

Oregon http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/preparedness



#### Oregon Completes Pandemic Influenza Full-Scale Exercise Exercises allow states and localities to test their abilities to respond to potential disasters.



In 2006, the Oregon Public Health Division (OPHD) completed the *PandORa* (Pandemic Oregon Activity) full-scale exercise. The

exercise involved the scenario of a widespread outbreak of a new influenza virus that resulted in hundreds of victims falling ill in communities throughout the state. Participating organizations included OPHD, more than 30 local public health departments, 50 hospitals, two tribal health departments, the Oregon Board of Pharmacy, Oregon National Guard, and state agencies of emergency management, administrative services, education, transportation, and the fire marshal.

Key successes and best practices identified during the exercise included collaboration between the Joint Information Center and the Operations Section, teamwork among staff experts in epidemiology and immunizations, strong knowledge and practical application of the Incident Command System, and frequent monitoring and correction of inaccurate media reports. OPHD also identified key opportunities for improvement that are essential to successfully managing the pandemic influenza threat and apply directly to other potential disasters. These improvements included the need for a larger agency operations center, clarification of the public health-based resource request and filing process between public health and the State Emergency Coordination Center, incorporation of a formal documentation management system, and additional training in emergency management software applications. The lessons learned from this exercise will help OPHD improve response to future emergencies.

According to the Oregon Public Health Division, the cooperative agreement is valuable because it has dramatically increased the capacity, expertise, and integration of public health with emergency response agencies within the state. The state has been able to hire and train staff in areas of communicable diseases, epidemiology, and information systems, and they have proven critical for local public health departments during this time of increased scarcity of public funds.

# **Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness**

Below are activities conducted by Oregon in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.

# **Disease Detection and Investigation**

The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure.

| Detect &<br>Report | Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651   | Yes       |
|--------------------|--|-----------|
|                    | - Primary method for receiving urgent disease reports*2  | Telephone |
|                    | Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks across state lines (through the CDC <i>Epi-X</i> system) <sup>3</sup> | Yes       |
|                    | Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza <sup>4</sup>  | Yes       |

\*Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned to receive the reports 24/7/365.

<sup>1</sup> CDC, DSLR; 2005; <sup>2</sup> CDC, DSLR; 2006; <sup>3</sup> CDC, *Epi-X*; 2007; <sup>4</sup> HHS, OIG; 2007





#### **Public Health Laboratories**

Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA "fingerprinting" techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as *E. coli* O157:H7 and *Listeria monocytogenes*.

| Detect & Report | Number of Oregon laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network <sup>1</sup>  | 1    |  |
|-----------------|--|------|--|
|                 | Rapidly identified <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 using advanced DNA "fingerprinting" techniques (PFGE): <sup>2</sup>  |      |  |
|                 | - Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07)   | 12   |  |
|                 | - Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  | 100% |  |
|                 | Rapidly identified <i>Listeria monocytogenes</i> using advanced DNA "fingerprinting" techniques (PFGE): <sup>2</sup>                                 |      |  |
|                 | - Number of samples received (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07)   | N/A  |  |
|                 | - Percentage of test results submitted to CDC database (PulseNet) within 4 days  | N/A  |  |
|                 | Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive messages <sup>3</sup> ( $8/05 - 8/06$ )                          | Yes  |  |
|                 | - System complied with CDC information technology standards (PHIN) <sup>3</sup> (8/05 – 8/06)  | Yes  |  |
|                 | Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform initial screening of clinical specimens <sup>3</sup> (8/05 – 8/06) | Yes  |  |
| Crosscutting    | Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria <sup>4</sup> (8/05 – 8/06)   | Yes  |  |
|                 | Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria <sup>4</sup> (8/05 – 8/06)   | N/A  |  |
|                 |  |      |  |

<sup>1</sup> CDC, DBPR; 2007; <sup>2</sup> CDC, DSLR; 2007; <sup>3</sup> APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007; <sup>4</sup> CDC, DSLR; 2006

### Response

Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or real event and how the department can improve.

| Control      | Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) <sup>1, 2</sup>  | Yes |  |
|--------------|--|-----|--|
|              | Oregon SNS plan reviewed by CDC <sup>2</sup>   | Yes |  |
|              | - Score on CDC technical assistance review (1-100)   | 68  |  |
|              | Number of Oregon cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative <sup>3</sup>  | 1   |  |
| Crosscutting | Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with: <sup>1</sup> (8/05 – 8/06)  |     |  |
|              | - Hospitals  | Yes |  |
|              | - Local/regional emergency management agencies   | Yes |  |
|              | - Federal emergency management agencies  | Yes |  |
|              | Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative agreement activities <sup>4</sup>   | Yes |  |
|              | Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders <sup>5</sup> (8/05 – 8/06)  | Yes |  |
|              | Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real event <sup>*†6</sup> (partial year, $9/06 - 2/07$ )                                    | Yes |  |
|              | Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when power and land lines were unavailable <sup><math>+6</math></sup> (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) | No  |  |
| Improve      | Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event <sup>16</sup> (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07)                                | Yes |  |

\*Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS.

<sup>+</sup> States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only.

<sup>1</sup> CDC, DSLR; 2006; <sup>2</sup> CDC, DSNS; 2007; <sup>3</sup> CDC, DSNS CRI; 2007; <sup>4</sup> CDC, DSLR; 1999-2005; <sup>5</sup> APHL, Chemical Terrorism Preparedness; May 2007; <sup>6</sup> CDC, DSLR; 2007