentations this morning, you  
19 know, it would be more possible to build a scientific rationale around upper  
20 respiratory cancer, lung cancer, esophageal cancer, areas of the body where we  
21 know that there was direct contact with the carcinogenic substances and we know  
22 that there have been other kind of health effects, but I think the difficulties we, we  
23 don't -- I mean, I guess, and maybe **Dr. Landrigan's** study will help with that but  
24 with the hematologic cancers and the lymphomas, we don't as yet, I think, have  
25 strong epidemiologic evidence, and I'm not sure we have, you know, an exposure --  
26 you know, we have a strong argument in terms of biologic plausibility, and I guess --  
27 so the argument about -- I think we can say that, you know, it's in shorter -- it's  
28 observed that they have a shorter latency period but in terms of -- so I guess what  
29 I'm seeking is, are that -- do people have thoughts on that. How should we  
30 approach the question of the blood cancers given that that seems to be something  
31 that people are highly concerned about? Excuse me? Does anyone care to  
32 comment on that?

33 DR. WEAVER: So this is Virginia, and you know, blood cancers are the ones that  
34 based on latency alone, we could be seeing now from World Trade Center  
35 exposures. You know, ten years out, those would be the first wave of cancers that  
36 you would see. Those are also caused, or closely connected, with a number of the  
37 VOCs. And if you look at VOCs in combustion products, they ask -- there are a  
38 number. So you have an exposure mixture going on there. And so from that point

1 of view, I can see the biological plausibility and that being an initial concern.  
2 DR. ROM: I think by definition, volatile means volatile, that these compounds  
3 probably were very high, right at the beginning with the burning of all the fuels,  
4 and they evaporated into the air and they weren't measured, and exposures were  
5 probably way higher than any of the standards so that it's biologically plausible that  
6 you're going to see non-Hodgkin's, Hodgkin's lymphomas and the acute leukemias,  
7 acute myelogenous or non-lymphatic leukemia and probably chronic myelogenous  
8 leukemia. I think the ALL and CLL are different biologies, and that may be  
9 something totally different 'cause ALL is in children and CLL is in the elderly  
10 associated with a lot of genetic mutation defects. But the others, and multiple  
11 myeloma, I would add, probably all are very biologically plausible at this time.  
12 DR. MARKOWITZ: Also the firefighters study in fact was positive for non-Hodgkin's  
13 lymphoma. It showed a relative risk of 1.58 -- and actually whether you use the  
14 corrected one, which tries to take account of the surveillance issue or not, it  
15 showed a 50- to 60-percent increase when compared to the general population of  
16 men, and when they looked at it compared to the firefighters who hadn't been  
17 exposed, it was still elevated; it was 80- to 90-percent increase. Not statistically  
18 significant at that point because the numbers are smaller, but when it was  
19 compared to the general population it was elevated and that was statistically  
20 significant, so there was real epidemiologic evidence that blood cancer was  
21 increased.  
22 DR. TALASKA: I think we might want to look more, too, at some of the other  
23 compounds that we haven't really spent any time with: the furans, the dioxins;  
24 what sort of impact they have, both animals and -- in animal studies for the most  
25 part, to see if there is a link between those -- or perhaps an interaction between  
26 those. And I don't think anyone has looked at those as hard as maybe we should.  
27 DR. ALDRICH: (Indiscernible) the document that's not biological plausibility  
28 (indiscernible). Mesothelioma sometime in the distant future and probably lung  
29 cancer in a little bit less distant future, relative to the asbestos exposure. It's hard  
30 to quantify but certainly potentially a factor.  
31 The fire department study did not show an increase in lung cancer; it actually  
32 showed a decrease in lung cancer possibly related to the health worker effect, but  
33 that was seven years of study, and that was probably too early to see the effects.  
34 DR. WARD: So I guess I'm getting a sense. I know some people have not spoken  
35 very much today but the sense of the comments I'm getting is that many people on  
36 the committee feel that it is certainly biologically plausible that we would be seeing  
37 some cancers in excess, either now or in the future, and I guess the question is, is  
38 there someone who wants to state, you know, make a statement -- or are there

1 people who would like to speak to the question who have not spoken on it? Or we  
2 can go back to the, you know, the poll, but I guess I'm just trying to get a sense of  
3 the committee, of where we stand at this point. Time, again, so we can think about  
4 how we want to frame the discussion tomorrow in the maximal -- you know, in a  
5 productive way. Valerie?

6 MS. DABAS: Just from my observation, I understand that the latency period for  
7 blood cancers is short. I think we get into a very funny situation when we start  
8 piecemealing each part out. Both the fire study and Mt. Sinai seem to indicate that  
9 thyroid and prostate, they're seeing increases, and so if we start going by what is  
10 easiest and not looking at the whole picture, then I think we may start asking too --  
11 well, I guess you can't ask too many questions but then it gets very confusing.  
12 For me, I've seen, you know, from taking information from responders, I've seen an  
13 increase in thyroid, I've seen an increase in prostate. I was told that, you know,  
14 thyroid is common, prostate is common, but when we look at the ages people are  
15 being diagnosed, it's very uncommon for a 38-year-old man to even be tested for  
16 prostate cancer, so when they come up with prostate cancer, I think it's significant.  
17 I also have seen an increase -- you know, how do you deal, then, with the blood  
18 and liver canc -- kidney cancers that we're seeing? Liver cancers with people that  
19 are not hepatitis C and do not have cirrhosis of the liver. You know, we had four  
20 cases reported in that instance and, you know, so you have to really look at the  
21 whole picture as opposed to just saying well, the blood cancers are a four-to-six  
22 year latency period, we're at four to six years. If that's the case, that's just  
23 assuming that the dust is the same exposure as we've seen with all these other  
24 studies, and I don't think these studies take into effect the concentration of  
25 chemicals, metals and so forth, and we keep saying the dust is different than  
26 anything that we've seen before, and therefore I think we have to treat it different.

27 MR. CASSIDY: I just wanted to add that I think it's clear that we need to remember  
28 what was highlighted today, which is that this type of exposure to the variety of  
29 different things, the concrete, the dust, the metals, the benzene, all the chemicals,  
30 really hasn't been -- we haven't seen that anywhere before so when you want to  
31 start breaking down studies and say well, exposure to benzene means this. When  
32 you add them all together, you really have a toxic stew that, I think, is so  
33 biologically plausible to say that blood cancers and these other cancers are a result  
34 of that exposure, and I do think the severity of the exposure, you know, bears out  
35 clearly that, you know, those who were caught in the dust, in the cloud, in the  
36 collapse, those who were there in the 48 hours, those who spent extensive times  
37 there, clearly have a more likely coming down with these cancers, but I think it's  
38 biologically plausible that anyone that was subject to this is going to have an

1 increased rate of cancer so that my view now, given everything that I've heard, is  
2 that that cancer should be included.

3 We need a better mic system.

4 DR. HARRISON: Steve, this is Bob Harrison. Were you saying that we should  
5 recommend that all cancers be covered regardless of site?

6 MR. CASSIDY: I'm sorry? I think to say all is a broad statement; it really is. But I  
7 think that clearly the blood cancers, which are showing up early, I think anything  
8 related to the lungs, the respiratory system, anything that you can possibly inhale,  
9 so the esophageal cancers. You know, the fire department study proves that  
10 firefighters lost 12 years' lung capacity in the blink of an eye. That can't be  
11 dismissed as -- if that didn't exist people would say well, maybe this dust cloud  
12 really isn't going to do anything to us. But it proved what happened. Twelve years  
13 lung capacity, so to say all? I'm not saying all but I think we should err on the side  
14 of, if there's any evidence, we should err on that side.

15 MS. FLYNN: I really appreciated [identifying information redacted] comments, and I  
16 just want to say that I think that this is obviously not a deliberation that should use,  
17 you know, scientific certainty; this has been said before.

18 As his basis, he talked about a 51-percent of, you know, using the phrase that Steve  
19 Markowitz used earlier: We can reasonably anticipate that these cancers are linked  
20 to World Trade Center exposures, and right now that sounds pretty right to me.  
21 I also want to add that the community cannot be left out of this deliberation, and  
22 also that the James Zadroga Act, and I can provide pages to folks if they want them,  
23 provides for one list of World Trade Center-covered conditions.

24 And we all know as erratic and full of gaps as the sampling information was on the  
25 Pile, you know, how much more is not known about community exposures. But  
26 what we do know is that members of the community, residents, students and area  
27 workers have the same respiratory and the same set of aerodigestive 9/11-related  
28 illnesses as responders, and it's more than reasonable to anticipate that they would  
29 develop the same set of cancers.

30 MS. HUGHES: I also just wanted to -- I'm not a biology expert, but I did go online  
31 and if we could break the body down into different body systems, like respiratory,  
32 and then look at the different things that could be impacted, so it is not just  
33 necessarily the lungs but it's the throat, so we're looking at a comprehensively wide  
34 body system so I just wanted to add that as well.

35 **ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES AND ADJOURN**

36 DR. WARD: So we do need to leave the building shortly. So again I'm trying to sum  
37 up the sense that I'm getting. It seems that many people are in favor of listing at  
38 least some cancers of some systems as World Trade Center-related conditions, so I



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CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER  
STATE OF GEORGIA  
COUNTY OF FULTON

I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Master Court Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the above and foregoing on the day of February 15, 2012; and it is a true and accurate transcript of the proceedings captioned herein.

I further certify that I am neither related to nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor have any interest in the cause named herein.

WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 9th day of March, 2012.

---

STEVEN RAY GREEN, CCR, CVR-CM-M, PNSC  
CERTIFIED MERIT MASTER COURT REPORTER  
CERTIFICATE NUMBER: A-2102

This verbatim transcript of the WTC Health Program Scientific/Technical Advisory Committee, Committee Meeting held in New York City on February 15-16, 2012, has been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a), and personally identifiable information has been redacted as necessary.

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**THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE  
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION  
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH**

convenes

MEETING TWO

WORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH PROGRAM

SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

VOL. II

DAY TWO

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2012

Jacob K. Javits Federal Building  
26 Federal Plaza New York, NY

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The verbatim transcript of the  
Meeting of the Scientific/Technical Advisory  
Committee held at the Jacob K. Javits Federal  
Building, New York, New York, on February 16, 2012.

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February 16, 2012

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### TRANSCRIPT LEGEND

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In the following transcript: a dash (--) indicates an unintentional or purposeful interruption of a sentence. An ellipsis (. . .) indicates halting speech or an unfinished sentence in dialogue or omission(s) of word(s) when reading written material.

-- (sic) denotes an incorrect usage or pronunciation of a word which is transcribed in its original form as reported.

-- (phonetically) indicates a phonetic spelling of the word if no confirmation of the correct spelling is available.

-- "uh-huh" represents an affirmative response, and "uh-uh" represents a negative response.

-- "\*" denotes a spelling based on phonetics, without reference available.

-- (inaudible)/ (unintelligible) signifies speaker failure, usually failure to use a microphone.

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2

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25 Kimberly Flynn,

26 Co-Founder, Director, 9/11 Environmental Action

27 Catherine McVay Hughes

28 Vice Chairman, Community Board 1 World Trade Center Redevelopment

29 Committee, Lower Manhattan World Trade Center Redevelopment, New York City.

30 Susan Sidel, J.D.

31 Resident of New York City and volunteer WTC responder.

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Senior Scientist

CDC/NIOSH/Office of the Director

Cincinnati, Ohio

P R O C E E D I N G S

(8:36 a.m.)

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**COMMITTEE BUSINESS**

DR. WARD: Okay, we're going to get started and call the meeting to order, starting with Paul doing the roll call.

DR. MIDDENDORF: If the members around the table would just state their name for the record, that would be great.

MS. HUGHES: Catherine McVay Hughes. Hello? Catherine Hughes.

DR. ROM: Bill Rom.

DR. QUINT: Julia Quint.

MS. MEJIA: Guillermina Mejia.

MS. SIDEL: Susan Sidel.

DR. WARD: Elizabeth Ward.

DR. HARRISON: Bob Harrison.

DR. ALDRICH: Tom Aldrich.

DR. TALASKA: Glenn Talaska.

DR. NORTH: Carol North.

DR. MARKOWITZ: Steven Markowitz. Steven Markowitz.

DR. MIDDENDORF: And then on the phone we have anyone?

DR. DEMENT (via telephone): John Dement.

DR. MIDDENDORF: I heard John Dement. Did I hear Virginia also?

DR. WEAVER (via telephone): Yes.

DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay. Thank you very much. Let me also point out since we're in a different room we do have different evacuation routes. The easiest way to get out of here is to go through the double center doors over here, to my left and in the back of the room, you go straight through the next set of glass doors and immediately turn to your left, and the fire exit is marked on a door down that hallway. In case we need to evacuate, that's where we need to go.

DR. WARD: Okay, so we have a short time before we start the public comments, and we'd like to ask Dori Reissman to speak to us about the question that was raised yesterday regarding the language in the Zadroga Act.

DR. REISSMAN: Good morning, everyone. So I'm Dori Reissman, I'm the medical director for the World Trade Center Health Program. And what I wanted to try and do for you was to clarify, I think, the questions that I heard yesterday regarding whether or not there are certain criteria that you need to meet within this committee in order to make a recommendation regarding cancer. So what I wanted to clarify was that in the Zadroga legislation, the following quote is: World Trade Center-related health condition means a condition that is an illness

1 or health condition for which exposure to airborne toxins, any other hazard or any  
2 other adverse condition resulting from the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks, based  
3 on an examination by a medical professional with experience in treating or  
4 diagnosing the health conditions included in the applicable list of the World Trade  
5 Center-related health conditions, is substantially likely -- this is the part that really  
6 should catch your ear -- is substantially likely to be a significant factor in  
7 aggravating, contributing to or causing the illness or health condition as  
8 determined.

9 Now what this means, that quote specifically refers to the job of the clinician in the  
10 program to individually assess somebody's exposure and disease relationship. It is  
11 not your charge. Your charge -- the only language actually in the statute about  
12 your charge had to do with the administrator's discretion to request input from  
13 you, advice from you, as to whether to include cancers or type of cancers in the list  
14 of covered conditions.

15 Once that list is established, which we already do have quite a number of  
16 conditions there, then the clinician within the program can assess the individual's  
17 exposure disease relationship for that individual's determination. Okay?

18 What the administrator asked you to do, and charged the committee very  
19 specifically, was to give him a scientific basis for your recommendation. That didn't  
20 restrict you to any definition of what the scientific basis meant. So I wanted to be  
21 very clear about that.

22 Yesterday I heard a variety of interpretations of what that could be. Some of it is  
23 reasonable, I think, was a word that you used. One of them was more likely than  
24 not. Whatever it is that you decide, you need to use those criteria along with how  
25 you're scientifically arriving at your recommendation. Does that answer the  
26 question?

27 DR. WARD: Are there any questions for Dori? Yes, Glenn. John, you have a  
28 question as well?

29 DR. DEMENT: I didn't check but I (indiscernible).

30 DR. TALASKA: So we can take -- from what you understand, then we can decide  
31 what level of recommendation to make to the administrator about the disorders  
32 that we're considering.

33 I just wanted to be absolutely clear. It's up to the committee then to set the  
34 strength of recommendation to the administrator as to what we feel is the  
35 relationship between the exposure and the disease then, right? And the condition?

36 DR. REISSMAN: Yes, you can comment on what you believe the strength to be.

37 DR. TALASKA: Yeah.

38 DR. REISSMAN: And if you feel that there are criteria that you'd like to see

1 continued to be used, you can make a statement about that as well.  
2 DR. TALASKA: Gotcha, okay.  
3 DR. REISSMAN: Do I need to repeat anything since this microphone was not on?  
4 Or are we good? Okay, thank you.  
5 DR. WARD: Okay, so were there any questions from the committee members  
6 joining us by phone?  
7 DR. WEAVER: So, we couldn't hear that, or at least I couldn't hear it.  
8 DR. WARD: Okay, so we'll ask Dori to repeat that.  
9 DR. MIDDENDORF: We don't have time.  
10 DR. WARD: Well, we don't have time for the whole thing but maybe she'll give us a  
11 quick summary.  
12 DR. REISSMAN: I'm sorry about that for the people on the phone, I thought it was  
13 on. The bottom line was yesterday in the meeting there was a question about a  
14 specific criterion for scientific relationship between a health condition and an  
15 exposure, and it was a specific quote of the health condition or the exposure is  
16 substantially likely to be a significant factor in aggravating, contributing to or  
17 causing the illness or health condition.  
18 And what I was saying to the committee here was that that is for an individual  
19 clinical assessment of exposure disease relationships. That is not your charge.  
20 Your charge is simply to look at whether you think cancer or a type of cancer is  
21 appropriate to add to the list whereby a clinician can then apply that criteria of  
22 substantially likelihood test, if you will, to that individual clinical assessment. And  
23 the criteria that you can use are up to you; it could be more likely than not, it could  
24 be reasonable, it could be whatever words you choose but the advice that you give  
25 to the administrator needs to have a scientific basis and rationale.  
26 **PUBLIC COMMENTS**  
27 DR. WARD: Well, I'll turn it over to Paul for the public comment period.  
28 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay. Thank you. I want to point out that each of our  
29 commenters is signed up on a first-come first-serve basis, and each of them will  
30 have up to five minutes to present.  
31 I want to remind our commenters that it's often surprising how quickly five minutes  
32 can go by when you're talking about a subject of great importance to you. So at  
33 four minutes I will let the commenter know that they have one minute remaining  
34 so they can make sure that they have the opportunity to make the most important  
35 points and make sure they get that across to the committee. If they have not  
36 finished at five minutes, I will have to rudely interrupt them and thank them for  
37 their comments. I apologize up front to anyone to whom that occurs but we must  
38 do that to be fair to all of our commenters.

1 We do have several commenters who are on the phone, and I just want to remind  
2 them that they should keep their phone on mute until I call their name. Then they  
3 should unmute and make their comments; and again, I will give them a warning  
4 when there's one minute left and let them know when their five minutes is ended.  
5 Also I want to point out to everyone that you do have the option of submitting  
6 written comments to the docket to this committee. The docket number is 248, and  
7 you can find the instructions on how to get to the docket in the Federal Register  
8 Notice, it's on our committee web page, it's also on the NIOSH docket page.  
9 Lastly, I want to remind our commenters about the redaction policy for public  
10 comments. That policy is also published in the Federal Register Notice; it is on the  
11 committee web page and also the registration in the back here, if you want to look  
12 at that.  
13 So, with that we will go to our first commenter who is on the telephone, Jeffrey  
14 Stroehlein.  
15 JEFFREY STROEHLEIN: Hello, I'm right here.  
16 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay, can you go ahead and start?  
17 JEFFREY STROEHLEIN: Yes. I'm Jeff Stroehlein, retired New York City fireman,  
18 May 9, 2011. On September 11, 2001, the United States and the world was struck  
19 with an incredible, terrible tragedy. Two planes crashed into both towers of the  
20 World Trade Center. The loss of life on that day was incredible. It would affect the  
21 lives of many as the world watched in horror.  
22 I'm here to represent firefighters and first responders with the after-effects of that  
23 day, the cancer that has followed in the 9/11 path. On March 16, 2011, my life was  
24 regular: go to work, hustle the kids around, pay bills, enjoy family life when time  
25 was available, as we both worked and tried to mix our schedules so we could have  
26 one of us with the kids and pass some length of times.  
27 The problem was that for about ten to 14 days I was having headaches. I'm pretty  
28 tolerant of pain and not a guy who gets sick a lot. My wife had had enough and on  
29 March 17, St. Patrick's Day, earlier I was at the doctor's office. My wife then  
30 convinced the doctor to send me for an MRI. She's in the nursing field.  
31 Later that day the doctor called and said he wanted to see us. My wife knew that  
32 wasn't good news and we headed right to North Shore Hospital.  
33 The next day, March 18, 2011, I was in surgery getting a brain biopsy. Our world  
34 would change as I was diagnosed with large-mass brain lymphoma (indiscernible)  
35 CNS lymphoma.  
36 My head had been cut open and I had ten staples in my head as I was medicated  
37 for pain. As I got my senses back and was given terrible news of my cancer  
38 diagnosis, I did not sit and cry and feel sorry for myself. The first thing I told my

1 wife was I will not lose to cancer. Then for my three children and my little girl who  
2 turned four the next day on March 19<sup>th</sup>, I would not be there to celebrate as I lay in  
3 the hospital bed. This was just a start as we decided to transfer to Sloan-Kettering  
4 Hospital.  
5 It was in that time there was much to do in case the worst would happen and I was  
6 to pass on. We needed a healthcare proxy, a will and a power of attorney. But  
7 when (indiscernible) support there was absolutely no help from FDNY as far as  
8 what to do. It felt like our world had just been turned upside-down. I would not  
9 lose any of my spirit as I would fight the fight. I would stay positive through all my  
10 chemo treatments, and I have no plans of anything different. The side effects have  
11 been no bargain. As much as I have told you about me, this isn't about me; it's  
12 about us, the first responders, who are still being diagnosed with cancer ten and a  
13 half years later. I am the voice for all first responders.  
14 FDNY doctor, [identifying information redacted], did a study the first seven years  
15 after 9/11 and cancer was at 19-percent higher rate in (indiscernible) responders  
16 than those who weren't there. That's just firemen.  
17 I was diagnosed in the ninth year after 9/11 and still hear of first responders being  
18 diagnosed with cancer every week. My stats and others are not even in the 19-  
19 percent stat. The percentage is higher than that and still growing. Although sad,  
20 there will be more first responders diagnosed with cancer.  
21 All FDNY vehicles that responded to 9/11 were loaded with dust and debris. They  
22 all went back to their firehouses uncleaned. Now the firehouse was contaminated.  
23 Where was a fireman's gear after his day on the Pile? Uncleaned and back in the  
24 firehouse.  
25 Ten and a half years ago -- I'm sorry, all FDNY members were ordered on the chart  
26 down to the pit and clean-up. There were so many contaminants, poisons in the  
27 air, two airplanes disappeared, glass, computers, desks, jet fuel and even human  
28 body parts were in the air that day for months and who knows how long after. As  
29 my friend [identifying information redacted] would say, for any of those toxins  
30 individually in a bottle, and it would have a skull and crossbones, with a do not  
31 inhale. These were many unknown amount of toxins. In the early stages the city  
32 was unprepared with little paper painting sheetrock masks. Twenty minutes of  
33 breathing and moisture, and the mask would be torn open over your mouth.  
34 Later we were told the air was safe to breathe. Why would you give out masks if  
35 the air was safe to breathe? Many lung and breathing problems have occurred.  
36 Many in first responders. How is cancer not caused? Are the people who make  
37 this decision blind? None of them were on the Pile, no politicians were digging on  
38 the Pile.

1 Ten and a half years ago, FDNY, police officers and all the first responders were  
2 getting pats on the back and 'atta-boys as politicians praised them. They couldn't  
3 do enough for them.  
4 DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute, please.  
5 JEFFREY STROEHLEIN: Now you can turn your back and deny, deny, deny. Cancer  
6 cannot be caused from all these toxins of 9/11? There is no doubt cancer was in  
7 the air on 9/11. I speak for all first responders but mostly FDNY as that's where I  
8 worked. As more and more first responders die of cancer every week, something  
9 must be done. I will not be one of the first responders who loses his fight with  
10 cancer. Thanks for all my support and my wife, my family's, and to (indiscernible)  
11 162, many other firehouses and the FDNY and all my friends. I'll be here fighting  
12 the fight. God bless.  
13 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you, Mr. Stroehlein.  
14 Our next commenter is Jim Melius.  
15 DR. JIM MELIUS: Mic working okay? I have a head cold, my ears are plugged up so  
16 hard to tell. Anyway, good morning everybody on the panel, everybody here. I'd  
17 like to thank Dori who saved me about three minutes by going over some of the  
18 same territory and now I don't have to go into long definitions as much.  
19 What I'd like to comment on this morning is what your task is here, and I think it's  
20 very important to recognize it's not the usual review of a carcinogen, what would  
21 be done by IARC or NTP or some regulatory agency. Rather, you're being asked to  
22 make a determination whether a medical condition should be added to the list of  
23 World Trade Center medical conditions.  
24 That list is going to be used to determine whether or not people in this program  
25 will be treated for that medical condition, but only after a physician determines  
26 that that patient has that condition, the definition that -- criteria that Dr. Reissman  
27 just spelled out, and that that condition for that particular patient is World Trade  
28 Center-related. And even after that physician makes that determination, that will  
29 then be reviewed by someone at NIOSH and following a, you know, some sort of a  
30 standard pattern of criteria so there's -- there will be consistency in that  
31 certification process.  
32 And this kind of setup was deliberately put in place in the legislation, this sort of  
33 two-step process: one, there would be a list of medical conditions; secondly, there  
34 would then be an application of a physician diagnosis determining whether or not  
35 for that particular patient, their condition was related to their World Trade Center  
36 exposures.  
37 Because, and I think it's sort of obvious that you cannot expect a panel such as  
38 yours to make a determination for every single person, every single circumstances.

1 This is a complicated situation, you're going to be look at -- you covered much of  
2 this yesterday that came up; it's a complex exposure, many carcinogens in it, it's  
3 not very well documented in terms of levels of exposure, many different types of  
4 work that went on. There's a high rate of respiratory and other illnesses that don't  
5 really track with the exposure measurements that were made, at least  
6 quantitatively. You have a limited time of follow-up so a full determination on  
7 what will be the disease experience for this population will go on for many years,  
8 20, 30 years.

9 However, you know, Congress didn't ask -- expect you or the administrator to wait  
10 20 or 30 years. They actually asked for an annual review of whether or not cancer  
11 was a World Trade Center-related condition and a determination and a report to be  
12 made on that by the administrator. And I think it's -- as you look at this evidence  
13 and make your scientific and medical evaluation of that evidence, I think it's  
14 important to put that in that context. You're making a determination on really  
15 whether or not a condition'll be covered for medical treatment in this program.  
16 And I think as we heard yesterday, we'll probably hear more tomorrow, that  
17 determination has significant consequences for the people in the program. We  
18 don't have a perfect healthcare system and as all of us -- you know, and many of  
19 you experience daily is that coverage is limited for many people, and there's an  
20 economic and personal hardship for people if this isn't covered. And that that  
21 should be -- the context should be simply is this -- should this be added? Should  
22 there be coverage provided given the process that's in place.

23 I think it's obvious you shouldn't -- you know, you're not going to be adding a  
24 condition that it's not possible for a physician to make that determination based on  
25 the evidence or something, so there's some rationale to it.

26 DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute.

27 DR. JIM MELIUS: I know I have one minute, yeah, to go, but at the same time I  
28 think it's a much different level of evidence than you would require for a IARC  
29 carcinogen or whatever, and it's hard; it's even hard for me, I know, thinking about  
30 this, I think possible-probable, I can of certain types of evidence. You know, and so  
31 forth that I think you have to think about this and approach this differently.

32 Finally just briefly I want to say one piece of advice I think -- and I appreciate the  
33 public comment period, I appreciate you adding more time. I think we're hoping  
34 for next time to be able to have some more convenient times for people coming in.  
35 The committee that I chair we do -- we allow people ten minutes, and we do that  
36 and, you know, sometimes people go on long but it's not for people like me 'cause I  
37 can probably try to tighten up what I say and get it in five minutes, but for the  
38 people that are affected by the program they need -- they really do, many of them

1 do need more time to explain. They don't know what you're looking for and it  
2 really does help them. And I'll end there.

3 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much. Our next commenter will be Michael  
4 Barasch.

5 MICHAEL BARASCH: Good morning everybody and thank you for the opportunity  
6 to speak this morning, and thank you for your time and volunteering on this  
7 committee. I'm an attorney and I'm with the firm of Barasch and McGarry. I'm  
8 proud to say that my firm represented Jimmy Zadroga, and we currently represent  
9 his little daughter and father. We've represented thousands of rescue workers at  
10 the first victim compensation fund in the subsequent years after, and currently  
11 thousands who are now in treatment and hoping to apply to the new victim  
12 compensation fund.

13 I'm very familiar with the respiratory illnesses sustained by the Ground Zero  
14 workers and for better or worse I get calls every day from guys and women  
15 afflicted with cancer.

16 This morning I have brought with me three of my clients. They have asked me to  
17 speak on their behalf. First, **[identifying information redacted]**, would you stand up,  
18 please? **[identifying information redacted]**. On September 11<sup>th</sup> John was 44 years  
19 old, living in Staten Island and an active member of the Ladder 103 in Brooklyn. He  
20 responded to the attacks and worked over 300 hours on the Pile. His boat from  
21 Staten Island that morning was one of the first to arrive as the towers fell. His  
22 group of firefighters dug out **[identifying information redacted]**, who was one of the  
23 few to survive the buildings' collapses.

24 Prior to September 11<sup>th</sup> John was very healthy and a nonsmoker. He currently  
25 suffers from chronic bronchitis, chronic cough and last September -- I'm sorry,  
26 September of 2010, he was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.

27 He wants me to say that the cancer has taken an enormous psychological toll on his  
28 wife, his 11- and 13-year-old daughters, who have watched him sick and go through  
29 chemo. He's most scared of course of not knowing whether he'll be there to see  
30 his daughters grow up.

31 He wants you to know that notwithstanding his illness he's proud of his service and  
32 would do it all over again.

33 **[identifying information redacted]**. **[identifying information redacted]**? On  
34 September 11<sup>th</sup>, **[identifying information redacted]** was 47 years old and had retired  
35 three months beforehand. He had worked for the FDNY Engine 23 in Midtown.  
36 Selflessly he responded to the attacks before the first building collapsed, and he  
37 worked hundreds of hours at the Pile.

38 He's currently suffering severe reflux and leukemia and being treated at

1 Sloan-Kettering. Prior to September 11th, he was very healthy and a nonsmoker.  
2 He has a wife and two daughters, and he wants you to know that he, too, would do  
3 it all over again.  
4 And [identifying information redacted]. On September 11<sup>th</sup>, [identifying information  
5 redacted] was 43 years old and an active member of Ladder 172 in Brooklyn. He  
6 responded to the attacks and worked 45 days on the Pile. Last year [identifying  
7 information redacted] was diagnosed with lung cancer. Recently he was devastated  
8 by the news that the cancer has spread to his brain and his spine. He knows that  
9 the chances of him being alive in five years are less than two percent, and prior to  
10 September 11<sup>th</sup>, he was a healthy individual and a nonsmoker.  
11 Look, we all recognize that the risk of adding cancers to the victim compensation  
12 fund and to the treatment program are real. It will reduce the money available for  
13 care, treatment and compensation available to those who are suffering from  
14 respiratory illnesses which are already accepted as illnesses caused by the Trade  
15 Center dust. On the other hand, to wait another five years for indisputable proof of  
16 causal connection means that many of the rescue workers in this room or listening  
17 from their offices and homes, will not live to see the benefit of what seems to be a  
18 foregone and logical conclusion. With all due respect, I'd like to suggest that this  
19 committee accept what some of the experts, such as [identifying information  
20 redacted] and Prezant have opined. To wit, there is a high degree of certain that  
21 toxic dust exposure has and/or will cause cancer.  
22 DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute, please.  
23 MICHAEL BARASCH: I submit that at this time, at least for the rescue workers who  
24 were on the Pile, you should recommend immediately that the respiratory cancers,  
25 esophageal cancer, the blood cancers, thyroid and prostate cancers be recognized  
26 as being caused by the toxic World Trade Center exposures. Thank you.  
27 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much. Ask our next commenter to come up,  
28 David Howley.  
29 DAVID HOWLEY: That's an act to follow, good lord. Okay. Well, I'm going to be, I  
30 guess, the first police officer; I mean, everybody else was a fireman. Good  
31 morning, everybody. My name is David Howley, and I'm retired from the New York  
32 City Police Department.  
33 A lot of this stuff is covered so I'm not going to try to make you hear all the same  
34 things, you know, two and three and four times, however many times people speak  
35 today. So I'm going to try to make this personal for you guys at your level, what  
36 you guys have to think about.  
37 So the first thing is just real briefly about me. In 2006 after retiring, I was  
38 diagnosed with squamous cell, head and neck cancer. From that point on, first

1 oncologist told me basically I was dead and didn't know enough to die yet, and  
2 that's a true statement and you can look at my wife's face back there and I'm sure  
3 it's registering horror. The next doctor wanted to, because they didn't know where  
4 the primary was, because squamous cell only shows up with PET scans, they didn't  
5 know where the primary was; they couldn't find it. So next doctor wanted to cut  
6 me up into little pieces to try to find, and do biopsies everywhere, to try to find  
7 where this thing was 'cause it didn't show up. I've had two strokes and I was  
8 overdosed on chemotherapy once and almost died from that, too. Basically my  
9 doctors now call me the miracle patient 'cause none of them thought I'd be here.  
10 So, okay, well, I am and we're moving forward and we go from here. So let's put  
11 this in your guys' ballpark. You guys have been given a responsibility that should  
12 never have been put in your doorstep in the first place. There's no question about  
13 that. Cancer should have been in the original law. Congress people were told it  
14 should have been put in the original law, and they refused to do it. Why? God only  
15 knows about that one. But so here you are.  
16 So you have to make the determination not only about the facts that are in front of  
17 you, which as the good lawyer said, you can't do with a hundred percent certainty  
18 because this kind of stuff, and a lot of you I know are doctors and researchers, and  
19 you're used to dealing with long studies and drawn out, clean sterile environments,  
20 you guys are used to working with them. Many of you are that I know. You don't  
21 have that here. You're not going to have that here; it's never going to happen,  
22 because the disaster itself was at such magnitude that there's nothing for you folks  
23 to compare it to. This is all brand new. Nothing of this size, scope, amount of  
24 concrete, glass, steel, toxins, dust, office equipment and everything else has  
25 never -- then burned at 3,000 degrees, has ever happened before in the history of  
26 mankind. So you can't go back and go, well, this happened in 1924. It's relatively  
27 close, let's compare and see what happened to those people. It was -- there's  
28 nothing to compare it to.  
29 Our grandchildren, if we're lucky enough to have grandchildren, will wind up doing  
30 theses (sic) on their own when they're going to medical school, and try to put all  
31 this together for us. And they may still not have 100-percent concrete answer. It's  
32 that, it's that bizarre what happened that day.  
33 So you have to look at it as well, what's the best possible evidence that you have?  
34 What seems to be what's going to happen? So you really, the only wrong decision,  
35 as far as I can tell, I think it's pretty much a ground ball, is to go -- is to not do this.  
36 Because by not doing it, you're going to be slowing down the research or stopping  
37 the research; you're going to be stopping people from getting the treatments that  
38 they deserve, you're going to be stopping the families from getting the support that

1                   they needed. And you also quite frankly have to be able to look in the mirror for  
2                   yourselves and go, you know what, did I maybe not save somebody's life today or  
3                   this person down the road and maybe today, maybe tomorrow may have died  
4                   because they weren't able to get the treatment that they need.  
5                   I was very lucky, I had a great support system that I was able to get it, and I still  
6                   went through hell. But I'm here. Other people might not be that lucky.  
7                   And last but not least, so I don't take up too much of your time, you guys also  
8                   unfortunately have to look down the road. What if this hap -- we're basically  
9                   fighting a world war. We're in the middle of a world war. We don't call it that but,  
10                  being politically correct as we are this day we probably wouldn't, but if this was the  
11                  1940s, this would be considered a world war. And we're still there today. And you  
12                  guys have to look and go, if this happens again, are those same first responders,  
13                  guys like me, guys like these three firemen, guys like the fireman on the phone, are  
14                  we going to go down there? Are the guys and girls that are out there on the street  
15                  today gonna go down there and do the same thing? Ninety-eight percent of the  
16                  people that were below the floors where the planes struck got out of that building  
17                  alive. Will that happen again? It rests on your shoulders. Thank you very much  
18                  and God bless you.  
19                  DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much, Mr. Howley. Our next commenter is  
20                  Michael Winter.  
21                  MICHAEL WINTER: Good morning. This is extremely difficult for me so I apologize  
22                  in advance. I've been affected by post traumatic stress disorder due to  
23                  September 11<sup>th</sup>.  
24                  On September 11<sup>th</sup> I was in charge of the operations control center at United  
25                  Airlines. I was in the job to manage the people who were legally responsible, along  
26                  with the captain, for every flight operated by that airline and every airline in this  
27                  country. Every flight operated by U.S. airlines is required to have a licensed aircraft  
28                  dispatcher managing the flight on the ground along with the captain in the air. The  
29                  reason dispatcher is highly trained and licensed is they have to know the same  
30                  thing as the airline captain does. Dispatchers take their job very seriously. I took  
31                  the job of managing aircraft dispatchers for United Airlines very seriously.  
32                  Like most people I remember seeing the pictures of the hole in the side of the first  
33                  twin tower hit. I knew it was not a small aircraft as they had reported on my  
34                  commute to work on the radio.  
35                  I can still feel the impact of the second tower on my body as I stood and watched it  
36                  on the overhead screen in the ops control center. There have been many times I  
37                  wish I would have died on that day. It would have stopped the pain, the feeling of  
38                  responsibility, the never-ending questioning of what we could have done

1 differently, what could we have said differently for the flight attendant that called  
2 from the back of Flight 93, telling us that the aircraft was in control of hijackers.  
3 The emotional numbness I feel while trying to be a good husband and father. The  
4 difficulty being with other people, the total loss of interest in doing things I used to  
5 enjoy. The nightmares and sleepless nights are too numerous to count anymore.  
6 Fortunately a small piece of me still wants to live and make a difference in the  
7 world. My therapists say it is possible for people with PTSD to recover to a point  
8 where they can function in the world but not without consistent treatment. I've  
9 had to pay for the treatment thus far out of my own pocket, as my wife's insurance  
10 plan does not cover mental health for family members.  
11 I just want to read a couple excerpts from summaries written by my therapist and  
12 by the MD that diagnosed me with post-traumatic stress disorder. Michael Winter  
13 first presented with his wife, [identifying information redacted], for family therapy on  
14 1/15/2009; primarily presenting issue was children's symptoms. Secondary issues  
15 reported by [identifying information redacted] were multiple family problems related  
16 to changes in Michael's behavior that began in 2001 and continue to present.  
17 Michael's behavior changes that affected work relationships and lifestyle.  
18 Michael had moved upward in his career until he reached a career path in  
19 April 2001, when he became the head of the flight dispatcher organization for  
20 United Airlines, overseeing approximately 300 employees. As a flight dispatch  
21 manager, Michael was present on the flight control floor and directly supervised  
22 the flight dispatcher who monitored two of the flights that were crashed by the  
23 terrorists on September 11<sup>th</sup>. During the hours that followed the first plane crash,  
24 Michael was at the center of United Airlines' response to the terrorist take-over of  
25 aircrafts. He encouraged the supervisors to get flights safely landed, helped draft a  
26 message to the flight crews in the air, warning of possible terrorist attacks.  
27 By the way, the message from [identifying information redacted] to Flight 23 leaving  
28 JFK with six terrorists on the airplane was stopped before it got off the ground. Our  
29 messages were sent prior to anybody in the air traffic control system, and we  
30 stopped that flight from taking off. Michael was at his post helping to bring home  
31 the surviving planes and doing damage control for the company hit hard by  
32 terrorist attacks.  
33 He continued to work for United Airlines, following 9/11 and initially responsible  
34 for reorganization and down-sizing directly related to 9/11. Gradually he was  
35 demoted until he resigned after sick leave was exhausted. [identifying information  
36 redacted] reported that the marriage had been very satisfying and life had been  
37 good up until then but constant changes in mood and the ability to deal without  
38 anyone locking himself in a room for days.

1 Michael's presenting symptoms include irritability, physically withdrawing from the  
2 outside world, lack of joy in daily living, panic attacks, moodiness, constant  
3 vigilance, emotionally withdrawing from his wife and children, avoidance of  
4 discussions involving 9/11, emotional numbing, memories intrusive sleep.  
5 One other just comment -- well, actually this is the end of her letter. It says in my  
6 opinion that Michael Winter continues to suffer PTSD symptoms that are directly  
7 related to the events of his professional position responsibilities with the aircraft  
8 that were hijacked on that day. Michael was indeed a first responder on that date  
9 and a professional who stayed on duty to begin the remaining, the remaining  
10 airplanes home safely.  
11 DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute, please.  
12 MICHAEL WINTER: One minute? My final comment will be --  
13 MATTHEW MCCAULEY: Mr. Moderator, I have -- I'm up next; I cede two minutes of  
14 my time to Mr. Winter.  
15 DR. MIDDENDORF: No, you cannot cede.  
16 MATTHEW MCCAULEY: Okay.  
17 MICHAEL WINTER: Thank you. People on the ground that had not been directly  
18 involved in the terrorist attacks on that day are covered for PTSD, and my request is  
19 I be covered or just treated as a first responder. All I'm asking for is health benefits  
20 to get me back to living at least a somewhat normal life.  
21 I'm lucky to be here. A lot of people as you know, don't make it through severe  
22 PTSD; they end up killing themselves because the pain is just too great. I know that  
23 a lot of people, you know, certainly the people that are there have been hurt, and I  
24 understand that, but I'm just asking for some compensation ben -- just for benefits  
25 and health benefits, not compensation.  
26 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much. I do want to point out to our  
27 commenters that if there are additional -- there is additional information that  
28 you're able to present here while you're giving your public testimony, you do have  
29 the option of submitting to the docket, and any of the comments that come into  
30 the docket are shared with each of the members of the committee. So that's  
31 another way that you can get your information to the committee. Our next  
32 commenter is Matthew McCauley.  
33 MATTHEW MCCAULEY: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for  
34 permitting me to address this panel. My name is Matthew McCauley. I'm an  
35 attorney with the law firm of Parker and Waichman, and we represent numerous  
36 health -- numerous first responders, many of whom suffer from cancer. Wasn't  
37 always a lawyer and I won't always be a lawyer. I started out as a New York City  
38 police officer and I will always be known as being retired from the job. I've also

1                   been a paramedic for over 20 years, and it's what drives me to see through my  
2                   clients' eyes because I was a first responder at the 1993 and at 2001 terrorist  
3                   attacks. I'm one of the few attorneys you can say that they've seen the same things  
4                   through their clients' eyes, as many of them have served beside me and also  
5                   beyond me, beyond my days at the World Trade Center.  
6                   I come here to ask you to support the suggestion that at least certain cancers make  
7                   it into the fund and for healthcare benefits. As you heard over the last two days, a  
8                   lot of statistical issues that are there, trying to evaluate whether or not there have  
9                   been reported cases or non-reported cases. Three people -- two people you heard  
10                  from are out of state: **[identifying information redacted]** in North Carolina and  
11                  **[identifying information redacted]** who came up from Chicago.  
12                  There are many others like them that I also represent, who have cancer. They're  
13                  not counted because they came in from out of state, whether they be a member of  
14                  a USAR team in Florida or Chicago or if they came in from Pennsylvania. If they fell  
15                  outside the bell curve when the first reports came in and they're not part of  
16                  organized labor, whether it be NYPD, FDNY or their brother and sister labor unions,  
17                  many of them have fallen through the cracks because they went home. They came  
18                  here to New York, they did their job, they supported everybody, and now they have  
19                  cancer.  
20                  They went on about their lives, they continue to go on about their lives, but many  
21                  of them need the healthcare benefits and the compensation that goes along with  
22                  including this.  
23                  They should not be forgotten and I am here today because I represent many of  
24                  them, some from California, some from Florida, some from Chicago. They were not  
25                  part of the people who were accounted for. **[identifying information redacted]**, who  
26                  testified yesterday, is not in the World Trade Center (unintelligible) fund because  
27                  he has cancer. He was not counted.  
28                  He tried to contact them a few years back, they didn't take his information because  
29                  he wasn't having any qualifying injury. **[identifying information redacted]** is the same  
30                  way. **[identifying information redacted]** in Florida, USAR team, same way. These are  
31                  gentlemen who didn't come in with thousands, they came in one out of seven, one  
32                  out of ten, two out of eight. Small numbers of people who came in from fire  
33                  departments, police departments and first responders from around the country to  
34                  help us. They're not part of thousands of people. You know, they came in in small  
35                  groups and yet their small groups have been affected, and they're not spoken for.  
36                  With that extent, I work in a world of data and Daubert and all these other  
37                  standards when it comes to epidemiology, and epidemiology is a lot of things, but  
38                  for epidemiology, as you all know, you need to have good studies, good bases,

1 good ideas that go behind them. The problem was that there's a lot of different  
2 conflicts that are there. And we have issues as to whether or not we'll ever have a  
3 substantial amount of epidemiology. But the one thing that I think the researchers  
4 on this board know is that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. And it  
5 should go forward. There's enough support out there for it, there's enough  
6 information out there for it.

7 We could never conduct a study with all of these toxins put together. There would  
8 be no reason to and a study to mash everything together as far as one that has  
9 never been done and likely can never be done in that setting.

10 Please look to the people who were not accounted for. Similar to the way adverse  
11 events are looked at from drug companies, it's those that are not counted that are  
12 the most important. Underreporting is pervasive here.

13 I've also come in support of Michael Winter. Michael is an outlier. Michael's here  
14 looking for healthcare benefits. He is somebody who absolutely was involved in  
15 protecting the skies over everybody's head. He was absolutely involved in the  
16 actions that took place at the World Trade Center, at the Pentagon and at  
17 Shanksville. He should not be denied medical benefits because he wasn't physically  
18 within the confines.

19 DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute.

20 MATTHEW MCCAULEY: Okay. He was not --

21 DR. MIDDENDORF: Also please try to speak in the microphone.

22 MATTHEW MCCAULEY: He was not physically within the confines of what is  
23 defined there. He was there. He was at every single one of those locations, and I  
24 think that every fireman, every police officer who was on the ground the moments  
25 after it happened will tell you that they looked up 'cause they were afraid. He was  
26 one of the people protecting them from above. He was one of the people clearing  
27 the air space. Do not leave him out. He should not be left out because a  
28 spectator -- sorry, a bystander who was in the Millennium Hotel, who was looking  
29 out the window and unfortunately may have PTSD, that person's qualified, that  
30 person is qualified. They were evacuated from the hotel, they left the scene. I feel  
31 sorry for that person, I really do, but Michael Winter is somebody who was  
32 involved in this. He does not fall under the guidelines of an exact first responder,  
33 that we all consider a first responder; he was there.

34 I just ask that you please include cancer into the qualified injuries and that there be  
35 some sort of mechanism to include the exceptional special circumstances like  
36 people like Michael Winter. Thank you very much.

37 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you, Mr. McCauley. Our next commenter is, excuse me,  
38 on the telephone, John Fassari. Are you there, Mr. Fassari?

1 JOHN FASSARI: Yes.  
2 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay. Go ahead and please begin.  
3 JOHN FASSARI: Good morning. Thank you for taking my call. My name is John  
4 Fassari. I am a retired lieutenant from the New York City Fire Department.  
5 Operated at 9/11 for months, and I have to tell you that I have non-Hodgkin's  
6 lymphoma, a terminal cancer, something rare but also something that many of my  
7 fellow coworkers have gotten since operating at 9/11. And I just think that you  
8 need to hear that all of us, and many of my coworkers and friends that are not here  
9 today to make a telephone call or respond to this hearing because of the sicknesses  
10 and cancer that they had gotten and are no longer here.  
11 I myself being somewhat lucky and still being here, I'm just only waiting now for the  
12 axe to drop. But I just had to respond to this and, you know, let anyone that is  
13 going to make this decision about cancer that I just can't tell you how many of my  
14 coworkers, friends and first responders have gotten sick.  
15 Now, not only is it, you know, cancer and post-traumatic stress and all those other  
16 disorders that go with being sick, you know, it's a terrible thing, and I hope they  
17 reconsider and add cancers to the Zadroga Bill.  
18 I know many families are looking for help and need help, and I hope in the future,  
19 and I hope that this conference will be strong enough to make the decision to help  
20 these families in need. And again, especially for the families that have, you know,  
21 lost their first responders, their dads, their moms, anybody else that operated  
22 there and is no longer there today.  
23 New York City Fire Department chief medical officers believe that cancer is a big  
24 part of these guys being sick and I just wanted to let you know that, you know,  
25 we're sick and we're hanging in there. Thank you.  
26 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much, Mr. Fassari. Our next commenter is  
27 Frank Tramontano.  
28 FRANK TRAMONTANO: Good morning. My name is Frank Tramontano; I'm the  
29 research director for the New York City Patrolmen's Benevolence Association. Now  
30 more than ten years after the attack on the World Trade Center, this committee is  
31 searching for medical and scientific evidence to determine if cancer should be  
32 added as a covered illness for treatment under the James Zadroga Act.  
33 There has only been one cancer study published to date, and other than some of  
34 the testimony heard here yesterday, there are no studies that analyzed the effect  
35 of the World Trade Center dust that was inhaled and ingested and its connection to  
36 cancers.  
37 The testimony yesterday also revealed that there were no samples taken of the air  
38 for the first four days after the attack. So this committee has to decide on a cancer

1 petition with less than perfect information. There should have been more cancer  
2 studies and those that are about to come out, like the one [identifying information  
3 redacted] testified to this committee yesterday, has serious limitations.  
4 It is mind boggling to me that the City of New York has not done more with the  
5 information they had regarding New York City police officers. On March 30, 2007,  
6 [identifying information redacted], the then chief of staff of New York City deputy  
7 mayor, [identifying information redacted], testified, and I quote, that the New York  
8 City Police Department did a particularly thorough job identifying who from their  
9 ranks responded to 9/11 or took part in the recovery and cleanup at the World  
10 Trade Center site.  
11 Until yesterday, after days of getting beat up on this issue in the press, the City has  
12 finally agreed to release the data to Mt. Sinai. This is after denying them the  
13 information months earlier. If the City wanted to, we could have applied for  
14 research funds from NIOSH and hired staff and conducted an NYPD cancer study of  
15 its own. It is quite surprising this was not done, knowing that the City is constantly  
16 searching for ways to get more federal money.  
17 The City has also failed to release its department of health cancer registry report.  
18 The report is not only late but it will also be severely limited since it has been  
19 closed to new registrants since 2004, and contains, according to our sources, only  
20 approximately 4,000 police officers. There were six to seven times that number of  
21 police officers who responded to the 9/11 rescue and recovery effort and were  
22 exposed to the horrific environmental conditions in and around Ground Zero.  
23 Sadly the City of New York is not alone in its failures toward the 9/11 responders.  
24 The cancer study being released by -- shortly by Mt. Sinai Medical Center, which  
25 was briefly summarized yesterday by [identifying information redacted], includes only  
26 those responders who are registered with the World Trade Center medical  
27 monitoring program, a program that doesn't treat cancer. We know of at least 70  
28 police officers with cancer who should be in that study but are not.  
29 As mentioned, there has been one study released on this issue. The past fall, the  
30 fire department published a study entitled, "Early Assessment of Cancer Outcomes  
31 in New York City Firefighters after the 9/11 Attacks." While that study  
32 demonstrated an increase in cancer rates among firefighter first responders, the  
33 study included an adjustment in the data to delay the date of diagnosis by two  
34 years. When taking this adjustment into account, the study would cover a period  
35 up until 2006, resulting in a period of time after the study being longer than the  
36 period actually covered by the study. Frankly I don't understand why this  
37 committee does not have an updated analysis from the fire department. It seems  
38 to me it would qualify as medical evidence.

1 As you know, the report did show a 32-percent higher cancer incident among  
2 exposed firefighters when compared to non-exposed firefighters before the  
3 adjustment.

4 DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute.

5 FRANK TRAMONTANO: The study also demonstrated an increase in incident of  
6 cancer for a later period after 9/11 when compared to a period immediately after  
7 the attacks, a trend that is likely to continue.

8 These are significant facts and along with some of the presentations yesterday  
9 represent scientific evidence that should be sufficient for this committee to support  
10 the addition of cancer as a covered illness. It clearly represents a higher evidence  
11 threshold than some other illnesses covered under the Zadroga Act.

12 But there is more evidence out there. Through the PBA's own cancer registry, we  
13 have recorded four nasal cancers when the annual rate of nasal cancer in New York  
14 State is .1 for every 100,000. There are approximately 30,000 police officers who  
15 filed a notice of participation with New York State, saying they worked at Ground  
16 Zero. The police pension fund has seen a rate of increase of more than three times  
17 the cancer accident disability applications since 2006. There would be more  
18 evidence to the City if others had done a better effort, but unfortunately they failed  
19 to do so.

20 Please do not make the responders with cancer suffer any more because of the lack  
21 of effort.

22 Finally I believe this committee must consider the financial implications of not  
23 recommending cancer. If you are like me and others in this room, and believe that  
24 there is just a matter of time before the scientific evidence unequivocally proves  
25 the cancer link for the sake of the financial implications or for the families of these  
26 responders, I beg you to recommend adding cancer as a covered illness.

27 In the end the treatment for this disease bankrupts families, even those with good  
28 medical plans. There are yearly medical spending caps and lifetime medical  
29 spending caps that for the responders -- for those responders that are lucky to  
30 survive with this disease wind up depleting their family assets. How can we in good  
31 conscience --

32 DR. MIDDENDORF: Your time is up.

33 FRANK TRAMONTANO: -- hesitate another day to add cancer to this list of illnesses  
34 when these selfless individuals do not hesitate a moment to the call of their duty.  
35 Thank you.

36 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you. Our next commenter is Keith LeBow.

37 KEITH LEBOW: Good morning ladies and gentlemen of the panel. My name is Keith  
38 LeBow. I am a sick World Trade Center first responder but I'm not here about

1                   what's wrong with me today. I'm here to address the issue at hand, which is to add  
2                   cancer to this act that we fought for. Excuse me.  
3                   Everyone knows and understands now that the dust of Ground Zero was toxic and  
4                   contained many, many cancer-causing materials. Among them asbestos,  
5                   hexavalent chromium 6, mercury and cadmium. These are not only cancer-causing  
6                   but mutagenic as well, which means the cancer will be passed to future generations  
7                   to come, mutating or changing as each new generation is born. Studies have been  
8                   done, published but yet the fact of the matter is they are not being released to the  
9                   people who need them the most.  
10                  The doctors who are working to figure out ways not to just deal with that, with  
11                  what is wrong, but to heal us in the best ways that they can. Excuse me. Studies  
12                  are fine for gathering data but to ignore the problem means that all the data in the  
13                  world that you collect is worthless unless put to a good use. Now what I have right  
14                  here in front of me is just a sample of what I was able to find online about this  
15                  particular issue. To me that's great. It means to use this data means to save lives.  
16                  That's the best thing in the world. We just need to -- you know, we just need  
17                  better medical treatment.  
18                  What will it take to accept the fact that we were subjected to a very toxic  
19                  environment with little or no protection at all? More deaths from various cancers?  
20                  Cancers that normally take 20 to 30 years to manifest themselves are wiping out  
21                  and have taken many people's lives in less than ten years. Many people need this  
22                  to be added, especially people like construction workers who, unless they work, do  
23                  not get paid, do not get benefits and have no way of paying for any of their  
24                  treatments. To deny them this coverage means that once they are found to have  
25                  cancer from the dust, must continue to work even though they are in dire need of  
26                  this treatment; otherwise they must face mounting medical debt because they  
27                  have no coverage. You don't work, you don't get paid, you are no longer covered.  
28                  To ignore the obvious is to condemn many to horrible deaths.  
29                  Just imagine one day you wake up to find out yourself, your loved one or someone  
30                  close to you has gotten cancer from breathing in toxic fumes at work. The doctors,  
31                  as well as many others, know what caused them to develop cancer, but you were  
32                  told that the studies must be done than to hear you were denied any kind of help  
33                  necessary to help them.  
34                  You would want to move heaven and earth to do everything you could to save  
35                  them, not only to have your pleas fall on deaf ears but just be denied completely.  
36                  That is what is being done to us now.  
37                  So please, for the sake of sick and dying World Trade Center responders, victims,  
38                  survivors and their families, please accept cancer as being a part of the Zadroga Act

1 so more do not pass on from it. Thank you very much for your time.  
2 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much, Mr. LeBow. Our next commenter will be  
3 Tracy Conte.  
4 TRACY CONTE: Good morning. My name is Tracy Conte and I am the daughter of  
5 retired FDNY Lieutenant [identifying information redacted]. My father worked at the  
6 Trade Center site for 16 consecutive days, sleeping inside of a body bag for a few  
7 hours at a time to escape the choking dust. He passed away on July 20, 2010, of  
8 the most aggressive case of metastasized prostate cancer that the oncologists and  
9 hematologists who treated him had ever seen in the history of their practice.  
10 My father, Lieutenant [identifying information redacted], developed the Trade Center  
11 cough right away and the lung issues. But there was no signs of cancer.  
12 He remained active -- he retired in 2002 but remained healthy and active  
13 throughout his retirement, participating in his community, bringing a Memorial Day  
14 parade to his town after a 30-year hiatus, revitalizing the membership of his local  
15 American Legion, taking care of his grandchildren, taking care of his elderly  
16 neighbors.  
17 On Memorial Day 2010, my father started experiencing back pain and difficulty  
18 breathing, and felt weak. By early July he was diagnosed with prostate cancer. Just  
19 five weeks after his symptoms appeared, he had lost 30 pounds, could barely walk  
20 and barely breathe. He entered the hospital on July 8, 2010, and what happened  
21 over the next 12 days was mind-numbing, like a freight train running out of control.  
22 His body stopped manufacturing blood, he received platelets and blood transfusion  
23 and still his blood oxygen level was dropping. The doctors could not figure out  
24 what to make of his advanced breathing difficulties and how his oxygen levels were  
25 dropping. They were scratching their heads, an entire team of doctors, all  
26 specialties.  
27 A bone marrow biopsy uncovered that his marrow had been replaced by bad cells.  
28 The sample extracted during the biopsy was dust. His PSA score nearly doubled  
29 every 24 hours. Five days before he died it was 300. Four days before he died it  
30 was over 500. The day he died it was over 3,000 which was the highest score the  
31 doctors had ever seen.  
32 Doctor after doctor told us that he was one of the sickest, if not the sickest, patient  
33 they had ever encountered in their careers. Every major system failed at the same  
34 time: lung, bone marrow, kidney, renal, heart. According to the doctors it was as  
35 though the cancer had bloomed throughout his body.  
36 He had no family history, was the most aggressive case and was -- he was the  
37 sickest person that the doctors had treated and the doctors were scratching their  
38 heads. They had never seen anything like it. It was like a force had taken over.



1 Let me put this uniform up. I put it in the bottom of my closet and I was going to  
2 put a harsh memory, a damp, damp, memory away. And I stayed home for like a  
3 week and a half.  
4 After several years, one of my good partners, her name was [identifying information  
5 redacted], she worked in PSA 5, she succumbed to cancer at Sloan-Kettering  
6 Hospital. And last year I said you know what, we got something, I'm going to reach  
7 out to this doctor, [identifying information redacted], who's been doing scientific  
8 study down there, and give him this uniform just so he can test it and see what's  
9 going on, with a lot of people who has been diagnosed with this.  
10 This was a vehicle, this is a vehicle on how and what people were facing. Can I pass  
11 it around? This is not a do-right or do-wrong situation to the first responders; this  
12 is a life-or-death situation for the first responders. That's why you see so many of --  
13 that's why you see so many of the police and firemen and all the other city workers  
14 and first responders coming down here to support this situation.  
15 I'm not going to take up a lot of time. It's very emotional. I have been also  
16 diagnosed with asthma today but it could be cancer tomorrow. I just implore you  
17 that could have been your husband or your wife, your son or your daughter, your  
18 child, your family member. This is a real surreal situation. This is why I want you to  
19 bring -- I brought in the uniforms. Just imagine you being down there, you on the  
20 panel being down there, succumbing to all this smoke, this dust, covered in this.  
21 And now ten years later, we here to fight for putting one thing on the bill. The right  
22 thing to do is to add cancer into the bill. Thank you so much.  
23 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much, Mr. Harris. Mr. Harris? Is it possible to  
24 get a copy of this photograph that you're sharing with the committee?  
25 ALONZO HARRIS: Yes, it is. Sure.  
26 DR. MIDDENDORF: If you could send it to me by email or whatever, I would  
27 appreciate it.  
28 ALONZO HARRIS: All right.  
29 DR. MIDDENDORF: The reason I need it is that we need to be able to put it into the  
30 docket.  
31 ALONZO HARRIS: Can I walk around with the uniform so they can just see -- for you  
32 guys to see, if who wants to see it, they can see it --  
33 DR. MIDDENDORF: Sure. Sure, go ahead.  
34 ALONZO HARRIS: -- on a close-up basis.  
35 (pause)  
36 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much, Mr. Harris.  
37 Our next presenter is on the phone. Ken Zevekus (ph). Mr. Zevekus, are you on the  
38 phone? If you are, please unmute it.

1 KEN ZEVEKUS: Yes, can you hear me?  
2 DR. MIDDENDORF: Yes, we can hear you now.  
3 KEN ZEVEKUS: Okay. Good morning. Thanks for giving me the opportunity to  
4 speak to you, today. I'm a retired New York City chief officer. I was there on 9/11,  
5 and I would like to share something with you. I don't know how old the panel is but  
6 I'd like to give you some new information that you may not be aware of.  
7 Ironically in 11 more days it will be the 37<sup>th</sup> year anniversary of the infamous  
8 telephone company fire in New York. Over 440 of my brothers responded to that  
9 fire that day, and within five days of that fire, roughly 200 of them had chest pains,  
10 couldn't breathe, all other types of respiratory maladies. And approximately ten to  
11 15 years after that, half of that number, roughly 100 of those guys, were dead from  
12 cancer.  
13 Now in the ensuing years, through the federal government and various OSHA and  
14 NIOSH programs, it was determined that there was -- this was our first exposure to  
15 a hazardous material, polyvinyl chloride, and in the early 90s, some other unique  
16 information was discovered that the New York City Fire Department had the  
17 highest cancer rate in the nation -- in the world, because we responded to the most  
18 amounts of incidents and fires that any city that would ever have.  
19 I was part of a small group; I was part of 14 unique individuals who were given over  
20 225 hours of training, brought up to what they called the technician level; and it  
21 was our job to transmit to first responders: police, fire, all first responders, military,  
22 that the exposures that we were likely to have at chemical fires, hazardous material  
23 fires, things like that, never thinking that ten years later, roughly 2001, it would be  
24 deja vu; it would be all over.  
25 You talk about going numb? The second that plane hit I knew what was going to  
26 happen because I knew every single one of us who were going to be there, all the  
27 firemen, all the cops, all the innocent bystanders who got caught up in that  
28 whirlwind, that we were going to become a new panel of statistics, and sure  
29 enough, just like at that World Trade Center -- I'm sorry, the telephone company  
30 fire, approximately ten years after that fire, all of a sudden this stuff starts to  
31 manifest itself again.  
32 I don't know why it's taking a brain surgeon or a nuclear physicist to even think  
33 about that that cancer didn't come because of what we all were exposed to on that  
34 date. I think it's criminal; I think it's immoral for anybody not to admit that, that  
35 that's a possibility.  
36 We didn't go there because we were getting paid. We were professionals, we were  
37 highly motivated, we were motivated to save human life, something that only God,  
38 I was brought up, could do. But we were trying to be like God that day and we

1                   were trying to save as many of our fellow citizens as we could.  
2                   And a lot of us now are starting to pay the price for that. I'm asking that you, I'm  
3                   asking that governments, municipalities, whoever, step up and do the right thing  
4                   now for us, like we did the right thing for you on that day. Thank you.  
5                   DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much, Mr. Zevekus. Our next commenter is  
6                   also on the telephone, Victoria Gilles (ph). Ms. Gilles, if you're there, please  
7                   unmute.  
8                   VICTORIA GILLES: Yes, good morning.  
9                   DR. MIDDENDORF: Morning.  
10                  VICTORIA GILLES: I'm a good will ambassador from Washington State, and after  
11                  9/11 I did, with the Seattle Benevolence Association, I did a big event raising  
12                  \$50,000 for the widows' and children's fund for the FDNY. Deputy Chief Nick  
13                  Visconti, at the time, attended that, along with Assistant to Chief of Department,  
14                  [identifying information redacted], who died on 9/11, [identifying information  
15                  redacted], attended this event.  
16                  After we had raised the money I took the check back to New York City. I visited a  
17                  lot of stations, seeing a lot of the memorials, listening to a lot of stories from a lot  
18                  of the men and women that were telling me about their brothers and sisters that  
19                  were lost. A lot of the men would say to me, would -- they're not going to  
20                  remember us. They're going to forget. And I would say to them, who could ever  
21                  forget this? Who could ever forget this tragedy? But they believed that they would  
22                  be forgotten. In April of last year when bin Laden was caught, on the day he was  
23                  caught, my friend, [identifying information redacted], when I talked to him on the  
24                  phone, had told me he was diagnosed with esophageal cancer. His comments to  
25                  me were: I'm a Vietnam vet, 9/11 vet, I watched my best friend die on 9/11, and I  
26                  took care of his kids from there on out, they lived across the street from me. This is  
27                  what it comes to for me at 58 years old, this is what it comes to my brothers and  
28                  sisters that are dying in record numbers.  
29                  I made a promise to him, that his government did care. And he kept saying they  
30                  don't care. They don't care about us. I said I will help you with whatever I can. He  
31                  sent me a newspaper article that was telling me about the James Zadroga Bill. He  
32                  asked for my help. He said, I will be dead in two months, Vicky. But whatever you  
33                  can do to help me and to help my brothers and sisters that this is going to happen  
34                  to, because rest assured it's going to happen, would you please do it? I said  
35                  absolutely, I will do what I can.  
36                  I am married to a first responder, to an incident commander, who, as he watched  
37                  the World Trade Centers come down, as we all did on that horrific day, kept saying  
38                  to me, where's the respirators? Where are the respirators? Why do they not have

1 respirators on? There were very few people wearing those respirators in that toxic  
2 dust. Of those towers that were built in the 1960s, that it was obvious that with  
3 asbestos and everything else that was going on, there was going to be problems  
4 later.

5 The U.S. needs to take care of their own. I wrote letters to 14 senators and  
6 congressmen. Senator Steve Hobbs, from Washington State, is the only one that  
7 spoke up. He sent letters to U.S. Congressman Adam Smith, who spoke up and has  
8 been letting me know what they're -- what they've been doing since then.

9 It is shameful as people from the United States that we are not taking care of our  
10 own, our own heroes, when we take care of everybody else out there. It is  
11 shameful it's been ten years. It is shameful that politicians went to bat for the  
12 James Zadroga Bill, which had to do with cancer, and then took cancer out of the  
13 bill.

14 First responders are not meant to go to war. They are meant to save lives in fires  
15 and accidents and things like that, but not war. We owe it to them as our heroes to  
16 do the right thing. Do we actually expect, as a police officer before me said, for  
17 them to go back into anything that might happen, and with terrorist attacks  
18 happening right now around the world, this could happen again in the State of  
19 Washington. Does it need to happen in our own back yard before we get the big  
20 picture? Do we actually expect them to go back into buildings such as the World  
21 Trade Center, the Pentagon, whatever, and do the same thing over again, when we  
22 are not taking care of them?

23 I want to say to the people on the phone, I understand what you're going through.  
24 My husband and I care. We care. There are people that care. And we will fight this  
25 until something is done. We are not going away. Thank you.

26 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much, Ms. Gilles. Our next commenter is  
27 Stephen Levin. Okay, I don't see him here. You don't happen to be on the phone,  
28 do you, Mr. Levin? Okay. Again, I'll move him to the back of the list and then we'll  
29 call on him to see if he happens to show up.

30 So we'll go to the telephone again. Eric Ashlie. Mr. Ashlie, are you on the line?  
31 ERIC ASHLIE: Yes.

32 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay.

33 ERIC ASHLIE: Can you hear me?

34 DR. MIDDENDORF: Yes, we can hear you.

35 ERIC ASHLIE: All right, thank you. My name is Eric Ashlie, and I'm calling today on  
36 behalf of Washington State Senator Steve Hobbs. First I wanted to thank the  
37 committee for allowing testimony on this matter. It's extremely important and I  
38 appreciate that. More importantly, thank you so much to those of you that have

1 testified before me yesterday and today.  
2 Those who were at Ground Zero on the front lines over ten years ago deserve more  
3 than what Congress has offered them in the current legislation. The first  
4 responders of 9/11 are America's most courageous men and women. Victoria  
5 Gilles, who just spoke, came to us back in August and said, she basically said exactly  
6 what she just said to us, and we were astounded that cancer had been taken out.  
7 While I understand that the first review that came out did not establish  
8 presumption of cancer, since then we have seen a series of studies that do so. Now  
9 is the time for the committee to recognize this opportunity and recognize the men  
10 and women who were brave enough to step up for their country -- for our country,  
11 back on September 11<sup>th</sup>. I know there are a lot of people that want to testify today  
12 so I'm going to keep it short, and we've already provided written testimony. God  
13 bless all of those of you that have been part of this experience and have family and  
14 friends that have been affected. Thank you so much. That's all I have.  
15 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Ashlie.  
16 Our next commenter is Esther Regelson.  
17 ESTHER REGELSON: Hi. My name is Esther Regelson, and I live three blocks south  
18 of the World Trade Center site. I was caught in the dust cloud on September 11<sup>th</sup>  
19 and moved back into my apartment five months later.  
20 The EPA conducted no testing or cleanup of our building, although it said it was  
21 contaminated. To this day I am uncertain to what degree my apartment and the  
22 rest of my building were cleaned of the World Trade Center dust, raising concerns  
23 about further exposures long after the events of 9/11.  
24 Although I had preexisting asthma, my asthma worsened significantly after 9/11.  
25 Subsequent tests at the World Trade Center Environmental Health Center showed  
26 that my lung capacity was only 43 percent of normal. Thankfully that capacity has  
27 increased due to the specialized treatment that I have received at the WTC EHC.  
28 I'm a member of the World Trade Center Health Program survivor steering  
29 committee. And on behalf of the committee, I would like to summarize our ideas  
30 regarding NIOSH's WTC research approach and priorities. The survivor steering  
31 committee plays an advisory role in the administration of the survivor health  
32 program, and represents the community of affected non-responder WTC  
33 stakeholders.  
34 First, there are a wide range of knowledge gaps with respect to science, biology and  
35 treatment of WTC-related illnesses. NIOSH should close these gaps by supporting a  
36 diverse portfolio of studies at different levels of funding that includes pilot studies,  
37 clinical trials, studies of disease mechanisms, epidemiological studies and basic  
38 science research. We urge the creation of key resources that are useful to multiple

1 investigators.

2 Second, NIOSH should encourage and fund proposals that address health effects to

3 survivors as well as responders. Studies of survivor populations should address

4 health effects on those living, working and attending school in the impact zone

5 defined by the Zadroga Act and represent the diverse populations and geographic

6 areas affected. Wherever feasible, cancer incident studies must include survivors

7 as well as responders.

8 Third, NIOSH should recognize that WTC research is disaster science. Especially

9 with respect to the survivor community, researchers are operating in the absence

10 of preexisting baseline data or comprehensive environmental measurements from

11 which to assess exposures. These limitations must not become an insurmountable

12 barrier to meeting the health needs of 9/11 survivors.

13 Fourth, NIOSH should encourage researchers committed to collaborating with

14 affected communities, using a community-based participatory research or CBPR

15 model for their studies. The benefits of the CP -- BPR model are well established.

16 Fifth, NIOSH must strengthen the surveillance function of the data centers to

17 gather and analyze data in a timely fashion. Otherwise there is little chance that

18 important trends, including the emergence of new conditions, will be recognized.

19 Sixth, NIOSH should ensure that all research proposals receive proper peer review

20 by including appropriate specialists. We also have the following recommendations

21 regarding WTC Health Program research priorities for the survivor population: one,

22 given children's increased susceptibility to harm, especially in critical periods of

23 development, it is imperative that NIOSH move quickly to support in-depth studies

24 of respiratory, developmental and endocrine health impacts for this rapidly

25 dispersing cohort; two, we recommend that blood samples be collected from

26 WTC-exposed children and preserved for later analysis including the freezing of live

27 cells containing genetic markers. These samples could prove useful in at least three

28 ways: as potential source of biomarkers for exposure to WTC toxics, as a source of

29 protein markers of disease with potential use in diagnosing and understanding

30 WTC-related illness, and as a source of genetic material which can be analyzed for

31 evidence of genetic alterations relevant to disease that may be detected many

32 years after exposure.

33 Strong protocols to protect privacy of all data must be developed in consultation

34 with the survivor steering committee.

35 Three, because so little is known with respect to inflammation and other

36 underlying mechanisms for WTC illness such as sarcoidosis, cancer and asthma, it is

37 critical that NIOSH support studies of disease mechanisms.

38 DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute, please.

1 ESTHER REGELSON: I'm almost done. Four, cancer incidence and prevalence must  
2 be tracked across all WTC populations.  
3 And five, last, in addition to -- in an analysis of WTC EHC patients, 60 percent screen  
4 positive for mental health condition, 40 percent of whom had symptoms of PTSD,  
5 anxiety and/or depression. Those with lower respiratory problems seem  
6 particularly vulnerable.  
7 There is a growing literature on the impact of parental PTSD and depression on  
8 children's mood, anxiety and behavior, including one study among 9/11 survivors.  
9 It would therefore be valuable to investigate the impact of parental mental health  
10 disorders on their children's mental health as well as children's mental health on  
11 their parents. This would provide essential information about the  
12 intergenerational transmission of mental illness after a terrorist attack. A version  
13 of these comments has been submitted by our committee co-chairs to the NIOSH  
14 docket. On behalf of the committee, thank you for your time.  
15 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much. Next commenter is Fred Krines.  
16 FRED KRINES: Good morning. My name is Fred Krines; I'm employed by the New  
17 York City Police Department. On September 11, 2001, as the disaster occurred at  
18 the World Trade Center, I was one of the first responders, thereafter as a  
19 volunteer. Me and my coworkers responded over there without hesitation. We  
20 dug through the piles and thereafter that I also was ordered to go over there.  
21 2010 of June, I was diagnosed with follicular dendritic cell sarcoma, a very rare  
22 cancer. (Indiscernible)-wise, there's 50 of them in this world today. I had a radical  
23 (inaudible)-section performed June 2010 with (indiscernible) treatment after that,  
24 chemotherapy and 45 days of radiation. I'm asking you to add cancers in the bill for  
25 medical treatment.  
26 I was very lucky that the doctors caught this on time, and they performed surgery.  
27 'Cause if it wasn't, I would have been dead today. And that's all I want to say.  
28 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I couldn't hear what kind of cancer it was.  
29 FRED KRINES: Follicular dendritic cell sarcoma.  
30 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I don't know what that is.  
31 FRED KRINES: It's a very rare cancer; there's maybe 50 of it known worldwide. I  
32 have documentation over here for it, if you want to see it. And it's just, like the  
33 doctor said, it's just I have to go for PET scans every six months because it's a rare  
34 cancer that nobody knows about. I just want to have the doctors of the panel over  
35 here just to recommend cancers in -- when they go in front of Congress next month  
36 so people could have a chance to live. Thank you.  
37 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much. Micki Siegel de Hernandez.  
38 MICKI SIEGEL DE HERNANDEZ: Good morning. My name is Micki Siegel de

1                   Hernandez, I'm the health and safety director for the Communications Workers of  
2                   America; we represent mostly nontraditional responders as well as area workers.  
3                   I wanted to make a few comments about the Sinai study results that were reported  
4                   on yesterday by Dr. Landrigan, particularly for those of you on the panel who are  
5                   still wedded to the idea that epidemiological studies are the ultimate proof needed  
6                   to add cancer as a covered condition.  
7                   I wanted to comment on the ways in which these studies, like the Sinai study, are  
8                   an underestimate and an undercount of the true rates of cancers.  
9                   When I consider these limitations, it makes the Sinai analysis and their results even  
10                  more striking. For one, the results are for a portion of responders, not the entire  
11                  group of responders, the true number of which is actually unknown. As you heard  
12                  testimony today, none of the national -- the thousands of national responders are  
13                  included in any of these studies. And this is especially important with regard to  
14                  rarer cancers, but certainly for all.  
15                  The results are also based upon patient matches with cancer registries, the Sinai  
16                  results. The New York State Cancer Registry has a two-year lag time. The New York  
17                  State Cancer Registry -- in other words, the more recent, these past two years,  
18                  cancer cases reported to the New York State Cancer Registry, would not be  
19                  counted in the Sinai results.  
20                  The New York State Cancer Registry is also better at capturing certain cancers, solid  
21                  tumors, less so for others. Blood cancers, one of the World Trade Center cancers of  
22                  concern, most concern, are less likely to be reported and counted in the New York  
23                  State Cancer Registry.  
24                  Fourth, as other commenters have talked about today, many responders with  
25                  cancer are not part of the World Trade Center Health Program for many, many  
26                  reasons. When I speak to our union members with cancer, and there are many,  
27                  some of which with multiple cancers in addition to their other World Trade  
28                  Center-related disease, I always ask if they are a patient in the World Trade Center  
29                  Health Program and if not, why. These are the two most common reasons for  
30                  nonparticipation: first, obviously when a person has cancer, their life is consumed  
31                  by their disease and their treatments. The World Trade Center Health Program  
32                  does not currently cover cancer and so many people see no reason to be part of  
33                  the program. And to go for more doctor visits on top of what they are already  
34                  dealing with in their lives.  
35                  The second reason for nonparticipation for many people is that they are just plain  
36                  angry, and understandably so, that their diseases have not yet been recognized and  
37                  covered in the program, and they refuse to participate for that reason alone.  
38                  Finally, I would like to comment about the selection of certain cancers, and I worry

1 about cherry-picking which cancers to include given the incredible range of  
2 carcinogens and other contaminants that people were exposed to. This would be a  
3 huge disservice to those people who were simply unlucky enough to get the wrong  
4 cancer at this time, like the gentleman who just testified. It also worries me  
5 because it is hard to imagine a way in which additional cancers, one by one,  
6 especially rarer cancers, will ever get added to this list unless record number of  
7 responders and others contract a particular disease, get sick and die.  
8 As Dr. Melius said earlier, your decision is ultimately about enabling those affected  
9 to receive care to get that care. I personally would rather fight for adequate  
10 funding for both the World Trade Center Health Program and the victims'  
11 compensation fund than exclude those deserving of this care. I hope you keep all  
12 these things in mind today as you deliberate. Thank you.  
13 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much. Bill DeBlaiso? Apparently he was held  
14 up downstairs. We'll move him to the back of the line again. Jo Polett?  
15 JO POLETT: My name is Jo Polett, and I live at 105 Duane (microphone issues).  
16 How's this? Okay. My name is Jo Polett, and I live at 105 Duane Street, a 52-story  
17 high-rise located seven blocks north of the World Trade Center site. Constructed in  
18 1990, the building has no asbestos-containing material.  
19 Yesterday we heard panelists and members of the public note the disconnect  
20 between reassuring government sampling results and the health effects of many of  
21 those exposed to World Trade Center dust and smoke. The 2002 ATSDR NYC DOH  
22 final technical report of the public health investigation to assess potential  
23 exposures in settled surface dust in residential areas of lower Manhattan. A good  
24 example of that disconnect is cited on page one of the NIOSH February 2012 WTC  
25 OPC document prepared for this committee.  
26 I'm concerned that someone hoping to learn something about residential  
27 exposures might read the ATSDR NYC DOH study, so I'll spend a few minutes telling  
28 you what I know about it.  
29 In November and December of 2001, ATSDR NYC DOH sampled in and around 30  
30 residential buildings for asbestos, SVF and mineral components of concrete and  
31 building wallboard.  
32 You may recall that at the last meeting of this committee I provided you with  
33 asbestos and lead sampling results from my building. I'll quickly reprise some of  
34 the asbestos results. On December 3rd, 2001, CIH sampled the supply air diffuser  
35 on the tenth floor, sample was collected by MicroVac and analyzed by TM for  
36 asbestos. The sample tested positive for asbestos at a level of 550,000 structures  
37 per square centimeter; that's 50 to 500 times above expected background.  
38 Additional subsequent sampling of the entry door frame of a fifth-floor apartment

1 yielded a result of 123 asbestos structures per square centimeter, indicating that  
2 the ventilation system was circulating asbestos through hallways and into  
3 apartments, sampling of the fan coil unit of the living room heating and air  
4 conditioning in that unit yielded a result of 37,000 asbestos structures per square  
5 centimeter. Not only was my building one of the 30 buildings sampled by ATSDR  
6 NYC DOH for their study, but the fifth floor apartment, the results I just cited, was  
7 one of the two residences in the building that was sampled.  
8 Yet according to the ATSDR NYC DOH report, no asbestos was found in the  
9 common areas of the building or in either of the apartments that were sampled.  
10 How is that possible?  
11 According to the comments of [identifying information redacted], an asbestos expert  
12 who reviewed the study when he served on the peer review committee for EPA's  
13 exposure in human health evaluation paper in 2003, quote, I think that asbestos  
14 was likely present in all of the bulk samples collected and that the failure to detect  
15 asbestos in many of the indoor settled dust samples or the outdoor samples was a  
16 question of deficiencies in either the analytical method or the conduct of the  
17 method.  
18 So what was the purpose of conducting such sloppy sampling? Well, we were  
19 informed of these results in January of 2002, during a dispute with the landlord  
20 about whether and how to clean the ventilation system.  
21 DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute, please.  
22 JO POLETT: A letter from New York City Department of Health, stating that there  
23 was no asbestos at 105 Duane Street was distributed to every tenant in the building  
24 along with a 105 Duane Street fact sheet compiled by the New York City  
25 Department of Health, disputing the validity of our finding and condoning the  
26 landlord's plan to use a company that was not certified in asbestos and had never  
27 cleaned a tall building to clean the ventilation system. I mean, this looks pretty  
28 innocuous. Here's the study but this study, like the EPA sampling results, were  
29 weaponized and used against us when we tried to make our building safe for  
30 habitation. Thank you.  
31 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much. The next presenter is Jewell Bachrach.  
32 JEWELL BACHRACH: Good morning. I'm Jewell Bachrach. Can you hear me? I live  
33 at 18 North Moore Street, which is the northern end of the accepted community  
34 that has -- is supposed to get response by government forces. I've lived the  
35 majority of my years down here -- lived and worked. I've lived here since 1968 of --  
36 when the -- however, when the report came in after analyzing my apartment, it  
37 had asbestos, and now to -- and two years ago I was operated on for lung cancer,  
38 although I have lived a very healthy lifestyle. I never smoked in my life.

1 One of the problems is no one's ever cleaned, even though it's supposed to be the  
2 area which all this debris has fallen and which you know to be really serious  
3 problem -- no one's ever cleaned the outside of the buildings. I don't know what's  
4 happened in 2012. I bet you could find something now. I mean, even though I live  
5 a half a mile away, they found, they found asbestos and I mean, it shocked me that  
6 I have -- that I had lung cancer. It was luckily caught comparatively early. But I'm  
7 constantly bombarded with radiation because they need to take tests every few  
8 months to find out if I'm still clean. You know, I'd like some other way to die. I'm  
9 going to be 80 and I want to live a little longer.

10 I really think cancers should be considered one of the problems here, since that  
11 should not have been a reason for me to die. I mean, I haven't lived a life like that.  
12 Please, please do consider it. You've had very excellent people who have come up  
13 here, who have really analyzed the situation and where -- it's -- where -- further  
14 work could be done. That's fine. But no one in this operation knows that I had  
15 cancer. It was just lucky -- I mean, I was just lucky in that since I was more than 65,  
16 God bless Medicare, had paid for it.

17 One week in the hospital cost the federal government for me \$92,000, and yet the  
18 only medication that I got, that I asked for was a vitamin pill and a stool softener  
19 plus a little numbing of my nerve endings after the operation. That's all I got. And  
20 the bill was \$92,000. You know, come on, help. Thank you.

21 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much, Ms. Bachrach. Our next commenter is  
22 Bill DeBlaiso. Apparently he's downstairs in line and trying to come up. How about  
23 Collin Ecosta? Or Stephen Levin? Mr. DeBlaiso?

24 BILL DEBLAISO: Thank you very much. Thank you for the opportunity to speak  
25 before you today. I'm sorry I'm running a few minutes late, I'll be brief. Good  
26 morning to everyone and I'd like to thank the committee for addressing the critical  
27 issue of adding cancer to the list of World Trade Center-related health conditions as  
28 specified in the Zadroga Act.

29 As public advocate for the City of New York, I am reminded regularly of the horrors  
30 of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, and the tragedy brought upon our city. Unfortunately  
31 many of our men and women who served as first responders on 9/11 and in its  
32 aftermath remember that day for a far different reason. They are currently  
33 suffering from cancer as a result of the toxins that were exposed to -- that they  
34 were exposed to during the recovery and cleanup operations.

35 Mt. Sinai Medical Center has treated thousands of first responders and it's  
36 conducted extensive research into the connection between illnesses these  
37 individuals have developed and their exposure to toxins at Ground Zero. I recently  
38 called on the City to provide Mt. Sinai with all available information regarding New

1 York City police officers who served at Ground Zero and subsequently developed  
2 cancer. But while the City obfuscates, these individuals suffer, and even more fear  
3 the day when they may be diagnosed further.

4 When the planes struck our city on 9/11, these brave men and women answered  
5 the call of duty, never once pausing to think about long-term health implications.  
6 In the days and weeks following 9/11 many of these first responders continued to  
7 work around Ground Zero and at the Fresh Kills Landfill, breathing in the toxins that  
8 cause their suffering today. They worked in difficult conditions surrounded by a  
9 cloud of dust that contained known carcinogens such as asbestos, benzene and  
10 dioxin. Any of these elements on their own would be extremely dangerous; mixed  
11 together in the air, they have proven deadly.

12 Research by the New York City Fire Department has found a 19-percent higher  
13 cancer rate among FDNY members who had been at Ground Zero than among  
14 those who had not. Mt. Sinai has already found four cases of multiple myeloma  
15 among responders under age 45, an extremely young age for diagnosis. Just  
16 recently cancer-causing toxins were found on the uniform of **[identifying information  
17 redacted]**, who survived being buried in the World Trade Center debris on 9/11.

18 I understand the purpose of this committee is to review scientific and technical  
19 information in order to make a recommendation to the administrator of the World  
20 Trade Center Health Program, yet common sense shows us the suffering is real.  
21 These individuals are struggling and dying of cancer right now.

22 The Patrolmen's Benevolence Association has found at least 297 officers who  
23 served in the World Trade Center operations have been stricken with cancer.  
24 Another 66 have died of cancer since 9/11. Before September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, an  
25 average of six police officers per year were diagnosed with cancer, so again, 297  
26 officers have been stricken since 9/11, 66 have died. Previous to that an average of  
27 six police officers a year were diagnosed with cancer. Ever since the attacks an  
28 average of 16 police officers a year are now diagnosed with cancer, constituting an  
29 increase of nearly 300 percent.

30 The NYPD lost 23 officers on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, but even more have given their  
31 lives since that tragic day as a result of cancer they developed in the aftermath of  
32 the attacks. Take the story of **[identifying information redacted]**. Officer **[identifying  
33 information redacted]**, a native of Mount Vernon, spent over 200 hours down at  
34 Ground Zero, working 12-hour shifts, breathing in toxic air that we know was filled  
35 with carcinogens. In 2007, while in his early 40s, **[identifying information redacted]**  
36 was diagnosed with a stage IV flat skin tumor, which is a cancer of the bile duct.

37 DR. MIDDENDORF: One minute, please.

38 BILL DEBLAISO: This is an extremely rare form of cancer that usually develops in

1 patients older than 65. Officer [identifying information redacted] had no history of  
2 cancer in his family. The only known risk factor he had for developing this rare type  
3 of cancer was exposure to toxins, including asbestos and dioxin, which were  
4 present in the air, dust and debris at Ground Zero.  
5 As Officer [identifying information redacted] fought for his life, he also advocated for  
6 the passage of the Zadroga Act with specific inclusion of certain types of cancer on  
7 the list of World Trade Center-related health conditions. Sadly, he lost both fights.  
8 But here today you can right -- at least right one of these wrongs by recommending  
9 that cancer be added to the list of World Trade Center-related health conditions so  
10 that every first responder suffering from these rare cancers, can get the help and  
11 support that Officer [identifying information redacted] never had the chance to  
12 receive. Please don't let his story get lost in your analysis because the City refuses  
13 to turn over all of the necessary data for this study.  
14 That our first responders are suffering without needed medical care is outrageous  
15 and shameful. As their advocate, I strongly urge you to include cancer under the  
16 James Zadroga Health and Compensation Act. Thank you very much.  
17 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much. Mr. Levin?  
18 STEPHEN LEVIN: Thank you very much, members of the committee, for the  
19 opportunity to testify before you this morning. In the interest of allowing frankly  
20 more important testimony this morning from first responders and professionals, I  
21 am going to keep my remarks very brief.  
22 My name is Stephen Levin, I am a council member for the 33<sup>rd</sup> district in Brooklyn,  
23 and I am here today to strongly urge you to include at the very least some cancers,  
24 including but not limited to blood cancers, including leukemia, lymphoma and  
25 myeloma, nasal cancers, thyroid cancer and prostate cancer. And for those  
26 currently that -- and those cancers that currently meet less of an evidentiary  
27 standard, that this committee continue to study them very closely.  
28 From the testimony that you have heard over the past day, the anecdotal evidence  
29 is absolutely overwhelming and in my opinion indisputable, that certain cancers are  
30 linked to work at Ground Zero. However, I believe that this committee is beginning  
31 to see clear scientific evidence emerge that even more firmly establishes that link.  
32 I serve on the Lower Manhattan Redevelopment Committee on the City Council.  
33 Two and a half weeks ago, we held a hearing on the 2011 report of the New York  
34 City World Trade Center Medical Working Group. Frankly I found this report and  
35 the Bloomberg administration's answers to my questions to be very frustrating.  
36 The report says, quote, the first World Trade Center cancer risk study to be  
37 published found that firefighters with World Trade Center exposures may be at a  
38 greater risk for cancer than firefighters who weren't exposed. I call that the

1 understatement of the year considering that the FDNY report found a 19- to 30-  
2 percent increase in cancer among firefighters who served at Ground Zero.  
3 In response to my questions about how many studies would be needed to establish  
4 a scientific link strong enough for this committee to proceed with covering cancer,  
5 **[identifying information redacted]**, Deputy Commissioner of Epidemiology at New  
6 York City Department of Health, demurred.  
7 While yesterday this committee heard some preliminary results from **[identifying  
8 information redacted]** of Mt. Sinai on their study -- on their World Trade Center  
9 Health -- their study of the World Trade Center Health Program, showing a  
10 14-percent increase among a broad range of cancers. The question I ask is when is  
11 enough evidence enough?  
12 I found his challenge to this committee to be particularly appropriate. And I won't  
13 try to paraphrase but I will put my own spin on it.  
14 Knowing that you will never in many years achieve a 100-percent ironclad proof  
15 from epidemiological perspective of a Ground Zero to cancer link, when does this  
16 committee make the judgment based on overwhelming anecdotal evidence, a  
17 growing number of medical studies, and just plain old common sense, to vote to  
18 have certain types of cancers covered under the Zadroga Act, in accordance, I  
19 believe, with the intent and spirit of the legislation? I believe that that time is now  
20 and that this committee should listen not only to all of the growing evidence but  
21 also to its collective conscience. If you do not act, for far too many, justice delayed  
22 will be justice denied. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify.  
23 DR. MIDDENDORF: Thank you very much. One last call for **[identifying information  
24 redacted]** ? Apparently **[identifying information redacted]** has decided not to provide  
25 his comments.  
26 On behalf of the committee, let me thank each and every one of the public  
27 commenters of today and yesterday, both here in person and on the phone, and  
28 also those who have submitted their written comments. It really does provide the  
29 committee with a very different perspective than they can get from just reading the  
30 literature and I think it's, I think, very beneficial for them, so we very much  
31 appreciate you taking the time and effort to come and present your perspectives to  
32 them.  
33 DR. WARD: Thank you. So at this point we'll take a 15-minute recess and be back  
34 promptly. We'll be back promptly at 10:40. Thank you.

(Recess taken 10:25 a.m. until 10:53 a.m.)

**DISCUSSION OF PETITION ON CANCER**

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38 DR. WARD: So Paul is going to call the roll and then we are going to --

1 DR. MIDDENDORF: I'll just make a note of it.  
2 DR. WARD: Or just make a note of it; and then Paul wants to say a few words  
3 about our overall charge and perspective.  
4 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay, I think as we begin to really think about the issue before  
5 us as to whether or not to add cancer -- or make any recommendations or provide  
6 advice to add cancer or a specific type of cancer, make that recommendation to  
7 the program administrator, we need to know a little bit about what the needs of  
8 the administrator are.  
9 It's important to recognize that whatever decision the committee makes and  
10 whatever recommendation it makes to the administrator, the administrator  
11 needs -- will then take that information and make a decision whether to move  
12 forward with the recommendation or how to move forward with that  
13 recommendation, anywhere from fully accepting it, going beyond it, not accepting  
14 it, whatever. What would be most helpful to him in help -- in making that decision  
15 is if the committee spends a lot of time really critically analyzing the underlying  
16 assumptions, the underlying science that they are making that decision -- or what  
17 they're basing that decision on.  
18 So I think in this particular case, since we have a very unique situation where we  
19 all recognize that the available science is rather limited, there are large gaps in our  
20 knowledge, in fact the information is evolving rapidly as we're trying to make the -  
21 - this decision. So it's very important that all of the assumptions, all of the  
22 information, be critically looked at so that there is a robust record that the  
23 administrator can use to help make him -- to help him make a decision on where  
24 he wants to go with the recommendation.  
25 I think the other thing that we need to recognize is that there's sort of a  
26 600-pound gorilla in the room, and that's that each of the members, I believe, has  
27 a deep respect for each and every one of the responders and survivors who's been  
28 impacted by the attacks on 9/11. But, while each of us has that respect and we  
29 want to honor those people, we need to make sure that that does not prevent us  
30 or inhibit us from really looking at the science, understanding what it says, what it  
31 doesn't say and what additional information might be needed, what the  
32 assumptions are. So, while we want to honor those responders and survivors, we  
33 want to make sure that they understand that they are respected by the  
34 committee, the committee needs to feel comfortable having that open discussion,  
35 having a robust discussion, so that in the end the program administrator can make  
36 a good decision on what to do. And in the end it is somewhat paradoxical if the  
37 committee does not provide a good robust discussion, then what may happen is  
38 that things may not go forward appropriately, it leaves the administrator open for

1 attack or whatever -- not attack, for questioning. So that if he tries to move  
2 forward with a rule to add cancer or a specific type of cancer, what could happen  
3 is that it would be questioned more thoroughly. So paradoxically it may wind up  
4 actually hurting or inhibiting the ability of the administrator to provide the relief  
5 that the committee feels is appropriate if they don't do a good job of describing  
6 the science and the underlying assumptions.

7 DR. WARD: And I think you all heard -- or the committee at least heard yesterday,  
8 I did have the idea of taking a poll. That's one way to start off the committee's  
9 deliberations. I think in terms of where we are at the meeting, that's probably not  
10 a good way to go. I think the way the poll is constructed really doesn't capture  
11 the complexity of peoples' opinions, so what I'd like to do as an alternative,  
12 though, is to give everyone on the committee the opportunity to speak about  
13 where, you know, where they stand on the issue at this point of whether cancer in  
14 general should be listed as a World Trade Center-related condition or whether  
15 specific cancers should be listed.

16 What Paul and I will do, and I'm hoping Paul will do this, is I am eager to really  
17 record this in a systematic way. So even though people don't have to express a  
18 specific opinion about specific cancer sites, if they do express that opinion, we're  
19 going to try to tabulate it so at least we know where the committee stands in  
20 relation to specific sites.

21 I probably will take some notes, and what I'm going to be taking notes on is more  
22 some of the larger issues, such that when we do write up any recommendations  
23 to Dr. Howard, I can make sure that, and we will have the transcripts, and we will  
24 have the notes, but I'm not sure we'll have all of those things in the time frame  
25 that we need to write the letter, so I am going to take some notes just to make  
26 sure I capture some of the important ideas. So if that's agreeable to everyone, I'd  
27 like to start. And I don't, I -- Steve, did you?

28 DR. MARKOWITZ: I have a question. I have a question. The question is: I don't  
29 know if this is on or not but --

30 Does Dr. Howard want advice on specific cancers above and beyond a  
31 recommendation about cancer in general?

32 DR. WARD: I think the way he phrased his letter is yes but I'm sure Paul or  
33 someone else from the NIOSH staff... I think it said something like cancer or  
34 specific cancers but we'll verify that.

35 DR. MIDDENDORF: Yeah, it's right here.

36 DR. WARD: Yeah. It's phrased as, on whether to add cancer or a certain type of  
37 cancer to the list.

38 DR. MARKOWITZ: So if I could suggest a way of talking about it, perhaps we could

1                    have an initial discussion on, in general, whether at least some cancers are related  
2                    to exposures, and then secondarily talk about specific cancers, as opposed to  
3                    mixing the two topics into the same conversation.  
4                    DR. WARD: So you're saying, just to make sure I understood you, first ask peoples'  
5                    opinions about whether specific cancers should be listed and second, to talk about  
6                    the issue of cancers overall? Is that what you're --  
7                    DR. MARKOWITZ: Well, in reverse order.  
8                    DR. WARD: Oh.  
9                    DR. MARKOWITZ: Yes, the different -- have a first, a broader discussion about  
10                    whether any cancers are related and then secondarily what specific cancers,  
11                    specific cancers we would recommend.  
12                    DR. WARD: Okay. So that's a little different from what I said but I think I  
13                    understand it now. Okay, whether any cancers and then, and then if yes, which  
14                    cancers. And Glenn?  
15                    DR. TALASKA: My question was about the process that we're going to go through  
16                    with this. Are we planning, if we do make a recommendation one way or the  
17                    other, that we will have subcommittees to draft the response, or what's your idea  
18                    as far as how we're going to proceed if we do, regardless of what the outcome is?  
19                    Paul's got an answer.  
20                    DR. MIDDENDORF: Yeah.  
21                    DR. WARD: Good.  
22                    DR. MIDDENDORF: Whatever you decide has to be done in an open meeting of  
23                    the full committee. So either it needs to be drafted today while we're here or we  
24                    need to try and establish another, a meeting. Those are part of the FACA rules.  
25                    It's a federal advisory committee; it has to be done in an open meeting.  
26                    DR. WARD: So one option again, depending on how difficult the task is going to  
27                    be and how much, I mean, this is not going to necessarily be a 50- page report; it  
28                    could be a two- or three-page report so, so one option, I think, that might make  
29                    sense is that I could draft something and then we could have a teleconference to  
30                    discuss the draft and make any changes that we want to make.  
31                    DR. TALASKA: My only concern is with the documentation. If we're going to  
32                    document this well, it's going to take some time to document and can't be done  
33                    just ad hoc, at least from my point of view; I'm not that bright. So I can't provide  
34                    all the references that one would consider including to make sure that the  
35                    documentation is robust.  
36                    DR. WARD: Okay, well, why don't we wait until the end -- towards the end of the  
37                    meeting to address that, when we have a better sense of what we're talking  
38                    about?

1 DR. TALASKA: Okay.  
2 DR. WARD: But I understand your concern and we'll figure out some way to  
3 incorporate everyone's input.  
4 Was there anyone else who wants... Yes.  
5 MS. DABAS: I just want to know if the recommendation had to be unanimous  
6 amongst the committee or just majority, and whether there was going to be your  
7 opinions written?  
8 DR. MIDDENDORF: Whatever the recommendation is, it needs to be a majority of  
9 the committee, a majority of the voting members, according to our bylaws.  
10 DR. WARD: Okay, so I think the question we'd like to address first, and I'll ask for  
11 volunteers, you know, to speak, but I would love to hear from as many members  
12 of the committee as possible so we really have a sense. And so the question we're  
13 going to address first is whether we think any cancers should be listed as World  
14 Trade Center-related.  
15 And I'd like to give the people on the phone the opportunity to speak first, not to  
16 put them on the spot but just to make sure they have the opportunity. If you  
17 would prefer to defer until later in the discussion, that's okay, too, but let me  
18 know if you'd like to speak.  
19 DR. DEMENT: This is John.  
20 DR. WARD: John, John, sorry.  
21 DR. DEMENT: I guess, I feel like we're sort of going a bit backwards with regard to  
22 any cancers, and if you're asking me for a comment with regard to I think it's  
23 reasonably anticipated that cancers will result -- will come about as a result of this  
24 exposure, my answer would be yes. But then I have some concerns about a  
25 general statement about cancers.  
26 DR. WARD: So let me just paraphrase to make sure we understand. So you're  
27 saying you think it might be reasonable to say that some forms of cancer might  
28 reasonably be anticipated to occur but maybe not reasonable to say all cancers?  
29 Is that...  
30 DR. DEMENT: Well, I, I think it's reasonably -- it's a reasonable anticipation that  
31 cancers will result from this exposure; however, I think we need to then go from  
32 there with some more discussions about types of cancers that have greater  
33 support for that conclusion.  
34 DR. WARD: Okay. One thing we've done in the room is we put up kind of a  
35 standardized list of cancer types. We've put up a standardized list of cancer types  
36 and I don't know if there's a way to -- which is from the American Cancer Society's  
37 Cancer Facts and Figures, but it's the same kind of classification that's used by  
38 pretty much everyone for human cancers. So Paul, if you can get it to show the

1 full screen, that would be great. And this is just so that when we refer to -- if we  
2 want to refer to cancers of different organ groups.  
3 DR. MIDDENDORF: That is full screen.  
4 DR. WARD: This is just a tool to help us communicate. It's nothing more than  
5 that. And people can access this online if they're at home at an internet by going  
6 to the cancer.org website and looking for the facts and figures publications.  
7 Okay, so Virginia, any comments now or do you want to hold off until later in the  
8 discussion?  
9 DR. WEAVER: No, I do want to comment now because I will not be able to rejoin  
10 you after lunch, so... I would concur with John that I think that World Trade  
11 Center exposures will increase risk for cancer.  
12 I think there may well be specificity within particular types of cancer, and I base  
13 that based on tox knowledge and work with firefighters exposed to combustion  
14 products.  
15 I also think that in documenting our determination, there are some things that are  
16 critically important to include in that because no matter what decision we make, it  
17 will be -- it will generate a great deal of discussion, and so I think it's very  
18 important to document the discussion we had yesterday about measurable  
19 increased risk in cancer from only a month of asbestos exposure, about decreased  
20 breast cancer rate with cessation of HRT, and I also think Liz made some  
21 comments about radiation that -- I was trying to teach and couldn't hear all that  
22 well, but I think that it's very important that we document measurable increased  
23 risk from short-term or relatively short-term exposures.  
24 And then I think that it's important that we, if we go forward with some type of  
25 cancer recommendation, clearly document that we are not sitting and waiting for  
26 epidemiology, that there are other lines of science that we can use to move  
27 forward.  
28 DR. WARD: Thank you.  
29 So now turning to other members of the committee, maybe you can signify with  
30 your tent cards when you'd like to speak. Steve has his tent card up.  
31 DR. MARKOWITZ: I also think that at a minimum there's a reasonably strong  
32 likelihood that at least some cancers will have or will result from World Trade  
33 Center exposures. A reasonably strong likelihood that cancer has or will result  
34 from World Trade Center exposures, and I have a number of components of an  
35 argument that, if I can go through some of those.  
36 One is the, the fact that many established human and suspected human  
37 carcinogens were documented to be present in the dust, or in the dust or smoke,  
38 at that time.

1                   Secondly, we know that there were certainly ample exposure to World Trade  
2                   Center dust and smoke, not so much documented through many of the sampling  
3                   but documented through both knowledge about what occurred at the site, but  
4                   also I'm impressed by the magnitude of the nonmalignant disease that's occurred  
5                   among World Trade Center responders.  
6                   Third, we heard some information about the relationship between relatively short  
7                   exposures and cancer. Not saying that all exposures there were short because we  
8                   know that community exposure probably continued over a number of years.  
9                   There were in addition some workers who worked outside of the World Trade  
10                  Center after -- site after it closed in June or July 1st, 2002, but the majority, at  
11                  least of the workers, had relatively short exposures. Although I'm impressed by if  
12                  you worked 12- to 16-hour shifts, seven days a week for six months, that gives you  
13                  a year and a half of exposure in a relatively short period of time. Nonetheless, by  
14                  occupational standards, the exposures were relatively short but we've heard  
15                  evidence, both from limited human epidemiology but also from animal studies,  
16                  that short exposures can lead to cancer. That I think's an important part of the  
17                  rationale.  
18                  I think Dr. Weaver raised an interesting point that we should explore about  
19                  steeper exposure rates. Maybe that influences cancer incidence.  
20                  Another point is about synergy, which is, with so many carcinogens present, the  
21                  rule in multiple carcinogens, even though it hasn't been thoroughly investigated,  
22                  is that synergy seems to occur very commonly; and whether that's for PAHs, as Dr.  
23                  Talaska mentioned, or Dr. Rom mentioned for asbestos, that the interaction when  
24                  multiple carcinogens are present is the usual case, not the exception.  
25                  I think another point that Dr. Dement raised is there's no -- current scientific  
26                  thinking is that there's no safe threshold for the carcinogenic effect in asbestos or  
27                  for that matter other human carcinogens as well.  
28                  A further point is that the hallmark of nonmalignant disease among responders  
29                  and community residents has been inflammation, inflammatory disease in the  
30                  respiratory tract. And it's pretty well established, and Dr. Aldrich and Dr. Rom  
31                  know this a lot better than I do, but that inflammation is an underlying mechanism  
32                  for the development of cancer and that's become an emerging hypothesis but  
33                  there's a lot of evidence in support of it.  
34                  Then finally we come to epidemiology. It's limited but I think the firefighter study  
35                  is a positive study. Positive, I don't mean positive for people who have developed  
36                  cancer but positive in the sense that it showed an increased risk. It didn't appear  
37                  to occur accidentally and isn't readily explained, I think, by confounders; it's a  
38                  modest increase in risk but it is there.

1 So I think when I put it all together, to me, this supports a case in favor of a  
2 reasonably strong likelihood that cancer has or will result from WTC exposures.  
3 DR. WARD: Thank you, Steve. Leonard, Kimberly, do you know which one of you  
4 put --  
5 DR. TRASANDE: Sure. I was third. I was third. I think Tom was first.  
6 DR. WARD: Okay, good. Thank you, I was taking notes so I wasn't looking up. So  
7 which of you was first; do you know?  
8 DR. ALDRICH: I guess I was.  
9 DR. WARD: Okay.  
10 DR. MIDDENDORF: Before you start, I just want to remind everybody, you need to  
11 hold the microphone up near your mouth for the entire time you're speaking.  
12 Otherwise the transcriptionist can't hear it, and we want to make sure that we  
13 capture everything clearly.  
14 DR. ALDRICH: I'm sorry, I thought this was on. I was one of many authors of the  
15 fire department study. I was not the primary or secondary, I wasn't the senior  
16 author, but I do have a good bit of familiarity with that study and although it's a  
17 single study and only epidemiology so far, it does have a number of really  
18 important strengths: it was a well-controlled study with a known exposure, pretty  
19 well-known exposure, with good, maybe not perfect case finding, that means that  
20 the numerator was probably pretty close to accurate; and a known total  
21 population at risk, which means the denominator is pretty close to accurate; and  
22 furthermore it took surveillance bias and a number of other biases well into  
23 account. I would like to point out one thing that isn't clear from a cursory reading  
24 of that paper, that the cases that were found after 9/11 were not at an earlier  
25 stage on average; in fact, the stages were, if anything, slightly later-stage cancers  
26 for the post-9/11, which suggests that this was not surveillance bias that took --  
27 that led to the higher level.  
28 The finding was that total cancers were increased to a small degree. This is not an  
29 epidemic level increase in cancers but it was only seven years post-9/11 that were  
30 included in the data so rates may well be higher in future studies. Nonetheless  
31 the study was, did show an increase in cancer incidence, and so although it's only  
32 a single study and although it's quite preliminary, I think that there is some  
33 epidemiology that we should not ignore and so for those reasons I favor including  
34 cancers of some types in -- recommending the inclusion of cancers of some types  
35 in the health program.  
36 DR. WARD: Thanks. Guille?  
37 MS. MEJIA: Okay. I'm just going to jump into this. It's my position and my  
38 opinion that cancer should be covered. Whether all cancers should be covered, I

1 don't know. You know, that's something that we need to have further discussions  
2 on.  
3 What do I base this on? Well, it may seem -- my rationale may seem elementary  
4 to some, I mean, I'm not a doctor, I am not a scientist, I am not a researcher, but I  
5 think it's a conclusion that any reasonable person would reach based on the  
6 presentations that we've had for the last three or four days, you know, the  
7 beginning in November to today.  
8 We know a lot of things. Whether we can put them all together is something that  
9 we also have to work out but we know a lot of things. We know that there were  
10 lots of substances that were present in the environment and we know that many  
11 of these substances are very toxic and many of them are carcinogens.  
12 We know how the exposures occurred. People were caught in the cloud and then  
13 there were workers who were responding and performing work that was  
14 necessary to rescue and eventually restore the area.  
15 We know how and why these substances entered the body. I mean, right? We  
16 know the routes of entry; there was inhalation hazards. There were no controls in  
17 place so that, you know, the workers could not be protected against inhaling  
18 some of these substances or ingesting some of these substances or coming into  
19 contact with some of these substances.  
20 We know that there are effects from these exposures based on the fact that we  
21 have workers in the program that have covered conditions. So there are some  
22 effects from these exposures. The fact when we're dealing with cancers, at least  
23 in the field of workers comp, there is -- there have been cases and causal  
24 relationships established between the disease and the work at Ground Zero. So  
25 there is some causal relationship there.  
26 We know that, aside from many of these substances being classified as  
27 carcinogens, many of them are also -- can cause inflammation and can cause  
28 irritation that may be a precursor to cancer. All right, at least that's what I heard  
29 from the presentations.  
30 We know that there are many gaps in the data but we should not hold that, you  
31 know, against the worker. It's not their fault that there are no -- that there is not  
32 enough data there. You know, they were just out there to respond and to take  
33 care of what they needed to take care of.  
34 Yesterday we heard a presentation about short exposures to high concentrations  
35 of substances, especially in the textile workers. I think that's important to keep in  
36 mind, that just a short exposure can lead to cancer. So, you know, we don't need  
37 to worry about latency. I mean, the traditional thought about cancer is that  
38 there's a latency period involved. I mean, it's like an old married couple. You talk

1 about cancer and you got to talk about latency. In this group they don't have the  
2 luxury of time to wait.

3 Just a few other thoughts. Just because the association between the exposure  
4 and cancer may not be strong at this time, I don't think that we should dismiss it  
5 entirely. I think there's enough out there to make a case for the coverage of  
6 cancer.

7 And finally I think that what I need to say is that even though the incidence -- if we  
8 deem the incidence of cancer among the population to be improbable due to a  
9 lack of studies or any other information, I don't think that it means that it's not  
10 plausible. And that's an important point to make. That's it.

11 DR. WARD: Thank you. I think Glenn was next, then Kimberly.

12 DR. TALASKA: Okay. First of all, I would agree that I think that cancer should be  
13 covered under -- for the first responders, and I think there's several reasons. I  
14 think Steve just did a great job of very systematically laying out why, and Guille  
15 did, too, why it might be the case.

16 I think some of the arguments against that seemed to be important were that the  
17 epidemiological data are not strong enough for causality, and that is an argument  
18 that, again, I think, on the other hand the data are starting to show some things.  
19 And in the studies that are being done they are trending in a way that is disturbing  
20 for an observer. Second, I think the other reason that one might believe that it  
21 would not be related is that the data today report that the exposures were  
22 relatively small. I think we heard yesterday from John Dement and I provided  
23 some evidence that that may in fact not be the case and that there's reason to  
24 believe that the exposures were, for the individuals working in the Pile certainly,  
25 that the exposures were quite large. And that there are data to support that from  
26 some of the biological monitoring that was done, and also the relationship  
27 between the personal and the area samples, and the history of that.

28 So I think, and then most importantly I think we've got a soup of carcinogens  
29 which are known to affect several sites, specific sites, and these are some of the  
30 sites that we're considering. So the materials that were known to be in the cloud  
31 and materials that were known to be at Ground Zero have caused disease which  
32 people, some people are seeing.

33 And then finally that the interaction between these materials, the soup included  
34 materials that were not only carcinogen initiators but were carcinogen promoters,  
35 and they tend to complete the package. And some of these materials were those  
36 which would tend to persist.

37 I agree with the others on the committee that the exposure apparently, if we have  
38 people that are working for six months, working long shifts and double shifts, that

1 in fact that's a significant exposure and a significant time that they were there. In  
2 some cases locally extremely high levels, it appears, so I think there's, for those  
3 reasons, I would support the inclusion of at least some cancers into the, into our  
4 recommendation.

5 DR. WARD: Thank you. Kimberly?

6 MS. FLYNN: I think that some cancers, and I am not expert enough to say which,  
7 but I think certainly non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, I will never hear the initials NHL as  
8 National Hockey League ever again. This has been a constant refrain but I would  
9 certainly go beyond blood cancers. I think that some cancers must be included for  
10 the exposed population of responders and survivors.

11 I want to remind anyone who was not present at the November STAC meeting to  
12 hear the survivor presentation, to please go back and read that presentation in  
13 the record. Survivors were exposed in myriad, myriad ways to World Trade  
14 Center dust and smoke, some of the testimony we heard earlier today went to the  
15 fact that survivors had, you know, intense dust cloud day-of exposures, they also  
16 had ongoing exposures in the area. Many people live and work in the area, as Jo  
17 Polett testified, there is World Trade Center contamination -- was World Trade  
18 Center contamination present in air handling units in her building. This is the case  
19 in many buildings.

20 Everyone here needs to understand that there was no proper testing and clean-up  
21 program by the Environmental Protection Agency, the only agency that in fact has  
22 the expertise, obligation and capacity to pull off such a program.

23 Fewer than 18 percent of apartment, individual apartments in lower Manhattan  
24 below Canal Street, were cleaned by the EPA. And there's a lot of people here  
25 who could tell you that in many ways that clean-up was flawed and inadequate.  
26 So, you know, when a cancer is added for responders, it's added for survivors  
27 under Zadroga for that reason and also for the reasons that survivors do not have  
28 a monitoring program.

29 Responders have a monitoring program. You qualified for that program if you  
30 were exposed. Survivors had a treatment program which became widely available  
31 to them in the year 2006, very, very late in the game. Lots and lots of survivors  
32 went elsewhere, saw private doctors. That is one of the reasons why the  
33 denominator, the number of patients in the survivor program is, you know, a little  
34 over, well is probably closer, actually at this point, to 6,000.

35 But shifting on to some of the testimony that we heard today and also a repeated  
36 refrain, which I think is very, very important, that the events were unprecedented,  
37 that the exposures were unprecedented. And I guess I want to challenge all of the  
38 experts on this panel to really very carefully think through what that means in

1 terms of constructing a robust rationale for cancers to be added. And I think that  
2 actually that Dr. Markowitz and Dr. Weaver have started doing that.  
3 So unprecedented means that you are exposed to a host of toxic materials which  
4 are simultaneously carcinogenic, mutagenic, materials that simultaneously attack  
5 the nervous system, the immune system, the endocrine system; and that for  
6 many, many people these contaminants, their exposure to these contaminants,  
7 was in the form of an absolutely unprecedented assault. I had firefighters tell me  
8 that being in the vicinity, being on the site, when those buildings collapsed was  
9 like having somebody pull your head back, open your mouth and, like, load in, you  
10 know, three bottles of talcum powder, you know, at 150 miles an hour traveling  
11 into your mouth and overwhelming your airway, overwhelming your body  
12 systems and I'm not excluding cops, who we know were exposed and had no  
13 respirators. We know so many people had no protection whatsoever, but I'm  
14 saying that the insult to the body was absolutely unprecedented.  
15 I'm saying also that these insults happen in ways that we know about because we  
16 saw them on television and they happened in ways that we don't know about, so  
17 I'm talking about, you know, as Dr. Weaver said yesterday, the toddler crawling on  
18 a contaminated carpet, the kids who were jumping up and down on a  
19 contaminated sofa. I mean, these things happened all over lower Manhattan and  
20 in fact we really do not have any idea whether or not there are still people living  
21 and working in the area who are subject to ongoing exposures from the fact that,  
22 for instance, the air handling units were never properly cleaned.  
23 The other piece of this unprecedented -- so you have unprecedented exposures,  
24 you have unprecedented, you know, unfathomable exposure scenarios, some of  
25 which are ongoing, and likely ongoing, it's reasonable to assume that, and you  
26 also have this sort of new kinds of illness. So the medical director for the survivor  
27 program, [identifying information redacted], has said many times -- I think she's also  
28 testified to this in Congress -- that we're treating it, we're treating World Trade  
29 Center asthma like regular asthma but really we don't know what it is. So there  
30 are ways in which the disease process and there are ways in which the kind of the  
31 end point illness is WTC-specific, and I think that's also something that the experts  
32 here really need to take into account.  
33 What are all of the ways in which these unprecedented exposures may be  
34 shortening latency times? What are the ways -- I mean, I thought the idea that  
35 Dr. Weaver had, that we're looking at the possible impact of steepness of  
36 exposures. What are the ways in which we're seeing people who should not be  
37 getting multiple myeloma showing up with multiple myeloma in their early and  
38 mid-40s? What about these rare cancers that we're hearing about?

1                   And I guess when we start to look at the epidemiological record, I would have to  
2                   remind everyone here about Micki Siegel de Hernandez's testimony and the  
3                   degree to which what we currently have by way of, you know, denominators and  
4                   numerators is a partial perspective.  
5                   There are so many people out in the country right now who are not, whose  
6                   cancers are not being counted in the monitoring program, whose cancers are not  
7                   eligible for the World Trade Center health registry or maybe they didn't even  
8                   know that the World Trade Center health registry existed. So there are all of  
9                   those people out there and some of them actually managed to make it in here and  
10                  talk to us.  
11                  So I think that we, you know, we understand, you know, I think that the FDNY  
12                  study was very well designed and I'm very glad to hear Dr. Aldrich say that, you  
13                  know, he considers it to be strong, strong epidemiological evidence, and as a non-  
14                  expert, I wholeheartedly agree. I understand also that the FDNY needed to take  
15                  certain steps to be able to say that look, we're controlling for surveillance bias. I  
16                  understand that but we also need to consider, as Micki said, the numbers of  
17                  people who are not being surveilled at all.  
18                  And I think that we have to base our considerations -- and it's very, very  
19                  reasonable for us to make sure that we are not allowing this, this population to  
20                  essentially fall into a data gap that was not created by them and that is not their  
21                  fault and I think that we owe everyone, survivors as well as responders,  
22                  deliberation here that looks at the available data in the context of unprecedented.  
23                  DR. WARD: Thank you, and I've tried to now make a list of tent cards 'cause we  
24                  have so many of them it's hard to follow, but I think the order was Bill, Leonardo,  
25                  Julia, Valerie, Susan and Catherine? So Bill.  
26                  DR. ROM: Thank you. First of all I think I would like to start off by seconding  
27                  Steve's list of exposures. I do make the case that WTC dust and responders have a  
28                  risk for cancer. The exposures included carcinogens, there were multiple  
29                  carcinogens, there was broad exposure in the short term, and all of these  
30                  increased the risk and these people will develop increased numbers of cancers.  
31                  Second of all, the issue of lumping or splitting, do we just say cancer or do we say  
32                  specific cancers? I think the Zadroga Act answers that question. It doesn't just say  
33                  lung disease, it lists lung diseases. So if you look through the list and you look for  
34                  sarcoidosis as a specific lung disease, you don't find it. And the Zadroga Act did do  
35                  a little bit of lumping and took sarcoidosis and put it under interstitial lung  
36                  disease, which probably has a few diseases that may not be associated, so I guess  
37                  we can do a little bit of lumping.  
38                  So going on to the specific diseases, I think lymphoma, leukemia and multiple

1 myeloma already are being seen. And even with such a short latency these  
2 cancers are coming up and we should probably list them. But then you get to  
3 splitting again and lymphoma has non-Hodgkin's and Hodgkin's. And you look  
4 through the firefighter paper and non-Hodgkin's is significant but Hodgkin's is not.  
5 And then if you look at leukemias, ALL occurs in children and CLL in older patients.  
6 It may not have much of a biological plausibility for environmental exposures so  
7 I'll take a pass on those, leave it as a lumping.  
8 And then there's two big sites that are -- need to be addressed, and they're the  
9 major sites on the list you put on the board and that's lung, and then some other  
10 sites that came up positive in the epi studies. So for lung I'll start with that. That  
11 did not come up in the firefighter study and it did not come up in [identifying  
12 information redacted]line about the Mt. Sinai study of the responders. But I think  
13 lung is very biologically plausible, and we have the carcinogens and we are going  
14 to see lung cancer, and I think these people should be evaluated and should get  
15 support. And I would expand the lung to also include mesothelioma, even though  
16 we're violating our rule of latency on both of them as we don't have 20 years you  
17 need for lung cancer and 35 to 40 years for mesothelioma. I just don't think we  
18 can wait that long for proof.  
19 And then there's three sites that popped up that I don't think there's any  
20 biological plausibility at all, and they're thyroid and prostate and some sites in the  
21 GI track. So these popped up in the firefighter study and [identifying information  
22 redacted] mention of the responder study. So I have difficulty in supporting sites  
23 that just don't have any biological plausibility for environmental exposure, WTC  
24 dust or otherwise. It just doesn't make any sense. That's too, that's a bit of a  
25 leap. And we have to provide the science to the administrator and we can't  
26 provide any science on those, other than data from these epi studies that  
27 probably represent surveillance bias and other confounding reasons they came  
28 up. And maybe the committee can address these further. Thanks.  
29 DR. WARD: Thank you. Leonardo?  
30 DR. TRASANDE: Thank you. I want to begin by supporting Steve and others' lines  
31 of argument and state my opinion that cancer should be included as a covered  
32 condition, leaving pending the second component of the discussion.  
33 I wanted to add roughly five points that I think represent issues that have been  
34 glancingly addressed so far but I think are very important. One is that our legal  
35 direction, as I understand it from the Zadroga bill, is not to distinguish  
36 subpopulations, and my understanding is that we're still always relying on a  
37 clinician judgment once a condition is added to the bill for -- that is required in  
38 order to result in having a patient have care supported by the Zadroga fund.

1                   And also my second point is that community exposures were highly variable in this  
2                   context and likely overlapped in ranges of exposure with exposures experienced  
3                   by many of the responders, and I think that's important to highlight and I think,  
4                   much as we try to characterize those exposures with questionnaires and other  
5                   methods, it may be impossible to really tease that apart very carefully. And I'm  
6                   hearing a theme of well, we know in responders there's more plausibility for  
7                   responders but I think there's a very large gray area here that we need to accept.  
8                   And I think there's quite a lot of plausibility for community exposures leading to  
9                   cancer in this population as well.

10                  I wouldn't be here if I didn't raise a point about pediatric and perinatal  
11                  vulnerability. That raises additional and worrisome concerns in what are likely  
12                  less exposed populations. So that's my third comment, and I think the literature  
13                  on that vulnerability is ample, I don't think I need to review it here.

14                  I want to keep my comments brief and just proceed to my fourth point, which is  
15                  that there -- we've talked about statistical capacity of the fire -- the department  
16                  study of the responder study that was presented yesterday, there's extremely  
17                  limited statistical power that exists, even if you use the whole 46,000 children  
18                  who lived below 14<sup>th</sup> Street on September 11, 2001. That nearly eliminates the  
19                  possibility of a definitive negative study in that population. And so I think I want  
20                  to caution, voice my caution, that we will need to rely on plausibility and  
21                  reasoning by analogy for pediatric and perinatal exposures and their association  
22                  with cancers that may have even latency in the range of a 30- to 40-year range,  
23                  given the uncharted waters that we're in. And though I would say it's worthy of  
24                  further study and I'll leave that point there.

25                  Following up on Bill's point, my fifth point is going to signal a concern I have about  
26                  splitting cancers by category, and that's especially keen for the pediatric  
27                  population. While I agree there are certain cancers that predominate and you  
28                  would expect increases in patterns to emerge if they were to emerge for ALL and  
29                  other conditions, and I agree with Bill's points that there are some concerns about  
30                  plausibility. I am concerned that we are in, in an uncharted territory and may  
31                  have to err on the side of biological plausibility as being the momearm (ph) for  
32                  our decision, and so I just would also raise further cautions when we're splitting  
33                  on the basis of adult responder data. And my concern being that there will not be  
34                  very good applicability of that coverage to a population that may have been  
35                  affected at an earlier stage of life. Thank you.

36                  DR. WARD: Okay. Julia?

37                  DR. QUINT: First I do agree that cancer should be included as a covered condition  
38                  for many of the reasons that Dr. Markowitz -- and I will third his notion of why.

1                   Lots of carcinogens, many -- some human carcinogens, lots of animal carcinogens,  
2                   and I want to say something about that in particular. We seem to be -- when we  
3                   act as government agencies to protect workers and public health, we try to  
4                   protect both populations from chemicals that have been identified as carcinogens  
5                   based on animal data, and we do that by implementing regulations and policies.  
6                   One of the commenters yesterday said that if he were under OSHA jurisdiction  
7                   and were constructing a building and had to use many of the carcinogens that  
8                   have been identified in the WTC dust and smoke, that, you know, he would have  
9                   to use certain controls because we do believe that those cancers that are found in  
10                  animals can cause cancer in humans. So that, you know, I think it's a false  
11                  distinction on the public health side and the prevention side, when we have laws  
12                  and regulations, to say that those are, those chemicals can cause cancer in  
13                  humans on one side and then when we end up seeing a number of cancers, that,  
14                  you know, we have a different rule for the covered conditions. You know, and in  
15                  that the agencies which are tasked with identifying evidence of whether or not  
16                  chemicals cause cancer, the National Toxicology Program and the International  
17                  Agency for Research on Cancer are now classifying agents as human carcinogens  
18                  based on mechanistic data in addition to epidemiological data and animal  
19                  bioassay data; and in fact, benzo alpha pyrene was classified as a human  
20                  carcinogen, is one of the WTC agents, is now classified as a human carcinogen by  
21                  IARC where it wasn't before, and this is based on mechanistic data.  
22                  And in addition IARC has published a review in which they have identified 11 sites  
23                  of cancer for which there is sufficient human evidence, and some of the -- for  
24                  those 11 sites, WTC agents are implicated; in other words, if you look at, I don't  
25                  know how many of the different agents, but asbestos for instance, they have said  
26                  that there is sufficient evidence of human cancer for cancer of the ovary for  
27                  asbestos.  
28                  So I think we should definitely look at that IARC review in terms of the cancers  
29                  that they have had -- have deemed as sufficient evidence of human cancer for the  
30                  agents that were in the WTC dust and smoke. It seems very pertinent. They're a  
31                  very prestigious group. But they are looking at lots of data. It's reviewed by a  
32                  huge panel of people, and I don't think we need to repeat that review.  
33                  Again, you know, we talked about exposure. We don't have a lot of exposure data  
34                  but we do have -- we operate on this premise, again, on the prevention side that if  
35                  chemicals are genotoxic there's no safe exposure level. Many of these chemicals,  
36                  most of them are genotoxic. And even for the ones that may be operating by an  
37                  epigenetic mechanism, we have individual variability in terms of the exposed  
38                  populations, both survivors and responders and the whole gamut of people who

1                   were exposed, and we have different background exposures. And one of the ways  
2                   in which this can play out is that some people have a very different ability to  
3                   metabolize chemicals, toxic chemicals, to make them nontoxic, so that will  
4                   contribute disproportionately to their risk for cancer. And we don't know a lot  
5                   about that.  
6                   The other thing is we don't know how large the number is of people who may  
7                   have developed cancer from these exposures because we don't have sufficient  
8                   surveillance systems to pick them up. So I think that, you know, all of this is a  
9                   developing science. The mechanistic data is developing as we speak. A lot of the  
10                  cancers that are not deemed to be human carcinogens today will be in the future.  
11                  So I personally have a very hard time.  
12                  Some cancers we have more evidence for. I would definitely go with the list of  
13                  cancers that have been shown in epi studies where there is an increased risk, and  
14                  definitely the ones that IARC has associated with some of the agents that we  
15                  know were in the dust and smoke. But beyond that we don't know which cancers  
16                  in humans will be caused by the chemicals that cause cancer in animals because  
17                  they aren't concordant. And so I think that that raises the possibility that some of  
18                  these cancers that we don't think -- that we don't have evidence for now, we  
19                  might have evidence for in the future based on mechanistic data, and I have a very  
20                  hard time leaving, you know, saying that cancers that -- for which we don't have  
21                  human data right now and don't have strong biological plausibility may not be  
22                  covered. That's my dilemma with all of this.  
23                  DR. WARD: Valerie.  
24                  MS. DABAS: I also looked at the IARC report and I found several things. One of  
25                  them was ovary cancer linked to asbestos as well as larynx, colorectum, stomach.  
26                  They also identified beryllium now as a human carcinogen and found that there  
27                  was significant epidemiological studies that indicate a high risk of lung cancer in  
28                  occupational group. Cadmium also had carcinogenic levels. On page 80 it  
29                  identified prostate cancer as one of the things that it was -- that it linked to it.  
30                  Urinary and kidney cancer were amongst the ones that they found. They  
31                  identified lead and that it increased the risk of lung cancer, stomach cancer,  
32                  urinary bladder cancer. When they looked at PCBs and they found Hodgkin's  
33                  lymphoma in one study dated 1996 as one of the risks of being exposed to lead.  
34                  Again, quoting from them, as in the studies reviewed by IARC, instead of risk of  
35                  liver or bile duct cancers were reported in several cohorts and follow-up studies of  
36                  capacity workers. One case control study also reported increased risk of bile duct  
37                  cancer. They listed several others such as tissue sites such as gastrointestinal  
38                  tract, brain, testes or skin.

1                   When they looked at PNAs, they listed in animals that they found PNAs cause  
2                   numerous types of cancers in animals including lung tumors, liver cancers, skin  
3                   tumors, urinary bladder cancer, forestomach tumors, esophageal tumors,  
4                   intestinal tumors, mammary gland tumors, nose tumors, larynx, pharynx,  
5                   lymphoma, tongue tumors, anus tumors, cervix tumors, abdominal tumors,  
6                   tumors of the blood vessels, kidney cancer, respiratory system cancer, ovarian  
7                   tumors, cancers of the oral cavity and cancer at the injection site sarcoma.  
8                   So when we looked at that report we found that there was significant evidence  
9                   and they had significant epidemiological studies to back their evidence in their  
10                  2011 report. I think it would be very dangerous if we start picking apart cancers,  
11                  specifically for the person that came in today that had a very rare cancer. You  
12                  know, what do we do with that person? Do they stay out for the entire time while  
13                  they figure out whether his cancer specifically is linked to the World Trade Center  
14                  exposures or what? And those people are the ones that are going to get drugs  
15                  that are not covered by their health insurance. People with very rare cancers are  
16                  under -- you know, they more than likely will not have drugs that, you know, are  
17                  covered by their insurance.  
18                  You know, I had one guy, [identifying information redacted], who spoke to me, and  
19                  he has a very rare cancer of the pancreas and his drug is a test. And so it's  
20                  \$12,000 per month and it is not covered under his health insurance. So I think if  
21                  we start picking cancers apart, we're going to leave the people that are most  
22                  needy out to dry.  
23                  DR. WARD: Thank you. Susan?  
24                  MS. SIDEL: Thank you. I of course definitely think that cancer should be included  
25                  and I think that, to make a case for this scientifically, I think that we're in fairly  
26                  good shape because I think that one of the big things that has come out of this is  
27                  that so much of the information we have is not like, it's not working in real time.  
28                  Because even any of the studies that have been done, including the one that isn't  
29                  even out yet, is already old. By the time they compile the people that have cancer  
30                  and then match that against the New York state registry, which is two years  
31                  behind, and then they have to submit it for publication. And then I'm sure the  
32                  publication period, you know, that takes awhile because you might get rejected;  
33                  you have to go some place else, and then your article has revisions, so anything  
34                  that we can work with in real time is going to be way too old for it to be, to help  
35                  people today.  
36                  The other thing that I'm very concerned about is that our committee and in fact  
37                  the entire World Trade Center health program is over like 15 years from 9/11,  
38                  right? There's, like, a statutory end to this. And that is when we're going to see --

1 that is when we are going to have the latency period for a lot of cancers come up,  
2 so if we did rely on epidemiological studies, we're not going to have them until we  
3 can't do anything with them. And that is really, really hard, you know, that is a  
4 shame.

5 I think that there's a lot of information in the articles we do have. On page 904 of  
6 the fire department, [identifying information redacted] article, in the first paragraph,  
7 I mean, the first column, I think it's the second paragraph, where he's talking  
8 about inflammation and how other diseases of inflammation that are affecting  
9 survivors and responders are the diseases that are covered, so that's like a big  
10 lead-in to what kind of cancers should -- you know, if you follow the same  
11 thinking, the same track, I think it's going to just naturally take you to covering  
12 certain cancers.

13 And then the other thing is that we have a lot of information that's just old  
14 established science on what carcinogens cause when people are exposed to them.  
15 And I think that it's out there, it's old established science and that we can just  
16 compile things based on that evidence. Thanks.

17 DR. WARD: Thank you, so what we're going to do is take the final comments, like,  
18 from Catherine and Bob and then we'll take a break for lunch.

19 MS. HUGHES: Hi. As I think the only local mom on this committee, I just wanted  
20 to provide a little insight 'cause I had two young boys on September 11<sup>th</sup>. And  
21 people talked about exterior clean-up. Well, one of the problems was the EPA  
22 was supposed to be in charge of the internal clean-up on spaces and then the DEP  
23 was responsible for the outside.

24 And every part of it was a process and we've heard about whether it's worked or  
25 it hasn't worked. But for example, finally the DEP did get around to requiring that  
26 roofs of buildings had to be cleaned. For a very long time roofs were never  
27 cleaned. And facades of buildings were hosed down, if they were cleaned, for  
28 months or up to over a year. So in the summer of 2006, if I hadn't reported into  
29 the DEP clean-up, the newspaper stand one block from the World Trade Center  
30 site, then the little top of that stand would never have been cleaned. They found  
31 six bags of World Trade Center debris over a year later on the roof of the  
32 newsstand. And a lot of people walk in that area.

33 When I had my son's birthday in October of 2002, which was over a year, in the  
34 dark, I see a guy in a white tie-back suit with rubber boots, bolted onto the roof,  
35 doing an asbestos or EPA, you know, exterior clean-up. So I just want to remind  
36 people about the inconsistencies of exposures, and they were ongoing for the  
37 community as well.

38 I agree with a lot of what our medical experts have said here and, you know, that

1 Dr. Markowitz had kicked off, and if we could also look at cancers so we're looking  
2 at systems rather than just picking one. Because that rare cancer we heard about,  
3 I'm not a doctor but it could have been related to dioxin exposures or from the  
4 dielectric fluid, I believe, 'cause I happened to be researching it the other day, but  
5 he should not be left. So if we're looking at systems, so it could be that you were  
6 exposed through the skin, so look at the skin as a holistic mechanism, look at the  
7 inhalation and the ingestion, so that's how we can start looking at the cancers.  
8 Thank you.

9 DR. WARD: Thank you. Bob?

10 DR. HARRISON: I agree, yes. I think everybody -- I've just been taking notes. So  
11 I'm a yes also in terms of the general inclusion of cancer but I had just -- I would  
12 add just a few other points.

13 I think there's some interesting evidence in terms of short-term exposure to  
14 benzene and hematopoietic malignancies that could be cited as evidence. As has  
15 been said, this is a relatively short-term exposure but there's some -- quite a bit of  
16 data, I think, is emerging on low-dose and/or intermittent exposures to benzene  
17 that could provide some, you know, additional biological bases to argue that  
18 there's scientific evidence to make a recommendation.

19 I would like to see somehow mention of certain premalignant hematopoietic  
20 disorders. The healthcare providers may see somebody with aplastic anemia,  
21 there's a premyeloma condition, there's myelodysplasia, there's number of blood  
22 disorders that, followed long enough, will lead to malignancy without the  
23 diagnosis yet of AML or multiple myeloma. So somehow I'd like to get across that,  
24 so it doesn't hamstring the healthcare provider in not being able to provide  
25 treatment for those conditions. Sometimes it's just monitoring.

26 Third is I think we should acknowledge that cancer is multifactorial, that there are  
27 individuals who develop cancer from multiple risk factors both environmental,  
28 occupational and personal. I think it's important to acknowledge, for credibility  
29 actually, that cancer is multifactorial, that not all cancer is the same, that we're  
30 going to have individuals who are eligible for treatment and compensation who  
31 have smoked for 40-pack years, who have dietary risks, who have genetic risk  
32 factors, and that to the casual reader I think it's not necessarily intuitive that -- or  
33 how three months of exposure is responsible for their cancer when they might  
34 have multiple other risk factors that seemingly are even more important.

35 This is a problem I face all the time with my patients who have occupational or  
36 environmental exposures, and so I would suggest adding something along the  
37 lines of, I think to echo what Dr. Markowitz says, that citing the abundant medical  
38 and scientific literature that acknowledges that environmental and occupational

1 exposures are an important cause of cancer, that the exposures from the World  
2 Trade Center are likely to be a significant factor, or if you'd like, a substantial  
3 factor, in causing certain cancer types. So this really acknowledges that cancer is  
4 multifactorial but the contribution of the World Trade Center is a significant  
5 factor.

6 I think that might help the clinician, frankly, in the second phase, where each of  
7 the diseases must be certified. I think that would give them clear guidance and  
8 might give NIOSH some context in which to understand a specific case.

9 My last point is childhood cancers, and Dr. Rom mentioned ALL, which although I  
10 would like further discussion whether ALL should be included for adults, what  
11 about the child, you know, in the community who's diagnosed by a pediatrician,  
12 who's eligible and who has ALL? Should we not include that as a covered  
13 condition as one of the most common causes of childhood cancer? So I just want  
14 to make sure that we address that issue in some way.

15 MS. HUGHES: So can I make one point of clarification? I actually, I was actually  
16 looking at the New York State Data Registry from 2008. That was online, and, you  
17 know, it's four years later, and just did a really preliminary, nonscientific report  
18 and broke it down by ZIP code, and it turned out, just for lung and bronchial  
19 cancer for the years 2002 and 2006, you know, I haven't verified this, but if you  
20 look for the breakdown, there was an increase between 15 to 49 percent of above  
21 expected cancer rate for the ZIP code 10282. In ZIP code 10007 within 15 percent  
22 expected, within the ZIP code 10038, which is east of the World Trade Center site,  
23 15 to 49 percent increased, more in the financial area, ZIP code 10005, very sparse  
24 data, and then in ZIP code 10280, you know, there was again some lung cancer,  
25 but this is just very preliminary so it's, you know, just something to think about.  
26 Thank you.

27 DR. WARD: Thank you. So we will break for lunch. We're back on schedule so  
28 we'll reconvene at 12:45.

29 (Recess for lunch, 12:02 p.m. to 1:04 p.m.)

30 DR. WARD: Would the committee members please take their seats so we can get  
31 started? Okay, if everybody would take their seats so we can see who's here and  
32 who's not here. So we're still short a few committee members, Paul.

33 DR. MIDDENDORF: Yeah, we do have a quorum, though.

34 DR. WARD: Okay, so we do have a quorum, and what we're planning to do is  
35 really resume where we left off and have all the committee members who haven't  
36 spoken on the main issue have an opportunity to speak, and then move onto the  
37 next phase of the discussion. So Steve, would you like to start?

38 MR. CASSIDY: Yeah. Thank you. You know, I want to start off by saying that I too

1 support that cancers be included. I think the discussion of how we decide if we  
2 limit which cancers are covered or we try to eliminate certain cancers and say  
3 they shouldn't be covered is difficult.

4 When I look back at what was said yesterday, some of the testimony, I thought  
5 that it was very interesting, the presentation that Dr. Rom made about burnt  
6 particulate matter and how particulate matter clearly causes cancers and that  
7 burnt particulate matter was something he really hadn't experienced before. And  
8 we didn't have any real comparisons to that. And I think, you know, when you  
9 add that to what Dr. Talaska testified to about the exposure, about the pyrenes,  
10 about how the exposure was clearly greater than was measured, when you look at  
11 what the testimony from Dr. Dement about the asbestos and just about how  
12 much was in the air in terms of the concrete dust, I think it's just clear that this  
13 episode was something that is not comparable to anything in the past.

14 You know, I will point to something outside of the scientific things and think about  
15 what the New York City fire chiefs, the most experienced people in the world, did  
16 that day; they never thought those two buildings were coming down. The reason  
17 they never thought they were coming down was because they weren't supposed  
18 to come down. They are fireproof, high-rise buildings. We have fought thousands  
19 and thousands of fires in high-rise, fireproof buildings. So they did not believe  
20 that they would come down maybe at all and certainly not early.

21 When they came down, then you look back and say well, what was different?  
22 Well, what was different was two planes crashed into them at 600 miles an hour,  
23 jet fuel, all the things that we had never experienced. And I think that highlights  
24 for us on the committee that what we're dealing with, now in terms of trying to  
25 analyze the data and the cancers that have popped up, and we're doing it with  
26 only a short period of time, [identifying information redacted] study, the fire  
27 department study's only seven years; that when you look at that, you have to do it  
28 in the context that this is probably a once in a lifetime occurrence. It's certainly  
29 nothing to compare to. Uncomparable. There's nothing like it so I think when we  
30 decide on cancers, I think the consensus is yes, cancers have to be covered. You  
31 know, right now I would say I'm leaning toward saying that it's impossible, or very,  
32 very difficult, to say we should eliminate these cancers from the list or that we  
33 can, as we heard testimony from people here this morning who have incredibly  
34 rare cancers, how do you say well, we don't have any data that proves that that  
35 rare cancer is likely to happen and therefore you're out. I don't know how we do  
36 that; and I think there is enough scientific data that suggests that this exposure  
37 that people suffered was unlike any other one and because of that, I think that we  
38 could make an argument that maybe we should just include all cancers.

1 But I certainly believe that, you know, we're going in the right direction. I think  
2 cancers have to be covered. And I'm open to further discussion about how we do  
3 that but I want to do it in the context of reminding everyone that I think that the  
4 data shows and the testimony that we've had and the doctors who have made  
5 presentations to us are highlighting that the exposures that everybody faced that  
6 went down there are unique and significant and unlike probably anything else  
7 anybody has ever faced, and I think that's why we're facing such unique problems  
8 at this point in time. Thank you.

9 DR. WARD: Carol?

10 DR. NORTH: Thank you. I'll just be brief because it's been said. I'm in agreement  
11 with the other folks around the room that it seems appropriate to include cancers.  
12 I do want to say that we've heard a number of really moving and compelling  
13 testimonials that help bring a face to the diseases and the suffering, which has  
14 been a good thing. But I want to say that I make every effort to base my decision  
15 on science and I think we have good evidence in science both in the epidemiology  
16 and the biological plausibility of the known exposures that several of the other  
17 experts in the room have summarized very well. But that evidence leads me to  
18 believe that there is a substantial likelihood of excessive occurrence of cancers  
19 without sufficient compelling arguments of other explanations.

20 DR. WARD: Thank you. So I think we've heard from everyone on the committee.  
21 Virginia and John, are you still there?

22 DR. DEMENT: Yes, I'm still here.

23 DR. WARD: Thank you. And I think Virginia may have left for her class. So  
24 essentially what I heard pretty much, well, from every member of the committee  
25 is that they think cancer should be included, that there's a substantial likelihood of  
26 excess risk. I think many people made very, you know, compelling and convincing  
27 arguments of that. So the issue -- so that issue seems to be everyone has a  
28 common opinion on that.

29 I think the question then is between the decision to include all cancers and several  
30 people have spoken to, you know, to the fact that it's difficult to decide which  
31 cancers to exclude or that it's not appropriate to exclude any cancers. Other  
32 people have spoken to the idea that some cancers are much more likely than  
33 others and so we should try to designate certain cancers or organ systems as on  
34 the list and not necessarily include all cancers.

35 So my personal opinion, just I realize I haven't said it, is I'm in full agreement with  
36 everyone who said that cancer should be listed, and I still have some questions in  
37 my own mind about all cancers or selected cancers. And the one piece of  
38 information that is in my mind, and I know everyone's aware of it, but I think that

1 one of the things that's difficult for me is knowing that, over a lifetime, up to half  
2 of men and a third of women will get cancer. So even if the World Trade Center  
3 exposed populations had not had these exposures, you would expect a large  
4 number of people to get cancer. And so that's one of the things that's in my mind  
5 that makes it a little bit more difficult to decide if we should list all cancers or  
6 selected cancers, but I do agree with some of those arguments that we know  
7 something but we don't know everything, and so yes, it's possible to say well, if  
8 it's a cancer that's caused by asbestos, then it would -- there would be a very clear  
9 rationale for including it or if there's a cancer in a site where we've seen chronic  
10 irritation and inflammation, there's a clear rationale.

11 But, you know, again, I see the opposite, I mean, I see the other side as well that  
12 it's, you know, it's hard to exclude any cancers 'cause we really don't have a full  
13 set of information to make strong decisions about exclusion, so with that I'd like  
14 to leave the floor open to people who have opinions one way or the other on the  
15 issue of listing all or listing selected cancers.

16 DR. ALDRICH: I guess others have made this point but I think it bears repeating  
17 that other conditions that are covered under the bill, certainly bronchitis and  
18 asthma, PTSD and GERD, they all occur in many, many people absent World Trade  
19 Center exposure and yet they're covered. Nonetheless I think you make a good  
20 point that there is no way to know the exact causation or whether somebody who  
21 has a cancer was destined to get it in the absence of World Trade Center, but we  
22 have to work with what we have.

23 DR. HARRISON: Oh, I'm sorry. I think that there are some cancers for which the  
24 biological plausibility, the tox, the animal, the mechanistic, the human data are  
25 stronger for a connection and other cancers for which it's weaker or absent, and  
26 that I would like to see our committee make a recommendation that reflects the  
27 variety or the spectrum of evidence with some suggestion, and I'm not sure of the  
28 language with which to phrase this, but some suggestion that the evidence is  
29 stronger or that we see evidence for certain types of cancer that's greater than  
30 other types of cancer, and maybe not make a definitive recommendation on  
31 which absolutely to cover; in other words, transmit that notion, but I don't want  
32 to be so crass as to punt it back to Dr. Howard to make a final determination.  
33 The alternative would be to specify and to spell out very distinctly and create a  
34 list. I guess I don't personally feel like we either have the time or the charge as a  
35 committee to review the kinds of evidence in the detail that we need to really  
36 create such a specific list.

37 DR. WARD: Okay, any other comments on this? Steve? Sorry, Susan.

38 MS. SIDEL: Hi, I was just wondering if --

1 DR. MIDDENDORF: Before you start, could I do one thing? The reason we have  
2 the buzzing is because the microphones have to be turned up to make sure that  
3 you can be heard. If everybody will make sure that they put the microphone right  
4 in front of their face for the entire time they're talking, we can turn that down and  
5 hopefully get rid of the buzz.

6 MS. SIDEL: Okay, how's that? Thank you. You know, I was wondering from a  
7 practical perspective how specific we have to be because if we say cancer then --  
8 and maybe some other people can help with what the process is, but then your  
9 doctor, I'm assuming your World Trade Center doctor, has to say that you have a  
10 World Trade Center-related cancer. Then he's going to send that to the feds,  
11 they're going to certify it. Then you're going to have a fight with workers comp or  
12 whoever is going to pay for part of whatever. So there's a whole process that's  
13 involved.

14 So maybe we can lay out some guidelines and say there's certain cancers that are  
15 well-known to be associated with the carcinogens that were at the site and here's  
16 some of those, but that we're leaving it open. So therefore if your doctor can  
17 make a biological plausibility argument.

18 But then I'm also wondering is that in the course of that like what if, you know, do  
19 you have your occupational medicine doctor do that, do you have your oncologist  
20 do that? Who does that? So that's another thing that's out there. But I'm just  
21 wondering like in the real world how specific this is going to have to be at this  
22 point.

23 DR. WARD: Steven, then Kimberly.

24 DR. MARKOWITZ: So just to answer Susan's specific question, in the real world,  
25 the World Trade Center health program has many doctors who are not even  
26 trained in occupational medicine, and certainly not in oncology, and will be  
27 looking for a lot of guidance on what's related to the World Trade Center or not in  
28 terms of particular cancers. Whatever they decide then has to be reviewed by  
29 NIOSH which has already asked us for guidance from this committee. The more  
30 we comment on this probably the better off everybody is.

31 When I think about this issue I think, well, we should rely, there are various  
32 approaches. One way is to think that to rely primarily on epidemiology 'cause  
33 after all that's, you know, that's the human outcome. The problem with that of  
34 course is that we have one epi study, we have the Mt. Sinai study which we don't  
35 have because all we have is a one-liner on that so we can't really say anything  
36 about that. But whatever we say, you know, the Sinai study will be available in a  
37 couple of months and we have to leave open to whatever new findings they may  
38 have. But if we were to rely on the epidemiology, specifically the firefighter study,

1 the cancers we would come up with are thyroid, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, maybe  
2 colon, maybe stomach and melanoma. That's the list and I may be, you know,  
3 overlooking one or two, depending how you interpret the numbers actually, but  
4 that's the -- that would be the list.

5 An alternative approach would be, I think what has been discussed, which is it  
6 look at the roots of exposure and biological plausibility and look at where the  
7 nonmalignant disease is occurring among WTC survivors and responders, and then  
8 we'd look very much at respiratory cancers, upper respiratory cancers; we'd look  
9 at head and neck, pharyngeal, nasal, sinus cancers, laryngeal cancers. And the  
10 esophageal cancer because we know that reflux is increased among responders,  
11 and maybe skin cancer because all those PAHs got on people's skin when they  
12 worked down there. And that list, actually that list is virtually completely different  
13 from the list that you construct from the firefighters' study from the available  
14 epidemiology which is an odd problem.

15 Another approach would be, and I think this is kind of the broadest approach, is to  
16 look at the total list of chemicals that NIOSH in their first report on carcinogens  
17 listed as being of concern, it's in Appendix E or Appendix D of that report, and  
18 there are 287 chemicals. And I counted the number of IARC carcinogens, it's  
19 either A, or one or two carcinogens, but one is definite, two is -- 2A, 2B are  
20 possible, probable, and there are about 70 carcinogens on that list. So you could  
21 take that list of 70, and IARC has nicely spent the last few years updating that list  
22 and specific sites attached to that list, and then you can match up that list with  
23 those sites, including the sufficient evidence and the limited evidence, and you'd  
24 come up with a big universe of cancers that are plausibly related to what I told  
25 you has occurred down there.

26 There would probably still be some exceptions. It wouldn't include all cancers.  
27 I'm not sure that everything down -- if you match that up, which I haven't done,  
28 there are probably still a few cancer types that are excluded but it would be the  
29 broadest possible list that you could cite a rationale for.

30 I don't know which approach we should take but I think that sort of is -- or we  
31 could, you know, say we can't decide that, in the absence of being able to decide,  
32 then just include them all.

33 DR. MIDDENDORF: I just want to point out to the committee that the document  
34 similar to what you are suggesting has already been developed. It was sent out to  
35 each of the committee members roughly a few weeks ago. And I think that's the  
36 document that Valerie was discussing earlier.

37 DR. MARKOWITZ: And does it have the cancer sites attached to that?

38 DR. MIDDENDORF: Yes.

1 DR. MARKOWITZ: Oh, okay.  
2 DR. TALASKA: Yeah, I've been using that document for the last little while while  
3 listening to testimony and coming up with some of the sites and some of the  
4 compounds that are associated with it; and it for example in the discussion that  
5 we had for respiratory disease, clearly asbestos, PAH for hematopoietic cancer  
6 that are on our list, would be butadiene and PCBs. For non-Hodgkin's lymphoma,  
7 PAH is butadiene, formaldehyde, silica and dioxin. From leukemia, benzene,  
8 butadiene, formaldehyde, soot, PAHs and PCBs. And for thyroid the ones that are  
9 on there are dioxins, in furans and butadiene.  
10 DR. WARD: Julia?  
11 DR. QUINT: I also did what Dr. Markowitz did, is I counted up all the carcinogens  
12 and all of the IARC 1s and 2As and 2Bs and got 70. And I was alluding to what you  
13 said exactly in my earlier, not so articulate discussion of using the IARC list as a  
14 guide to deciding which cancers and I think Valerie actually had a broader list than  
15 I did. They have sufficient and limited. I only said the 11 cancer sites were the  
16 sufficient evidence, but we could definitely do the limited as well, and would be a  
17 broader number. So I very much favor that as opposed to any of the other two  
18 alternatives he listed, which was epi data and I forgot what the other ones were.  
19 Either that or all would be my suggestion.  
20 DR. WARD: Let me just ask one question for clarification. So are you referring to  
21 both animal and human sites or just human sites?  
22 DR. QUINT: I was referring to human sites. I think, and I had even narrowed it  
23 further to sufficient in human, which is a much narrower list. But I would be in  
24 favor of, you know, broadening that to the limited evidence as well. And it's this  
25 paper by Jim, right?  
26 DR. WARD: Right. Well, there's two separate documents. There's a paper by Jim  
27 and then there's a document that Paul put together that's much longer.  
28 DR. QUINT: That one I didn't get.  
29 DR. WARD: That actually lists all the sites in animals as well as humans. But what  
30 it doesn't have is -- what Jim's paper has that's unique is it has the carcinogens  
31 associated with each site.  
32 DR. QUINT: Exactly.  
33 DR. WARD: But this, but Paul's more extensive document has the sites associated  
34 with each --  
35 DR. QUINT: Okay. I didn't get Paul's document. And the only thing I would say  
36 about the animal sites is that there's lack of concordance with human sites, so I  
37 think we have to be a little careful about that. Because it causes cancer in one site  
38 in animals doesn't mean that it's going to cause that same cancer in humans, so I

1 would use caution with that.  
2 DR. WARD: Yeah, I agree and I think that's, but I wanted to make sure that's what  
3 you were thinking as well.  
4 DR. QUINT: Yes.  
5 DR. WARD: Kimberly.  
6 MS. FLYNN: I don't want to interrupt this particular flow of conversation; I just  
7 want to say two things. Would it be possible for both those documents to just  
8 quickly be resent to everybody because I'm hearing a little bit that not everyone  
9 has one or another of those documents?  
10 DR. MIDDENDORF: I just sent the NIOSH summary out to everybody. And you  
11 want the Cogliano?  
12 MS. FLYNN: Yeah.  
13 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay, yeah, I'll send that one right now.  
14 DR. WARD: And we can even put the Cogliano up on the screen.  
15 DR. MIDDENDORF: Yeah. We can even put the NIOSH one up, too.  
16 MS. FLYNN: The other issue is just something I want to mark and then we can  
17 come back to it later. As I understand it, and as the AFL-CIO understands it, there  
18 is provision in the Zadroga Bill for an individual's physician to petition the World  
19 Trade Center program administrator for inclusion of that specific case of cancer,  
20 you know, based on the specific argument that would be made.  
21 Maybe we can come back to this later, Dori. I don't know if you're the person to  
22 whom this question should be addressed but this is just in response to a point that  
23 Susan had raised. But again, I don't want to really, I don't want to interrupt the  
24 flow at this point.  
25 DR. WARD: So as I'm hearing it, there's at least three options on the table which  
26 are not mutually exclusive. One is to focus on the limited epidemiologic study, the  
27 cancers that have been seen to be in excess in the published epidemiologic study.  
28 One is to focus on cancers basically based on routes of exposure, biologic  
29 plausibility and the sites where we've observed nonmalignant conditions. Third is  
30 to really rely on the evidence that's been assembled by IARC regarding sites of  
31 cancer associated with carcinogens that were present at the World Trade Center  
32 site, and that idea would include both sites that were deemed to be sufficient and  
33 limited in humans.  
34 So I wonder if anyone else has a different point or a different idea than those  
35 three? I mean, obviously the other option on the table is to just specify all cancers  
36 and leave it up to the judgment of the physician.  
37 DR. ALDRICH: Well, then you could also look at combinations of those approaches  
38 but the one big, big problem with just looking at the epidemiologic data is that

1                   this was male only, and so clearly there would be no ovarian carcinomas, and  
2                   there's a question about asbestos relationship with that. And there will be very,  
3                   very few or very little possibility for breast cancer so I think that would be a  
4                   problem to rely on that alone.  
5                   DR. WARD: Valerie?  
6                   MS. DABAS: I think that's why I think we leave it up to the individual physicians.  
7                   I've seen them, it's, you know, on the basis that I've seen physicians specifically  
8                   tell responders that their particular cancer is not linked to WTC, so it's not a far  
9                   stretch to believe that physicians, individual physicians, would tell their patients  
10                  that these are the reasons why their cancer may not be linked. And so if they  
11                  have to make a written request to the program to get it, you know, to get this  
12                  person admitted into the program for cancer, I think that they would do it with  
13                  caution and we do have to leave the treating physician some leeway to make  
14                  determinations for their patients because they're going to know that patient's  
15                  background, that patient's, not necessarily exposure but other risk factors that  
16                  may be associated that might have made them more likely than not to get cancer  
17                  from the World Trade Center exposures.  
18                  DR. WARD: Tom? Did you have a comment?  
19                  DR. ALDRICH: Just one comment. I think it's dangerous to give individual treating  
20                  physicians too much power in this situation. I think we see that with the Long  
21                  Island Railroad disability problem. I mean, those, all those doctors verified  
22                  disability.  
23                  DR. WARD: Yeah, I guess as an epidemiologist, I think I probably have more of a  
24                  skeptical view of the information that clinicians would have available to them to  
25                  make those determinations, and I do think we have a few people who see patients  
26                  and make, you know, comp recommendations in the room and maybe they can  
27                  speak to it as well but for your, I mean, one of the complications, I think, is that  
28                  most occupational cancers are difficult to distinguish from non-occupational, at  
29                  least based on pathology or symptoms or really anything about them, and so in  
30                  the absence of epidemiologic data or, you know, other strong -- it's going to be a  
31                  hard call from -- for the physician to make that determination, I would imagine.  
32                  MS. DABAS: But on some instances at the NYPD and FDNY, they have had to.  
33                  When they filed for three-quarter pension disability, physicians have been asked  
34                  to make that type of determination and further their determination is looked at  
35                  by their district surgeon which is hired by the City, so there is some scrutiny to  
36                  what these physicians are doing and I think that again, if we believe that cancer  
37                  has -- there are multiple sources and multiple things that contribute to somebody  
38                  developing cancer, such as their past history, then we have to, in a certain way,

1 also bring the physician in because if somebody has, you know, a history of -- has  
2 some type of medical history since 9/11 where they're getting treated for GERD  
3 and they're getting treated for asthma and they're getting treated for all these  
4 other things, and they develop a cancer, I think that physician can make the  
5 determination that their cancer might have, more likely than not, is caused by the  
6 inflammation from those diseases and thus World Trade Center-related.  
7 DR. MIDDENDORF: I do think I need to caution the committee that the question  
8 before you is not whether or not you can push the determination downstream.  
9 The question before the committee is: Do you believe that all cancers or a specific  
10 type of cancer should be added to the covered list and what is the scientific  
11 justification for that? Pushing it downstream is not something that you really  
12 need to be thinking about or focusing on.  
13 DR. DEMENT: This is John Dement, can I just interject a comment?  
14 DR. WARD: Yes.  
15 DR. DEMENT: With regard to the comment previously about asbestos and ovarian  
16 cancer, that's based actually on human data. The original listing in IARC for lung  
17 and mesothelioma did not include ovarian but these data came about later and is  
18 now listed based on human data as well as the larynx.  
19 I guess I, as a researcher, favor a list based on the IARC criteria that we discussed  
20 as opposed to all cancers. I think it's much more defensible. And I too have a lot  
21 of concerns about placing too much, too much weight on physicians who may or  
22 may not have training to make these determinations.  
23 DR. WARD: Thank you, John.  
24 DR. TALASKA: I would agree with that very much. I think that we help the  
25 administrator much more if we can give the list of either sites or -- that have  
26 biological plausibility with related to the exposures that we know occurred, and  
27 that would help them make much stronger and much more defensible case in the  
28 political realm or any other realm. The stronger the evidence that we can provide  
29 for particular things. We have already admitted there's limitations of what's out  
30 there. And we're acting on the -- but we have seen that there is other information  
31 that we can use based upon exposure, based upon effects and relationships that  
32 are known either through human studies with previous exposures or through  
33 strong animal evidence where things like soots, where there seems to be an  
34 indication. And I think we help much more and build a much more defensible  
35 case by doing some culling and not just allowing individuals to be able to --  
36 physicians particularly be able to -- they can say which diseases.  
37 DR. WARD: So it sounds like several people have spoken in support of the idea of  
38 using the IARC carcinogen list. Would anyone else like to speak either in favor of

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that or as opposed to it?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you.

DR. WARD: Oh, I'm sorry. I was saying that several people had spoken in favor of using the IARC list, you know, the list of carcinogens that were present in relation to the IARC list of sites affected to make a recommendation, and I just wanted to know if anyone on the committee either wanted to speak -- further speak in favor of that idea or speak against it.

MS. MEJIA: Can I just make a comment? I mean, I just got this article so I really haven't had the time to look at it, but I'm uncomfortable carving out certain cancers over others.

In light of what Dr. Aldrich said, you know, we still have some questions about cancers in men and in woman and in children and in others, and again, I think that there will be controls and guidelines built into this at the other end that could then address, you know, whether that cancer should be covered or not. You know, I'm just uncomfortable about carving out and then leaving out a population that really should have been covered. Those rare cancers that Valerie spoke of, I don't want to play God here.

DR. WARD: Steve?

DR. MARKOWITZ: Well, you know, I think if we recommend a scheme, whatever scheme we recommend, that rare cancers should be included because they're rare and we have no way of proving or disproving, never will have any way most likely or hopefully they will remain rare, so I think they should just be included. One vulnerability of the approach -- I think the IARC approach that I'm a little concerned about is this master list of 287 chemicals which are, as we see on the title up there, chemicals of potential concern, which NIOSH inherited from 2003 proc- -- 2002 process, where these agents were assembled from EPA data from four sources. And the vulnerability is that there's the word potential concern. And it's a very long list. Clearly there's good documentation for certain things like PAHs, asbestos, dioxin, you know, important chemicals. And there may be relatively little documentation for other agents on that list. We don't have the capacity to look at that and evaluate, select out which are important and which aren't important. But it is a vulnerability because that list is very long. And if in fact some of those exposures were truly just potential and they weren't necessarily there, then it makes the approach, it undermines the approach. That's what I'm saying.

DR. WARD: Yeah, so let me just say one thing. So in terms of the IARC list, when we talk about identifying sites associated with exposures, you're really only talking about the group 1 and 2a carcinogens, which is a much smaller list because IARC

1                   only designates sites, human sites, for those things that are thought -- that have  
2                   sufficient evidence in humans. But on the other hand that approach leaves out a  
3                   large number of substances for which there may be compelling evidence of  
4                   carcinogenicity in animals but just no strong and enough epidemiologic studies to  
5                   demonstrate a site- specific effect.  
6                   So there's pros and cons but I think, but it is important for the committee to  
7                   understand that if we did take the approach of using the sites for the IARC  
8                   specified carcinogens, that that would be limited to carcinogens which IARC  
9                   believes had sufficient evidence in humans because otherwise they can't specify a  
10                  site.  
11                  Yes.  
12                  MS. HUGHES: I also just wanted to remind people there was a meeting early on, I  
13                  remember, at the Javits Center, where a lot of the air quality data analyzed was  
14                  discussed. I remember one of these sampling people might have been from the  
15                  EPA, I can't remember. He was like wow, we found chemicals that we never even  
16                  knew existed before. So they might not even actually make this list because we  
17                  didn't know that they could have been created or formed and what their impact  
18                  may be, so I just wanted to put that information out there.  
19                  DR. WARD: Okay. Paul just pointed out there's 14 group 1s. Fourteen or 15, so  
20                  we're talking about a relatively small number.  
21                  DR. HARRISON: What about 2As? I'm sorry, Paul, did you count the 2As?  
22                  DR. MIDDENDORF: I can try.  
23                  DR. HARRISON: Is it possible to sort of throw up some examples? I'm getting a  
24                  little confused --  
25                  DR. WARD: Can we throw up the --  
26                  DR. HARRISON: -- about what exactly we're proposing now? Right. So we're  
27                  talking about using the Cogliano paper.  
28                  DR. WARD: Well, let me just say what the Cogliano paper is. So the Cogliano  
29                  paper was done after IARC re-reviewed all of the compounds that had been  
30                  previously assessed as group 1, so it's mostly that but he's also providing data  
31                  about, I believe, 2A carcinogens. But I think the sites of cancer in humans are only  
32                  listed, I believe, for the group 1s. Yeah.  
33                  So basically what they're doing is they're taking the agents that are classified as  
34                  carcinogenic for humans and showing the associated cancer sites.  
35                  DR. HARRISON: And that's in table 1 and what was their proposal? So use the  
36                  table 1 which has both the sufficient and the limited evidence. From the Cogliano  
37                  so it's table 1 if I'm doing that correctly.  
38                  DR. WARD: Right, and just basically that's just the most, I mean, it's the most up-

1 to-date version of all the IARC information.  
2 DR. HARRISON: And then to cross-walk that with the evidence for exposure from  
3 the World Trade Center site? So the chemicals would have identified a concern  
4 from the World Trade Center site. Cross-walked against table 1 and then to derive  
5 the cancer sites?  
6 DR. TALASKA: Isn't that what your paper did though, the NIOSH paper? Didn't  
7 you do that cross-referencing already on World Trade Center sites -- excuse me,  
8 with World Trade Center exposures?  
9 DR. MIDDENDORF: Well, what's in the NIOSH document is a listing of the -- it's an  
10 extraction from the summary paragraphs in IARC identifying what the evidence is,  
11 both human and animal. So it identifies the human sites as well as the animal  
12 sites that were looked at.  
13 DR. TALASKA: Yeah, so for table 2 it's for limited evidence in humans, which could  
14 be because sometimes it's complex mixtures and the individual components are  
15 then listed inside of that and there's never been any human data, just one  
16 compound in PAHs for example, so there's several PAHs listed there for example.  
17 And then but then sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental animals,  
18 so if we include both table 1 and table 2, and then those have already been culled  
19 because they've been compounds which were identified at the World Trade  
20 Center.  
21 DR. MIDDENDORF: All right, you're talking about 2 or 2A?  
22 DR. TALASKA: I'm talking about NIOSH, in your NIOSH paper, you're the lead  
23 author, table 1, which is sufficient in table 2.  
24 DR. MIDDENDORF: Okay. In table 1 are the group 1 IARC compounds.  
25 DR. TALASKA: Correct.  
26 DR. MIDDENDORF: And table 2 is group 2A.  
27 DR. TALASKA: Two-A compounds, correct. So that takes into account some of the  
28 exposure situation and actually if we use that particular table, then we have a  
29 built-in biological and exposure plausibility.  
30 DR. WARD: Right. So we have four tents up and we'll just go in order. So, Steve.  
31 DR. MARKOWITZ: Just to clarify. Is the proposal to include the 2As? Two-As are  
32 probably carcinogenic in humans. Is the proposal to include the 2As? Two-As  
33 include, PCBs is a 2A; it's not a 1.  
34 DR. MIDDENDORF: Right.  
35 DR. MARKOWITZ: So 2As, a site is specified, I believe.  
36 DR. MIDDENDORF: It is.  
37 DR. MARKOWITZ: In the -- right. A cancer site is specified so we don't have that  
38 problem with animal-only data where we don't know what site it causes in

1 humans?  
2 DR. MIDDENDORF: Right.  
3 DR. MARKOWITZ: We don't have that problem with the 2As. There are only a few  
4 2As on this list.  
5 DR. WARD: Right, so certainly then we should include them. If the site is just --  
6 see, I think it depends. Some things may be 2A and not have a human site  
7 because it's not based on human data but I mean, if it's classified as 2A and there  
8 is human data and there is a site specified, then I think it should be included.  
9 DR. MARKOWITZ: I agree with that.  
10 DR. WARD: Yeah. Julia?  
11 DR. QUINT: I'll be brief. The only -- the other cautionary note that we should put  
12 somewhere in the recommendation is that this is ever-changing because these,  
13 you know, chemicals are being moved up based on mechanistic data so we should  
14 definitely state that this is a dynamic process within IARC and now NTP as well in  
15 terms of, you know, moving class -- reclassifications of these chemicals.  
16 And I also wanted to ask, there's another paper from the 100 IARC monograph,  
17 100 monograph series that was published as a separate paper and I'm wondering  
18 if that's included. If we have all of the substances from that table. It's a special  
19 report on metals, arsenic and dust in fibers. Did your list include all of those as  
20 well?  
21 DR. WARD: I would think it should because that was one of the six subgroups of  
22 the IARC 100.  
23 DR. QUINT: Right, and you went through the whole series. Okay. Great. Thanks.  
24 DR. WARD: So Steve, your tent is up. Did you have...  
25 DR. MARKOWITZ: Oh, no, I'm sorry.  
26 DR. WARD: So it sounds like there's no disagreement that we might -- that we  
27 would want to include kind of the cross-walk between Paul's table of the  
28 substances present at the World Trade Center and the IARC group 1 and 2A  
29 carcinogens for which they're site-specified. But I think we should -- I mean, and  
30 that may cover a large number of the sites that we would be otherwise concerned  
31 with. But I guess one question would be -- so that's one approach and it's very  
32 systematic but should we also -- I mean, I'm concerned about the cancers that  
33 might be associated with the sites of chronic inflammation and irritation, whether  
34 we want to call that out specifically, and this may be getting beyond our charge  
35 but I still think it's worth having in our minds, so for some of those cancers, like  
36 laryngeal and oral pharyngeal, if they're specifically called out then there may be  
37 increased scrutiny or screening.  
38 Now as someone who's now devoted their life more to general cancer issues, I can

1 say that it's not a foregone conclusion that early detection and screening is  
2 beneficial all the time. Sometimes it can just result in longer survival with the  
3 cancer and not a reduced risk of dying of the cancer, but still there's an -- yeah, it  
4 can. Unfortunately, so. So I guess but I do think it's worth, 'cause I guess in my  
5 mind still from, and it's from, you know, many of the things we discussed  
6 yesterday, I do have a particularly high concern for cancers developing at the sites  
7 where there's inflammation and irritation just because of all of the things we  
8 discussed yesterday. You've got exposure to mutagens, you've got -- and then  
9 you've got these chronic inflammatory processes that could very well enhance the  
10 potential for developing cancers at those sites, so that's one piece -- that's one  
11 question that, you know, I'd like to hear some opinions on. Glenn?  
12 DR. TALASKA: I'm in strong -- now I'm in strong agreement with that, now that it's  
13 on. The best case for cancer synergy in the world is the interaction between  
14 aflatoxin exposure in China and the hepatitis B1. Individuals who are positive for  
15 aflatoxin exposure have about a five-fold increased risk of liver cancer and  
16 individuals with hepatitis B1, have hepatitis B, have it was like seven- or eight-fold  
17 but the interaction is 60-fold, so if you're positive for both you have a 60-fold  
18 excess risk.  
19 And that's the idea, again, of irritation, increasing self proliferation. And I'm in full  
20 agreement with what Steve said earlier about for those sites where cancer occurs  
21 in the organ systems that are already included in the program, where there is  
22 irritation, where there is chronic exposure, where there have been effects  
23 documented I think, are -- should be really highlighted. That should be part of the  
24 biological plausibility when we say these sites, there are data from the exposure  
25 to support these sites. That should be highlighted. Where we know the  
26 exposures are high, that should be highlighted 'cause it gives the administrator  
27 much more information in defense when they come back.  
28 The more information we can provide them, I believe, the better. And for those  
29 sites we don't know, we can include all of these other sites as -- if we want to just  
30 say we approve cancer. And then these are the ones which have this level of  
31 biological plausibility, these are the ones that have this level, this is where we  
32 don't know, from a scientific point of view, and we can help them out.  
33 It's all we have. We just can't -- it's not really up to us at this point, I don't believe,  
34 to assign that now this is related to this, if there's no evidence at all.  
35 DR. WARD: Yes.  
36 DR. HARRISON: I just have a question. I agree with what you said, Liz. I just have  
37 a question about using the IARC 1 and 2A: Is that sufficiently precautionary in its  
38 approach? I just don't know enough. I just don't recall the criteria upon which

1 2As are developed and whether we're --  
2 DR. WARD: No, it's not really -- I mean, because the reality is there's a lot of  
3 carcinogens on the 2B list that are, you know, are known to be carcinogenic in  
4 animals; there is not sufficient human evidence. And typically that's because  
5 there's been no opportunity to do definitive human studies. It's not that there are  
6 no -- it's not that there are negative studies, it's that there are no studies or there  
7 are small studies. But on the other hand, so if you're trying to look for sites of  
8 cancer, of potential risk from specific exposures, it's really the only, it's the only  
9 source of data because you can't specify a site at risk if you don't have human  
10 data. But it is a real limitation, and I certainly think that it's, you know, in general  
11 it's not precautionary to just look at human -- carcinogens based on human  
12 evidence.  
13 DR. HARRISON: So are you arguing that we should include 2Bs?  
14 DR. WARD: I don't think we can, you know, in looking at -- I mean, I think we  
15 should consider 2Bs as potentially carcinogenic but they won't be of great help in  
16 looking at sites and focusing on sites of cancer of particular risk.  
17 Steve?  
18 DR. MARKOWITZ: But, you know, we can make that explicit in the  
19 recommendation that we considered 2Bs and we ran into this practical problem  
20 was that they're not -- don't coincide necessarily with specific human sites but  
21 that if there's some way in which to use that information in the future or -- so is  
22 the proposal then to use IARC 1s and 2As and then supplement that with  
23 additional cancer sites for which there is epidemiological information, data or  
24 otherwise biological plausibility?  
25 DR. WARD: I think so. I think, I mean, for sure the 1A and 2As for the sites, and  
26 then I think several people spoke strongly on the inflammation, irritation, biologic  
27 plausibility. I don't think very many people have spoken about the using the  
28 results from the epidemiologic study but certainly that's something we should  
29 consider. Yes?  
30 DR. ROM: I just want to make sure that we're all speaking the same language. I  
31 was going back to the Cogliano article, table 1 lists the carcinogenic agents. There  
32 are a hundred things listed. And the second column says cancer sites with  
33 sufficient evidence in humans. I take that now we're all agreeing that's IARC 1.  
34 Okay, the third column says cancer sites with limited evidence in humans. I'm  
35 taking it we're all calling that 2A from IARC. Is that correct?  
36 DR. WARD: It may not be totally exactly correct but by and large it's correct  
37 because a carcinogen can be group 1 without human -- without sufficient human  
38 epidemiologic evidence. If it has evidence in animals and it has evidence of the

1 mechanism in animals also being relevant in people. So that's the group 1. And  
2 2As for the most part will have limited evidence in humans and sufficient evidence  
3 in animals, you know; in some cases where there's limited evidence in humans,  
4 they will specify a site for that.

5 DR. TALASKA: I think all the ones in table 1 do say they all have sites which have  
6 sufficient evidence, but then there are also sites which have limited evidence in  
7 humans, okay, so they've already been listed as 1A carcinogens because they have  
8 sufficient evidence for one site, more limited evidence for the other.

9 DR. ROM: Okay, this table also lists occupations so I think that we can pretty  
10 much ignore. And then it also lists many different medications and I think -- and  
11 so that's something we can ignore.

12 DR. WARD: And we're only focusing on the agents for which they're on the list of  
13 agents that were present at the World Trade Center site, which is pretty  
14 exhaustive. It's listing everything but you could speak to how that list was  
15 generated.

16 DR. MIDDENDORF: Essentially what we did was we went back and we took the list  
17 that the EPA had developed, and it wasn't just the EPA, they had some other folks  
18 with them, identified chemicals of potential concern from four different databases  
19 that they had put together. And then we also added, based on the suggestions  
20 from the committee at the last meeting in November, selected other chemical  
21 agents. I think we added soot and some other things that the committee had  
22 suggested needed to be added to that list, so we added those as well.

23 DR. WARD: Steve?

24 DR. MARKOWITZ: But Bill, there are some 2As that are in -- I don't think are in  
25 table 1. I think to get into table 1 you had to be a one.

26 DR. ROM: Right.

27 DR. MARKOWITZ: For instance, tetrachloroethylene, which is a 2A, it's  
28 perchloroethylene. And I don't see it here, but it is a 2A. It would be included if  
29 we recommended 2A.

30 DR. WARD: Yeah, and I think that's the proposal is 1 or 2A. As long as there's a  
31 site specified in the 2A listing, either sufficient or limited. Otherwise it could be  
32 included as a potential carcinogen but it's not informative as to site.

33 DR. MARKOWITZ: In looking at this list that Bill drew our attention to, there is  
34 radiation listed in the IARC and we haven't really discussed that at all. Is there any  
35 evidence that there was any exposure to radiation at the World Trade Center?  
36 Exposure?

37 DR. MIDDENDORF: Yeah, the limited data is reviewed in the first report, the first  
38 review of cancer, first periodic review of cancer, and my recollection is that there

1 is very little radiation exposure.  
2 What was looked at, trying to remember what it was. Yeah, tritium was looked at  
3 and there may be some -- one or two others, but the general finding was that  
4 there was very little potential -- there is very little identified exposure to radiation.  
5 And by radiation I'm referring to ionizing, not non-ionizing radiation.  
6 DR. WARD: Yeah, the one question that I had yesterday, when the results of the  
7 analysis of the uniform were presented, was that barium was listed. And I don't  
8 know enough about barium to know if it's -- I know that barium, forms of barium  
9 are used for radiologic examinations because they are radioactive, but I don't  
10 know that -- but it's not?  
11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No. I don't think so.  
12 DR. WARD: Okay. Good.  
13 MS. HUGHES: I also believe that there were medical offices at the World Trade  
14 Center site as well so that they had x-ray capabilities.  
15 DR. TALASKA: But if the x-rays aren't turned on then there's no exposure at all,  
16 you know, unless they had a sealed source site and those are pretty well  
17 protected, pretty well. But I don't know.  
18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Not after an explosion.  
19 DR. TALASKA: Yeah.  
20 DR. WARD: So I guess one question that would be nice to have the answer to is:  
21 If we did what we're proposing to do, in terms of the IARC match, you know, are  
22 there major -- are there sites of concern that were found in the epidemiologic  
23 studies or for other reasons that would not be included, and I mean, there was a  
24 specific question about childhood cancer; we obviously have not discussed  
25 childhood cancer very much but maybe if we like that approach, then we probably  
26 should also look at what's excluded and Glenn and Tom both...  
27 DR. TALASKA: No, all of the sites that, at least the ones that I mentioned earlier,  
28 respiratory systems, hematopoietic, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, leukemia, and  
29 thyroid are all included in the list that was in Paul's presentations.  
30 DR. WARD: What about prostate?  
31 DR. TALASKA: Prostate? I don't -- let me check. Prostate'll be one I check.  
32 DR. WARD: Tom?  
33 DR. ALDRICH: Yeah, I was just looking that up. I didn't get to prostate but two --  
34 what I was concerned about is thyroid and melanoma, and both of those get  
35 cross-referenced so I was just going to look up prostate and have that for you.  
36 Looks like there's some animal data linking prostate to several ones but I don't see  
37 any human data. No, I don't see any human data with prostate.  
38 MS. DABAS: Just uniform, the barium that you found, it was from Day 1 the

1 uniform -- his uniform so at that point the x-ray machines hadn't gotten there so it  
2 wouldn't be likely that that's where it came from. His uniform came from being  
3 on the site on the first day and then leaving shortly after for medical attention.  
4 MS. HUGHES: Point of clarification, I meant there were medical facilities at the  
5 World Trade Center complex. That could have had radiation in it and that could  
6 have been a possible source.  
7 MS. DABAS: Oh.  
8 DR. TALASKA: Prostate is one that wasn't -- there lead and cadmium are the two  
9 that are listed for prostate.  
10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Arsenic. And arsenic as well.  
11 DR. TALASKA: And arsenic. Okay.  
12 DR. WARD: So that would be included as well.  
13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Limited for arsenic.  
14 DR. WARD: Yeah. Susan?  
15 MS. SIDEL: I was just wondering if there's anything -- if we should like be  
16 comparing this list to say the list that came back from Lee on what was on that  
17 uniform just to cross-reference it?  
18 DR. WARD: I think we can do that. I think -- I mean, like I said, I noticed that many  
19 of them seemed to be the same. The one that popped out at me as not having  
20 been on some of the other lists was barium but certainly we can, we can do -- but  
21 I guess the one caution, now that we're thinking about this approach, is that much  
22 of the data on these carcinogens that IARC used was from occupational studies  
23 and it was primarily men, so it will under-represent cancer sites that might occur  
24 predominantly in women or only in women, so that, that is an acknowledged -- it's  
25 a universal problem. Yes, it's a universal problem. But it's probably something  
26 that we would want to acknowledge.  
27 DR. TALASKA: But Liz, we, you know, the barium that's used in medical  
28 procedures, if that's what we're worried about, is not radioactive.  
29 DR. WARD: Well, that was my specific question.  
30 DR. TALASKA: Yeah.  
31 DR. WARD: Yeah.  
32 DR. TALASKA: It not radioactive, it's used as --  
33 DR. WARD: They make it radioactive.  
34 DR. TALASKA: -- a radio-opaque substance.  
35 DR. WARD: I see, gotcha, gotcha.  
36 DR. TALASKA: Okay? Okay, so that they can trace the line of the whole --  
37 DR. WARD: Yeah, thank you. Yeah. Thank you.  
38 DR. QUINT: I just have a -- can I? I thought we were going to include the cancers

1                   that had increased incidence in the epi studies along with the IARC list; is that not  
2                   correct?  
3                   DR. WARD: Well, that was what I was just trying to get clarification on. We heard  
4                   several people speaking in favor of the IARC and several people speaking in favor  
5                   of the ones that were affected by nonmalignant diseases but only a few people  
6                   had specifically said to make sure -- I mean, many of them will be covered already.  
7                   DR. QUINT: Right.  
8                   DR. WARD: But I guess even if they're covered already, we probably, in our  
9                   evidence summary, would like to specifically state that there's further evidence  
10                  from an epidemiologic study.  
11                 DR. QUINT: I would agree with that. I want that included as far as --  
12                 DR. WARD: Tom?  
13                 DR. ALDRICH: From the epidemiologic study, there are only a few individual  
14                 cancers for which there was even a suggestion of increased cancer risk because  
15                 the numbers were so small. I mean, even though it was close to 10,000 people,  
16                 the numbers of cancers were small, so non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, but that's  
17                 already going to be covered based on IARC; thyroid, same thing; melanoma, same  
18                 thing. The only concern is prostate. And the truth is the epidemiology for  
19                 prostate is pretty weak because the prostate is one of those cancers that is really,  
20                 really susceptible to surveillance bias. And post-9/11, people were getting a heck  
21                 of a lot more exams and blood tests detecting prostate cancer. So I'm not sure  
22                 there's a clear-cut -- any clear-cut evidence of prostate cancer has increased by  
23                 the events of 9/11.  
24                 Now, we heard yesterday from -- that the Sinai study may show that but, you  
25                 know, we can't base anything on a few words about what a study that has not yet  
26                 been published will or won't show. So I find it difficult to justify including  
27                 prostate.  
28                 DR. WARD: Valerie?  
29                 MS. DABAS: I guess my question on the prostate with the fire department study is  
30                 just the average age in which these people were diagnosed. You know, we can  
31                 say that the number is not significant when we look at the general population but  
32                 do we look at the age of these -- you know, if the average age to be tested for  
33                 prostate cancer is 55 and we're getting people that are in their 40s getting  
34                 prostate cancer, is that not an area for concern and do we just dismiss prostate  
35                 cancer in general?  
36                 DR. ALDRICH: Among the non-exposed people in the fire department study, they  
37                 were all under the age of 60 at the onset of the study. And there were a  
38                 substantial number of prostate cancers, both in the exposed and unexposed

1 group. What was not so clear was that there was an increase. So it's not like  
2 there -- prostate was one of the ones -- one of the highest represented cancers in  
3 the unexposed group, so I think the problem isn't lack of case finding and I don't  
4 think the problem is an age issue with prostate. There may be an increased risk of  
5 prostate cancer from World Trade Center but I don't think the epidemiology is  
6 enough to show that, and we don't have any chemical, what do you call it?  
7 Chemical risk data that shows a prostate risk.  
8 DR. WARD: I thought somebody said lead, arsenic and cadmium.  
9 DR. ALDRICH: Did I miss that in my search? If that's the case then we don't have a  
10 problem.  
11 DR. WARD: Yeah. Glenn?  
12 DR. TALASKA: Yeah, the cadmium one is going to be tough because there was  
13 biological monitoring data and cadmium is one of those things which persists. So  
14 once you're exposed to cadmium, you know, your first day of exposure to  
15 cadmium -- if you're going into a job making batteries, 30 years later when you  
16 retire, you'll still have 50 percent of that first day's exposure in your body. Okay?  
17 So cadmium is one of those compounds where it leaves a long trail. So basing it  
18 just on that, I think, is a little bit weaker and will set the administrator up for a bit  
19 of criticism from it because in fact cadmium levels were lower in the firefighters  
20 than they were in the control population overall. There were a few -- there were  
21 some firefighters that had had higher levels.  
22 DR. WARD: Susan?  
23 MS. SIDEL: I was just going to say, the one point that I wanted to make is that  
24 maybe, you know, the other factor is considered, that is this cancer unusual in  
25 someone in this age, and so therefore it was something that wasn't going to be  
26 included, it could be included because it's affecting somebody, you know, at a  
27 time when they shouldn't be having it. If they were too young to really have this  
28 cancer so then it's more likely that it's World Trade Center-related. That could be  
29 some sort of a caveat that maybe it's not just cut and dry, that there might be  
30 some other, you know, extenuating circumstances?  
31 DR. WARD: And I guess where I don't -- so that, would that be something that  
32 would be considered in terms of an individual clinician recommendation or is that  
33 something that we would need to make in our, in our recommendation?  
34 MS. SIDEL: I mean, if we're thinking about excluding something, I would, I would  
35 say that we should say, however, there is this factor that we -- that if somebody is  
36 below the age of whatever, that that's unusual, it's unusual to contract this cancer  
37 at that particular age, if that's the case, with what Valerie was saying about  
38 prostate, that the people that were getting it were too young to be getting it.

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DR. WARD: Julia?

DR. QUINT: One thing that might be equivalent in toxicology is the time to tumor in animals. When you treat animals with, you know, with the chemical and they get tumors earlier, that's considered significant in terms of the findings, so we may have the human equivalent of that with some of these high intense exposures over a short time period in humans. I mean, that could be plausible.

DR. WARD: Yeah. Catherine?

MS. HUGHES: I'll pass for now.

DR. HARRISON: One advantage I can see to this approach is that it eliminates the need to deal with dose. So I think we're basically would be saying that if we're using a 1 and 2a and cross-walking with the exposures from the World Trade Center, if you have one of those covered cancers, you're eligible, after review by the physician and NIOSH, for treatment and compensation. So I think that has some real advantages because it gets -- you basically, I think, skirt the issue of how long were you there for, what the exposure intensity was and maybe even a latency period, although we haven't talked about the latency period yet. And I think I support that approach for its simplicity and its precautionary principle embedded in that; although, there's a part of me which says that -- there's a little bit of discomfort I have also with that approach because, you know, basic principle for many cancers, although there's certainly no threshold for carcinogens and some concept of dose response and dose risk, which we are not, which we are maybe not acknowledging this approach somehow. But I think I'm okay with it.

I guess I just want to say I think that that's a sensible approach that affords the kind of treatment and compensation to this population that I think we've heard lots of testimony over the last couple of days that's very compelling in terms of, you know, providing the services that people need.

DR. WARD: Tom? No. Steve.

DR. MARKOWITZ: I want to make sure I understand what you're saying. That we defer questions about dose and time factors to -- we don't make any recommendation about dose and time factors?

DR. HARRISON: Correct. I'm not proposing that we make any recommendation. It's almost like a presumption. Steve, you know, like there's a --

DR. MARKOWITZ: No, no, I agree with it.

DR. HARRISON: Right. Yeah, there's a cancer presumption here that if you fall into this group and this category by some scheme, 1A, 1 plus 2A plus a cross-walk to the exposure plus biological mechanisms and the other factors that we mentioned, that you're covered.

1 DR. MARKOWITZ: One other comment that I have, is one way of addressing  
2 Susan's concern about age is, if we do have kind of an escape clause for rare  
3 cancers, that we could define rare as being by site or by age, and that would cover  
4 that. That leaves a lot to the discretion of the treating physician but that's okay.  
5 DR. WARD: I guess another question that I would have about this is, is in the end,  
6 are we going to come close to covering, by this approach, all cancers anyway?  
7 DR. MARKOWITZ: No. I don't think so. I'd have to look at the tables but I don't  
8 think so.  
9 DR. WARD: It would be nice to -- if we could -- I don't know how quick anyone can  
10 do it 'cause I -- I mean, if we're covering, if it turns out that we were covering  
11 90 percent then -- you don't think so?  
12 DR. MARKOWITZ: No.  
13 DR. WARD: Even keeping in mind that lung, breast, colorectal and prostate are  
14 probably 50 percent of all cancers. So I mean, it's probably worth looking at to  
15 see which -- I mean, it's probably a majority of cancers that will be covered when  
16 we do this tabulation, I'm guessing, so then the question is which ones will not be  
17 covered, and then the other thing I think we need to be careful of is sometimes  
18 when IARC designates sites, it may -- they may not exactly match up to the sites  
19 that we know of today -- I mean, it's not going to -- I mean, we need to be careful,  
20 when we make these final tables, that we are not inadvertently excluding sub-  
21 sites or, you know, things that really should be included conceptually.  
22 DR. MARKOWITZ: By the way, I don't see breast cancer on this list. I'm not  
23 advocating it, I'm just saying it's a big cancer that's not on the list, as an example.  
24 Most of the cancers, if you combine 1 and 2As are the respiratory cancers and the  
25 head and neck cancers, including pharynx, nasal sinuses, GI cancers, I think thyroid  
26 and prostate, melanoma and --  
27 DR. WARD: And leukemia.  
28 DR. MARKOWITZ: And the blood cancers.  
29 DR. WARD: Yeah, blood cancers.  
30 DR. MARKOWITZ: Including lymphomas and all the leukemias. I think that's it.  
31 And bladder cancer.  
32 DR. WARD: Yeah, and I guess that really -- at this point one of my biggest  
33 concerns still is that we're not covering women, and it's not something that we  
34 did but I mean, it's going to be problematic, I think, as this recommendation goes  
35 forward that, I mean, that that is one of the limitations of that database so we  
36 should think about how to -- if we can address that and how. Bill?  
37 DR. ROM: I have reservations of using the IARC list and I think it goes too far. And  
38 if you take the IARC list and you start with the first item, and the first item on the

1 list is arsenic. We're all in pretty good agreement that if you inhale arsenic you  
2 probably have an increased risk for lung cancer. But there's also a lot of  
3 toxicology violations here. You start off with oral arsenic, and then with oral  
4 arsenic, you've got bladder, skin, liver and kidney. Now we're getting what I  
5 would say is a reach that, you know, this isn't really relevant to WTC dust  
6 exposure in our experience of what we're supposed to be recommending.  
7 So if we are to use the IARC list, and Dr. Rom says this is a reach, I think somebody  
8 needs to go through the list and annotate this and say what's relevant and what's  
9 not relevant, and I would say that oral arsenic, on the very first line at the top of  
10 the list, is not relevant to our WTC dust exposure.  
11 DR. WARD: See then, I would argue with you. So this is why I get so difficult  
12 'cause I would say well, a lot of the evidence for humans in arsenic is from  
13 drinking water; and people are working on the site, they're eating, they're  
14 drinking, they're touching their lips, so people have the potential to absorb arsenic  
15 through the oral route and again, I -- yeah, so that's where you get -- it gets so  
16 hard, when you try to fine tune it too much, you're going to have a lot of  
17 differences of opinion.  
18 DR. ROM: I would argue that if you went to Bangladesh, where you've got the  
19 highest arsenic exposures in the world, you're going to have, you know, there's  
20 going to be some increased cancers, but trying to find these sites is going to be a  
21 real challenge.  
22 DR. WARD: Well, I think where a lot of the data comes from is epidemiologic  
23 studies in countries where there is highly arsenic contaminated water, and so you  
24 do see excess bladder cancers, for example, associated with living in areas that  
25 have high arsenic content in the water.  
26 And the other thing is that a lot of these same sites are related to some of the  
27 other carcinogens on the list.  
28 So I also have qualms about the IARC list and the two of them are, there is, I  
29 mean, it's not really addressing women very well and it really is only those things  
30 for which epidemiologic studies could be done, and we know that that's not the  
31 whole universe of potential carcinogens. So I do think that it should be the IARC  
32 list plus, not just the IARC list.  
33 DR. ROM: I would counter-argue once again that somebody needs to go through  
34 this list with some judgment about medical toxicology, about the route of  
35 exposure, the quantity of exposure, because you can go to benzo(a)pyrene and  
36 we think that has always been the big carcinogen in tobacco smoke, but when you  
37 get right down to it and look at adducts and all of this, you'll find that there are  
38 other carcinogens in tobacco smoke, like petroleum, which are in other aldehydes,

1                   that are in huge quantities and make just as many adducts. And benzo(a)pyrene  
2                   may not be the carcinogen for the lung cancer. And you go to the second line and  
3                   we have benzo(a)pyrene as lung, bladder and larynx, so somebody's got to make  
4                   some judgment calls about the sites related to what the exposures were, the  
5                   quantity and the type of exposure, whether it was inhaled or skin or what have  
6                   you. And that may be the job for the administrator and his staff.  
7                   DR. WARD: Tom?  
8                   DR. ALDRICH: I think you make a really good point about women being left out of  
9                   much of the research that's gone on to generate the list, and mostly we're talking  
10                  about breast, ovarian, uterine, cervical.  
11                  As far as ovarian they're probably going to wind up being included along with the  
12                  asbestos risk. Breast seems to me to be the big problem. But aren't there  
13                  enormous databases of breast cancer patients and wouldn't it be a quick, easy  
14                  study to do a case-control study of breast cancer patients for World Trade Center  
15                  exposure in the background? Wouldn't that be something that could be done  
16                  from retrospective data that's already sitting in a database up at Sloan Kettering  
17                  or somewhere?  
18                  DR. WARD: I doubt it.  
19                  DR. ALDRICH: Couldn't we marry that with our other research mandate to say you  
20                  must do a case-control study?  
21                  DR. WARD: Well, I think it's an important issue but I don't know. I mean, it's  
22                  usually epidemiologic studies are not, you know, there's no such thing as easy in  
23                  epidemiologic studies.  
24                  DR. ALDRICH: True, but breast is such a common tumor that it might be one  
25                  where this kind of approach would be very fruitful in a very short period of time.  
26                  DR. WARD: Right. And I do think that, you know, especially if we could do a  
27                  population-based study rather than a hospital-based study, there might be some  
28                  benefit. So okay, I think we need to figure out, I mean, I think there's concern  
29                  about over-reliance on the IARC list. But, I mean, I'm not sure that it makes sense  
30                  for us to recommend fine tuning the IARC list any further because I think we're  
31                  going to run into the same problem we've run into before, that we don't have  
32                  enough information about level of exposure and route of exposure and relevance  
33                  to further refine that list. And in addition most sites will be listed -- will be on the  
34                  list because of their association with many or at least a number of carcinogenic  
35                  exposures, so their inclusion will rarely be based on one particular exposure. And  
36                  even for benzo(a)pyrene, for example, benzo(a)pyrene is just one of many PAHs  
37                  and a large number of -- or at least a significant number of the PAHs are  
38                  carcinogenic. It's not just benzo(a)pyrene.

1 So I, I mean, so somebody else, I mean, could kind of, I'm looking at Steve 'cause  
2 he's been so good at pulling consensus together. Kind of summarize where you  
3 think we are from hearing the discussion, both what you think there's general  
4 agreement on and what there might not be general agreement on that we should  
5 discuss further.

6 DR. MARKOWITZ: So I gather there's some consensus around recommending the  
7 use of the IARC 1 and 2A categories in combination with the NIOSH list they've  
8 already published in their first report on carcinogens, the contaminants of  
9 potential concern, to identify specific organ sites where a cancer is likely to be  
10 related to World Trade Center exposures; and then secondly that that list be  
11 supplemented by additional cancer sites in which there's either a strong biological  
12 plausibility, strong exposure information or epidemiologic data that support  
13 addition of those sites; and third I would -- I'm not sure there's a consensus about  
14 this but that rare cancers should in addition be included, rare being defined by site  
15 or by age. Was there anything else?

16 DR. WARD: And I think the -- I mean, so two outstanding issues are, you know, we  
17 probably don't have to go further in defining rare, but I think we should  
18 acknowledge there is a big complexity there so, you know, I mean, is brain rare?  
19 When brain is rare -- and no, not rare. Okay.

20 DR. HARRISON: Liz, excuse me, I just want to say goodbye. I'm sorry but I have to  
21 really.

22 DR. WARD: Thank you so much. Sorry.

23 DR. HARRISON: And I do support what's being said.

24 DR. WARD: Okay, great. Great. Thank you. I'm noting to the record that Bob  
25 Harrison is leaving.

26 MS. HUGHES: Can I ask one point of clarification? Is there a list that talks about  
27 what the average age are for different cancers? 'Cause we haven't seen that  
28 table.

29 DR. WARD: There's actually lots of data and I can easily provide some of -- I mean,  
30 I can provide all of it basically from the work that we do at ACS. So we basically  
31 have age-specific incidence rates for pretty much every cancer and from that --  
32 and we also have estimates of the number of people per year diagnosed with  
33 specific cancers at specific ages. Sometimes those numbers can be a little bit  
34 easier to digest. And these are not just our numbers, I mean, we share the  
35 numbers with the National Cancer Institute and the CDC, so that's pretty  
36 straightforward information to provide. I think what's more difficult is to know  
37 where to draw the line as to what we consider rare and common but I'm  
38 imagining that we won't get into that level of detail in our recommendations.

1 So the only issue -- one of the issues that I feel is not covered there and maybe we  
2 should at least address is, as Tom said, for breast cancer it, you know, I mean, we  
3 either could take no opinion or we could say it should be covered or we could say  
4 that it really needs to be a research priority because most of -- a lot of the data  
5 that we're basing our determination on is occupational studies where there were  
6 not sufficient women to address female, breast and gynecologic cancers.  
7 DR. ALDRICH: Steve Cassidy just pointed out that the EMS fire department study  
8 is being analyzed as we speak and its results will be in the not too distant future  
9 and more than half the EMS workers are female. Now, the numbers won't be  
10 10,000 but it'll be a lot.  
11 DR. WARD: Great.  
12 DR. ALDRICH: And breast is a common tumor, so.  
13 DR. WARD: Great. And that fleetingly passed my mind, too, so I'm glad you  
14 mentioned it. But still for the recommendations at this point in time we have to  
15 decide whether to just let it rest or to make a specific comment about it, I think,  
16 just because it is one of the foremost common cancers in the population and  
17 we're really not able to address it with that particular database that we're relying  
18 on for most of our information. So even if we just say that, it should probably be  
19 addressed. In the context of whether the -- you know, why did we choose to take  
20 this approach and then what are the limitations of the approach. Steve?  
21 DR. MARKOWITZ: I want to come back to Bill's point because I think it is a  
22 vulnerability for the administrator about adopting this approach, which is, you  
23 know, that list of 287 chemicals was, you know, contaminants of potential  
24 concern. I keep thinking about potential and thinking about what kind of  
25 exposure -- kind of sampling that was dependent upon and we heard about some  
26 of the limitations of sampling, and it may be that some of those exposures were  
27 not important at all or maybe even not have occurred at all. I don't know what  
28 potential means there. So it may be worth amending or putting in into the text  
29 around these recommendations that this list should be examined with reference  
30 to, you know, the validity; acknowledging that there are, you know, big problems  
31 with the measurements that were taken.  
32 DR. WARD: Yeah, and I think one of the things that we presented yesterday was  
33 partly a selective view from me on, you know, what -- of the ones that are 1A, like  
34 asbestos, I kind of highlighted some of the ones where they were significant  
35 exposures so no one can argue that one percent by way of asbestos is not  
36 significant, and then they're also, you know, group 1A with very strong evidence  
37 of carcinogenicity and pretty strong evidence about specific sites, and some of the  
38 other ones that we focused -- that's one of the reasons we focused on the metals

1 because there were a number of metals that were there and a fair bit of -- and  
2 reasonably high concentrations that were group 1A, so I think when we look at it  
3 there will be some carcinogens listed that some might argue -- I mean, vinyl  
4 chloride is an example where I, at least, wondered you know, vinyl chloride is  
5 listed but was it really a significant exposure, but, you know, it would take deep  
6 digging to know that because, you know, if it was a product of pyrolysis of some of  
7 this stuff, then it might have been a significant exposure.  
8 But yesterday I kind of focused on the ones where there was evidence both that  
9 there was -- the 1As where there was evidence of substantial exposure but it  
10 would be a lot of work, I think, to go through and try to look at the others.  
11 And yeah, and it's probably a caution 'cause it's just based on evidence that it was  
12 there. There was no minimum set for the amount that was there. But I think that  
13 it's probably also true that many of the ones that were, you know, were facing a  
14 fair number of sites on, like asbestos, were there in large quantities, and that  
15 there were numerous lung carcinogens present. So it's really very few sites that  
16 will be based on, you know, one compound alone that had questionable exposure  
17 associated with it, I think.

18 Kimberly?

19 MS. FLYNN: I'm just wondering whether we need a special statement about  
20 children because children are not just little adults. I don't know if children cancer  
21 sites differ from adult cancer sites, and maybe Leo could speak to this.

22 DR. TRASANDE: Thank you. I think Steve's comments start to address this insofar  
23 as there are, if we -- and I think there's a delicate dance of how this is written that  
24 will -- we'll just have to keep a close eye on.  
25 I think, I am -- I always have some caution about a blanket inclusion of all of the  
26 whole population without regard to any plausibility or scientific argument. But I  
27 think the argument that Steve has pointed out about the rare cancers for which  
28 there are potential benefits by including in a precautionary mode, that are real  
29 and important to consider, so my current inclination, and I think this needs to be a  
30 group process; I certainly shouldn't drive this, would be to include all pediatric  
31 cancer in the bill. But I say that with quite a bit of caution recognizing that there  
32 are a host of cancers that will occur naturally in an unexposed population. And  
33 that's a risk that we all -- I think we all are accepting across a host of other  
34 conditions as well.

35 DR. WARD: Julia.

36 DR. QUINT: I was just going to say that some of the uncertainty about the list of  
37 chemicals and which ones were relevant and some of the exposure route data is  
38 offset too by the large number of volatile chemicals for which, you know, we have

1 -- that are 2B carcinogens, a lot of them -- for which we have no human data so  
2 we won't be saying anything about the sites for those chemicals. So I think there's  
3 uncertainty on both ends where we're leaving some possible cancers out because  
4 we don't know -- we don't have the data, we don't have the studies to support  
5 them, and we'll overstate some other things maybe but there is -- and those  
6 qualifications have to be clearly stated in the document. I mean, we're still  
7 operating in an area of uncertainty; we're just doing the best we can based on the  
8 information we have.

9 DR. WARD: Right. I agree. And I think, you know, I mean, in some ways until we  
10 actually see the list and how it tabulates, we may still need some further  
11 discussion but it sounds like there's some agreement at least on the approach.  
12 So is there anyone who would still favor listing all cancers as opposed to the  
13 approach of trying to narrow down the focus somewhat by looking at the IARC or  
14 looking at the criteria that we've discussed, the IARC criteria, the nonmalignant  
15 irritation and inflammation, the epi studies, the rare cancers and the proposal to  
16 include all pediatric cancer? Valerie?

17 MS. DABAS: I guess my reasoning for saying all is because I haven't seen the list  
18 yet. You know, these are all lists that, you know, we're saying okay, well, the epi  
19 studies, biological plausibility; what does that mean? Which ones are they? Until  
20 I see it on a chart, then I can't say that I would definitely say okay, let's piecemeal  
21 it out because most -- 90 percent of the cancers are included, and there are  
22 10 percent that we know for sure that will never be, you know, associated with  
23 exposure, that those are the ones that we're leaving out.

24 My concern is just, we won't have this list today. I'm assuming that once we leave  
25 here, you know, the list will go around. I'm not sure what the -- how we're going  
26 to take it from here but I mean, IARC plus this plus that. If I could see it, I think I  
27 might be able to have a better understanding of where we're going with this and  
28 not -- and move from all to that list. But until I can see that list, I can't move from  
29 all to this.

30 DR. WARD: Kimberly?

31 MS. FLYNN: Oh, I'm sorry.

32 DR. WARD: Oh, I'm sorry. Let's hear from Julia and then Paul suggested we have  
33 a break so that everybody can stretch and think.

34 DR. QUINT: I just have one -- do we have a list of all the cancers? I mean, even  
35 when we get the list of the ones we've mentioned, I'm not sure what universe  
36 that represents.

37 DR. WARD: Well, actually I mean, it's not all.

38 DR. QUINT: All cancers, I don't mean all cancers in the world. I mean, all cancers

1                   that have been diagnosed or whatever that seem to be WTC-related. Because  
2                   that's the denominator that we're --  
3                   MS. DABAS: I don't think we can 'cause while I sat here today I got an email from  
4                   somebody that was diagnosed with sinus lymphoma, some type of sinus  
5                   lymphoma, so every day I get a new call about somebody that is diagnosed -- has  
6                   been diagnosed and hasn't come forward yet. Or, you know, lives in another state  
7                   and is completely oblivious to the discussions that go on here or go on in New  
8                   York City about cancer, and have convinced themselves, you know, that it's not  
9                   related so therefore they shouldn't make a phone call to, to that.  
10                  And then again, you know, these monitoring programs are not monitoring for  
11                  cancer so people are steered away from them. If you believe you have cancer,  
12                  you're going to an oncologist, you're not going to Mt. Sinai. You know, once  
13                  you've been diagnosed you're definitely not going to take four hours of your day  
14                  to get the first exam and then follow-up exams because you're going from one  
15                  oncologist to a PET scan to, you know, all these other appointments.  
16                  What I've been told by the people that are diagnosed is that they retired from the  
17                  NYPD and became full-time patients as their second job. So in doing so reporting  
18                  their cancer is never the first priority.  
19                  DR. WARD: But I think, yeah, there are lots of ways cancers are classified but the  
20                  list we shared earlier -- so this is basically the classification by primary site and this  
21                  is a standard classification and it should really capture all malignant neoplasms.  
22                  There is going to be a category of other and unknown. There's other ways to  
23                  classify cancer, by histology, but probably this would be the most logical way to  
24                  classify cancer and it would capture all the histologies. Yeah, and then but the  
25                  question of the rarity is you may be able -- a cancer may be rare based on its  
26                  histology, not just its primary site and so we may have to grapple a little bit with  
27                  that.  
28                  DR. ALDRICH: I think Dr. Harrison mentioned the premalignant conditions. I think  
29                  it was -- and I think those are important, the hematologic premalignant conditions  
30                  are important things to include in the coverage specifically because those people  
31                  definitely need follow-up. They may not need expensive treatments, which is a  
32                  good thing, but they definitely need follow-up and ought to be specifically  
33                  included, even though they're not cancers. And maybe on the other end of the  
34                  spectrum, of course, we wouldn't want to include basal cell carcinomas of the skin  
35                  because it's really not the same kind of biology as other cancers.  
36                  DR. WARD: Yes, and I totally agree with you and I'm hoping -- well, so not only do  
37                  I agree with you, and I think that opens the door to an important research area  
38                  because I do think that, especially with multiple myeloma, there's a lot of new

1 research on the premalignant conditions, and so, but I would appreciate that one  
2 of the clinicians actually puts together a list of what those are because --  
3 DR. ALDRICH: I nominate Dr. Rom for that.  
4 DR. WARD: Good. I know some but I don't think we know all. Leo?  
5 DR. TRASANDE: I just want to make a follow-up comment that, related to my  
6 comment in the earlier session about the possibility of adolescent and early adult  
7 cancers in pediatric or perinatally exposed populations for which we have no idea.  
8 I'm not saying for which we have no idea a priori as to which may occur. And I'm  
9 pointing this out as a potential research need more than anything else. I'm not  
10 suggesting it be included in the bill but I think it's certainly a concern that merits  
11 watching. It might be that early onset adult cancers arise in pediatric exposed  
12 populations insofar as there's greater proximity, greater time of exposure, acute  
13 subchronic and chronic types of exposures as well. Thank you.  
14 DR. WARD: Okay, so I think we should take a break so everybody has a chance to  
15 move around and think about the issues.  
16 (Recess 2:40 p.m. to 3:08 p.m.)  
17 DR. WARD: So all the committee members take their seats. Hi, John and Virginia,  
18 are you still with us?  
19 DR. DEMENT: This is John. I'm still here.  
20 DR. WARD: Hey, John. Since we've been talking for a long time and I know you  
21 were able to interject once, I would like to give you the opportunity if there's  
22 anything you'd like to add to our discussions before we get in the thick of it again  
23 and forget you're there.  
24 DR. DEMENT: No. I think I agree with the approach that we're taking. I'd like to  
25 hear a little more discussion of the rationale for including all of the pediatric cases,  
26 if that's the proposal on the table.  
27 DR. WARD: Okay, it just happens that Leonardo's tent is up so we'll --  
28 DR. DEMENT: Very good.  
29 DR. TRASANDE: All right, I'll address John's question. The thought process flowed  
30 from the fact that we know that a number of members of the community, many  
31 members of the community had exposure ranges that likely overlapped with  
32 ranges seen in firefighters and other responders in which increases in cancer had  
33 been detected, and that raises the significant potential or plausibility. The fact  
34 remains that in a sample of at most 46,000 children below 14<sup>th</sup> Street on  
35 September 11, 2001, it's un -- it would be hard to be convinced by any study that  
36 would be negative for cancer associations, and accepting that as definitive. And in  
37 the absence of such a study, we have to fall back on biological plausibility and in  
38 the context of children's unique vulnerability to chemicals such as those identified

1 in the World Trade Center disaster, there remains an extra cause for caution and  
2 perhaps precaution in that population. And so I can't define for you a footprint of  
3 cancers that I would expect plausibly to be increased in a pediatric population  
4 because I don't think we've seen a pediatric population exposed to something of  
5 this magnitude. I suppose we could start to reason by certain disasters like  
6 (inaudible) but they're different.  
7 And so that begins the line of reasoning towards supporting the inclusion of  
8 pediatric cancers, and it builds to some degree on the principle Steve outlined  
9 about including rare cancers. I think they're grounded in the fact that there's  
10 really not an epidemiologic platform on which to build and sustain a definitive  
11 decision, yea or nay, as to whether an association can be confirmed.  
12 So John, clearly -- love to hear your thoughts -- you're much more expert in the  
13 world of carcinogenesis than I am.  
14 DR. WARD: John, do you have any comments?  
15 DR. DEMENT: Yeah. Yeah, I agree with the concerns and somewhat the rationale.  
16 I guess what we're talking about is cancers that would be different from the sites  
17 that we're going to identify based on the identified pollutants in the exposure and  
18 the IARC list. So it would be those that would be again, fairly rare, I would think in  
19 addition to those.  
20 DR. WARD: Okay.  
21 DR. TRASANDE: John, and my response would be that given what little we know  
22 about the causes of cancer in adults and what much less we know about the  
23 causes of cancer in children though, benzene 1,3-butadiene and a few others  
24 coming to mind, I think it's hard to a priori elaborate such a footprint that we  
25 would anticipate for pediatric cancers that might emerge or a unique pattern.  
26 Other than some of the increases in incidents that we've seen in the context of  
27 increasing chemical exposures at large, thinking of testicular, brain and leukemia  
28 being the three that I can think of. But that wouldn't be a reason for putting those  
29 three conditions above all of the others in the context of an acute World Trade  
30 Center-related exposure. Those are in the context of more sub-chronic or chronic  
31 exposures.  
32 DR. WARD: Yeah, and I guess the other issue is that just the distribution of cancer  
33 types in kids is so different from that in adults that you really can't -- I mean they  
34 don't even line up very well, like there's not much lung, there's not much  
35 colorectum, so yes, so it would be hard to infer one from the other.  
36 Okay, and I mean, I do want to make sure, I think, I don't know that we'll have a --  
37 be able to make, have a statement drafted to read to the committee by the end of  
38 this meeting unless anyone else has had time to write one. I hope to write one.

1 DR. TRASANDE: So my placard was up for a different reason.  
2 DR. WARD: Oh, I'm sorry.  
3 DR. TRASANDE: It was process, actually, related.  
4 DR. WARD: Okay.  
5 DR. TRASANDE: And so I would be keen to see a draft consensus document, if we  
6 could achieve a rough consensus here. And I would see the need for -- I don't  
7 think we're going to get there by 4:00 p.m., given that it's 3:15. And so my  
8 anticipation is that we will need a conference call follow-up to review and approve  
9 a draft document. And that brings me to well, how is that document going to be  
10 created, and my -- and I'm certainly not committing to be a major author in such a  
11 document. There are others that probably are best suited to do that but I do  
12 think we need to resolve pretty quickly what's next in getting to that report and  
13 then having a discussion about it, but that's just a suggestion on my part.  
14 DR. WARD: Well, Dr. Howard has already granted our extension for our  
15 comments to be submitted no later than April 2nd so we've moved the deadline  
16 from the March 2nd to April 2nd. I think there's a couple of components, I mean,  
17 two things that I think we can do fairly quickly after this meeting is write up a  
18 summary that will include the list of IARC carcinogens in sites, so everybody has  
19 an opportunity to look at that, look at the other sites that we've agreed to based  
20 on the lines of evidence that we've discussed. Then I think there needs to be --  
21 and I'd like to do that sooner rather than later just so people can think about it.  
22 But then there needs to be an effort to actually write our recommendations out in  
23 a report. We will hopefully fairly soon have access to Ray's transcript of our  
24 discussions this afternoon, which he's agreed to put first on his priority list above  
25 the rest of the meeting. So we will actually be able to pull some ideas and text  
26 from things, you know, thoughts that people have expressed during this meeting.  
27 And then of course if there are people who would like to work on a draft  
28 specifically, then we can have volunteers to do that as well. I'm certainly willing to  
29 work on it, too. But then the idea would be to get a draft out that then would be  
30 the topic of discussion at a conference call after -- hopefully we would get the  
31 draft out long enough before the discussion so that people would have an  
32 opportunity to review it in detail and possibly even send comments so that we  
33 could try to incorporate them in the draft that we're reviewing on the conference  
34 call, but that is a pretty tight time schedule. Now our conference call will have to  
35 be announced in the Federal Register so Paul can talk a little bit about that.  
36 DR. MIDDENDORF: As far as the Federal Register is concerned, basically just give  
37 you the short story, I'll need to draft the Federal Register notice next week, early  
38 next week, so if anybody has any suggestions on agenda items, I need to get those

1 before early next week.  
2 DR. WARD: Yes, Leo?  
3 DR. TRASANDE: I also just have one other -- I realize that this -- the other at least  
4 burning topic on my forebrain about this meeting was the research agenda and  
5 whether we as a committee needed to approve that document from which the  
6 draft was sent around. And my instinct would be to try to close that aspect of  
7 business, that the conference call would focus on the cancer document.  
8 DR. MIDDENDORF: I don't think we need to do anything more with the document,  
9 it has been submitted. If there are new research ideas that the committee wants  
10 to forward on, they can begin developing a new document.  
11 DR. WARD: Glenn?  
12 DR. TALASKA: I was wondering, one thing I mentioned this to you once, Liz, and to  
13 other members of the committee, one of my concerns is that, really, to honor the  
14 people that were the first responders in this site that we learn something from the  
15 mistakes of the exposure metrics that were gathered for this particular  
16 catastrophe, and perhaps is it within our purview to be able to make  
17 recommendations of what things should be included for a national response, for  
18 the next -- to protect anybody else in case there's another catastrophe of this  
19 magnitude or a magnitude like this? Is that something that this committee can  
20 deal with?  
21 DR. WARD: Well, I mean, my first question which, and then I'll turn it over to Paul,  
22 is I think to a certain extent that has been done in other venues so my first  
23 question would be to look for whether it's been done before and et cetera, if we  
24 really have something to add, but I'll turn it over to Paul in terms of our charge.  
25 DR. MIDDENDORF: Yeah, I think if you look in the Zadroga Act and looked at what  
26 the charge for this committee is, it is a scientific and technical advisory  
27 committee, and that would probably be outside the scope. However, if you  
28 wanted to make suggestions to the program on things on an individual basis,  
29 you're more than welcome to do that.  
30 DR. WARD: Right, it's also possible that members of this committee, if there's,  
31 you know, if they feel moved to, to get together and write a paper, then, you  
32 know, they -- because we are going to be immersed in depth in some of these  
33 issues and there's certainly no prohibition from taking that into a scientific  
34 publication with people who would like to work together on that.  
35 DR. TALASKA: Okay.  
36 DR. MIDDENDORF: It would not be a product of the committee, though. That  
37 would be your individual efforts.  
38 DR. WARD: Right. It would be a byproduct but not a product. So I'd like -- I mean,

1 is that process -- Valerie.  
2 MS. DABAS: Yeah, I just had a question for Paul. Did you want us to send you  
3 possible dates or how would it work in trying to figure out? You said you needed  
4 some time to put it on the docket, so I just wanted to know if you had directions  
5 for the committee as far as what they need to do to facilitate that.  
6 DR. MIDDENDORF: Yeah, what I'll do is as soon as I get back in the office I'll send a  
7 Doodle request and try to identify times. One of my questions for you: Do you  
8 think that a four-hour time frame is enough? I'm getting a lot of head shaking, so.  
9 We will have to include a public comment session so that would reduce it to about  
10 three and a half hours. But I think we can make that a short public comment  
11 section but we do need to allow that within our agenda. And it would probably be  
12 close to the end of March because that's the only time frame that's available to us  
13 in terms of when I have to get the Federal Register notice in and how much lead  
14 time I have to give them.  
15 MS. DABAS: And if the Mt. Sinai or the fire department study is out by then on  
16 the EMS workers, would we be able to see those and evaluate those, and if  
17 anybody from those entities wanted to present the findings, would that be okay  
18 for that date?  
19 DR. MIDDENDORF: It's certainly an agenda item you can suggest. And I'm  
20 wondering is that actually going to be published or it's only going to be submitted  
21 at this point?  
22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, it's going to be submitted.  
23 DR. MIDDENDORF: And so I doubt that it will be out by -- in the next month.  
24 DR. REISSMAN: I just wanted to respond briefly to the question about whether or  
25 not your advice or your input would be helpful. You know, we're always  
26 interested whether -- it's outside the committee, but we've done a lot at NIOSH,  
27 and also within HHS in general, in response to the lessons that were observed, I'll  
28 put it that way, in 9/11. And one of the major projects that NIOSH tried to help  
29 coordinate in all of this was an emergency responder health monitoring system,  
30 and it's a guidance document that's in a -- I think it's in a docket with NIOSH, and  
31 I'll find that and give it to you so that it can be put out there. But it talks about all  
32 the lessons learned in all of this from a responder safety and health perspective.  
33 Not from the community perspective 'cause NIOSH typically doesn't deal with the  
34 community except within this venue. So I just wanted to let you know about that.  
35 DR. WARD: Are there comments or questions about the process? Glenn?  
36 DR. TALASKA: No, no. That was -- sorry.  
37 DR. WARD: Okay, so any other questions or comments about either the  
38 discussions today or the process? Yes.

1 MS. HUGHES: Can you clarify a little bit more how the report will address the  
2 precancerous conditions? 'Cause I know that had come up. That it wasn't only  
3 the end result but sometimes something along the way.

4 DR. WARD: Well, I think we specifically talked about the precancerous conditions  
5 for the hematologic cancers and the lymphomas, where there's a very known --  
6 where many of them do progress to the full-blown cancer. I don't know if there's  
7 any consideration of any other kinds of premalignant conditions and I'm sure  
8 there is a reason to think about them.

9 DR. ALDRICH: I'm probably the wrong person to ask. I'm not familiar with any  
10 other areas where there are well-defined premalignant conditions that have a,  
11 you know, inexorable progression the way they do in hematology.

12 DR. WARD: Well, the one I can think of is colon cancer.

13 DR. ALDRICH: Yeah.

14 DR. WARD: So if you, if we screen people for colon cancer, we're going to remove  
15 adenomatous polyps that then will be -- so it's not completely a moot question. I  
16 don't know that we want to go too deeply into it but it's -- the other question in  
17 this is just, I guess I want to titillate people -- I mean, the other difficult question is  
18 down the road is lung CT for screening. Not that that would necessarily prevent a  
19 cancer but it could detect it early. And obviously it's not going to be a yes/no  
20 answer because it hasn't been studied in this population with all -- but, I mean,  
21 these issues are going to be important down the line and it's good to put them on  
22 the table. Yes, Julia.

23 DR. QUINT: I have a question. How would this differ from medical guidelines  
24 which in occupational health are often developed to help physicians diagnose and  
25 recognize, you know, the work-relatedness of disease? Would this be different  
26 than that or?

27 DR. WARD: It could be because for some of these things we're still -- I mean, well,  
28 for colon cancer for example, you know, there are guidelines for the general  
29 population but it's really a question -- but we have to acknowledge that in the  
30 course of screening, we will be identifying premalignant conditions that -- and so  
31 and treating them. So that's one area. For lung CT, I think the problem is there's  
32 only now just recently been a clinical trial demonstrating that screening high-risk  
33 people, by virtue of their smoking history, with lung CT, it is a benefit in terms of  
34 reducing mortality. There is, however, both a question of radiation exposure,  
35 they're screening yearly, and there's a question of morbidity associated with --

36 DR. MARKOWITZ: False positives.

37 DR. WARD: The false positives. So and what's different about this population is  
38 it's, you know, we don't know -- first of all, we don't have the same degree of

1 confidence in our estimate that it's of high-risk. We may have pulmonary  
2 abnormalities that could make the reading of the -- you know, so there's a million  
3 questions that would come up and it, you know, I guess it's a good way to end the  
4 meeting to know that we -- we're certainly not answering all the questions about  
5 cancer and treatment of cancer and screening and early detection of premalignant  
6 conditions in this meeting. And we can't possibly but they are serious questions.  
7 So other comments or? Steve?  
8 DR. MARKOWITZ: I think, you know, Barrett's esophagus is another premalignant  
9 condition.  
10 I want to go back to the issue of childhood cancer just for a moment. The logic in  
11 covering childhood cancer is that kids were -- some kids were substantially  
12 exposed, that the population's so small that we'll never get a epidemiologic  
13 answer from that population and that kids have unique vulnerabilities. So in the  
14 adult population where we have this enormous, you know, decades of research  
15 on, mostly or a lot epidemiologic demonstrating this causal relationship between  
16 exposures and the cancers, which we don't have in kids. So is there anything  
17 beyond those three things that we can point to that would bolster the case for  
18 kids having cancer being covered?  
19 DR. WARD: I think maybe expanding a bit on the increased vulnerability and  
20 biologic plausibility because you have, you know, I mean, kids by their very nature  
21 have more dividing cells and I think there is a pretty strong line of argument  
22 about -- I mean, even the EPA, I think, sets their, you know, has just kind of sets  
23 risk limits for kids differently than for adults based on vulnerability so I think those  
24 things could be cited.  
25 DR. TRASANDE: Just to expound on that a little bit, and when I made that initial  
26 round of comments this morning, I had left the traditional line of arguments, what  
27 I call traditional because I just have used them a lot early on in my career, but  
28 children's ventilation rates are greater per pound and therefore they inhale and  
29 they could have inhaled more out of proportion to their weight than adults in the  
30 context of the World Trade Center disaster.  
31 Their lungs are in a developing phase all the way through age 20 and so a toxic  
32 injury could have more significant consequences at that time of life. And there  
33 are others as you mentioned developing organ systems that could fail or be  
34 deranged as a result of chemical injury. And then there's the longer latency over  
35 which they can have cancer occur, which is a nontrivial component of the  
36 arguments. I think that's just elaborating on; I don't think it's adding anything  
37 intrinsically new, but I think it provides cement to the foundation of the argument  
38 and the literature is substantial in those regards.

1 DR. WARD: So let me ask one question of Paul and the NIOSH folks, so when we --  
2 let's say if we wanted to address the issue of childhood cancer, do you want the  
3 committee to come up with really a rationale that cites literature or do you want  
4 us to just, you know, essentially say what Leo said and not cite literature? What is  
5 your -- what kind of documentation are you requesting for these  
6 recommendations?  
7 DR. MIDDENDORF: The recommendations can be whatever the committee  
8 chooses and they can choose to document the recommendation to the extent  
9 that they want. But I think the point is that the more the scientific basis there is  
10 for it, so if you go into the literature and you do literature citations, that makes  
11 your case stronger. But it's up to the committee as to how strongly they want to  
12 make that.  
13 DR. WARD: Yes, Catherine.  
14 MS. HUGHES: I just want to give some background information generally on  
15 children downtown, because there was that great program for responders, they  
16 first came out with the guidelines for adults and they revised them, and finally  
17 after many years, the pediatric guidelines were developed, so it was many years  
18 later. And so there's a huge catch-up game going on here. And there's not has  
19 been as much attention in both time or money in doing the studies, just because  
20 there is such a limited population.  
21 DR. WARD: And has anyone made an estimate of what -- of the number of  
22 childhood cancers that might be expected in the 46,000 kids; I'm talking  
23 specifically now about childhood cancers, not cancers as they get older. Has that  
24 been done or not?  
25 DR. TRASANDE: (Inaudible) matter of public record. Not to my knowledge. It's  
26 simply a calculation exercise derived on SEER data would really be my basis as a  
27 starting point.  
28 DR. WARD: Well, it might be useful I guess in terms of writing up the  
29 recommendations. It might be useful as just one of the reference points. But I  
30 guess I mean, my sense is that we don't -- you know, we're not being  
31 commissioned to write a 50-page paper but I think, you know, I think we all know  
32 what some of the more difficult points are and I think the childhood cancers may  
33 be a little bit more debated, so maybe we should, you know, we should think as a  
34 committee then for those things that we think will need a higher level of defense  
35 or of explanation, that we do ask committee members who have unique expertise  
36 in those areas to pitch in and help to draft those sections.  
37 And maybe we could think about having kind of the main document which  
38 summarizes the key recommendations and then kind of supplementary material

1 that has the more detailed reference information supporting the -- supporting our  
2 recommendation.  
3 So would people like to volunteer at this point to help with the drafting of  
4 recommendations or to help with drafting specific parts of the recommendations?  
5 DR. TRASANDE: I'll help with something.  
6 DR. WARD: Great. And Leo, we're counting on you for childhood cancers.  
7 DR. TRASANDE: I can certainly provide -- pull from multiple sources a summary of  
8 the key literature that one would want to cite.  
9 DR. WARD: Good. So.  
10 MS. FLYNN: I have another process question which is at what point would the rest  
11 of us get to see the draft so that we would be able to comment on the call or even  
12 before -- I mean, is there a possibility for a draft to be circulated before the call and  
13 comments from some of us who are not among the original drafters?  
14 DR. WARD: I mean, that would be ideal and I guess what we need to do is work  
15 backwards from the date of the call and see what's feasible. I mean, my hope  
16 would be to get at least a one-page summary out to the committee next week.  
17 You know, really just trying to synthesize what our main points were and also to  
18 make the table of the cancer sites from the IARC, you know, from all the different  
19 sources so the committee has an early preview of those documents; and then to  
20 work on the more -- and to take feedback on that and then simultaneously work  
21 on the longer rationale document so that it can be distributed and it can be  
22 commented on before, you know, before the call so that the call would really be  
23 mostly to discuss the more difficult areas and make sure we have the language  
24 exactly the way we want it, but that's what we hope for in an ideal world. And  
25 we'll certainly do our best to achieve that.  
26 DR. TALASKA: As much as I'm loathe to nominate another committee member, I  
27 would really love to see if John help us with the asbestos section.  
28 DR. WARD: John, are you still there?  
29 DR. DEMENT: Yes, I am. And yes, I'll help you with the asbestos section.  
30 DR. WARD: Excellent.  
31 DR. MIDDENDORF: Since we're talking a little bit about process and timing, we  
32 also need to be able to post whatever document it is you're going to be discussing  
33 on the conference call; it has to be posted several days ahead of time so that  
34 people who want to comment on it and provide comments in our meeting, have a  
35 chance to look at it so, you know, that backs it up even a little bit more.  
36 DR. WARD: Okay. Valerie.  
37 MS. DABAS: I know you talked about summarizing but I think, I know for me, one  
38 of the things that I do want to see is that list because we talked about biological

1                   plausibility, we also talked about rare cancers and defining -- having definition for  
2                   that and then the IARC list. So I think once we get those three things and the list, I  
3                   think that would be great if we can circulate that first, just in case anybody had  
4                   comments on it. I'm sure I will.  
5                   DR. WARD: Yeah, and that is the idea, to give out the most -- you know, to  
6                   distribute the most important information first while we work on the details.  
7                   So unless anyone else has a further comment or concern, I think we're ready to  
8                   close the meeting. I appreciate all of -- yes, Steve.  
9                   DR. MARKOWITZ: This has nothing to do with cancer. We had one of the persons  
10                  during the public comment, I think an air traffic controller, talk about being  
11                  eligible for the World Trade Center health program for PTSD and it's a question  
12                  whether our -- the charter for this committee includes a request from the  
13                  administrator to advise on eligibility, and whether it's something that we should  
14                  take up or are permitted to take up in the near future.  
15                  DR. MIDDENDORF: I can address that the Zadroga Act does require the  
16                  administrator to consult on the eligibility for Shanksville and for the Pentagon but  
17                  I'm not sure what it says -- Dori, do you know what it says as far as eligibility is  
18                  concerned?  
19                  DR. REISSMAN: I think the question that the administrator can ask of the advisory  
20                  committee is if there should be any modifications to the Pentagon and Shanksville  
21                  eligibility criteria, but I don't think it goes as far as to say in the act stipulates,  
22                  must present at the site, so that's a dilemma there. And I think she might address  
23                  that directly.  
24                  MS. HOWELL: The administrator can ask for assistance with the initial Pentagon  
25                  and Shanksville eligibility criteria, which is what you all had the presentation on  
26                  yesterday. He can also, if he chooses, to open it up to modification of eligibility  
27                  criteria for the New York responders and survivors. Then he would come to you  
28                  all and ask for consultation there but he would have to initiate that process.  
29                  DR. WARD: So is there some mechanism by which the committee can transmit  
30                  that particular issue to Dr. Howard? Can we just call attention to that issue for  
31                  him in a separate communication?  
32                  MS. HOWELL: I mean, the program administrator takes notice of everything that  
33                  happens during these committee members -- I'm sorry, meetings, and has been  
34                  listening to all the public comments, so I mean, I think he's aware of the issue  
35                  already.  
36                  MS. FLYNN: Can I just --  
37                  DR. WARD: Yes, Kimberly.  
38                  MS. FLYNN: I spoke to him at some length, and he applied for enrollment and was

1 denied, and he appealed the denial, and Dr. Howard denied the appeal. And so, I  
2 mean, you know, denied the appeal based on his geographic location.  
3 Paul, I don't know what we can do but we really have to do something. I mean,  
4 even if we have to go back to the main authors of the bill. I mean, it is not in the  
5 spirit of the bill to exclude someone who truly fits the definition of a first  
6 responder on the day of 9/11. I don't mean to put you on the spot but I -- we  
7 have to make sure that this individual gets the care that he needs and deserves.  
8 DR. MIDDENDORF: Yeah, I think it's something that we'll just have to look into to  
9 see what -- if anything can be done and if so what. I can't promise anything more  
10 than that at this point.  
11 DR. WARD: Yes.  
12 MR. CASSIDY: Just on that note on the post-traumatic stress, I know from  
13 speaking to Sheila Burnbaum that one of her concerns was literally anybody could  
14 claim that they have post-traumatic stress, and they have it from watching the  
15 event on TV, no matter where they were. And although I'm not an expert, you  
16 are. Maybe you want to comment on that. Is that crazy?  
17 DR. NORTH: There are specific criteria in our diagnostic manual that talk about  
18 how you can get PTSD, what are the qualifying exposures and just seeing the news  
19 on TV is not one of those.  
20 But it's beginning to sound to me like this is complex enough that it might be wise  
21 to want to discuss it further, and I, with my expertise, I think I can help us clarify  
22 some issues, but I don't think we have time now.  
23 DR. WARD: Thank you. Yes, Tom.  
24 DR. ALDRICH: There's a small precedent related to the New York State task force  
25 on -- worker protection task force, where we included a group of dispatchers.  
26 MR. CASSIDY: Fire alarm dispatchers.  
27 DR. ALDRICH: Fire alarm dispatchers who were not at the World Trade Center site  
28 but were taking calls all morning from people who were about to die and had  
29 subsequent -- some of them had some subsequent mental health issues.  
30 DR. WARD: Thank you. Well, thank you all for your full and active participation. I  
31 think we've had a great and robust discussion, and I thank everyone from the  
32 community who hung in there for the long meeting. And John, thank you  
33 especially. I know it's really hard to stay on these calls long distance, and we  
34 really appreciate your input.  
35 DR. DEMENT: Thanks a lot. I'm happy I could contribute to some extent.  
36 DR. MIDDENDORF: Let me just express appreciation from the program for all of  
37 your thoughts and inputs. We very much appreciate it. Thank you.  
38 (Meeting adjourned at 3:43 p.m.)

This verbatim transcript of the WTC Health Program Scientific/Technical Advisory Committee, Committee Meeting held in New York City on February 15-16, 2012, has been reviewed for concerns under the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a), and personally identifiable information has been redacted as necessary.

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CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER  
STATE OF GEORGIA  
COUNTY OF FULTON

I, Steven Ray Green, Certified Merit Master Court Reporter, do hereby certify that I reported the above and foregoing on the day of February 16, 2012; and it is a true and accurate transcript of the proceedings captioned herein.

I further certify that I am neither related to nor counsel to any of the parties herein, nor have any interest in the cause named herein.

WITNESS my hand and official seal this the 9th day of March, 2012.

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