U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

WORK GROUP ON THE AREA IV OF THE SANTA SUSANA FIELD LABORATORY SITE PROFILE AND SEC

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FRIDAY, APRIL 17, 2009

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The meeting convened at 10:00 a.m. in the Zurich Room of the Cincinnati Airport Marriott Hotel, Hebron, Kentucky, Michael Gibson, Chairman, presiding.

# PRESENT:

MICHAEL H. GIBSON, Chairman JOSIE M. BEACH, Member WANDA I. MUNN, Member PHILLIP M. SCHOFIELD, Member

THEODORE M. KATZ, Acting Designated Federal Official

# IDENTIFIED PARTICIPANTS:

NANCY ADAMS, NIOSH Contractor\* TERRIE BARRIE, ANWAG\* HANS BEHLING, SC&A\* GREG BERONJA, SC&A LIZ BRACKETT, ORAU\* RAY CLARK, ORAU\* JACK FIX, ORAU\* ELIZABETH HOMOKI-TITUS, HHS\* EMILY HOWELL, HHS LARA HUGHES, NIOSH BONNIE KLEA, Petitioner\* ROY LLOYD, HHS\* JOHN MAURO, SC&A ROBERT MORRIS, ORAU\* JIM NETON, NIOSH GENE POTTER, ORAU\* ADAM SALKIN, Public\* JOHN STIVER, SC&A ELYSE THOMAS, ORAU

\*Participating via telephone

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# PROCEEDINGS

(9:57 a.m.)

MR. KATZ: Good morning. This is Ted Katz, the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, and this is the Santa Susana Working Group, and we're just coming on line now.

Let me just check the phone lines and see. Do we have any Board members on the phone?

(No verbal response.)

MR. KATZ: Okay. So Mark was possibly going to call in. No Mark, and then we have the rest of our Board members here. So we're going to start right away beginning with roll call, and for everybody in roll call, government and contractors and so on, please also state your conflict of interest situation.

So beginning in the room with Board members. Mike.

CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Mike Gibson,

1	Chair of the work group. No conflict.
2	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Philip
3	Schofield, Board member. No conflict.
4	MEMBER BEACH: Josie Beach, Board
5	member. No conflict.
6	MR. KATZ: Wanda.
7	MEMBER MUNN: Wanda Munn, Board
8	member. No conflict.
9	MR. KATZ: All right, and I think
10	on the line we don't have Mark right now who
11	is the alternate for this, and there are no
12	other Board members on the phone; is that
13	correct?
14	(No verbal response.)
15	MR. KATZ: Okay. But in the room,
16	the NIOSH ORAU team, please.
17	MR. NETON: Jim Neton, OCAS. No
18	conflict.
19	DR. HUGHES: Lara Hughes, OCAS. No
20	conflict.
21	MR. KATZ: And are there any NIOSH
22	ORAU team on the line?

1	MR. MORRIS: Robert Morris, ORAU
2	team. No conflict.
3	MR. KATZ: That's Robert Morris.
4	MS. BRACKETT: Liz Brackett, ORAU
5	team. No conflict.
6	MR. KATZ: Welcome, Liz.
7	MR. POTTER: Gene Potter, ORAU
8	team. No conflicts.
9	MR. KATZ: Okay. Then how about
10	SC&A in the room?
11	DR. MAURO: John Mauro, SC&A. No
12	conflict.
13	MR. BERONJA: Greg Beronja, SC&A.
14	No conflict.
15	MR. STIVER: John Stiver, SC&A. No
16	conflict.
17	MR. KATZ: Are there any other SC&A
18	on the line?
19	(No verbal response.)
20	DR. MAURO: Not yet.
21	MR. KATZ: Okay. You're expecting
22	some then. Great. Okay.

1	And then we have?
2	MS. THOMAS: I'm Elyse Thomas, and
3	I'm with the ORAU team.
4	MR. KATZ: Did I just skip you
5	somehow?
6	MS. THOMAS: Yes, kind of went
7	right on to the next group, but that's fine.
8	MR. KATZ: Oh, I'm sorry.
9	MS. THOMAS: And I have no
10	conflict.
11	MR. KATZ: You've got to get your
12	word in quickly. Sorry, Elyse.
13	MS. THOMAS: No problem.
14	MR. KATZ: Okay, and then we will
15	have in the room, but we don't right now one
16	HHS employee, but we can get her to identify
17	when she comes in.
18	On the line do we have anybody from
19	HHS or other federal employees?
20	MR. LLOYD: Roy Lloyd. No
21	conflict.
22	MR. KATZ: Welcome, Roy.

Okay. Then how about petitioners?
Do we have any petitioners on the line?
MS. KLEA: Bonnie Klea, petitioner.
MR. KATZ: Welcome, Bonnie.
MS. KLEA: Thank you.
MR. KATZ: And any other members of
the public or staff from congressional
offices?
MR. SALKIN: I'm from the public.
Adam Salkin.
MR. KATZ: Adam Salkin?
MR. SALKIN: Yes.
MR. KATZ: Okay. Thank you.
Welcome.
MS. BARRIE: This is Terrie Barrie
with ANWAG.
MR. KATZ: Oh, welcome, Terrie.
MS. BARRIE: Good morning.
MR. KATZ: Okay. Anyone else from
the public?
(No verbal response.)
MR. KATZ: Okay. Then that covers

1	roll call.
2	MS. ADAMS: Ted, it's Nancy.
3	MR. KATZ: Oh, Nancy. Sorry. I
4	should have said contractors, too, I guess.
5	Welcome, Nancy. Nancy Adams, contractor to
6	NIOSH.
7	MS. ADAMS: NIOSH.
8	MR. CLARK: Ray Clark with ORAU is
9	here.
10	MR. KATZ: Oh, okay, another. Ray
11	Clark. Thank you.
12	MR. FIX: Jack Fix, ORD.
13	MR. KATZ: Jack Fix. We have quite
14	a cast.
15	Any others?
16	(No verbal response.)
17	MR. KATZ: Okay. Then for everyone
18	on the phone, just to remind you, please,
19	please, mute your phones except when you're
20	speaking. Star-six if you don't actually have
21	a mute button, and please do not put the call

on hold. If you need to go somewhere, just

disconnect and call back in because the hold will mess up the line for everybody.

Thank you.

I'm sorry. The mute is star, the star sign on your phone and then six. It will mute your phone.

Mike.

CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Okay. The agenda we've got set up for today is to review the site profile issues matrix. That's kind of like a little bit of history of where we've been since the last time we met.

The Board assigned SC&A to do an SEC petition evaluation. So that will be the second item on the agenda.

And then once we cover that information and probably after lunch some time early this afternoon, then if there's any claimants or advocates on the line that feel we may have missed some things that they feel are important, they can raise the issues at that time and then we'll take them under

consideration.

And then finally the action items and path forward to close out the day.

So with that, I'll turn it over to SC&A for the site profile issues matrix.

MR. KATZ: And let me just note Emily Howell from HHS has joined us.

MR. BERONJA: Good morning. This is Greg Beronja. Again, I'm with SC&A, and as Mike said, the first thing I'm going to do is go through the site profile review. We have an issues matrix for that, and what I'm going to do is there's a number of these issues which are more editorial in nature and we'll pretty much kind of skip over those. There's a couple issues where I think it will be better to discuss during the SEC discussion, and then there's a few where there are NIOSH action items, and then we can talk about those maybe in this context.

So I'm going to go through. I guess folks on the phone, I apologize if you

don't have this. I'll try and make sure that 1 2 you understand the issue and ask questions if you have trouble following from the phone. 3 Yes, go ahead. 4 5 DR. NETON: I've got a question about process here. 6 We're going to do the 7 site profile and go over the issues and then decide which ones are SEC issues? 8 I mean, to me right now we have an 9 10 SEC evaluation form on the table that has a class that's already proposed to be added, and 11 I don't know that we want to go 12 back and 13 tackle profile issues right now sort secondary to that. 14 15 Well, certainly it's Mike's, 16 Chair's, prerogative, but I'm just sort of wondering. 17 I think the intent BERONJA: 18 19 really was to not really go over any, quote/ unquote, site profile issues. 20 DR. NETON: Okay. 21 I think there were

BERONJA:

MR.

1	some issues here that naturally go into the
2	SEC where there were maybe action items on
3	NIOSH's part that will play a part in the SEC.
4	DR. NETON: Okay.
5	MR. BERONJA: So if there's
6	anything where you think I'm going into too
7	much detail
8	DR. NETON: No, that's fine. I
9	just didn't want to get engaged in some
10	detailed discussions of some secondary set
11	profile issues that would take up most of the
12	day
13	MR. BERONJA: No.
14	DR. NETON: and then we'd not
15	really get into the SEC issues.
16	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: That's mainly
17	just historical
18	DR. NETON: Okay.
19	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: just to get us
20	all back up.
21	DR. NETON: That's fine.
22	MR. BERONJA: And my hope, although

I haven't done many of these, is that we can get through this in less than an hour at the most, maybe even a little bit quicker, and I'm going to go through these just by the issue number and hopefully everybody in the room has these.

Issue 4.1-1 was just the discussion about the inconsistency of the presentation of dates in the operation, and this is somewhat of an editorial issue and somewhat of an SEC issue that we will discuss in the SEC discussion.

The same thing is true on 4.1-2, which are names used to reference the site in the document are not consistent. Again, it's an editorial issue that I think when NIOSH has time they're going to go back and address.

I'm going to move through these pretty quickly. So if anybody has any questions.

4.2-1, there's a discussion about the sodium reactor experiment. Again, I think

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I'm going to skip this right now because this is covered also in the site profile where there's a NIOSH action item.

4.2-2 is a discussion about just

the composition of the work force, which I think is being adequately handled. So I don't want to really go into this, whether it's the co-worker models that are being worked on or other things.

4.2 - 3is lack of sufficient detail potential exposures to assess This is covered in more detail. workers. It's more specific responses in the SEC or later on.

4.2-4 references an incomplete listing of radionuclides, and I think there this again is going to be covered in some of the SEC issues, and I think NIOSH has said that they're going to revise some of the sections and tables of the SEC profile related to this.

4.2-5 is a discrepancies in dates

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presented, and again, it's editorial that I think will be fixed when NIOSH does some revisions to the documents.

Again, 4.2-6 is a presentation of the owners and operators, which was a little bit confusing in the document, again, editorial, and it will be addressed later.

Then we move to 4.3-1, is insufficient guidance in TBD-3 to perform dose reconstructions, and in going through these things, I don't think that there's anything that we need to discuss here. I think actions as far as resolving some of these things or how these things will factor and the SEC will be discussed at that time.

4.3-2 talks about Table 3-2 in the site profile that needs to be revised, and again, this is an editorial thing that I think NIOSH is going to address when they have a more of a clarification chance. Ιt was related the presentation of medical to exposures, but was discussed in 4.3-2.

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4.4-1 and 4.4-2 is improper use of surrogate data for environmental exposure. Again, the environmental exposure issue is talked about in the SEC and we'll cover that there.

4.4-3 development of breathing zone air concentrations, I think NIOSH is going to describe the basis for the factors used in doing this in the next revision of TBD-4, and this, again, will be covered maybe to some small extent during the SEC discussion.

4.4-4 is justification for assignment of external dose estimates is not provided, and the NIOSH response to this was it's being reviewed and will be described in the next revisions of TBD-4.

Again, we have an SEC issue that deals with some of the internal dosimetry that we'll discuss during the SEC as well as there are issues related to the external doses, and I'd rather cover those there, but otherwise some of these things will be revised

editorially in the next revision of the TBD. 1 4.4-5 talks about consumption of 2 potable water. Again, we'll cover this in the 3 There is some information that SC&A had 4 noticed in some later documents that we think 5 6 should be factored in in looking at this, but 7 think this is probably more of a dose reconstruction issue than an SEC issue, but it 8 will be discussed later on. 9 4.4-6 talks about the sodium burn 10 pit and some other areas as radiation sources, 11 again, this the sodium 12 and experiment and a few other incidents will be 13 discussed during our discussion of the SEC. 14 15 4.5-1 internal monitoring was not 16 complete or well documented. Again, we've got a discussion on internal monitoring in the SEC 17 review. 18 19 4.5-2 is the same thing, related to internal dosimetry, and in fact, I think quite 20 a few of the next issues -- 4.5-3, missing 21 radionuclides is also addressed later.

1	point, five, dash, two talks about co-worker
2	model, and I think maybe we can just hold off
3	and talk about that as we get to the SEC, too.
4	4.5-5 is a very specific. It's the
5	real chronic intake should be used in
6	evaluating bioassay results, and I think NIOSH
7	is taking I think they've drafted OTIB-0068
8	to address some of the correction factors that
9	were noted in the site profile.
10	I guess that's is that final or
11	not?
12	DR. NETON: I'm not 100 percent
13	certain.
14	MR. BERONJA: Okay.
15	DR. NETON: I can look.
16	4.5-6 talks about inconsistencies
17	between MVA values described in the text and
18	the ones reported in a table. Again, I think
19	this is more of an editorial issue that will
20	be cleaned up when the TBD is revised.
21	4.5-7 talks about clarification of
	II

1	think the response here talked about some of
2	the analytical methods used for uranium, as
3	well as some of the other analytical methods
4	used from '75 to '88 are going to be
5	investigated by NIOSH to determine whether the
6	fluorometric and radiometric methods were used
7	for uranium samples as well as potentials for
8	exposure.
9	So I think that we can talk about
10	that more in relation to the SEC.
11	4.5-8 is, again, just a
12	presentation of dates that's going to be
13	fixed. Again, a somewhat minor issue.
14	4.5-9 talks about neptunium and
15	depleted uranium not included in the table,
16	which again will be revised the next time
17	around. I'm just looking at some of the
18	specific responses here.
19	I think this one is okay. We'll
20	talk about that related to the SEC, too.
21	And then there's the specific issue
22	of 4.5-10 on the inappropriate solubility type

for lung cancer. I think here OTIB-71 was developed to cover uranium aluminide, and so I think we do have coverage there as far as the specific approach to doing that.

I don't know, John. Is there anything else related to that?

DR. MAURO: From a perspective, you'll notice that at the bottom of each of these briefings on the status of these issues related to site profile there is characterization as to whether we consider it to be an SEC or non-SEC, and I think it's important that everyone start here, everyone is looking at the SEC when we get to that point.

We realize that it's really not our call of what is and what is not an SEC issue, but we do give our opinion where it starts to lean toward.

So I think it's helpful to start with the site profile of all, all the issues, and then quickly triage down to the places

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where, you know, at least we felt represent SEC issues, and then we'll go into those later, but I would not want to preclude the work group from looking at this and saying, "Well, wait a minute. I think maybe this should be an SEC issue." It's important that that be done. Okay?

MR. BERONJA: Thanks, John.

I'm going to move on to 4.5-11. Again, this talks about elements presented in TBD-2, which provided a background of the site, are not addressed in TBD-5. Again, this is more of an editorial issue, although it does plug into the internal dosimetry and were the proper radionuclides being monitored. So it will factor into that discussion later on.

4.5-12 talks about value reported by the contract laboratory. Again, I think we determined last time around that this was not a significant issue. So we'll move on from there.

4.5-13, the evaluation of uranium

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bioassay data, again, we've kind of already talked about this, and I apologize. I think this was noted in the last time around. There are a few issues here. We were following the TBDs, you know, kind of one through six. So we had issues associated with them, and some of them were kind of repeats or overlapping. So I apologize for that.

4.5-14, personnel exposure records appear to be complete or of quality, and, you know, I think in through the SEC review we've tried through and look at a lot of the information pull if thought there and out we was sufficient information to be able to do dose reconstructions or, in general, is there sufficient information that you could determine if there's enough information there to do anything.

So I think we've done that analysis, and that will come through in our discussion of the SEC review.

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1	4.5-15 talks about site survey data
2	source term cannot be regarded as useful
3	surrogate data for bioassay data and the dose
4	reconstruction.
5	I think this is going to link into
6	NIOSH's progress related to some co-worker
7	models and internal dose co-worker models. So
8	maybe we can hold off. I think early on in
9	our SEC discussion maybe you guys can talk
10	about the status of those couple of efforts
11	which will address a number of questions.
12	I think that same thing holds for
13	4.5-16. Potential unmonitored internal
14	exposures associated with radiation incidents
15	are not addressed.
16	4.5-1 is no co-worker model on the
17	external side, and we'll get to that.
18	4.6-2 is workers were unlikely to
19	have been monitored for thermal neutrons, and
20	I think we need to have a discussion about you
21	guys were going to look at the whole neutron

issue related to Santa Susana.

That neutron issue is also 4.6-3 and 4.6-4, and then really on 4.6-5 the dosimeter response for low energy photons.

Let's see. I guess, this one, John, you have that issue. So maybe if you could.

We've identified DR. MAURO: Yes. this as not an SEC issue because usually there doing correction factors are ways of dealing with responsiveness to low So I see this as a side profile Whether or not the working group sees it the same way, certainly, but like I said before, I just want to alert you. This is sort of the rock we started with and the full breadth of issues that were raised. Many of them are in the process of being resolved because there has been a round of discussion related to the site profile issues, and some of them are really clearly SEC issues.

So I think the reason we're going through this is we needed a jumping off point

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1	so that we're all on the same page, knowing
2	where we began, and it has been quite some
3	time.
4	MR. BERONJA: It has been since
5	August.
6	DR. MAURO: So please bear with us.
7	We thought it would be good to get a baseline
8	and then we move from there, and then we'll
9	quickly move into the SEC issues.
LO	MR. BERONJA: Right.
L1	MEMBER MUNN: Well, we did touch on
L2	this in August, did we not?
L3	MR. BERONJA: Yes.
L4	MEMBER MUNN: I think we discussed
L5	this.
L6	MR. BERONJA: We did, and Lara and
L7	I went back and forth a little bit on making
L8	sure that we properly got NIOSH's responses in
L9	here.
20	The other reason to go through
21	this, and I'm combining things a little bit,
22	is there are some action items that were

1	identified in here that we wanted to follow
2	upon. I think we're going to hear about those
3	during the discussion of the SEC just to keep
4	this concise, and then depending on the status
5	of that, we can go back to this site profile
6	and decide if there's anything else that we
7	need to address here, given the action items
8	that they had out of this.
9	MEMBER MUNN: My comment was based
10	solely on this particular item.
11	MR. BERONJA: Right, okay.
12	MEMBER MUNN: I think this
13	particular item was discussed earlier.
14	MR. BERONJA: Oh, right.
15	MEMBER MUNN: And it was agreed.
16	DR. MAURO: And it was agreed, yes,
17	and it might be closed.
18	MR. BERONJA: Right.
19	MEMBER MUNN: Yes.
20	MR. BERONJA: 4.6-6, again, talks
21	about the surrogate time periods. Let me just
22	look at them specifically.

Okay. This one was repeated from an earlier one. So we don't need to talk about that.

And then 4.6-7 talked about Area 1, which is not -- I think it is stated it's not part of the covered areas.

So anyway, that's that. In fact, we did it a lot faster than I thought we would.

I guess in going through that, like I said, there are a number of action items. In fact, as we go through the SEC discussion if there's something from the site profile that we don't hit on, I'll come back and make sure that we address that just to finish off the site profile, but I think we should be able to get enough information during the discussion of the SEC review to be able to, to the extent that we need to, kind of close out this issues matrix here.

So any questions on that before we jump into the heart of the discussion here?

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1	MEMBER MUNN: I don't have any
2	questions. I have a request. The working
3	draft was a document that was sent to all of
4	us at one juncture, and I have suffered a
5	catastrophic failure of database with my
6	system. If we have an electronic copy
7	available on anybody's computer currently who
8	could send me another copy of that.
9	MEMBER BEACH: I have it on my
10	flash drive. You can pull it off if you want.
11	MEMBER MUNN: Good. I'll pull it
12	off.
13	MEMBER BEACH: Do you want to do it
14	now?
15	MEMBER MUNN: I'll do it later.
16	We're not going to be discussing it
17	specifically.
18	Thanks.
19	MR. BERONJA: All right. I guess
20	just a little bit of background, in
21	particular, for the folks on the phone as well
22	as people here.

And let me just go back and describe a little bit to kind of set the stage for where we are right now. I think as most of you know, SC&A was told to go ahead and do the SEC review in September of 2008 at the Redondo Beach meeting.

At that time, SC&A's contract, I think, maybe only had just two or three months maybe. I know there were some extensions, but the life of the contract was uncertain.

So what was decided at that time was to do what we call the paper study review of the SEC. So we went ahead and did that. That was actually published in January of 2009 and is posted on the Website. So if any of you don't have it or want to have access to it, it is on the Website under the Advisory Board under Area 4. You should be able to find it.

Since then, in the December work group meeting, we were approved contingent on us getting the contract and finishing off the

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SEC review, and we were successful in getting the new contract. And then we went ahead and finalized our SEC review.

Quite honestly, I think we were able to do about 90 or 95 percent of our work in that paper study. We were able to gather the information that we needed to come to some conclusion, and so, again, so what is included in what is publicly available in that January 2009 report really has the essence of our conclusions.

Since then we have finalized the report, as well as an issues matrix, and they both went to DOE for review on Wednesday of this past week. They were both passed through DOE review. They have not been Privacy Act cleared at this point. So they are not publicly available.

But I think folks in the work group have actually received copies of both of those things. So for those folks on the phone, unfortunately, you know, unless you are part

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of the group that's able to receive that, you don't have these documents. You know, you can reference the paper study that we have where most of these things are presented, and I'll try and, to the extent that there's any confusion, go through those.

So what I'm going to do is I'm going to go through the issues matrix that has been cleared by DOE, has not been Privacy Act reviewed, and I'll be careful about any specific information I reference.

I guess maybe just in preface, and I don't know if this is the right thing to do or not, but as a preface, there's going to be about five or so major points that we're going to cover in this discussion. Some of them I think we're going to present. We've pulled some information to get in. Quite honestly I think we're going to shift the issues over to NIOSH and to DOE to deal with, and then if there's anything that we can do to follow up, we can.

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And those issues are related to what specific areas are covered by the SEC petition, and the the petition way is currently set up is it applies to Area 4 of the Santa Susana Field Laboratory. However, there is some conflicting information out there both, I think, in the data base that talks about the covered areas and so other documentation that we've got documented both in the paper study, as well as the final review and the issues matrix.

And I think that that issue needs to be put to bed, and kind of linked into that issue of what areas, you know, should be covered are the data of operation. There was some uncertainty there. I think the way things -- and I think 1955, for instance, was the date for Area 4. I think that's to some extent in stone right now. However, there is conflicting information about some operations started. Some information dates back to 1953.

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1	In our issues matrix, this issue is
2	talked about in our issue number one, as well
3	as there's some discussion up front about
4	this. So I think looking at whether to be a
5	little bit more specific, whether some of the
6	outlying facilities need to be covered, you
7	know, they were addressed to a large extent in
8	the site profile. We need to do that.
9	So I don't know if the folks from
10	NIOSH or our DOE representative have any
11	thoughts. This might be a good time just to
12	talk about that, and then we can talk about
13	any more specifics if folks want.
14	So that's really the first issue
15	that I threw out.
16	DR. HUGHES: Just to clarify, this
17	is number nine on the issues matrix, right?
18	Just to make sure.
19	MR. BERONJA: It is. I think it's
20	our nine Yes.
21	DR. HUGHES: Sorry.

MR. BERONJA: It's number nine and

it's our first, SC&A's first issue.

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DR. HUGHES: Okay. I see.

MR. BERONJA: So, yes, it talks about specifically as we look at it, you know. Canoga Park and De Soto and Downey and whether there's any other areas within the Santa Susana Field Laboratory.

DR. HUGHES: But DOE got treated as four separate sites. So would the SEC petition -- the petitioner submits a petition for a site, and this is clarified in the consult call, for which site the petitioner wants to petition, and that's the site that the SEC report is issued for.

Now, the technical basis documents can be combined for several sites if the sites are related, as for example these four sites somewhat related in that they are supervised by the same health physics department, which was located at Santa Susana, which was the largest site of those four.

As to the coverage states, DOE

typically does some research into not necessarily when the sites start operations, but when nuclear operations start at a given site. So I looked at some reports that sort of outline what buildings were operating, and Ι haven't really been able to pinpoint anything that was in operating shape before 1955.

So, I mean, if you see any information regarding that, if you could pass it along, but as I said, we don't really look at that. That's typically done by DOE who determines which periods should be covered.

Now, just a couple MR. BERONJA: references, and what I might do especially for folks on the phone, and I apologize, you know, for the documents, but if you look at one of the things just on this particular issue, on the coverage dates, in 4.2.2 and the paper 25, there's couple studies at page а I would just cite that as just references. the information. You know, here it talks

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about nuclear R&D activities in Area 4 increased rapidly from 1953 into the late 1960, and then there's a number of statements like this, you know. Either the site profile needs to be cleaned up to not talk about nuclear activities increasing from '53 to --

DR. HUGHES: What they were doing, they were building the reactor facilities and they were building facilities because there was nothing there, as I understand, before. So, I mean, the company was operating, but they weren't actually running the reactors or producing the fuel. So I think that's what typically classifies the starting date.

MR. BERONJA: I guess as long as that can be clarified maybe some of the wording there, you know, it says nuclear R&D activities increased rapidly. I mean, activities, you don't know what kind activities they really were and whether what you're saying is true, whether it was construction going on in '53 and '54 and the

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1 verbiage just wasn't very good. You know, as 2 long as we have that, but there really was no fuel sources or whatever therein that time 3 frame or other potential exposures. 4 I think that would help. 5 I guess the other comment that I 6 wanted to make is that -- and I don't know how 7 this happened, and I guess maybe just for the 8 petitioner's sake -- I think when the original 9 10 petition was done, the original petition included De Soto, and then when there was an 11 update to the petition, De Soto was taken out. 12 13 I think they also in the original petition referenced the burn pit, and I think 14 that was ultimately all narrowed down to Area 15 16 4. This is Bonnie. Can T 17 MS. KLEA: comment on that? 18 19 MR. KATZ: Yes, go ahead, Bonnie. That reference to MS. KLEA: Okay. 20 The first form I De Soto was an accident. 21

thought they wanted my work

22

filled out

I

1	history. So I put Area 4 and De Soto, and you
2	have mistakenly interpreted that as including
3	De Soto on my petition, which I did correct.
4	MR. KATZ: Okay.
5	MS. KLEA: I've never ever
6	petitioned for De Soto. I petitioned for Area
7	4 because I knew you could only do one area at
8	a time, and it was my mistake in just filling
9	out those forms.
10	MR. KATZ: Okay, okay.
11	MS. KLEA: So if I could just
12	correct that.
13	MR. KATZ: Thank you, Bonnie.
14	That's helpful.
15	MR. BERONJA: So there was no
16	intent, Bonnie, or desire on your part at the
17	time to do anything beyond Area 4.
18	MS. KLEA: That's exactly right
19	because that was the rule, and I was told that
20	it would be disqualified if I included
21	anything other than Area 4.
22	MR. BERONJA: Okay.

1	MR. KATZ: The ground rules are you
2	can't
3	MS. KLEA: That was a mistake on
4	filling out the form.
5	MR. KATZ: Bonnie, just to be clear
6	about what the rules are is a single petition
7	can only cover a single facility. You could,
8	of course, submit a separate petition for
9	another location, another facility.
10	MS. KLEA: Exactly, and who's
11	speaking?
12	MR. KATZ: I'm sorry. This is Ted
13	Katz.
14	MS. KLEA: Hi. Okay. No, I knew
15	the rules very well. It's just that the forms
16	were very confusing on submitting my petition,
17	and I thought that the form wanted my personal
18	work history, and that's what I put.
19	MR. KATZ: Thank you.
20	MS. KLEA: Okay.
21	MR. BERONJA: All right. Thanks.
22	In fact, I was just looking back at

it and maybe, I guess, just given what Bonnie has said as far as that clarification, that helps a lot. The only other thing I'd say, and I'm wondering if I have the specifics here. I'm actually looking at 4.2.1 in the paper study. It would be the same section, should be in the same section in the final.

DOE in actually identifying the covered sites has a database, and then also things are listed in the Federal Register. The last Federal Register notice that I had showing the covered areas was August 23rd, 2004. I don't know if that's the most recent one or not, but if you compared the database in that Federal Register notice, they were not consistent, and so maybe just for the future so that there's no confusion, I think that needs to be addressed, but maybe other than that, I think this issue, other than maybe, you know, on that date issue this thing can be put to bed.

DR. NETON: I just want to be

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1	clear. You're saying that the Federal Register
2	notice was earlier than the
3	MR. BERONJA: No, this is a
4	location issue.
5	DR. NETON: Oh, location.
6	MR. BERONJA: Yes, the covered
7	areas. The covered areas addressed in the
8	Federal Register notice was not consistent
9	with how it was presented in the DOE database.
10	DR. NETON: Okay.
11	MS. HOWELL: That's a DOL concern,
12	right?
13	MR. BERONJA: What's that?
14	MS. HOWELL: The Federal Register
15	notice, I mean, that would be a DOL-DOE
16	concern.
17	DR. NETON: Yes, yes, absolutely.
18	But our technical evaluation needs to be
19	consistent with what the most current
20	definition of facilities is. I mean, I
21	understand that. We certainly need to go back
22	and make sure that we're addressing the most

current definition of facility.

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There was a lot of issues early on with what parts of those facilities were DOE versus commercial, and I remember, you know, four or five years ago there was a lot of debate as to who was really covered at that facility, and I think they finally straightened it out, and that was the genesis of those Federal Register notices.

We'll certainly go back and make sure that we look at the most recent Federal Register notice.

MR. BERONJA: Right, yes. I guess maybe to close out these one or two issues, however we want to describe these, is that -and maybe, Lara, you can tell me if this is okay -- if you guys can maybe just provide the Board and use with information to document that there were no source materials or other things going on with '53 and '54 time frame, then we can kind of say, okay, '55 really was first time the that there potential was

1	exposure.
2	I think as long as we have that as
3	an action item coming out of that, that should
4	close this out.
5	DR. NETON: Well, I think we would
6	have to go back and petition or submit that
7	information if there were materials to the
8	Department of Energy, and they would make the
9	determination that it was covered. We can't
10	ad hoc start covering exposure to
11	MR. BERONJA: Oh, no. I don't mean
12	covering. I mean looking into maybe in more
13	detail whether there are activities going on,
14	and if there were activities, if there was
15	potential exposure in '53 or '54, then I would
16	think that we would go to DOE or DOL and
17	DR. NETON: Yes, we would always do
18	that.
19	MR. BERONJA: Okay.
20	DR. NETON: Absolutely. That's our
21	normal mode of operation.
22	MR. BERONJA: So is that something

1	you guys can do or do we
2	DR. NETON: Yes, we'll certain take
3	that up. I guess I would suggest that this
4	shouldn't hold up the process here because
5	sometimes even if you identify additional
6	exposure, it takes the DOE or DOL quite some
7	time to come to resolution with those issues,
8	and so we could move forward with the
9	recognition that there may be some change in
10	the early period.
11	You know, we've already established
12	that we're recommending to add a class
13	starting in '55 already.
14	MR. BERONJA: Right.
15	DR. NETON: So it would merely just
16	be more than likely probably just retroactive,
17	go back and move it back to '53 if that indeed
18	were the case.
19	MR. BERONJA: Okay.
20	MR. MORRIS: This is Bob Morris.
21	MR. KATZ: Yes, Bob.
22	MR. MORRIS: Did I hear the action

-	that is being will mountables
1	that's being will provide documentation
2	proving that there was no nuclear activity in
3	'53 and '54?
4	I don't know how we're going to
5	find documentation about something that didn't
6	happen.
7	DR. NETON: Well, yes. We need to
8	look at that, Bob, and see what actually did
9	occur, and in fact, if it's not covered by
10	Department of Energy prior to '55, yes, then
11	there's nothing more we can do.
12	MR. BERONJA: Oh, I agree.
13	DR. NETON: We're not required to
14	prove that nothing happened.
15	MR. BERONJA: No, no, no. It's
16	just due diligence to see if there's any
17	further information that something might have
18	happened.
19	DR. MAURO: Well, a lot of those
20	dates, the only reason why it came up is you
21	ran into some minor language
22	MR. BERONJA: That language

would --

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DR. MAURO: -- that would pose that question.

MR. BERONJA: Right.

DR. MAURO: By way of ground rules, when we look at these documents, for example, you're going to hear in moment definition of the class itself. It should have been monitored versus all workers and how we have an issue related to date. When we see something that catches our attention, it may very well catch our attention, but it may not be. It may be beyond the mandate of what we're trying to do. We're certainly receptive to let us know.

For example when we pick up something that doesn't seem to ring true, we think we have an obligation to pass it on through that group and then, of course, the work group at that point in time could consider what they're going to do about it.

So you're going to hear another one

1	in a minute related to the definition of the
2	class, I believe.
3	MR. BERONJA: Yes, maybe we can
4	talk about that right now.
5	DR. NETON: Another type of this
6	kind of issue. Why don't you go ahead?
7	MR. BERONJA: Yes. No, I think it
8	was our I think the language that was
9	included in the evaluation report talked about
10	all workers who were monitored. I think it's
11	our understanding that when the Board right
12	now is issuing a class, it's being applied to
13	all workers. There's no discussion about
14	DR. NETON: It's sort of backwards.
15	I mean, NIOSH made a recommendation as to
16	what that class is, and typically the Board
17	would go along with an all worker definition,
18	and that's mostly in the context of the
19	Department of Labor being able to administer
20	the class.
21	In other words, you know, can we
22	provide them a class that they can actually

1	address administratively? You can't start
2	getting down to specific occupational codes
3	because those, frankly, don't exist.
4	DR. MAURO: It's a little more
5	general. One of the things we both realize is
6	that when we saw the language, the class was
7	defined as all workers that were monitored or
8	should have been monitored, and it immediately
9	struck me that I think in general when the
LO	language is put together, that parsing is not
L1	made.
L2	DR. NETON: I mean, if you look at
L3	the Lawrence Livermore, I think,
L4	DR. MAURO: We did look at that
L5	one.
L6	DR. NETON: that definition, I
L7	think the workers were monitored.
L8	DR. MAURO: Okay.
L9	DR. NETON: In a sense, if we have
20	very concrete evidence that anyone who entered
21	an area where radiological sources were
22	present, had a batch, I mean, they were

1	monitored. Then that is essentially a
2	surrogate for workers who were exposed. We
3	could use that.
4	We thought that this was the case
5	at Santa Susana. In looking at this in some
6	more detail, we're starting to think that that
7	might not necessarily have been the case. And
8	given that, we're reconsidering that
9	definition.
10	DR. MAURO: Okay, but is this a
11	place for us? I mean, in other words, the
12	very fact that we brought something like this
13	up in our report, is this something that I
14	would say, well, really that's not within the
15	purview of SC&A?
16	This is the first time it came up.
17	DR. NETON: report on that, but
18	I think certainly you can bring up anything.
19	DR. MAURO: Sure.
20	MR. BERONJA: But what I'm hearing
21	you say, Jim, is that that's something that
22	you're reconsidering.

1	DR. NETON: Yes. We thought we had
2	very solid evidence that anyone who entered
3	essentially the administrative area was going
4	to be wearing a badge and, therefore, we could
5	use that as an essentially surrogate for
6	people who are exposed, and those would be the
7	ones who would potentially receive more than
8	100 millirem, which is what that definition
9	was, or should have been monitored, but that
10	might not be the case; in fact, probably not.
11	DR. MAURO: Well, when we see
12	something that for better or worse we say,
13	"This doesn't seem to ring true," we'll bring
14	it to the attention of the Board, and then, of
15	course, we dispose of it.
16	DR. NETON: Right.
17	DR. MAURO: In fact, we won't put
18	any self-constraints.
19	DR. NETON: We've seen a shift in
20	some more recent SEC's where we don't even say
21	should have been monitored. We just say

all --

1	DR. MAURO: That's what I'm talking
2	about. That was me. You know, Red brought it
3	to my attention, and I said, "Hum, I seem to
4	recall the language we're using now," you
5	know.
6	DR. NETON: Well, there's really no
7	hard and fast rule there. It's just a matter
8	of we use the data we have, and if there are
9	situations where we can conclusively guarantee
10	that everybody had a badge that entered RELAP,
11	we'd reserve the right to use that, but more
12	often than not that's not going to happen.
13	MEMBER BEACH: So we should see
14	that definition changing in the near future?
15	DR. NETON: I don't want to be so
16	concrete on that. I think we're considering
17	it, and it's more than likely to change, but
18	I'd like the folks, you know, the SEC team
19	MS. KLEA: This is Bonnie.
20	Can I ask who's considering
21	changing that wording?

DR. NETON: That's NIOSH.

1	This is Jim Neton speaking.
2	MS. KLEA: Okay, and who entered
3	that term? Because I do don't believe I had
4	that on my petition. I had all workers. I
5	didn't specifically say
6	DR. NETON: That's correct.
7	MS. KLEA: only the monitored
8	workers.
9	DR. NETON: Right, and you're
10	right. And we modified that definition based
11	on some information we had at the time we did
12	the evaluation because we believed it to be
13	appropriate. In looking at it more closely,
14	it may not be the right way to go, and I'm not
15	saying
16	MS. KLEA: Remember, Jim, you
17	specified that Boeing told you that
18	information.
19	DR. NETON: Right, right.
20	MS. KLEA: I remember that from
21	Redondo.
22	DR. NETON: Exactly, and you know,

we certainly reserve the right to change our mind when new information comes forward, and that seems to be where we're at right now.

MS. KLEA: Well, I'm certainly a witnessed. I was not monitored, and I had free access to every building.

DR. NETON: Right.

MR. BERONJA: Jim, I'm curious how you guys have done your evaluation part. Administratively how does that happen and if you guys change your mind? Is that something that as you go to the full Board meeting --?

DR. NETON: We would issue an amendment to the evaluation report and is our current. This happens I won't call it routinely, but it's not uncommon in these deliberations and discussions for us to change some of our positions and, in fact, add more time or a different class of workers, and we would enter, you know, a severely amended evaluation to present to the Board for their consideration.

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1	Usually we wait until the full
2	deliberations are over, although I'm a little
3	concerned on this one because we are holding
4	up the addition of a class for five years or
5	so, '52 to '58. So, you know, this is a
6	little different than the other ones where
7	NIOSH said, "Well, we can do all year," and
8	then, okay, we can go and deliver it. Right
9	now nothing is going to happen for this class
10	between '52 and '58 until we can do something.
11	DR. MAURO: The fact that right now
12	you bring up a very important point there.
13	DR. NETON: That's just a concern I
14	have.
15	DR. MAURO: And I think everyone
16	is. You'll see as we go through this we
17	concur with your finding regarding up to '58.
18	You'll see that we had some issues, and this
19	is going to really become the heart of this
20	discussion shortly, post '58, is are we in a

situation where until we resolve the post '58,

the out to '58 is --

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1	DR. NETON: No.
2	DR. MAURO: Good. That's important
3	to know because, you know
4	DR. NETON: I think it's up to
5	Mike, the Chair, or the working group to bring
6	back to the Board an opinion that if it was
7	his opinion that we are more comfortable to
8	move forward, they might be changing the
9	definition of the covered worker. So we move
10	that issue.
11	DR. MAURO: Yes.
12	DR. NETON: And then we could re-
13	add an amendment, addendum and deal with the
14	first piece, get that voted on, and then have
15	this piece move on. But, again, that's a
16	process issue that the working group and Chair
17	can deal with.
18	DR. MAURO: Sure.
19	MR. BERONJA: Maybe just to
20	summarize kind of where we are, we talked
21	really about, I guess, three issues: the
22	areas covered, the dates, and now kind of the

definition of the class.

So I think it sounds like at least the areas right now is going to be Area 4. The dates NIOSH is going to look at any other and make sure there's nothing else that would say that there were activities, nuclear activities or potential exposure in the '53 or '54 time frame, and then as far as class that's in NIOSH's court as far as potentially looking at the re-definitions.

So I guess with that I'm going to now formally go through each of these issues and the issues matrix, and for those folks, you know, on the phone that don't have this, what we're going to do is there were issues that were raised by the petitioner that NIOSH then responded to, and there were eight issues in total there. We'll go through those issues, and there were some issues that SC&A raised, actually five issues, and we'll go through each of those. Some of them actually are overlapping.

The first issue that was raised in the petition addressed through and the evaluation report was the sodium reactor incident. experiment You know, NIOSH presented in the site profile that they felt they had sufficient information and that they felt everybody that maybe would have been in that area would have been properly monitored.

I guess when SC&A looked at that information, we came across а couple reports that weren't referenced in the site profile thought that had some valid we information that should be considered and which showed some of the potential at least source terms and areas.

And I guess maybe with that I'd just put it back to you guys. I don't know if you were looking at the idea of developing a model or some other further way to analyze the potential exposures that occurred as a result of that incident.

This incident is actually pretty

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important in the context of the SEC things that occurred in 1959. So it occurred post '58 SEC, you know, approved time frame from NIOSH right now.

Okay. To address your DR. HUGHES: first concern with these reports, we actually have what NIOSH does is called diligence and data capture. So we look at all of available data our source, and reports that you referenced were reviewed, including a bunch, a large number of other reports and memos. Pretty much anything that was out there in the literature was looked at.

It wasn't cited in the evaluation report. It probably should have been cited, but this particular section talked about the releases that were to all these reports. They talk about the different estimates of the releases from the incident, and that's the reports that were cited.

So this can certainly be corrected.

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to your actually much more 1 2 important issue is you're concerned about the monitoring situation in 1955. So 3 we're looking into that. Fifty-nine. I'm sorry. 4 And we're currently looking at some 5 6 since there is no consensus of the 7 releases, we're looking into having independent expert looking into the estimates 8 with the most scientifically 9 and come up 10 defensible estimate an exposure model as a result of that that could be used for workers 11 non-radiological 12 the workers might have been on site if there 13 exposure potential. 14 15 Another issue goes back to the 16 internal monitoring. So I don't know if you want to discuss it here or if you want to 17 it 18 discuss when you go with internal 19 monitoring. Maybe let's wait. 20 MR. BERONJA: Let's wait. 21

MAURO:

DR.

22

For my benefit, you

know, I've been tracking this. So the sodium experiment incident that reactor was an post -- we'll define it as the occurred covered period for the purposes of this discussion. So it becomes important.

Could you give us a little bit conceptually what was the nature of the incident and up until the review of this new material, what did you have in mind as to how you were going to deal with that and now how is that possibly changing?

The incident, DR. HUGHES: Okay. this was а fairly -- it's a 20 megawatt experimental reactor that was sodium cooled. The reactor cooled was underground and covered with liquid sodium, and what happened, the coolant qot contaminated with an organic that caused the sodium material flow interrupt in the fuel channels, and it caused overheating, and actually the fuel cladding, which I believe was -- do you know? aluminum? -- melted, and the fuel was solid

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1	uranium metal. So
2	MS. KLEA: I'm having a hard time
3	hearing. Is that Lara Hughes?
4	DR. HUGHES: Yes. I'm sorry.
5	MS. KLEA: You're cutting out. I
6	can only hear half of what you're saying.
7	DR. HUGHES: Okay.
8	MS. KLEA: If you need to get
9	closer to the mic.
10	MR. KATZ: Yes, she's doing that.
11	DR. HUGHES: How is this? Is this
12	better?
13	MS. KLEA: Okay and I'm hearing you
14	say the cladding was cracked. Well, you know,
15	we have we had full-out meltdown of 13 fuel
16	rods, and I have three new witnesses that were
17	there.
18	DR. HUGHES: Yes. Well, the fuel
19	consisted of the uranium metal, which was
20	covered by cladding. So what happened, the
21	uranium formed it overheated and the fuel
22	rod essentially opened up, which you can refer

to as the meltdown, and 13 of the fuel rods were damaged.

MS. KLEA: Yes.

DR. HUGHES: So the issue is when fission occurs in a nuclear reactor, you produce what's called fission products, which among others consist of iodine and cesium, and the issue here is whether these fission products were contained in the sodium

You have to see that the entire reactor was covered with liquid sodium. It's a very dense liquid, or whether these fission products actually went out into the gas phase, brought the reactor -- the reactor was covered with a noble gas, gas blanket, and whether the fission products were then released from the cover gas system.

The entire reactor was also covered with a pressurized gas system. So whether or not these fission products escaped not just the fuel and the coolant and the cover gas, but from the cover gas into the atmosphere and

might have exposed workers that were on the site that might not have been radiological workers.

If there was a large release, it's absolutely conceivable that anybody that was on site could have been exposed. Now --

MS. KLEA: We have a new eyewitness who was there at the time as a reactor trainee, and he's testified on film that they had to bleed the reactor several times until - - this is one of our biggest conflicts with the program and with your point of view, that we have expert testimony of a real meltdown and releases.

DR. HUGHES: Yes, it's known that some of these gases were released. The issue is whether what these gases contained. It is known that there were radioactive gases, noble gases in the cover blanket.

What happens with this reactor system, these gases are pressurized into a tank where they're held until some of these

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fission products are gone. They are radioactively decayed, and after which it's what you referred to as bleeding, I believe, that these gases are released to the atmosphere.

But that is not all that unusual. So the issue, what we're looking into is these technical reports to see what could have happened. Is it chemically and physically possible for large amounts of iodine to be released from the sodium into this gas?

I think the contention is not so much that some of these gases were released. That's actually fairly well documented. So we're looking into that.

And if it turns out to be that large amounts of iodine, for example, were released, then we would come up with a release model that would --

DR. MAURO: So I have to look at these and conceptually. So conceptually what we have is we have a containment system.

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1 DR. HUGHES: Yes. DR. MAURO: There are 2 several barriers, plus the system that is containing 3 to the noble gases even if there were some 4 releases and up until, I guess, relatively 5 recently, the sensibility was a containment 6 7 system and it was unlikely that there was -and you did actually bleed, which is part of 8 the process. All matters were controlled and 9 10 monitored so we have a degree of control and we will know what's going on. 11 DR. HUGHES: Well, the incident was 12 not a controlled incident. 13 DR. MAURO: Yes, I understand that, 14 15 but as in any reactor transient, there are 16 design safety features which clearly come out, and eventually there's a protocol by which 17 maybe you would burp. We burped the noble 18 19 gases from Three Mile Island under controlled conditions. 20 DR. HUGHES: Right. 21

DR. MAURO:

22

But you're saying that

1	there's some new information or maybe not new
2	information. You're still looking into this
3	confirm that there was some that you
4	understand what the releases might have been.
5	DR. HUGHES: Right.
6	DR. MAURO: And whether or not they
7	might have been significant, and that's where
8	we are right now.
9	DR. HUGHES: That is correct, yes.
10	DR. MAURO: Okay, good. That helps
11	me.
12	DR. HUGHES: Did you want to add
13	anything?
14	DR. NETON: Well, it seems to me I
15	recall looking at this. There are sort of two
16	camps. There is one analysis put out by the
17	company, and then there was some additional
18	analysis that was part of a court proceeding;
19	is that right?
20	DR. HUGHES: That is correct, and
21	there were some like the Advisory Board, I
22	think, the Santa Susana Advisory Board, what

they're called.

DR. NETON: So we have two reports out there, section reports sort of on opposite ends of the spectrum, very minimal release and then large meltdown release and exposure of workers. So we've decided to go commission an independent review of both of those reports.

DR. MAURO: Excellent.

DR. NETON: And said which one appears -- you know, let's let science prevail here and say which one makes the most sense scientifically, and of course, where there are doubts we would probably err on the side of the claimant.

That coupled with the fact that we believe there are bioassay monitoring data available to some extent that can cover and bound these exposures, and that's part of another discussion that I think we're going to refer to later, refer to or talk about later, that has to do with the internal co-worker model yet to be developed for various reasons,

1	and we can get into that.
2	DR. MAURO: That's very helpful.
3	Thank you.
4	MR. BERONJA: So, Jim, have you
5	picked somebody to do this study or is that
6	something you're where is the process right
7	now as far as this independent review?
8	DR. NETON: That's a good question.
9	DR. HUGHES: Yes. There's
LO	currently like contract negotiations, you
11	know, with this expert.
L2	MR. BERONJA: Oh, okay. So
L3	somebody has been selected and it's just
L4	DR. HUGHES: Yes.
L5	MR. BERONJA: negotiated with
L6	them.
L7	DR. HUGHES: Yes, true.
18	DR. NETON: A contract employee.
L9	MR. BERONJA: And any idea how long
20	the study is going to take or when people
21	could expect to see the report? Do you know?
22	DR. NETON: No, I can't comment on

1	that right now. We'll certainly update you.
2	MS. KLEA: Did you say you have a
3	contractor?
4	DR. NETON: We have a person lined
5	up and there are contract negotiations going
6	on right now.
7	MS. KLEA: When will we know who
8	that person is or what company he represents?
9	DR. NETON: Well, as soon as we get
10	the contract in place. I'm sorry, but I'm
11	not, you know, in that loop right now, but I
12	can assure you as soon as we know we'll make
13	it available to the working group.
14	MS. KLEA: Okay. Who's speaking?
15	DR. NETON: This is Jim Neton.
16	MS. KLEA: Okay. I'm very
17	concerned about a conflict of interest on the
18	person you hire to study it.
19	DR. NETON: Understood.
20	MR. BERONJA: Anything else on the
21	sodium reactor experiment? Otherwise we'll
22	move on.

The second issue or I shouldn't say "second." Another issue that was raised by the petitioner related to radiation badges, and it was based on a Tiger team report indicating inadequate radiation badges.

I think NIOSH addressed this just in the context of the state of the art at the time and what was done, and I think in looking at this we concurred with the information and felt it was fine. So I don't think there's any further discussion that's needed there.

DR. HUGHES: Okay.

MR. BERONJA: The third issue that came up from the petitioner was related to tritium plumes, and this gets back to folks, you know, looking at the potential of exposure pathway, of folks drinking water from the aquifer at the site.

One of the things that we noticed was that at least for one of the dose reconstructions and maybe somewhere else that NIOSH did look at this pathway. A very

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conservative model was developed. In fact, it was based on water from a monitoring well, not from a drinking water well, and there were other conservative assumptions used.

The only issue that we had was that the highest concentration use from the monitoring well may have been from an earlier time with some later information with a much higher concentration, again, in the monitoring well, not in the drinking water well.

And, again, I don't necessarily see this as an SEC issue, but as something that needs be fixed related dose to to any reconstruction. You're looking that at particular tab. So I don't know if you guys want to.

DR. HUGHES: Okay. We actually have a small report prepared on that. Do you want to talk about it now or when it comes up later?

MR. BERONJA: Oh, why don't we talk

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1	about it now?
2	DR. HUGHES: Okay. I think Gene
3	was prepared to present this one. Is he on
4	the line?
5	MR. POTTER: Yes, I am.
6	DR. HUGHES: Okay. Would you like
7	to present it or do you want me to go over?
8	MR. POTTER: I can do it if
9	everyone can hear me okay.
LO	MR. KATZ: Yes, we can hear you
L1	well. Thanks, Gene.
L2	MR. POTTER: Okay. I think you've
13	fairly well covered the background on what we
L4	said in ER and so forth. So I'll skip that
L5	part.
L6	But in SC&A's summary, they mention
L7	that NIOSH has proposed a boundless exposure
L8	by assuming that workers consumed water from a
L9	shallow monitoring well that had the highest
20	tritium concentration.
21	That statement is not correct. We
22	never said we were using it, going to use any

values from the highest concentration, but merely Well, 34A, in which tritium has been consistently detected since 1991.

And then the comments where you mentioned the value of 117,000 pico Curies per liter. In fact, we had reviewed those reports that you cited in your comments, environmental reports from 2003 to 2006, in fact, based the mean value for Well 34A from those reports, and 117,000 pico Curies per liter was cited in actually the 2005 report. That was for a well, which is a newer well drilled much closer to the source, which is assumed to be primarily Building 4010, where a small reactor is operated in an activated the shielding materials and earth around the building.

So that was the basis for our choice, not the highest values, and Well 34A is down gradient, but somewhat north of Building 4010, and I prepared some diagrams out of the environmental reports, but I don't

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believe you have those unless I'm mistaken because it was determined they had to be sent for classification review.

MS. KLEA: Who is speaking?

MR. POTTER: Gene Potter.

MS. KLEA: Okay. Thank you.

MR. POTTER: And anyway, so the first point is we did consider those reports that were cited and picked Well, 34A based on its history.

Since SC&A's comments were made, the 2007 environmental report has been issued, and so we looked at that for this review in the last month or so, and there are several wells that are in the general direction of the supply well that was in Area 4, RD17, 27, 30, 63, 85, and 86, and other than Well, 34A, which we used, there was only one other well with a positive result, and that was RD63 on February 16th, 2006, at 350 pico Curies per liter, which is a value far smaller than what we were using.

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And then it was followed at that well with two samples in 2007 which were below the detection level.

So in conclusion, I feel we've addressed SC&A's comments to look at this newer information, and we stick by our earlier decision as the choice of a mean value for Well, 34A adjusted for 40 years of radioactive decay as being a conservative, yet somewhat reasonable approach for bounding that dose.

That's all I have.

MEMBER MUNN: It's difficult to see how one can tie with any degree of accuracy measurements from this century with the time element that's involved with this particular SEC unless no activities occurred anywhere in the area that would feed that aquifer, that had anything to do with nuclear processes following the period of the SEC.

MS. KLEA: Wanda, you're cutting out. Can you get closer to the mic?

MEMBER MUNN: That's because I'm

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nowhere near a mic. Hold on.

MS. KLEA: Oh, okay.

MEMBER MUNN: It isn't reasonable to assume that there were no activities following the given SEC period, and if there were activities following the SEC period, then measurements that are made 50, 40, 30 years later may have little direct bearing on events that occurred during the five or six year period that's being considered in the 1950s.

It may speak to general activities on the site in whole, but it would seem those higher values that were seen in the 2004, five, six, whenever those measurements were made would be very difficult to associate solely with the SEC period. Is that not correct?

MS. KLEA: I'm not understanding what you're saying. No one really knows when that tritium plume was released into the ground. We're assuming it was from reactor SNAP-8ER, which failed in 1964.

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1	MEMBER MUNN: Which is much later
2	than this period that we're speaking of here
3	today.
4	MS. KLEA: Right.
5	MEMBER MUNN: That's essentially
6	what I'm saying, Bonnie.
7	MS. KLEA: Right. Okay.
8	MR. POTTER: Let me just clarify.
9	I don't believe I agree with Bonnie's
10	statement that the source of this tritium had
11	anything to do with the failure of a reactor.
12	Its activation of the shielding materials,
13	concrete and so forth and the earth surround
14	from rather high neutron levels.
15	MS. KLEA: Wouldn't that come from
16	a reactor operation at that building?
17	MR. POTTER: Right, but you
18	mentioned a failure of some kind.
19	MS. KLEA: Well, it did. It was
20	shut down in 1964, and they lost 80 percent of
21	the cladding on the fuel rods.
22	MR. POTTER: But tritium is

produced by a neutron activation of the surrounding soil.

MEMBER MUNN: Yes, yes. Loss of cladding doesn't necessarily translate to what we're discussing here.

MS. KLEA: Well, actually no one really knows exactly where that plume came from because it was close to all of the reactor buildings. They were all in one area, and so the source point has not been found.

MEMBER MUNN: My comment was simply on the timing more than anything else.

MS. KLEA: Okay.

DR. MAURO: Could I try something out? So we do agree that some measurements of groundwater were taken at some point in time where we saw 117,000 pico Curies per liter. Now, that might have been in some locations which was isolated from sources of drinking water. I'm not sure of the date when that was collected, but the way I, again, visualize what I'm hearing is that, yes, there are

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mechanisms whereby groundwater could become contaminated and may have been superficial aquifer in the immediate vicinity could of the aquifer that have contaminated through a variety of mechanisms, and in fact, obviously was because you don't see that kind of level. I mean, I think you just don't see that kind of level unless there's a contaminating event.

And I think that the discussion we're having now is that, okay, what do we do about people who are drinking water from an aquifer in the vicinity of this facility. Perhaps it not the aquifer that was was contaminated. Maybe it was an aquifer that's clearly an unambiguously isolate or an aquifer from that source of water.

And there is good reason to believe that there's no way the tritium from this source could have ever gotten to the real drinking water source. I haven't heard that. I guess that's what I was looking for.

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MR. POTTER: Well, that is, fact, the conclusion that one would come to if you look at the monitoring wells which are all fairly modern data, that, in fact, the tritium from the vicinity of Building 4010 there may have been other buildings, as Bonnie said, involved in this as well. The SNAP reactor buildings are kind of in a cluster there -- but the data would tell you that, in fact, the tritium in the shallow monitoring wells has only migrated a matter of a few hundred feet in 40 years, and the one supply well in Area 4, WS17, was somewhat up gradient from the location of these buildings, and it was a minor source of drinking water.

And since it has been sampled, which is all fairly modern sampling, there's no evidence of tritium contamination in that supply well, and it is no longer used as a well and hasn't been for years as a supply well. I believe that ended in the early '60s or mid-'60s, that it was even a source of any

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kind of drinking water for the site.

So one reasonable conclusion would be that, you know, there was never any contamination. However, since we don't have sampling from 40 years ago, 50 years ago, this is the approach that was selected.

MR. BERONJA: And have you developed a paper or an issues paper or developed diagrams on this then?

MR. POTTER: Yes. That was, as I mentioned, it was determined. I thought this was going to be able to go to the working group, but it was determined that we should send this for classification review even though the source of this information is all from publicly available documents.

MR. BERONJA: And I guess as part of that report or maybe building on what John said, maybe there's at least a demonstration of the aquifers that are being monitored, as well as the aquifers that are used for drinking water, as well as any hydrogeologic

this aspects of environment as far as groundwater flow direction potentially changing because of populations new anything else, just to kind of put this thing to bed to say based on all of that -- I mean, part of the problem might be that the model was way more conservative than it needed to be, but yet we saw some information, you know, just maybe because we didn't look closely enough that said, well, if you're going to do this, then you should use this value.

But anyway, think that if what your report shows is that, you know, the groundwater flow direction has unlikely changed, that there is a separation between the monitoring of this aguifer and the other aquifer, then you know maybe that hopefully should put everything to rest here as far as this being an issue.

MS. KLEA: Well, could I add something? This is Bonnie.

We used wells in the other areas

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for supply wells, and they were known by OSHA and Rocketdyne to be contaminated with chemicals, and I have those records from the Department of Health.

And also I found out that all of the water runoff and waste water from Area 4 was piped into the other areas, and it went into their water system. So all of the water from Area 4 was used to spray the rocket engine test when they fired. So anything in that water would have been then re-suspended in the air and would have gone into the aquifer in other areas.

MR. BERONJA: I guess the one thing is unfortunately we can't look at the chemicals in this particular work, Bonnie.

MS. KLEA: Well, I understand that, but the chemicals is an indication that the contaminants have gotten into the wells, and the fact is that the company never tested for radionuclides in the drinking water ever until EPA told them to, and that was in the late

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'90s when the tritium was discovered.

So they just didn't monitor. That doesn't means it wasn't there.

MR. BERONJA: Yes, and probably the best we can do right now is look at the modeling that they're doing right now to say whether it's likely given the monitoring results that we have and the groundwater flow direction and everything else to see whether it's, you know, at all possible.

DR. HUGHES: Yes, if you look at the maps of the site where the plume is located, I mean, where the sampling was, to narrow down the location of the plume is fairly well out of line. I know the TCE concern was because the other areas use TCE as a degreasing agent of the chemical contaminant that Bonnie refers to.

So it would have been a much larger exposure source, I think, for that, but as you said, there are reports out there that outline the sampling that took place and where the

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1	plume is actually located and what the levels
2	are.
3	We haven't gone into any
4	hydrogeological discussion.
5	MS. KLEA: And Area 4 had its own
6	plumes.
7	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: I think what
8	Bonnie might be saying is you could use the
9	chemical as a tracer for the water being taken
LO	somewhere else and then getting back into the
11	system.
L2	MS. KLEA: Exactly.
L3	DR. HUGHES: That's chemically very
L4	
L5	DR. NETON: That's pretty dicey.
L6	It's an analogy that I'm not sure holds very
L7	well for a radionuclide versus an organic.
L8	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: I've got a
L9	question.
20	MEMBER MUNN: The reverse is true.
21	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: If during the
22	time frame when these reactors are going, were

1	there samples done on supply well for
2	activated sodium? I realize this has got a
3	very short half-life, but my concern is, is
4	this supply well when they're run a source or
5	not, or was there any testing done for that at
6	all?
7	DR. HUGHES: They did not test the
8	water supply for radionuclides as far as I
9	know. They did not.
10	MR. BERONJA: Well, maybe the next
11	step on this, you know, if the Board would
12	want, if NIOSH can prepare a report on this,
13	if the Board wanted we could take a look at
14	this report.
15	DR. MAURO: I think the modus
16	operandi always is white paper issued by you
17	folks. If the Board wants us to look at it,
18	if the work group wants to look at it, we'll
19	look at it.
20	Certainly I think that the issues
21	raised here is that there may have been more

than one way in which tritium could find its

way to drinking water supplies, is what I'm just hearing. One way, the little model I had in my head was somehow there might be a connection between the superficial aquifer, perhaps a deeper aquifer where the drinking water is obtained from.

But it sounds like that you've got arguments, strong arguments that that just didn't happen, but now we're hearing that, well, maybe there was some other way. The drinking water aquifer might have been contaminated.

I don't know, but in any event what you have to do is sort of convince yourself. Listen. You just can't conceive of a way in which tritium could have gotten into the drinking water supplies back in the late '50s, early '60s, and that's a story that needs to be told and we'd be happy to look at it.

MEMBER MUNN: And we do need to, I think, limit ourselves pretty much to tritium with respect to the specific radionuclide that

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Phil brought up earlier. You need to remember that that particular radionuclide, whether you're talking about activated sodium or nonactivated sodium, you're talking about one of reactive chemical compounds the most exists, and sodium is not going to go anywhere. It's going to react with water, with air, with anything you can possibly imagine. It's not going to become an aerosol and be transferred into the water supply. it it touches water turns into soon as something other than an activated compound. It's going to stop.

MEMBER SCHOFIELD: Well, we do know from Hanford though that some of the workers, the water they were drinking did have activated sodium in it. That's a proven fact there at Hanford.

That's why I'm asking is it possible the supply well during the operation of the reactors, would this be a problem? I realize it's going to only be a problem during

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1	the time the reactors are operating, but you
2	know, you have to look at this from an
3	internal exposure standpoint.
4	DR. HUGHES: It takes a while for a
5	chemical to get all the way down to the
6	groundwater, but you know.
7	DR. NETON: It can migrate through.
8	I don't know. We can look at this. I think
9	sodium was an issue raised somewhere else in
10	this review.
11	DR. HUGHES: It was raised as an
12	internal
13	DR. NETON: An internal exposure
14	issue.
15	One thing I'd like to point out to
16	sort of bound this a little bit though is that
17	I don't think we're talking about a major dose
18	exposure pathway.
19	DR. MAURO: Well, the MCLs of
20	tritium are I'm trying to think of the
21	drinking water standards. You know, they're
22	pretty high, but I mean this number certainly

1	is, you know, well above that. But I'm just
2	saying that
3	DR. NETON: But the dose metrically
4	is
5	DR. MAURO: Well, if it's 900, it's
6	four millirem per year. I'm drawing on my
7	memory of the drinking water standards, for
8	EPA, which didn't come out until 1976, but
9	somehow the number that sticks in my head is
10	four millirem per year associated with about
11	800 pico Curies per year.
12	DR. NETON: For continuous use.
13	DR. MAURO: Continuous, two liters
14	a day.
15	DR. NETON: This is work
16	environment, probably a little lower. So
17	anyway
18	DR. MAURO: I was just trying to
19	set
20	DR. NETON: Yes, and there's
21	certainly a dose that would need to be
22	considered in a dose reconstruction, but as

far as assignment of dose, it's going to be one of the more minor components.

DR. HUGHES: I think part of the drinking water source was bottled water, but part of it was also just groundwater. So I think the workers were provided drinking water that was shipped in from outside, but there were also taps and coffee makers and things like that.

MS. KLEA: I'd like to add a comment here. This is Bonnie.

Lara said that it would take a long time for anything to percolate down to the aquifer. Well, that's not true because we had two major fault lines that ran through that property down into our local reservoir, and that whole site was riddled with fractures and fault lines, and we have early memos from 1954 that the company was planning to build a big pit and dump all of the radioactive waste into that pit.

I'm working with DTFC, and we're

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doing a follow-up to see if they actually did
that, and I know it was common in that time
period to dump everything into the ground.
DR. NETON: Right. Bonnie, this is
Jim Neton.
We were talking about Sodium-24, I
think, in that context, and it has a fairly
short half-life. I forget how many.
DR. HUGHES: Fifteen hours.
DR. NETON: Fifteen hours? So, you
know, in sort of groundwater migration time,
the 15 hour half-life is pretty short compared
to how far things migrate in the groundwater,
unless it's still suggesting that some kind of
equilibrium could be built up or it's just
continuously being infused, but even so, I
think
MEMBER SCHOFIELD: But that would
only be a problem during the time that they
are running the reactors. Effectively there
is no problem when they're shut down.

MR.

BERONJA: All right. So I

1	guess the report is going to be generated, and
2	John said if we need to review it or whoever
3	would like us to review it, we can take a look
4	at it, but I think as Jim said, too, I think
5	this is a fairly minor issue. It's not an SEC
6	issue. It's more dose related to doing dose
7	reconstruction I'm sorry. Site profile.
8	Thank you.
9	MR. MORRIS: This is Bob Morris.
10	MR. KATZ: Yes, Bob.
11	MR. MORRIS: My recollection of the
12	EPA drinking water standard is that four
13	millirem per year for continuous as the
14	only source of drinking water comes from
15	drinking 20,000 pico Curies per liter.
16	DR. MAURO: It's 20,000. Okay.
17	Thank you for correcting me.
18	MR. MORRIS: Twenty thousand.
19	DR. MAURO: It's that high. Okay.
20	I stand corrected. I know where the 900 came
21	from. I stand corrected.
22	MR. MORRIS: And so I think the

conclusion you can come to just at face value is that dosimetricly the number will be small.

DR. NETON: Whether it's 30,000 or 100,000, you're in the ballpark of around ten, 12 millirem per year maximum. So these are small doses to consider, although necessary to be included.

Okay, all right. MR. BERONJA: Moving on, the next issue related to uranium fires where the petitioner referred numerous uranium fires and cites a couple of sodium explosion incidents of and about the monitoring, NIOSH concluded that data available for there the various was uranium fires that would allow dose estimates to be bounded. We actually reviewed quite a few different studies related to this and really came to the same conclusion that NIOSH did on this. So I don't think there's really any further discussion that's needed on that.

Issue number five talks about air monitoring. Again, this was a petitioner

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issue that, you know, sufficient air monitoring or air monitoring was insufficient related to, you know, determining exposures.

I think NIOSH concluded that there was a concern prior to 1958 about this. know, Ι think we concurred with NIOSH's conclusion about that prior to 1958. You know, we did have some questions about post 1958, and I think that's going to probably all get wrapped up in some of the other with discussions that have the other we So we can talk about those there.

The next issue is t.he sodium disposal facility or sodium burn pit. The facility was not adequately monitored and/or records are missing. NIOSH had a number of statements that they made where they said that they didn't really feel this was a significant issue just given some of the safety issues associated with going out to the facility, given some of the levels of radionuclides' present at the site.

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And you know, I think in general we still had some concern just about, you know, I don't think there's still good very information on when some of this contamination took place or some of the incidental exposure. You know, I think probably still in general are feeling as probably the exposures that folks would have gotten would have relatively minor, associated with walking by this facility.

I guess the only things I don't know if you guys have looked at any other information related to the sodium burn pit or any kind of modeling or anything else, Lara.

DR. HUGHES: What we looked into is more we have actually been in the context of some of the other issues into looking and producing co-worker models. So anybody who might have gone out there that may have not been monitored, you know, those could conceivably be bounded with the co-worker model, considering this was an intermittent

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1	operation.
2	So you would not have a worker at
3	the burn pit eight hours a day seven days a
4	week. Yes, so actually looking into the co-
5	worker model covering this exposure.
6	MS. KLEA: I have eyewitnesses on
7	that situation, and I certainly don't agree
8	that only the workers at the burn pit would
9	have been contaminated. They would have
10	released airborne radionuclides, would have
11	covered the whole site.
12	MEMBER BEACH: And this is Josie
13	Beach. I have a question.
14	It says contamination was
15	discovered in '78. Do you guys have any
16	records of when it was monitored prior to '78,
17	when the last
18	DR. HUGHES: It was not monitored
19	prior to '78 because it was not intended to be
20	a radionuclide disposal facility.
21	MEMBER BEACH: Right.

Ιt

**HUGHES:** 

DR.

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was a sodium

disposal facility. So I think when 1 2 started -- I'm not exactly sure what triggered the monitoring. I think it was the thought of 3 4 clean-up or -said they had 5 MEMBER BEACH: Ιt intermittent modeling done or not modeling, 6 7 but intermittent --Disposal, like they **HUGHES:** 8 were disposing sodium, like a pump that had 9 10 sodium in it, and they would douse it with water, submerge it in water to react to sodium 11 to make it -- essentially remove the sodium 12 13 hazard that Wanda had pointed out because sodium is so reactive. 14 MEMBER BEACH: So there's 15 no previous monitoring data available until '78? 16 No, because they did 17 DR. HUGHES: not intend for it to become contaminated. 18 19 did become contaminated, but again, if you look at the reports, this environment, those 20 levels are fairly low; they are in the pico 21

Curie range of cesium. So it's not -- there's

1	no indication that this was a major disposal
2	operation of radioactive
3	MS. KLEA: No, actually it was, and
4	I have a witness who before he died went on
5	record and on videotape that he was ordered to
6	do releases over the side of the hill, and you
7	may or may not know it did go down the hill
8	and got into Brandeis-Bardin Institute.
9	So the story the company is telling
10	isn't true at all. This was a major, major
11	clean-up pit, and the workers were ordered
12	without any protective clothing to pump it.
13	They had to pump it out over the side of the
14	hill.
15	MEMBER MUNN: Pump what out?
16	MS. KLEA: The liquid.
17	MEMBER MUNN: What liquid?
18	MS. KLEA: These were pits. These
19	were earthen pits.
20	MEMBER MUNN: Yes, but we were
21	talking about the burn pits, weren't we?
22	MS. KLEA: Yes, the burn pits.

1	MEMBER MUNN: And so
2	MS. KLEA: They would wash the
3	contaminated parts to get the sodium off, and
4	it was great fun for the workers to see the
5	explosions.
6	MEMBER MUNN: Yes, it's a very
7	spectacular reaction.
8	MS. KLEA: Yes.
9	MEMBER MUNN: And when it's over,
10	it's over, but
11	MS. KLEA: Anyway, the area was
12	contaminated with cesium, strontium, and
13	plutonium, and the workers had to pump the
14	liquid out that were in these pits over the
15	side of the hill, contaminating all of the
16	property below in Simi Valley.
17	DR. MAURO: So I'm visualizing two
18	concerns here. One is it's a burn pit and
19	things are burning.
20	DR. HUGHES: It's the sodium
21	reaction with water.

DR. MAURO: Sodium is reacting. So

you have a very exothermic process, steam coming off there.

DR. HUGHES: Just hydrogen.

Sodium DR. MAURO: is being oxidized. Water is steaming off, and you've got some kind of convective movement of air up and out with water vapor, and in the pit there perhaps is some cesium, some strontium, now so that the key issues whatever, become, okay, what type of concentrations of what radionuclides might have been in the pit when.

DR. HUGHES: Exactly.

DR. MAURO: And second, when you do this kind of thing, there are many models out there that are run. It's like burning oil and what comes up. You could sort of say -- okay. I'm not saying you should do this, but if I was trying to convince myself, okay, how do I convince myself that the amount of airborne radionuclides because of the burning process is relatively small, and what contribution

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1	could have to the dose is relatively small.
2	There are probably ways of doing it, a
3	bounding analysis.
4	Is that something that you folks
5	have done or are looking at or basically
6	you're basically using more heuristic
7	arguments why this is not an important
8	contributor?
9	DR. HUGHES: Well, we're looking at
10	in general workers handling radiological
11	materials and workers handling sodium reactor
12	components we presumed were monitored or at
13	least I would assume that a larger part of the
14	workers that would have gone out there were
15	monitored.
16	DR. MAURO: Okay.
17	DR. HUGHES: So we're looking into
18	the whole internal and external monitoring
19	data from the site in the form of a co-worker
20	model to bound doses to workers.
21	DR. MAURO: So the argument being
22	that the bioassay data that you have for

1	workers would have captured that. Whatever
2	contribution to intake, what might have
3	occurred while they were working with or in
4	the vicinity of the burn pit, the bioassay
5	data would capture those intakes and you
6	could, you know, along with other intakes that
7	you might have experienced from handling
8	material.
9	I just want to understand what the
10	line of argument is.
11	DR. HUGHES: Yes.
12	DR. NETON: The primary emphasis is
13	on the bioassay.
14	DR. MAURO: I have to say that
15	these kinds of transfer models are your last
16	resort.
17	DR. NETON: But keep in mind that
18	the concentrations are fairly low in these
19	materials, the pico Curie per gram.
20	DR. MAURO: Yes, and that's
21	important, and that's well established.
22	DR. NETON: And so they're

1	measurements.
2	DR. MAURO: Somebody measured it
3	and so you know it's in there.
4	DR. NETON: So when you have pico
5	Curies per gram, the cancer per exposure is
6	pretty low. You just can't entail enough
7	material to get a significant dose, but
8	nonetheless, we would propose to capture with
9	a co-worker model.
10	DR. MAURO: Okay. Is that all part
11	of the evaluation design profile or just
12	something that is coming out in the white
13	paper?
14	DR. HUGHES: Yes, it's the white
15	paper.
16	DR. NETON: The co-worker model is
17	yet to be developed.
18	DR. MAURO: Okay.
19	MS. KLEA: I'd like to add. This
20	is Bonnie.
21	I'd like to add that we had similar
22	pits behind the SRE in the early days of

1	operation, and I have a new witness that can
2	confirm this, and it's also written in
3	reports. They had ponds that they filled,
4	open ponds behind the SRE, and they used those
5	to wash the contaminated parts that had sodium
6	on them behind the SRE, and then those opened
7	dams broke, and all that liquid was released
8	down the hill, and then they put in piping
9	along the road to take the waste water from
10	the SRE over the Silvernale Pond, which was in
11	Area, I believe, Area 3.
12	So I don't remember if you have
13	information on the SRE pits.
14	DR. HUGHES: Bonnie, this is Lara.
15	I do believe we do, but if you want
16	to make sure, if you could forward any reports
17	that you have to us, if you want to make sure,
18	that would be fine.
19	MS. KLEA: I don't know that I have
20	anything that I haven't forwarded to you.
21	DR. HUGHES: Okay.

MS. KLEA: I think it's from that

1	historic
2	DR. HUGHES: I do remember.
3	MS. KLEA: data.
4	DR. HUGHES: Yes, I do remember
5	reading about this.
6	MS. KLEA: Right, and I have, like
7	I said, a new witness that was there at the
8	time, and he can testify as to what they did
9	in those pits, and then it's on record that
10	those earthen pits broke and everything ran
11	off the side of the hill.
12	MR. BERONJA: Well, again, I guess
13	on this one with the issues paper or the white
14	paper, co-worker model, we can take a look at
15	that if the Board wants, but otherwise I think
16	we can move on unless there's anything else.
17	Let's see. The seventh issue,
18	again, came through the petitioner. It was
19	identification of workers with blank radiation
20	exposure record sheets in their file, and I
21	guess that NIOSH had discovered through an

interview with current folks at Santa Susana

that all individuals were issued a blank record sheet in their file called a blue card, and if an individual entered into a controlled area, they were required to have a film badge, and any exposure was entered into their file, and that this practice was corroborated by NIOSH through random personnel record reviews and other reviews.

able SC&A was to pretty acknowledge this practice of these particular cards, these blue cards, and of course, I think had level don't the of we same information probably that NIOSH did in corroborating as far as just people entering controlled areas, that they all had badges and everything, but I think hopefully, you know, the co-worker models and other things that are being looked at would address this also.

MS. KLEA: Well, I know that that was not required until 1968. We had free access to everything when I was there.

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DR. HUGHES: I think the terminology is more people that routinely worked in this area. It is possible somebody had access to facilities. So we're looking into that with the co-worker model.

MS. KLEA: Right, and like I say, I read that those requirements were not enforced until 1968.

DR. HUGHES: Okay.

MR. BERONJA: Okay. The next issue is monitoring of firemen from other sites who were involved with fires or other events at Santa Susana, and NIOSH mentions that firemen wore film badges when working in areas with the potential for radiologic exposures, and one person interviewed mentioned that the firemen consistently wore badges. However, one fireman did not have monitoring records in their file. You know, I think there is still some question there.

Again, hopefully issues like this would be addressed, you know, through the co-

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1	worker models, I assume. I don't know ii
2	there's anything else that you want to add on?
3	I mean, I think we had discovered the same
4	things as far as there being some
5	inconsistency as far as the firm and having
6	badges or not having badges.
7	If there's nothing, let's see.
8	That's it as far as the petitioner issues.
9	What we'll do, unless folks want to take a
10	break, we could keep going and move into the
11	issues that SC&A had. Some of these actually
12	will have been covered already.
13	The first issue I'm sorry?
14	MR. KATZ: Bob?
15	MR. MORRIS: Yes.
16	MR. KATZ: Yes?
17	MR. MORRIS: The last conversation
18	on the blue cards, I think I heard SC&A say
19	that they agreed with the NIOSH position, but
20	then the topic changed sort of midstream.
21	Could you confirm that that's exactly what you

said?

1	MR. BERONJA: I think we concurred
2	with what NIOSH had found. I think the
3	conclusion was, what Bonnie was saying, is
4	that this practice actually started in 1968,
5	and what NIOSH was talking about as far as
6	workers being badged was workers routinely
7	working in specific areas.
8	Otherwise people maybe who were not
9	routinely working may not have been badged,
10	and that the co-worker model would hopefully
11	address these particular incidents is I think
12	what was stated.
13	MR. MORRIS: But I'm not quite
14	following. I think this is exactly my
15	problem, is that the issue was unfilled blue
16	cards; is that right?
17	MR. BERONJA: I'm sorry. Could you
18	say that again?
19	MR. MORRIS: The issue was blue
20	cards with no data on them; is that right?
21	MR. BERONJA: Right.
22	MR. MORRIS: And you confirmed that

1	that was an appropriate expectation
2	considering the common practice of business
3	through those years.
4	MR. BERONJA: Right.
5	MR. MORRIS: Okay, and then the
6	conversation shifted and it was some other
7	topic came in, and I'm not sure that I got
8	that.
9	Is it a new issue that has been
10	brought up or not?
11	MR. BERONJA: No, I think it was
12	what Bonnie stated, that this practice began
13	in 1968.
14	MR. MORRIS: But I think we know
15	that that practice of blue card being in the
16	files was before '68, wasn't it?
17	MR. BERONJA: I don't remember
18	offhand.
19	DR. HUGHES: Yes, that's correct.
20	I think Bonnie was referring to it being
21	enforced, that workers that were not monitored
22	were not able to access radiological areas,

1	whereas before that it was possible for them
2	to access these areas if they wanted to.
3	DR. MAURO: So we have workers in
4	earlier years that may have gotten access,
5	received some exposure.
6	DR. HUGHES: They might have had
7	access in
8	MR. STIVER: Or would have a blank
9	blue card.
10	DR. HUGHES: They would have a
11	blank blue card. They were not monitored.
12	DR. MAURO: And in theory, if you
13	have enough data, with good data from the blue
14	cards, somehow that could be used to build a
15	co-worker model for those workers who did not
16	have records.
17	DR. HUGHES: That is correct.
18	MR. BERONJA: And may have been
19	exposed.
20	MS. KLEA: This is Bonnie.
21	I have plenty of workers and worker
22	families who say there has been some more

monitored, and there are no records found or there are big, huge data gaps in the records.

DR. MAURO: For the benefit of the work group, this issue is regarding limitations in the data for set worker exposures, whether it's external or internal, more so I am assuming external. This would be helpful, is when there are missing data, incomplete data, but there is a body of real What the question becomes is: body of data representative enough in time and location doj and category that when collect that data -- let's say you start to try to build a co-worker model with it where you assign some distribution and try to, say, pick off an upper 95th percentile that some workers might have gotten -- the question always is: are there subpopulations of people because of their job categories or in time, which usually turns up to be even important?

For example, if your data is

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1	limited to post some year but you're worried
2	about people in an earlier year, building a
3	bridge over time is a challenge. I know in
4	the past we've seen this where an effort is
5	made to show why the data collected post
6	I'm going to use 1965 should be applied to
7	workers earlier and almost in a way really
8	there's a burden of proof here. You have to
9	feel pretty confident that because of the
10	nature of the operations, your understanding
11	of process knowledge, what took place, that
12	you could make that extrapolation.
13	That's not always easy to do.
14	DR. NETON: I'd like to know we've
15	done that.
16	DR. MAURO: In time? Okay. Do we
17	have one here?
18	DR. NETON: We've tried to go back
19	in time, but we've never been successful in
20	convincing the
21	DR. MAURO: It sounds like you
22	might have that here.

1	DR. HUGHES: No.
2	DR. MAURO: You don't?
3	DR. HUGHES: No.
4	DR. MAURO: I misunderstood then.
5	DR. HUGHES: Okay. I'm sorry.
6	DR. MAURO: So basically you're
7	saying in time there are just some workers for
8	some reason that just didn't get picked up.
9	DR. HUGHES: No. This whole issue
LO	was something that I actually brought up when
11	I looked through the record because for each
12	claimant we get records from the site, and
L3	sometimes this record would include an empty
L4	health physics record or what they refer to as
L5	a blue card, and they would say, "Oh, this
L6	worker was, for example, a janitor and was not
L7	monitored." That was just an example.
18	Now, some other records came back
19	and say we don't have any health physics
20	record for this worker. Therefore, he was not
21	a radiological worker, and there was a

discrepancy, and that's why we looked into

this, and it turns out that the site, Area 4, had different operators. That's this whole confusion about the different operators.

You had Rocketdyne workers, and you had Atomics International, and forgive me if I get this wrong again. So the workers that worked for Atomics International, issued this health physics card would be under health because they were supervision, and other workers who worked for Rocketdyne were not working with the nuclear operations, but they were working on Area 4. So they are covered under this program. file claims and do dose can we а reconstruction.

So that's the source of these two different sets of records. Because I was confused when I looked at it. It was like, well, do we have missing data here or do we not, and I was concerned. So that's why we looked into this, and that's actually this whole issue.

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1	DR. MAURO: Thank you.
2	MR. BERONJA: Anything else on
3	this?
4	Otherwise we're going to move into
5	the issues that SC&A have, and the first one
6	that we had was on the
7	DR. NETON: Could we possibly take
8	a ten-minute break?
9	MR. BERONJA: Sure.
LO	MR. KATZ: Okay.
11	DR. NETON: Before we move into the
L2	SC&A issues.
L3	MR. BERONJA: Yes.
L4	MR. KATZ: So we're going to take a
L5	ten-minute break. I'm just going to put the
L6	phone on mute, but it will not cut the line.
L7	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off
L8	the record at 11:43 a.m. and
L9	resumed at 11:54 a.m.)
20	MR. KATZ: Okay. This is the Santa
21	Susana Work Group, and we just were on a break
22	for about five minutes or so, and we're going

1	to start up a little again, and then we'll
2	have a lunch break.
3	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Before we go back
4	to you, Greg, just as far as planning, do we
5	want to go another hour or so and have lunch
6	or what do we want to do? I know some people
7	have flights out of here at four, 4:30.
8	MEMBER BEACH: Mine is at six now.
9	They just changed it.
10	MR. KATZ: Josie has more time
11	here. What time do you have to leave?
12	DR. MAURO: I'm 4:30. I guess if
13	it keeps going I can sneak out. Do you think
14	we might be able to finish up? How much more?
15	MR. BERONJA: I don't see us
16	even if we have lunch, I can't imagine us
17	going past three o'clock.
18	MR. KATZ: Even if we have lunch?
19	(Laughter.)
20	MEMBER MUNN: Skipping lunch is not
21	an option. No.
22	MR. BERONJA: Even if we have a

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1	regular lunch, it should.
2	MEMBER BEACH: So you're asking
3	another half hour, another hour? Is that what
4	you asked, Mike?
5	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Yes. Maybe go
6	until 12:30 and then break for lunch?
7	MEMBER MUNN: Why don't we break at
8	12:30?
9	MEMBER BEACH: That's fine.
LO	MR. KATZ: And we can try to do a
11	quicker lunch and get back.
L2	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Okay.
L3	MR. BERONJA: Back into it, we're
L4	going to start in now with the issues that
L5	SC&A had related to the SEC, and the first one
L6	actually we've already addressed. This is the
L7	issue of which areas should be considered. So
L8	I think it looks like all parties have agreed
L9	and are comfortable with the fact that this is
20	focused on Area 4. So we don't need to
21	discuss that anymore.

I think as part of that, the dates

were included, and NIOSH is going to be just going back and looking at '53 and '54 to make sure there's no other information that would indicate or information that would indicate that there were actually nuclear activities going on at that time.

The second issue that we have is on the adequacy of the internal monitoring program pre and post January 1st, 1959, and this thing is actually -- well, it's not quite as long as I thought it was. Maybe we have some longer ones. I think the crux of this particular one is that -- and maybe just a little bit of background.

First of all, we concur with NIOSH that the pre-1959 information is really not sufficient, and I think that we concur that the SEC should be considered for that particular time period.

Post 1958, what we did is we actually went through and looked at the claims that were filed related to Santa Susana, and

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if I remember right, I think that this was 100-plus claims that we looked at. Yes, maybe at the time that we did it I think it was close to 200. I don't know if that had --

DR. HUGHES: We have had well over 200 claims for over a year.

MR. BERONJA: So it was right around 200, I guess, that we looked at. What we did in looking at those was we looked at those claims and, in particular, the periods that the workers worked at the site, and then we looked at what percentage of the workers actually had internal dosimetry work, and then we plotted that.

Actually in Section 4.3.1.1 of both reports, and I think maybe just for a little bit of background here, we originally had multiple graphs presented in this section. We had a graph that showed from the early period all the way through '65 the percentage of workers that were internally monitored, and then we had the number of workers that were

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monitored over this period, and then we had the same two graphs, the percent and the number that were monitored from early on to a much later time frame, and actually the reason we did that was we wanted to focus on this through the '65 time frame.

When this document went through DOE review, they were a little bit concerned about us putting the number of workers that were monitored. So we actually pulled that out of that particular report, and while I thought I had lost a little bit of kind of the flavor for the number of people, I don't think it lost kind of the point that we're trying to make.

If you look at the graphs, what it shows is as far as the percentage of workers that was internally monitored, there's really nothing really that much that happened before '58, and then it picks up and there's a pretty increasing slope as you get into the '61, '62 time frame, and then there's a pretty strong

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baseline when you hit that '62-'63 time frame.

It then kind of comes down after that.

And really this particular information, the sodium reactor experiments -- some uncertainty there -- there has been some reports that have shown that there were places that folks didn't think that there were materials, that there were materials. There's one particular memo in '62 related to this.

All of this kind of gives us concern that this program was really not fully robust, potential of really going until probably at least about the '62 time frame. We have that concern in the '59, '60, the early '60s time frame.

While there are still some issues that we had post '62, '63, '65, I think as far as the program being a stable program and being able to have sufficient information out there to develop a co-worker model or something else, I think, you know, in general we thought it was fine.

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But it was this period as, you
know, the program was established and getting
going that we had some concerns. So that's
really kind of the crux of what came out of
some of this particular analysis. Again,
there's some specifics as far as how the
program was developed and some deficiencies,
but I guess I'd be curious just about, again,
the data set that we looked at was the claims
that were filed. We did not look at a bigger
data set or anything else that might have
said, "No, you guys didn't look at enough or
this class of workers."
So I'd be curious if NIOSH had any
different experience or what they thought
about these particular graphs, in particular.
DR. HUGHES: I don't particularly
understand what your total is. You said a
percentage. What is the total again?
MR. BERONJA: It's the percentage
of workers that were working at that period of

time. So those workers that were working, for

1	instance in 1959, what percent of those
2	workers were internally monitored.
3	DR. HUGHES: But this is solely
4	based on our claim information?
5	MR. BERONJA: The claim
6	information, strictly on a claim information.
7	MEMBER BEACH: So that would be ten
8	percent.
9	DR. HUGHES: Yes, but we have
10	okay. How did you limit those claims to 130?
11	I mean we have 240. Which ones did you
12	eliminate and what was the basis of that?
13	MR. BERONJA: You know what? I'll
14	go back and look. There were no claims
15	eliminated at all
16	DR. HUGHES: Okay.
17	MR. BERONJA: in what we looked
18	at. I don't know. In some cases there may
19	have been claims where maybe it was outside a
20	certain period.
21	DR. HUGHES: Okay.
22	MR. BERONJA: You know, that we

were looking at.

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DR. HUGHES: That makes sense, yes.

DR. NETON: This may be a moot issue anyway, though, because we're not going to base our co-worker models at all on the claimant's data. There are a large number of internal monitoring data available that we have access to. Unfortunately right now its in de-identified form, and that's the data that were used by Boice and others to do an epi study recently that was released at Rocketdyne.

And I'm not totally familiar with the numbers, but there is --

DR. HUGHES: I have some numbers to throw at you. The entire work force 46,970 people off the site, and I'm entirely sure this was only Area 4. It might have consisted of other areas, but the entirety of internally monitored personnel at the site over the entire course of operation was 2,200. Excuse me.

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So I do not have the total number of data points. I did not count them, but we do actually have all of this data, all of the internal monitoring data that was scanned and abstracted during this study. It's available in database format.

There is currently an issue with some information that the site needs to provide in order to use the entirety of the data, which is in the form of clarification of notation that was used mostly, and currently the site cannot respond to any request because they have funding issues. So this was actually where this was being held up at the moment.

MS. KLEA: Say that again, Lara.

DR. HUGHES: The sites, Boeing site currently has no funding to cooperate with NIOSH making data available, and this is the current hold-up of the development of the internal co-worker model, and the resolution of questions that we still have on the data.

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1	MS. KLEA: I thought they got
2	funded from NIOSH.
3	DR. NETON: No, I don't think NIOSH
4	funded them. I was wondering if the DOE.
5	DR. HUGHES: It's DOE funding.
6	DR. NETON: DOE funding, and there
7	was some issues with the continuing resolution
8	and budgets and that sort of thing, and I
9	think DOE is working through that, and I
10	suspect that that should be alleviated fairly
11	soon.
12	But there was also an issue about
13	us using certain sites have the concept of
14	we should only have access to claimant data,
15	and that's not true. We have access to the
16	full range, and we're working that through.
17	We just need to get the right people talking
18	to each other for them to drop that issue off
19	the table.
20	But literally I think there's
21	hundreds of thousands of bioassay records that
22	have been collected that we'll have access to

1	develop these co-worker models.
2	Now, the question still remains
3	whether it's a robust data set and were the
4	right people monitored and that sort of thing.
5	DR. MAURO: To put it in the way
6	I see it is that when you look at the claimant
7	records that we looked at, for whatever reason
8	we had 138 or something.
9	MR. BERONJA: Well, no, actually I
10	think I'll have to double check the
11	numbers. I think there were close to 200 that
12	we looked at.
13	DR. MAURO: Let's use that.
14	MR. BERONJA: Okay.
15	DR. MAURO: We have 200 and we say,
16	"Okay. You know, what percent of them were
17	those 200 claimants?"
18	And we see that there is an elbow
19	in the graph, and we plot it as a function of
20	time. You know, it stays pretty low, and then
21	we would hit under ten percent. You know,
22	it's nothing before 1957. Then it starts to

1	creep around a little bit, but then you see it
2	takes off, and by 1963, you're up to 35
3	percent.
4	So I mean, it's very simple. We
5	just look at it and say, "hmm." It looks like
6	you might have a deficiency of data based on
7	just looking at those 200 claimants, you know,
8	prior to the '62-'63 time frame.
9	MS. KLEA: Do you think that the
10	DOE is not allowing you to publish the number
11	of the workers doing internal monitoring?
12	DR. NETON: No.
13	MR. BERONJA: Actually I did say
14	that. The DOE in their review had some
15	problem from a I'm sorry. Maybe not DOE
16	on the Privacy Act concern, the Privacy Act
17	review. They had concerns. I couldn't quite
18	figure it out, of presenting the number of
19	workers
20	DR. NETON: Oh, in work products.
21	MR. BERONJA: Yes.
22	DR. NETON: But the Board has our

1	work products. You're talking about the
2	Privacy Act cleared
3	MR. BERONJA: That's right. That's
4	right.
5	MS. KLEA: So that's the workers
6	who had internal monitoring records.
7	MR. BERONJA: That were internally
8	monitored, right, yes.
9	MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: Liz Homoki-
10	Titus.
11	Let me just clarify that for you.
12	The Privacy Act Director for CDC gives us
13	directions on how to get a Privacy Act
14	clearance, and if it's a group of nine or
15	less, and you can determine who that person
16	is, then those numbers need to come out, and
17	that's why they're taken out of the third
18	version that goes to the public, but it is not
19	taken out for the Advisory Board. The
20	Advisory Board has all of the information.
21	MS. KLEA: You're indicating that
22	the internal records are nine or less?

1	MR. BERONJA: No.
2	MS. KLEA: Are the workers
3	monitored?
4	MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: no, I'm not
5	indicating that. I'm saying that they may
6	have said these three people
7	MS. KLEA: Oh.
8	MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: and then if
9	they were talking about a group of nine or
10	less, then that number would have to come out
11	so that those people cannot be personally
12	identified.
13	I'm not saying anything about how
14	many people may have actually had some type of
15	internal monitoring.
16	MS. KLEA: Okay. Who is speaking?
17	MS. HOMOKI-TITUS: This is Liz
18	Homoki-Titus. I'm an attorney with HHS>
19	MS. KLEA: Okay.
20	MR. BERONJA: Yes, in this
21	particular case, Liz, and I'm not sure if I'm
22	completely understanding you, I mean, this is

a plot just of the number of workers or percentage of workers. There was no way to figure out who these workers -- I mean I don't think there's a way to --

MS. HOWELL: We don't need to have this discussion in the middle of this meeting.

DR. MAURO: Well, I mean, the point I was simply trying to make is that there's a time period where it looks like there's paucity of data based on the 200 claims that Now, what I'm hearing is for we looked at. those very same time periods you may have not only the claimant data, but all worker data whereby you have a much more complete data set of bioassay, not only, you know, number of workers or percent of workers, but also the per worker, what samples they number of consisted of, the range of workers.

And what I'm getting at is when you start to talk about adequacy, the data adequacy to build the co-worker model or to rebuild your construction, we walked away from

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1	the work that we did, and you got a problem in
2	the early '60s.
3	DR. NETON: Based on the claimant
4	data.
5	DR. MAURO: Based on the claimant
6	data set.
7	DR. NETON: I can understand that
8	conclusion based on that, but like I say,
9	we're in the process of developing
LO	DR. MAURO: This is important.
11	DR. NETON: a full data set, and
L2	
13	DR. MAURO: To me this is a big
L4	issue.
L5	DR. NETON: I would point out that
16	just because there's a paucity in the early
L7	years one, of course, has to look at what type
L8	of work activities were going on, the type of
L9	work, the amount of work, that sort of stuff.
20	That has got to be looked at in context.
21	MR. BERONJA: Yes, I mean, and
22	Larry, you probably know this, I mean the '60s

was a pretty active time for this site.

DR. HUGHES: I think somewhat what you see in here is very likely consistent with the operations of the site that they ramped up. You know, they started small in '53, constructed, and then they wound up to mid-'60s, maybe late '60s, when they stopped operating a lot of these facilities, and finally went into decommissioning.

DR. NETON: So anyway, at least with this, like John said, you know, we had access to the claims data. We looked at it. You know, we started looking at it, and we saw this and we said, "Well, we'd better look at more of the claims just to get a better represented sample."

We did that and we still saw the same thing. So I think, you know, we still have a concern, but if you guys have better information to be able to develop a co-worker model, whatever.

DR. NETON: I mean, I wouldn't be

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1	surprised if we see a similar pattern of ramp-
2	up because, in fact, you know, we have a
3	technique where we could use claimant data to
4	develop co-worker models, and it's a valid
5	approach, but again
6	DR. MAURO: It's mostly heuristic
7	unfortunately. At some point everyone has a
8	judgment. Well, when do I have enough data or
9	enough time periods, enough different types of
10	workers where I'm starting to feel comfortable
11	that I could use that data to build it around.
12	We've been there before.
13	DR. NETON: And of course, a lot of
14	it, the more sparse the data that you have the
15	more claimant favorable you end up tending to
16	be. For instance, we've had very few data
17	points at some sites and said, "Well, we
18	really don't know the distribution, but we're
19	going to take the highest value."
20	I mean, we've done that at several
21	sites, or we'll take the 95th or

DR. MAURO: We're in the middle of

that in a couple of places, and we've had some disagreements on if, in fact, the intent was to monitor the people that had the highest potential for exposure, then that argument starts to hold nicely.

But then, again, the burden of proof is to make that case. Yes, these are the people, you know, and we've been through So, in effect, if it turns out that before. that even if you only have -- let's say it turns out you only had ten percent of your workers that have bioassay data. Right now my sense is that's not -- you know, you're missing -- you know, is that good enough to build a co-worker model where you could place a plausible amount down on all workers, which may be so you only have ten percent.

But if somehow you could make a case, and we're going to get into this when we talk about the OTIB bond on Y12. If you could make a case that says, no, we could demonstrate that those workers were, in fact,

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the workers that are the highest potential, and if we pick the upper 90 percent, even though it's only a small percentage, if we picked up 90 percent of those and we assumed that everyone gets that consistently, I as a health physicist would say that sounds pretty good, but right now we don't have that.

DR. NETON: I always like to use

DR. NETON: I always like to use the analogy, you know, the percentage of workers monitored is a very poor indicator of how robust the monitoring program was, and I always like to point out that's like saying only two percent of people who work in a hospital are monitored and, therefore, it's a poorly monitored program.

In fact, the only people that work in the Radiology Department are the ones that need to be monitored. I mean, so you've really got to look at what's going on.

DR. MAURO: But that case has to be made.

DR. NETON: Exactly.

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1	DR. MAURO: Really the burden of
2	proof is on you guys.
3	MEMBER BEACH: So this is Josie.
4	What can we expect NIOSH to
5	develop, a white paper or
6	DR. NETON: A co-worker model
7	using
8	MEMBER BEACH: For this issue.
9	DR. NETON: using the full set
LO	of data we have available from this facility.
L1	MEMBER BEACH: When it's available.
L2	DR. NETON: And we're working very
L3	diligently to secure those data.
L4	MEMBER BEACH: Right.
L5	MR. BERONJA: I guess from a
L6	procedural perspective, I mean, and it sounds
L7	like you guys have a roadblock right now from
L8	doing that, right?
L9	DR. NETON: Yes, it's my
20	understanding we actually have the data set,
21	but it's to be identified. So that limited
22	use to do what John has been asking, to just

sort of see where the right people, kind of 1 2 monitor, that sort of thing. the full data We have set of 3 records for a bioassay that I used. 4 It's better to have identified data to look at if 5 you can match people with what categories, 6 7 that sort of thing. This is, by the way --DR. MAURO: 8 I've been involved in many SECs, 9 you know, like next week is a big week. 10 This is the recurring theme over and over again. 11 Now, and this is a big DR. NETON: 12 13 ticket item here, and we talked about a lot of issues with fission products and tritium. 14 15 This is where the doses are really going to be 16 assigned from particularly the uranium values many radionuclides, the big dose 17 and how items. They're going to drive the 18 19 compensation CDs in most cases. 20 MR. BERONJA: Yes, I quess as far as post '58 we'll hold off until the work that 21

you guys do. I guess the question you have to

ask is, you know, right now if all of us are saying, yes, through the end of '58 we all agree, then is there a significant change as far as information available in '59 and '60 and '61, or what's the difference between those things or is it still, you know, a fairly small level?

DR. MAURO: That was part of our original mission, if you recall. If you take a real close look, they draw the line, you know, at the right place, and that's where we zeroed in, in addition to everything else.

MR. BERONJA: The next -- I don't think there's anything else there. There's a lot of specifics here, but I think we'll just hold off and wait and see what you guys find in that particular study.

The next issue we had, and we've discussed this already, this was an SC&A issue that also was a petitioner issue, and that is related to lack of information, related to the potential exposures with some facility

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1	incidents like the SRE and sodium burn pit,
2	and I think in both cases we've got an
3	independent study that you guys are going to
4	do on the sodium reactor experiment, and I
5	think the model that you're developing on the
6	sodium burn pit or at least another co-worker
7	part of the co-worker
8	DR. HUGHES: Wrapped up in the co-
9	worker analysis.
10	MR. BERONJA: So there's actions
11	being taken related to this.
12	DR. NETON: We're going to sound
13	like a broken record.
14	MR. BERONJA: Yes.
15	DR. NETON: We need to move forward
16	here, but the co-worker models, we've had many
17	discussions about how we handle incidents, and
18	we believe that the co-worker models tend to
19	incorporate many of the incident exposures
20	that would have occurred.
21	The next issue, and we could be
22	finished here before lunch, given the co-

worker model part of this and everything else, but we really just had two more issues, and they are not as important as the internal issue we just talked about.

But issue number four is the lack of information on environmental exposures. We've already talked about the drinking water aspect of this. The other, you know, concern that we've had all, although I don't know; probably from an exposure standpoint, and it's not a big one, is just the use of the staff data as far as an environmental exposure. think what was done there, and this might be contrary to what you were saying, Jim, but you don't typically do is I think they took some information from '71 through '99 and then apply that and actually use some of that through the earlier years.

I mean, probably we don't have too much of a concern even -- I know we were talking this morning about the .01 factor that was used and whether that's conservative or

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1 not, but the issue that some of our folks had
2 here was that it was used '71 to '99 when a
lot of the heavy activity was going on. Maybe
there's more activity going on in the '60s,
and is that really a representative time frame
or is it really possible to take that time
7 frame and then apply it back to the earlier
8 years?
So that's probably the big issue on
this. Otherwise we've dealt with the drinking
11 water side.
DR. BEHLING: Greg, can I interrupt
for a second? This is Hans Behling, SC&A.
MR. BERONJA: Sure. Thanks, Hans.
DR. BEHLING: This is one that you
should rate, and it's really a question of
going back to essentially Exhibit 1 in my
write-up, but of course, you probably don't
have it, but it's a replication of Figure 2-3
in the TBD, and if you look at Figure 2-3 and
you look at the activities as a function of

time from the early operations to the later

have ones where we do environmental monitoring, and you realize that there is a real disconnect here. So much work, different type of work, was done in the period which there absolutely during was monitoring.

the real question is can you realistically extrapolate backwards in time which from time period during the environmental monitoring was done and translate that kind of data into the time period where there was none done and realize that the activities associated with the site much different in terms of both were so quality and quantity.

MS. KLEA: Thank you, Hans.

MR. BERONJA: Yes, you know, I guess before I forget and end up looking at the specifics in some of these writings, with you on the phone, Hans, I know one other issue we had or there were several issues, Hans, that we had and I think we had kind of

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1	postponed this discussion on the neutron dose.
2	I don't know, Lara, if you guys want to talk
3	about what you're doing with that.
4	DR. NETON: Let's finish up what
5	we're doing with this environmental thing
6	first maybe.
7	I just had a couple of things. One
8	is I wanted clarification. When I was talking
9	about back extrapolation, I was specifically
10	referring to external, occupational external.
11	I think we have in a couple of instances
12	maybe done some back extrapolation using
13	environmental.
14	And so this would only apply to
15	people who would not fit in the co-worker
16	model, correct? I mean, so these are workers
17	who would not be considered radiological
18	workers at all, essentially be judged to have
19	no potential for exposure.
20	So one can sort of envision that
21	their doses would be by nature fairly low and,

in fact, some small fraction of what we were

1	assigned to the workers.
2	So I'm wrestling a little bit with
3	this back extrapolation. I think we're going
4	to have to go back and look at it, I guess.
5	DR. MAURO: So what I'm hearing is
6	that given that there's a problem of back
7	extrapolation, as Hans pointed out, there
8	might be other ways to come at the problem
9	DR. NETON: Yes, there are
10	certainly ways to bound. I'd certainly bound
11	a non-radiological worker though. I don't
12	think it's an SEC issue, but we would have to
13	come forward with some more appropriate
14	approach, I guess.
15	This would be maybe appropriate. I
16	know I haven't looked at this hard enough.
17	DR. MAURO: And again, so
18	everything is linked. Ultimately the linchpin
19	here is those bioassay data, especially in the
20	'56, '57
21	DR. NETON: Well, I'm not sure. I
22	mean, the bioassay data are definitely linked

to what we would consider a radiological worker, but there are instances where we would say this person is deemed not to have done radiological work and just by virtue of being present at the site could have breathed some stack emissions and gotten some small amount of gamma dose.

You know, I used to think that while certainly giving that person the full occupational dose would be bounding, but you know, you kind of wonder is that really a bounding dose. plausible So then fraction -- we had to decide what fraction, what's the appropriate fraction of the occupational dose would assign we to essentially non-radiological workers. Ιt looks to me like we need to do a little better job here explaining if what we did is valid or, if not, coming up with a better approach.

I'm confident we can do something here. I don't think we've ever had an environmental exposure be the basis for an

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SEC. There's always a first, I suppose, but I'm sure there's something we can do.

MR. BERONJA: Anything else on environmental?

DR. BEHLING: Yes, Greg. This is Hans again.

MR. KATZ: Yes.

DR. BEHLING: I guess I do have a mentioned question regarding had you previously that you felt comfortable with the reduction factor or the issue of the reduction factor as identified in the TBD of 0.01 was one that you feel has been resolved, and I guess I wasn't aware what was stated in that behalf, but it seems like a single value for the entire site seems to be something of an over generalization, given the size of site and the potential source terms throughout site where a person might have been exposed so that one size fits all seems a little bit over generalized.

DR. MAURO: Yes, I'm the guilty

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party, Hans. What I looked at is typically when I look at environmental exposures from airborne emissions, whether elevated or ground level, is you get the source term in pico Curies per second averaged over the course of year. You multiply by atmospheric dispersion factor, chi over 0, and that's location specific, and you come up with a concentration at location off site. some average annual concentration at some off site location.

In this case they didn't do that.

In this case they started with the point that,

well, let's say we have a source term. Of

course, that's what we're discussing was --

DR. BEHLING: Stack emissions.

DR. MAURO: Stack emissions. You have stack emissions, and there's certainly a concern there, but .01, and what they're saying in their site profile is if I know the concentrations, the average concentrations going out my stack over the course of a year,

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I'm going to assume that the highest exposure anyone could experience walking around the site would be .01 concentration. That is a very conservative assumption because I know what the chi over Q is going to give you.

DR. NETON: Worst case it is--

DR. MAURO: It is as bad as you can get. Now, I don't especially like that approach because you've never done it before. Looking at all of these cases, you've always used the chi over Q, but you know, if that's what you've elected to do here to place an upper bound, you know, I can't argue that that's not an upper bound. That would be an upper bound.

DR. BEHLING: Admittedly, that's the conservative value, and I'm just comparing it to what was done at the Hanford site where we have basically a very real breakdown by location, and I'm not sure whether or not such data is available here, but the second issue that I raised in my write-up was that this

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1	particular value of 0.01 does not incorporate
2	resuspension from contaminated ground service.
3	This is strictly a value that is assigned to
4	point releases, and it does not address
5	potential long-term deposition and
6	resuspension of radioactive materials.
7	DR. MAURO: That's true. You're
8	absolutely right. Quite frankly, I didn't
9	even give that a thought. I was just thinking
10	in terms of the atmospheric dispersion. It
11	would probably be a worthwhile exercise to see
12	if that contribution could change anything. I
13	have not done that.
14	DR. NETON: I'm not an expert
15	environmental modeler, but it would seem to me
16	that would be a very small contribution to the
17	overall dose.
18	DR. MAURO: That would be my
19	intuition, but I hate to leap to those things.
20	I tend to do that too quickly, yes, but it's
21	certainly something I did not consider.

DR. NETON: Okay.

1	MS. KLEA: This is Bonnie. Does
2	anyone look at the types of cancers that were
3	predominant at the different facilities?
4	DR. NETON: Bonnie, This is Jim
5	Neton.
6	We are looking at that sort of as a
7	side project that really is not related to how
8	we go about doing does reconstruction.
9	MS. KLEA: Okay. Well, I've seen,
10	well, the majority, and I've gotten the county
11	from the department. The majority of cancer
12	is lung. The second highest cancer is
13	bladder. So let's assume we all got internal
14	doses, even those of us who were not
15	monitored, and that mirrors the studies done
16	by the BEIR Group, the BEIR 7 report.
17	DR. NETON: I'm not sure what you
18	mean by that.
19	MS. KLEA: Well, the BEIR 7 report
20	found that the two cancers that were
21	statistically higher than they expected was
22	lung and bladder. Now, I know that the

1	bladder cancers are only being compensated at
2	three percent in the United States. So you're
3	obviously using old data. NIOSH is obviously
4	using old data that says that the bladder is
5	not very radiosensitive, and obviously it is.
6	DR. NETON: I'm not sure that
7	that's a correct characterization of that the
8	BEIR 7 report is saying, but that's a separate
9	issue which is related to our risk modeling
10	and not necessarily related to the ability to
11	do dose reconstruction.
12	MS. KLEA: Okay. Do you look at
13	the statistics on what kinds of cancers are
14	predominant?
15	DR. NETON: We are looking at that,
16	but remember these exposures are multifaceted,
17	and there are many chemicals at these
18	facilities as well, and there's radionuclides.
19	So an association in and of itself would not
20	necessarily point to the radiation being the
21	causative agent. You just can't

MS. KLEA: Okay. Well, that's what

the BEIR study found, and they studied the radiation exposures of the Japanese, and they found that bladder and lung rose statistically higher than they had expected.

DR. NETON: Well, we are very engaged in looking at the BEIR 7 report and have draft models for risk assessments using those parameters, and we're carefully evaluating them, and at such time as, you know, we can validate them properly, we are considering updating the version of IREP, but there are a lot of other issues behind the scenes.

In some cases the risk goes up. In some cases it goes down depending on what population you're looking at. Some of those data were based on looking at mortality data instead of incidence data, which is what we use in this program. So there's a lot of things to consider in doing this.

But the bottom line is we are looking at BEIR 7, and if we believe there's

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appropriate parameters to adopt in our 1 2 models we would, and as usual with this program, any time we make a change, we would 3 go back and reevaluate all the cases that had 4 been previously denied to see what effect they 5 might have on their outcome. 6 7 MS. KLEA: Thank you. And I just wanted to make you aware 8 that I'm a survivor of bladder cancer, and all 9 10 the new cancers are being diagnosed even with the reactor operators. Everyone had bladder 11 cancer, all of the survivors. 12 13 DR. NETON: Thank you for that 14 comment. 15 MR. BERONJA: Well, you know what? 16 I guess the only thing I'd say, we might be able to finish this up in the next half an 17 hour unless there's a lot of other issues that 18 19 people want to keep going and try and do that. I'll leave it up to you all. 20 MEMBER MUNN: We have to go through 21 our little exercise with what next and then 22

2	MR. BERONJA: Okay, okay.
3	MEMBER MUNN: And we have
4	housekeeping issues to deal with.
5	MR. BERONJA: Okay.
6	MR. KATZ: And we'll need to come
7	up with recommendations for the class that car
8	be recommended to the full Board at the next
9	meeting.
10	MR. BERONJA: Okay.
11	MEMBER MUNN: Lunch.
12	(Laughter.)
13	MS. KLEA: And when did you say the
14	telephone participants would be able to ask
15	questions?
16	MR. KATZ: There is no public
17	comment session, although as you note you've
18	been free to comment all along and you'll be
19	free to comment some more when we reconvene,
20	Bonnie.
21	MS. KLEA: Okay.
22	MR. KATZ: But so it's 12:30 now,

next.

1	and it will probably be at least 45 minutes
2	for lunch. Is that good? Maybe an hour. So
3	in any event, probably 45, 50 minutes we'll
4	reconnect the phone, okay, for everyone on the
5	phone.
6	MS. KLEA: Thank you.
7	MR. KATZ: And thanks for
8	attending. We'll hear you after lunch.
9	MS. KLEA: Have a nice lunch.
10	MR. KATZ: Thank you. Bye-bye.
11	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
12	matter went off the record at 12:30 p.m. and
13	resumed at 1:30 p.m.)
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1	AFTERNOON SESSION
2	(1:37 p.m.)
3	MR. KATZ: Good afternoon. This is
4	Ted Katz with the Santa Susana Work Group of
5	the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker
6	Health, and we are reconvening after a lunch
7	break.
8	And let me just check the phone
9	lines to see if we have some people with us.
10	Bonnie Klea, are you back with us?
11	MS. KLEA: Yes, I am. Bonnie Klea,
12	petitioner.
13	MR. KATZ: That's great.
14	Do we need to check on anyone else?
15	I think that's really we're okay.
16	MEMBER BEACH: You might see if
17	Mark is on there.
18	MR. KATZ: Mark, well, I wasn't
19	really expecting him, but Mark Griffin?
20	MEMBER BEACH: Oh, I thought you
21	were.
22	MR. KATZ: Okav. No Board members?

1	MS. ADAMS: Ted, Mark hasn't been
2	on the call at all today.
3	MR. KATZ: No, I know that. He
4	thought he might possibly join us for a couple
5	hours, but that's why I was asking.
6	MS. ADAMS: Okay.
7	MR. KATZ: Okay. Mike.
8	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Okay. Greg, do
9	you want to pick back up where we left off?
LO	MR. BERONJA: I am. I think we're
L1	really on the final issues that SC&A had
L2	related to the SEC petition, and the first one
L3	is actually involving external doses, and I
L4	guess two issues to discuss, maybe an external
L5	co-worker model, as well as just a discussion
L6	on the neutron dose. I don't know if you guys
L7	want to talk about those.
L8	DR. HUGHES: With regards to the
L9	external co-worker model, it has actually been
20	completed, and it is currently being reviewed.
21	It has not been issued yet, but it should be
22	issued within the next month, I think.

2	co-worker model what was analyzed is over
3	40,000 data points, and the date range is from
4	the beginning of the covered period through
5	1999, and it was determined that there were
6	over 5,000 individuals that were monitored for
7	external radiation exposure over the
8	operational period.
9	MEMBER BEACH: What year did that
10	start? I missed it.
11	DR. HUGHES: The co-worker model is
12	actually based on the epidemiological study
13	data that actually starts in 1948, but it's
14	for all of the four sites.
15	MEMBER BEACH: Okay.
16	DR. HUGHES: So we have '49 to 1999
17	that we have actually co-worker data on for
18	external exposure.
19	MEMBER BEACH: Thanks.
20	MS. KLEA: Is that to worker death
21	study?
22	DR. HUGHES: It's the

In order to develop the external

1	epidemiological study by Boice, yes.
2	MS. KLEA: Well, of course, you
3	know that I've objected to using that study
4	when we had the UCLA study.
5	DR. HUGHES: Well, the data that
6	both studies are based on is essentially the
7	same. The only difference is that Boice
8	scanned all of the data into a database, and
9	that is what we used because we don't have to
LO	we didn't want to go back and scan every
11	record again just because it would take a very
12	long time.
13	MS. KLEA: Okay.
L4	MEMBER MUNN: So to clarify, you're
15	using the data, not the Boice study itself.
L6	DR. HUGHES: No, we're using the
L7	data. That's correct.
L8	MEMBER MUNN: Yes.
L9	DR. HUGHES: We don't rely on any
20	conclusions they might have drawn or anything.
21	It's just the data that was scanned from the
22	worker files

1	MEMBER MUNN: Thank you.
2	MR. BERONJA: Anything else on the
3	neutron dose that you want to do?
4	DR. HUGHES: It's still being
5	reassessed. We don't have anything else to
6	report at the moment, and it will be
7	reassessed during the TBD revision.
8	MR. BERONJA: John, is there
9	anything that you have to add related to that
10	issue?
11	DR. MAURO: Oh, no.
12	MR. BERONJA: I mean just on that.
13	DR. MAURO: With regard to neutron,
14	just for my own information, are you leaning
15	toward utilizing neutron-photon ratios or do
16	you have some kind of calibration of knowing
17	what the neutron energy flux was and,
18	therefore, you can use the NTA film and then
19	make adjustment factors to it based on
20	knowledge of the energy distribution? Which
21	strategy looks like it's unfolding?
22	DR. HUGHES: I don't think we've

1	gotten to the point where we can say. We
2	brought it up in this evaluation report that
3	we could look into the photon-neutron ratio,
4	but I'm afraid I would have to get back to you
5	on that.
6	DR. MAURO: I just was curious.
7	DR. HUGHES: Yes.
8	DR. NETON: It's an option. It's
9	definitely an option that we have available.
10	DR. BEHLING: This is Hans.
11	I guess one of the things that was
12	raised in one of the findings was the issue of
13	thermal neutrons because the TBD states that
14	people were monitored for both fast and
15	thermal neutrons. Has that been resolved?
16	Because it's my understanding based
17	on the evidence that I've seen that the
18	ability to monitor for thermal neutrons didn't
19	exist.
20	MEMBER MUNN: I think that's what
21	we're discussing right now, Hans. I had
22	thought that's what we were discussing.

Specifically, the workers were unlikely to have been monitored for thermal neutrons was the wording that I think we were addressing, right?

MR. BERONJA: Okay. Actually that really covers the issues that we have. I guess maybe just to summarize some of the things, and this might not be a complete list. I'm going to go through this again.

As far as action items or things that I think we're going to see coming from NIOSH, kind of to follow up, I have, you know, a re-look at the years 1953 and 1954 to determine if there are any nuclear activities there could have been some exposure. There's a study that they've actually selected contractor, are in negotiations on sodium reactor experiment, and there's going to be an independent study done there. internal co-worker model is being developed where the sodium burn pit has also been addressed or at least a method of addressing

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that.

A tritium report is being prepared to just, I think, demonstrate or document the likely exposure there. I think Jim mentioned to take a relook at the environmental exposures, the applications since 1971 through later to earlier periods to determine if that's still the way that they want to go there.

And the last thing we have heard is this -- well, a couple of things. The external co-worker model is done, and it is going to be released in about a month, and then also relooking at the neutron dose is being evaluated again.

So I think those are the main things that I have as far as potential action items on things that we'll say. Again, I think maybe just in conclusion, you know, from our perspective, you know, I think we concur with NIOSH's thoughts as far as the 1958 and before period, and you know, we think things

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1	are still a little bit soft, and you're
2	welcome to look at other data in '59 and the
3	early '60s.
4	And then I think you are just
5	welcome to look at any other information
6	that's being generated.
7	DR. MAURO: I'm operating under the
8	assumption that we don't have any action items
9	right now. We will wait to hear from the work
10	group and then Ted to confirm when such action
11	items are triggered.
12	MR. BERONJA: Sure.
13	DR. MAURO: But right now we sit
14	and wait.
15	MR. BERONJA: Right.
16	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Jim, when do you
17	think you guys will have a final decision on
18	whether you're going to modify the definition
19	of co-workers?
20	DR. NETON: That's a good question.
21	I think we can resolve that issue in the next
22	week or so.

CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Because I think as far as me personally -- and it's up to the rest of the work group. I could be outnumbered here -- but at least until we get that I don't think I would recommend anything as far as this SEC as it sits.

DR. NETON: I guess what I'd be willing to commit to is that once we do decide, we certainly would let you know and the rest of the working group that that's a change in our position if that's the case.

CHAIRMAN GIBSON: I mean, I'm not trying to say that's the only issue that we're concerned about. Obviously potentially --

MR. KATZ: If you can draw -- I mean, that's just a question of where the start date begins for that, but you can draw up your recommendations to the full Board without knowing for a week or two what the start date is. I mean, it's not going to change any of the facts on the ground in terms of --

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1	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Well, see, that's
2	one thing that would at least keep me from
3	making a recommendation, based on what
4	everyone else things, but
5	MR. BERONJA: I'm sorry. I missed
6	it. When you said date, are you talking about
7	the all workers or are you talking about the
8	date?
9	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Well, number one,
10	the all workers. That's what I was asking Jim
11	about, and then I clarified that to say that's
12	not the only issue.
13	DR. NETON: I'm just trying to
14	figure out in my mind like let's say that we
15	did decide that it was going to be all worker
16	position. What's the mechanism then forward?
17	How are we entertained to get this thing
18	moving, to get the SEC?
19	I guess we would have to issue an
20	advised addendum to the evaluation. That's
21	what we would do, issue to you, and then the

Board through the working group could take it

1	up at their discretion. Because we have
2	already presented the evaluation before. We
3	did the addendum. I don't want to presume
4	what the Board would do with that. I mean, it
5	would be nice to get this class moving forward
6	if everyone was in agreement that was the
7	case.
8	MEMBER MUNN: It seems a logical
9	approach. The question is one of timing. Is
10	that going to be possible between now and,
11	say, the full Board's meeting in Cincinnati?
12	DR. NETON: Oh, in Cincinnati? I
13	would think so, yes. I thought you were going
14	to say in Amarillo. That would be pretty
15	MEMBER MUNN: I can't imagine that
16	you could do it between now and Amarillo.
17	DR. NETON: It's possible.
18	MR. BERONJA: Is that the end of
19	May?
20	MEMBER MUNN: That's only three and
21	a half weeks away.
22	DR. NETON: It depends on how

1	quickly we make this decision, I guess. If we
2	can get this out next week some time, I don't
3	want to speak for others that have to make
4	some decisions in light of what all the other
5	things are going on and prepare for the next
6	Board meeting. I don't want to prejudge, but
7	certainly I think by the Cincinnati meeting.
8	If not, maybe a Board working group call,
9	although I don't think SEC has been really
10	dealt with in a final vote on a Board call.
11	MEMBER MUNN: It's hard to do on a
12	Board call.
13	MR. KATZ: Well, I mean, I think
14	generally they're done face to face unless
15	it's just a complete non-issue.
16	DR. NETON: One of the messier
17	issues, this is a little messier than some of
18	the ones where we've said we want to add this
19	class and are reserving the rest of the
20	period. This would be sort of a carving out
21	of a current evaluation.

I'm not sure how we've ever dealt

with that. We must have dealt with it.

MR. KATZ: It's not a problem at all for the Board to go forward with a class that's covered. It's done it a number of times where it has gone forward with a recommendation for a portion of the SEC evaluation. It's not a problem at all.

I guess I would just suggest that this working group -- I mean, you can sort of -- you understand what the contingency is.

OCAS may not get through with this work in time for the Board meeting, but anticipating that it's possible they would, I mean, you could come to a conclusion as to say OCAS comes through with a conclusion that it really should be all workers, but it's for the period up to '58 is a definite go.

I mean, this work group could come up with a decision that, well, we support the recommendation up to '58 for all workers. You could come up with that conclusion now for that contingency, and then if this does go

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1	through, you know, like a greased pig and it's
2	there, then when the Board meets in Amarillo,
3	the Board could actually make a decision and
4	at least some of these claimants could get
5	paid, I mean, as opposed to waiting.
6	MS. KLEA: Does anyone know the
7	number we're talking about of claimants?
8	DR. NETON: No. Well, maybe Lara
9	does. I don't know.
10	DR. HUGHES: The current proposed
11	class that we limit it to monitored workers,
12	we're talking about ten claims, and the
13	numbers of claims if we included all workers,
14	we're talking about 37 claims. That would be
15	people with SEC cancers and required work
16	period.
17	DR. NETON: Between '53 and '58,
18	yes.
19	DR. HUGHES: Yes.
20	MR. KATZ: I would just make the
21	point that whether it's ten or 37, it's ten or
22	37 people that get compensated months sooner

1	if there's Board action.
2	MR. BERONJA: So you're saying I
3	could go ahead and do this proposal even no
4	matter what NIOSH does as far as
5	MR. KATZ: I mean this would be
6	just a contingent recommendation. If NIOSH
7	determines that it's all workers, then this
8	working group supports that recommendation.
9	DR. MAURO: And would make a move
LO	on the front end and then the back would catch
L1	up later.
L2	MR. KATZ: Right. That's just an
L3	option. I'm saying that's an option.
L4	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Some of the rest
L5	study, Wanda, Phil, Josie?
L6	MEMBER MUNN: This is difficult
L7	because SEC is limited in area more than
L8	anything else, and it seems to be impossible
L9	to limit workers who were assigned to this
20	area as opposed to workers who were present in
21	the area at one time or another.

So if you say all workers and

1	you're talking about all workers encompassing
2	only those whose work site was Area 4, then
3	that's an easy task for us to debate here and
4	deliberate.
5	If you're saying all workers with
6	the assertion that that means all workers who
7	had access or who were likely to have been for
8	brief periods of time in Area 4, then you have
9	another issue entirely.
10	So I'd want to be very clear about
11	exactly what you mean when you say "all
12	workers."
13	DR. NETON: This would have the
14	same caveat or proviso as almost all of our
15	other definitions, which is the requirement
16	for a 250 day work duration in Area 4.
17	MEMBER MUNN: Specifically at Area
18	4. So it
19	DR. NETON: Or an aggregate with
20	other SECs, but yes.
21	MEMBER MUNN: So anyone who worked
22	in one of the adjacent facilities, even though

they may have far more than 250 work days in 1 2 the aggregate, if they were not assigned in Area 4, they would not be compensated under 3 this particular SEC. 4 DR. NETON: That's correct. 5 MEMBER MUNN: Correct? 6 7 CHAIRMAN GIBSON: And are their employment records sufficient enough 8 document workers who may have had a home base 9 10 outside Area 4 and was assigned to Area 4? Well, all I can say DR. NETON: 11 there is that we vet these class definitions 12 13 through the Department of Labor, and they were comfortable with the way we worded it here 14 15 saying all workers who were monitored for Area 16 4. So somehow they must have felt they were capable to segregate or delineate the area for 17 workers. 18 19 MEMBER MUNN: However, they were about people who were monitored in 20 talking If we're going to say all workers in 21

then that's a different question,

Area 4,

2	DR. NETON: Well, but it still it
3	seems to me to be the same evaluation process.
4	I mean, it's a two step. It has got to be
5	monitored and be an Area 4. Now we're just
6	saying forget the monitoring. You've just got
7	to work in Area 4.
8	MEMBER MUNN: Yes.
9	MEMBER BEACH: Yes, and have proof
10	of working in Area 4.
11	DR. NETON: Well, they had to do
12	that anyway under the original definition.
13	They also had to have proof that they were
14	monitored. So it's a little less restrictive
15	or is less restrictive.
16	MEMBER MUNN: Our terminology was
17	always monitored or should have beer
18	monitored.
19	MEMBER BEACH: Should have been,
20	right.
21	MEMBER MUNN: And so I guess my
22	real question is whether the Department of

right, Mike?

1 Labor definition is specific enough to be able
2 to make the Board's usual recommendation in
3 the same way.
DR. NETON: Well, we have gone away
from monitored or should have been monitored
6 for several SECs now. In fact, it was too
7 difficult for the Department of Labor to
8 determine who was monitored or should have
been monitored even with our advice, and so to
work around that issue we have decided for
most SECs now to drop that designation and
just say all workers. It's much more readily
implemented by the Department of Labor.
MS. KLEA: And who's speaking?
DR. NETON: This is Jim Neton.
MS. KLEA: Okay. Thank you, Jim.
DR. NETON: So I suspect that they
would be quite okay with this definition if it
were to become it's the easiest class for
them to administer when they have already
decided who is an Area 4 worker because they

sent cases to us, and so, in fact, it really

1	would be just the cases that we have in our
2	possession that are listed as Area 4
3	claimants. It has already been essentially
4	decided now that I think about it.
5	I mean, we have those cases in our
6	possession. We have a pick list in our
7	computer programs on which site did you come
8	from. It's checked.
9	MR. BERONJA: Jim, just to clarify,
10	I think you've did say '53 and '54, but I
11	don't think you really meant that. Did you
12	really mean '55 through '58?
13	DR. NETON: Yes, yes.
14	MR. BERONJA: I just wanted to
15	clarify that.
16	MEMBER MUNN: Yes, that was the
17	other clarification I was looking at.
18	MR. BERONJA: Okay, yes.
19	MEMBER MUNN: As long as we're very
20	specific about what workers are covered when
21	we say "all workers" and as long as we're
22	specific about the time frame that we're going

1	to place before the Board, I have no objection
2	to our doing it with the caveat that NIOSH
3	will complete the study that's being done, and
4	we're assuming that there will be no
5	unexpected consequences from that that would
6	cause us to change our mind.
7	I have no objection to offering
8	that to the Board.
9	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Phil? Jim?
10	MEMBER BEACH: I am more
11	comfortable with the definition changing and
12	also bringing that to the Board once we know
13	that the definition has changed. I hesitate
14	to wait because I don't know how long it's
15	going to take to clarify those additional
16	years after '58 till '52 I think is what we
17	were talking about.
18	MR. BERONJA: '53, '54?
19	DR. NETON: Yes. That would take
20	some time because we would
21	MEMBER BEACH: And I hate to wait.
22	DR. NETON: I mean, we may be able

to decide if we did find additional information. We would have to send that on to the Department of Energy, and they would have to review it and they typically don't just turn it around quickly. They'll do their own investigation.

On top of that, also I think it seems to me after our discussions today the exposures after '58 through '59, it's going to take some time for us to flesh out the rest of these technical issues based on what we talked about today, developing a co-worker model where internal is not going to be short term. So I'd be happy to say let's just bump it all together if I felt we could get this done in a month or two, but I suspect that's not going to happen.

MEMBER SCHOFIELD: I agree with that Josie said, but once that definition changes, they may. I think that comports with that recommendation.

DR. MAURO: Is there agreement that

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1	if that doesn't happen, even the definition
2	from, you know, monitoring, should be
3	monitored, right on the way it's worded, it
4	sounds like that, correct, that you agree
5	that's certainly at a minimum what would be
6	recommended by the working group but may even
7	be expanded beyond that if between that time
8	period you're able to modify the evaluation
9	report and its recommendations to use the
10	language "all workers"? Then, of course, that
11	would expand the definition of the class.
12	But right now at a minimum am I
13	correct there's agreement that at a minimum
14	the recommendation would be for the definition
15	f classes that you have right now.
16	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: One question I
17	DR. MAURO: I don't know if I heard
18	that.
19	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: What I'm saying
20	right now is personally and it's just my
21	opinion I would not make that

recommendation.

1	DR. MAURO: You would not. See, I
2	wasn't sure. I was following the
3	conversation, and I wasn't exactly sure what
4	was decided on.
5	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: That's one area
6	that can be fixed it seems like fairly easily
7	if NIOSH decides to do that, and that's one
8	area that's not going to muddy up the water.
9	MR. BERONJA: One question that I
10	have, and I haven't been through these like
11	you guys have, but can the Board go through
12	and say we want it to be all workers no matter
13	what NIOSH has put in the evaluation report?
14	I mean, so you can go forward with
15	that and then if Jim disagrees, you know,
16	after a full Board meeting, I don't know how
17	that works.
18	DR. NETON: It's NIOSH's
19	preference, at least my preference, that we
20	sort of agree on these. If we are in
21	agreement it's much easier, I think. The

process is much smoother.

1	MEMBER MUNN: So clarifying again,
2	one more time, all workers, Area 4, years '55
3	through '58, calendar years '55 through '58,
4	correct? And the caveat will be worded how?
5	MEMBER BEACH: Were monitored or
6	should have been.
7	MEMBER MUNN: No, that's not the
8	caveat. No, the caveat has to do with
9	cleaning up the additional information that
10	NIOSH is putting together. If anything comes
11	out of that.
12	DR. NETON: No, I don't expect that
13	by this Board meeting we would have we
14	don't control the time frame for when the
15	additional years might be added.
16	MEMBER MUNN: I understand, but
17	that's what I'm trying to identify. We
18	started off talking about the caveat is if
19	everything that you finish up whenever you
20	finish up does not cause any disagreement with
21	what we've discussed here today and talking

making the change, then our recommendation is

go for it.

MR. KATZ: Just let me clarify. The contingency that's being talked about here is whether or not it's all workers or just monitored workers. That's the only contingency that Jim is saying possibly could get involved in time for the next Board meeting. The question of whether it's all workers or just monitored workers within the scope of their add recommendation.

MEMBER MUNN: Because the current SEC says monitored.

MR. KATZ: Because the current, as it's written now, it says monitored, but Jim is indicating that it is possible that would be switched to all workers before this upcoming Board meeting. That's the only thing on the table as a contingency for the upcoming Board meeting.

CHAIRMAN GIBSON: The reports and stuff, we just need to know about them in order to schedule our next meeting. Okay. So

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1	that's settled. Glad to see that happen.
2	MR. KATZ: So the settled is then
3	that there is not a recommendation from the
4	work group at this point.
5	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: At this point,
6	correct.
7	MR. KATZ: Okay. Well, then there
8	will not be a work group meeting before the
9	Board meeting.
10	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: No, I understand
11	that, but even through a call between the sub-
12	corporate members, if this language comes out
13	prior to Amarillo, they may have a
14	recommendation for the Board.
15	MR. KATZ: I mean, you have to have
16	a work group meeting to come up with a
17	recommendation.
18	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Can't you get on
19	the phone?
20	MR. KATZ: Well, if you had a
21	schedule work group meeting, but I mean, given
22	the amount of time that's left, that's

1	MEMBER MUNN: We essentially can't
2	do it.
3	MR. KATZ: It will be hard to do.
4	I mean, I guess if you're talking about, you
5	know, a 30 minute call, I guess, or 15 minute
6	call, I guess it's possible.
7	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Well, yes, that's
8	all I'm talking about, yes.
9	MEMBER MUNN: My understanding was
10	that what Ted had suggested and what I thought
11	we were agreed to as we went around the table
12	was what I was just clarifying, that we would
13	recommend, that our group would recommend to
14	the Board at the Amarillo meeting that the SEC
15	covering all workers at Area 4 from the years
16	1955 through 1958 would be accepted as a
17	special exposure cohort. That's what I
18	thought we were going to say.
19	Given the fact that NIOSH is still
20	looking at other years as possibilities, but
21	our recommendation for those years will be
22	MR. BERONJA: Well, I think it's

based on Jim relooking at the all workers 1 2 issue, is the only thing that --DR. NETON: Ιf NIOSH issues a 3 4 report, I think Ted is suggesting maybe the working group could pre-agree that if 5 6 report came out, it would be the 7 recommendation at this meeting. CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Just the change 8 on monitored workers to all workers. 9 10 MEMBER MUNN: Yes, but if we can agree to that here today, then we can make 11 that recommendation to the Board, and the only 12 would hold 13 thing then that the final completion of that particular SEC would be the 14 15 release of the NIOSH report. The date the 16 NIOSH report is released, unless it something contrary to all workers, then it's 17 done. 18 19 DR. MAURO: One problem we're going to continue to see a recommendation -- and 20

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that's what I'm here; it's conditional -- is

what does the Board do. If they can't act on

21

1	it, then we can say we were granted
2	DR. NETON: No. If the report
3	comes out, then the working group would have
4	the authority to say
5	DR. MAURO: Oh, I see. I thought
6	it might come out after the
7	DR. NETON: No, no.
8	MR. KATZ: It would be a
9	conditional recommendation.
10	DR. MAURO: Got it. Now it works.
11	MR. KATZ: And the one thing I
12	would just say about the idea of having
13	another conference call for 15 minutes or what
14	it would be to wait for this report, it's
15	going to cost us \$5,000 in the transcription
16	fee for that five minute call to say, "Okay.
17	It's out. We agree."
18	I mean, if you make the
19	recommendation conditionally now, it's no
20	different, but it's free because we're already
21	here.

Now, I would hate to spend \$5,000

1	just to wait and see it when there's no new
2	information. I mean, you have all of the
3	information in front of you now to make this
4	judgment, understanding it's conditional, and
5	the record is very clear at this point that
6	it's conditional.
7	MEMBER MUNN: And if the stars
8	align so that that report can, in fact, be
9	available at Amarillo, then it's a moot point.
10	DR. MAURO: Is that what we've got
11	here?
12	MR. KATZ: If the report is
13	available, then your conditional
14	recommendation goes into effect, and the Board
15	has a new report from NIOSH, and it has a
16	recommendation from this working group, and
17	then the Board can take it up and add that
18	small piece of this petition to the cohort if
19	it decides there's a hole, that that's what it
20	should do.
21	DR. NETON: And if it doesn't come
22	out before the Board meeting, then you need no

1	action.
2	MR. KATZ: It just waits, just as
3	it would now. It would just wait till the
4	next Board meeting.
5	MEMBER MUNN: We are waiting.
6	MR. KATZ: So it just needs
7	confirmation of this work group as to what you
8	want to do.
9	MEMBER MUNN: I would suggest we do
10	that.
11	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: It's done.
12	MEMBER BEACH: I agree.
13	MEMBER SCHOFIELD: I agree.
14	MR. KATZ: Let the record show it's
15	unanimous.
16	DR. NETON: And we'll do our best
17	to get this report out as soon as possible. I
18	can't speak for the people who have to revise
19	it. It seems simple on the surface, which it
20	probably is, but there's a queue for these
21	things to go through.

MUNN:

MEMBER

22

There's always

1	somebody in the details.
2	MR. KATZ: Bonnie?
3	MS. KLEA: Yes.
4	MR. KATZ: I just want this to be -
5	- I imagine this is all clear to you at this
6	point. Yes?
7	MS. KLEA: Yes, it is clear to me,
8	and I've seen many other SECs that have the
9	early years passed and then there was
10	continuing work to include, you know, more
11	years.
12	Now, my petition has been approved
13	through 1965, and I would like to see the work
14	go forward on those years also because really
15	from '58 to '59, what really changed? You
16	didn't have records and then you did have
17	records.
18	So I would like to see the early
19	year get passed until Mike knows a reason why
20	it shouldn't, but only if all workers are
21	going to be covered.

KATZ:

So

that

MR.

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is the

1	recommendation of this work group. It's for
2	all workers, Bonnie, and I just want to make
3	certain this is clear for you because this
4	petition is not actually on the agenda for
5	this upcoming Board meeting. So it's
6	particularly important that you're aware that
7	this could come up at this Board meeting.
8	MS. KLEA: Okay. So are we going
9	to wait until May to have a final decision on
10	this?
11	MR. KATZ: So the Board, yes, the
12	full Board is meeting in May, the 12th and the
13	13th, and you know, I can't tell you where on
14	the agenda this would fall, whether it's on
15	the 12th or the 13th, but it would fall on one
16	of those days. It will only be taken up
17	though if NIOSH gets this report out, this
18	addendum out, and we would certainly get you
19	notification of that as well.
20	MS. KLEA: Okay.
21	MR. KATZ: So you would know.
22	MS. KLEA: All right. So I'll let

1	Mike, since he's the head of the work group,
2	you know, make the final decision.
3	MR. KATZ: The work group has voted
4	already
5	MS. KLEA: Oh, okay.
6	MR. KATZ: to make this
7	recommendation. So they want to go forward if
8	they can.
9	MS. KLEA: All right. Well, it's
10	something.
11	MR. KATZ: Yes. I think that's
12	good.
13	MR. BERONJA: I imagine there's
14	other SECs being discussed.
15	MR. KATZ: It's dwindling.
16	MR. BERONJA: Oh, is that right?
17	MR. KATZ: There's definitely room
18	on the agenda for this. That's a good thing.
19	MS. KLEA: Okay. As long as you
20	don't forget the rest of the years, you know.
21	MR. KATZ: Absolutely, Bonnie.
22	Everybody here recognizes that there's a lot

of work left to do for the rest of the years.

MS. KLEA: And like I said, I have new witnesses here, and I hope that SC&A gets back out here. I have witnesses from the SRE, lots of witnesses. I also have a witness from the Owensmouth facility at Canoga. Now, I know we're working on Area 4, but I submitted evidence to SC&A of a huge nuclear accident there in July of 1958, and all of the workers, 45 of them, were put under lifetime secrecy. So that's something else I want to bring up.

At the same time we lost a reactor.

Okay? They were running a L-47 reactor, and at that same time period when we had this recorded accident, L-47 reactor was never heard of again, and when the NRC came out to find out what happened to it, no one knew where it was or what happened to it.

So you know, we have the lifetime secrecy problem of not having data.

MEMBER MUNN: It's pretty hard to lose a reactor.

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MS. KLEA: Well, this was a small one. It was actually very small, and it's was -- it's gone.

MEMBER MUNN: Yes, but whenever a reactor goes away, it's like an old song. The memory remains and so does a very definite signature in terms of radiological leavings, that it's pretty hard to just move a reactor and have it disappear.

Well, this MS. KLEA: It was like a great big, huge popcorn small. It was a small training reactor, L-47, and when the accident happened at Canoga, the AEC ran in screaming, you know, "We're all crapped up," which slang for was а contaminated, and when they tested the roof of the building and outside in the roads and the dirt, everything was hot, and then the workers were all forced to sign lifetime secrecy. don't know what happened there.

MEMBER MUNN: NRC had them sign secrecy --

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1	MS. KLEA: It was the AEC.
2	MEMBER MUNN: AEC.
3	MS. KLEA: Required lifetime
4	secrecy, and then the NRC came out to find out
5	what happened to the reactor and they could
6	find no records, and the U.S. Army Corps of
7	Engineers found high levels of radiation in
8	the groundwater underneath that Vanowen
9	Building.
10	So, you know, woman's instinct just
11	tells me that there might have been a
12	correlation between that lost small reactor
13	and a large accident at Vanowen in July of
14	1958.
15	MR. KATZ: Bonnie, you know, if you
16	have new information, any new information,
17	interviews, et cetera, that you want to submit
18	the door is always open on that.
19	MS. KLEA: No, I've already
20	submitted the notebook. I have a worker who
21	was at Vanowen when this happened, and he put
22	together a huge notebook, and I copied it all

and I sent it to SC&A. So that's already in your possession.

But I have new workers that I've found, and I wish you could come back out and interview them.

MR. KATZ: And information that's submitted to SC&A typically gets shared then with OCAS.

DR. MAURO: Yes, we would have it.

MS. KLEA: Okay. Well, that's the [Identifying Information Redacted] case, and I was on a conference call yesterday with a worker who was in Vanowen at that time, and he died in 1963 of Hodgkin's. So I told that interviewer about that accident, and that was new information, and my question on this interview is why is NIOSH processing claims for cancers that are not covered. Hodgkin's is not a covered cancer. Yet it has gone through the processing. It has gone through dose reconstruction.

DR. NETON: Bonnie, this is Jim

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Neton.

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Hodgkin's lymphoma is a covered -all cancers are covered under this program for
dose reconstruction with the exception of
chronic lymphocytic leukemia. What you might
be thinking of is the presumptive cancer list,
which Hodgkin's lymphoma is not one of the
presumptive cancers.

MS. KLEA: So as far as you know, would Hodgkin's disease be covered?

DR. NETON: Hodgkin's lymphoma is a covered condition, a covered cancer that we would reconstruct a dose for to develop a probability of causation for the Department of Labor.

MR. KATZ: Bonnie, it's covered if reconstruction for you have а dose that. individual. if Tt's not. covered the individual is in the special exposure cohort and it would be compensated that way. would not be compensated as a member of the special exposure cohort with that cancer.

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1	MS. KLEA: Okay. Well, now this
2	claim doesn't show Hodgkin's lymphoma. It
3	says Hodgkin's disease.
4	DR. NETON: Well, that's the same
5	thing.
6	MS. KLEA: Okay. So good. That's
7	good for the family. So you're saying
8	Hodgkin's is covered.
9	DR. NETON: Yes.
LO	MR. KATZ: Covered for dose
L1	reconstructions.
L2	MS. KLEA: Okay, and so he was
L3	there at Vanowen when they had that large
L4	accident, and I just met with the family last
L5	weekend and told them about and showed them
L6	the notebook of information I have. So that
L7	was new data.
L8	MEMBER MUNN: That information
L9	needs to be a part of his claim, correct?
20	MS. KLEA: Well, that's exactly
21	what I did on the conference call yesterday,
22	and I told him, I told the interviewer who is

1	from Cincinnati. I said I've already sent in
2	a witness testimony to SC&A. This man is
3	[Identifying Information Redacted] now, but he
4	put everything in writing. He had names and
5	addresses and phone numbers of all the 45
6	people who had to sign lifetime secrecy, and
7	before he died it was his goal in life that
8	these families should get compensated if their
9	husbands died of cancer.
10	MR. KATZ: Can I just say something
11	at this point about this conversation?
12	MS. KLEA: Excuse me?
13	MR. KATZ: This is Ted again.
14	MS. KLEA: Okay.
15	MR. KATZ: We should be careful. I
16	mean, I know people from the public can say
17	what they want on these calls, but this,
18	you're giving a lot of details. You're
19	getting into more details now about
20	individuals, and we try to protect the privacy
21	of individuals.

MS. KLEA: Oh, okay. Exactly. I

1	shouldn't say any names. Okay.
2	MR. KATZ: So it's fine to talk
3	about the general situation, but
4	MS. KLEA: Okay. Is this going to
5	be recorded and be on the Internet later?
6	MR. KATZ: Yes, there will be a
7	transcript, yes, of this working group
8	meeting.
9	MS. KLEA: Oh, okay. So you'll
LO	probably take that out.
L1	MR. KATZ: Yes, we'll certainly
L2	redact anything that might lead somebody to
L3	identifying an individual, yes.
L4	MS. KLEA: Okay. Great.
L5	DR. MAURO: Question. The matter
L6	of interviews, records of interviews that did
L7	not make it into a work product. That's still
L8	something that's going through the clearance
L9	process. So I think by setting the landscape
20	of the situation, it is that whatever material
21	has been compiled usually is in years, and

that always lags behind our work products.

1	Right now our plan is to continue
2	to finish that up, get it cleared, get a
3	computer clearance, get it into the full Board
4	and NIOSH as the rest of our deliverable as
5	these always lag behind. They just have to.
6	The degree to which the notebook
7	that reference was made to is part of that, I
8	can't speak to that right now.
9	MR. BERONJA: I don't know if it
10	went to Kathy or where it went.
11	MS. KLEA: It went to Kathy.
12	DR. MAURO: It went to Kathy. So
13	then it will be captured there, but right now
14	other than putting out that word product and
15	making an addendum to our report as an
16	attachment, which those are, there is no other
17	action item in this statement.
18	MR. BERONJA: I think that's right.
19	I think my priority would be to wait and see
20	the information that comes from NIOSH for all
21	of this information that we've talked about.

If we determine based on any additional stuff

1	Kathy gets and it makes sense to go out and do
2	interviews to help us come to that, we would,
3	but otherwise we may not just if we have
4	sufficient information.
5	DR. MAURO: But the sequence though
6	is that we do have to finish up the attachment
7	that has to do with interviews.
8	MR. BERONJA: Yes.
9	DR. MAURO: That's moving through.
10	We're doing that without any direction.
11	Anything else over and above that, that might
12	be appropriate and needed, we don't have until
13	we're given direction by the work group.
14	MR. KATZ: Right, but if something
15	new comes to light from the information that
16	Kathy is pulling together
17	DR. MAURO: Yes.
18	MR. KATZ: you would, of course,
19	report that out.
20	DR. MAURO: Oh, sure. We'll report
21	it out, but we won't act on it until we're
22	directed to do so.

1	MS. KLEA: Do you have a paper
2	review of the SEC that I could get a copy of?
3	MR. BERONJA: What we call a paper
4	study actually is on the Web, the January
5	version of the paper study, Bonnie.
6	MS. KLEA: How many pages is that?
7	MR. BERONJA: It's about 50 pages.
8	MS. KLEA: Oh, dear. Could
9	somebody send me out a hard copy?
10	MR. KATZ: Yes, absolutely, Bonnie.
11	Ordinarily these get sent out automatically
12	to the petitioners, don't they? Or maybe not.
13	Okay. Well, we will certainly get
14	that out to you. I think the final report is
15	in Privacy Act review.
16	MR. BERONJA: That's right. Yes,
17	that's right.
18	DR. MAURO: This is on the paper
19	study.
20	MR. KATZ: Well, I understand. I
21	understand the paper study was already done
22	and it's Privacy Act reviewed. So, Bonnie, we

1	have the final report that's the sort of full-
2	blown report that SC&A has done. It is going
3	through Privacy Act review, and we can get
4	that to you, which would have everything in it
5	as soon as the Privacy Act review is
6	completed, if that makes sense for you.
7	MS. KLEA: Okay. Well, whatever I
8	don't have I want, and
9	MR. KATZ: Okay. We'll get you
10	both.
11	MS. KLEA: matrix.
12	MR. KATZ: We'll get you both, and
13	I don't know if the matrix is Privacy Act
14	cleared or not. It's not.
15	MS. KLEA: Okay. Well, as soon as
16	anything is available, I'd appreciate it
17	coming in the mail and you don't have to send
18	it overnight or anything like that.
19	MR. KATZ: Okay. We'll get those
20	to you.
21	MS. KLEA: I'd appreciate it.
22	DR. NETON: I have a question about

1	the material that was sent to SC&A that we
2	might not have. Did I miss something?
3	MEMBER BEACH: The notebook?
4	DR. NETON: No, not the notebook.
5	There was some
6	DR. HUGHES: The incident it's
7	not really related to
8	DR. NETON: Something about the
9	interview with the claimant that was sent to
10	you. Did I miss something, Bonnie? I thought
11	there was something that SC&A received from
12	you that we might not have a copy of.
13	DR. MAURO: Is that the notebook?
14	MR. BERONJA: Either the notebook
15	or the incident in '58 that
16	MEMBER BEACH: Yes.
17	MS. KLEA: There was a very large
18	incident at the Vanowen Building in July of
19	1958. I've been unable to get anything from
20	DOE on that, but there were 45 men in the
21	sealed development processing group who were
22	in a conference room, and the AEC from the

Wilshire Division came running in down the hallway screaming that we're all crapped up, and tests were ordered of the roof of the building, outside on the road, across the street on the sidewalk, in the pool, and everything was hot, and the AEC made every single worker sign a lifetime secrecy, and I submitted every one of those names.

The person who gave me the notebook is very concerned, that he thinks every one of these workers should automatically be an SEC without going through dose reconstruction, and the person that made the notebook, now, he has been compensated, and he has a dozen different cancers.

But I have three witnesses that are still alive that testified to the same thing, the same large accident, and like I say, at that same time, this small training reactor disappeared and was never ever found again. So you can draw your own conclusions.

And also, I have eyewitness

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1	testimony that in their fuel laboratory at
2	Vanowen they had accidents that were so
3	terrible that the workers broke through the
4	walls. The walls were drywall and they broke
5	through the drywall just to get out of the
6	laboratory.
7	DR. NETON: Okay. I guess my
8	question is does NIOSH have this workbook or
9	whatever.
10	MS. KLEA: I sent it to SC&A.
11	DR. NETON: Right.
12	MS. KLEA: To Kathy DeMers.
13	DR. MAURO: I do see an action item
14	on our file. We've got to get a status report
15	of where our attachment, the interview
16	attachment, and any other supplemental
17	material that was provided to Kathy, where it
18	is right now in the system, and give you folks
19	an update on where that is and make sure, of
20	course it has been our standard.
21	Everything we get you get.

DR. NETON: No, I understand.

1	DR. MAURO: The only reason we have
2	something you don't have, we will get it to
3	you.
4	DR. NETON: That's fine. I just
5	want to make sure. It sounds like it's
6	something we don't have right now.
7	MS. KLEA: I also have a question
8	of missed sites. What about the Atomics
9	International Science Center? I see they're
10	not even listed, you know, as a covered
11	facility, and then we also had Atomics
12	International in Van Nuys in the late '50s.
13	DR. NETON: Well, some of those
14	sites have changed names. I'm not sure.
15	Again, that's a Department of Energy call, not
16	ours, but if you have information that you
17	believe supports the fact that they should be
18	on the list, if you send it to us, we'd be
19	happy to forward it on to the Department of
20	Energy.
21	MS. KLEA: Okay. What would I do,

1	DR. NETON: Yes, that would be
2	fine.
3	MS. KLEA: And who would I send it
4	to?
5	DR. NETON: You can send it to me.
6	MS. KLEA: And who are you?
7	DR. NETON: Jim Neton.
8	MS. KLEA: Jim Neton.
9	DR. NETON: Yes, N-e-t-o-n.
10	MS. KLEA: Okay. Jim, could you
11	send me an E-mail? Do you have my E-mail?
12	Maybe you could send me the address to send
13	the letter to.
14	DR. NETON: Yes, I can do that,
15	sure.
16	MS. KLEA: Okay. Do you have my E-
17	mail?
18	DR. NETON: I'll get it.
19	MS. KLEA: Okay. Thank you. I'd
20	appreciate that. That way I know exactly
21	where I'm mailing it.
22	I have two other facilities that

1	were not even ever mentioned. Well, the
2	Science Center, the Atomics International
3	Science Center, operated out of the De Soto
4	facility until they got too big, and then they
5	came over here and rented space from Thompson
6	Ramo Wooldridge actually two blocks from my
7	house, and they operated there for four years,
8	and that site is now has their own
9	groundwater, and the whole property is
10	radioactively contaminated.
11	I've never read any mention of the
12	Science Center.
13	MEMBER MUNN: That may have
14	something to do with their private side of
15	their operations.
16	DR. NETON: Well, Bonnie, I'm
17	looking at the DOE Website here, and Atomics
18	International is listed as a covered facility,
19	which includes both Los Angeles and Ventura
20	Counties.
21	MS. KLEA: Oh, well, Ventura County

would be the Science Center. Now, it would be

1	Thousands Oaks. Is that?
2	DR. NETON: Oh, I'm sorry. For
3	some reason it only covers a beryllium vendor
4	facility.
5	MS. KLEA: Okay. Well, that's not
6	good enough.
7	DR. NETON: Okay. You believe that
8	there was other material. See, they give
9	workers with radioactive materials.
10	MS. KLEA: Yes, the Science Center
11	was at De Soto. Then they came over here in
12	Canoga Park. That would have been on
13	Fallbrook Avenue, and then in 1964, they
14	relocated and built a new facility in Thousand
15	Oaks.
16	DR. NETON: Canoga is listed here
17	for sure. Well, if you send the information,
18	that would be very helpful, if you sent the
19	work with radioactive materials you believe
20	would qualify as a covered facility.
21	MS. KLEA: Well, I wouldn't know.
22	I wouldn't know what they did because we can

1	get no information whatsoever.
2	DR. NETON: So that's not going to
3	be very helpful then.
4	MS. KLEA: No.
5	DR. NETON: If I can't provide them
6	any additional information, it would just be
7	me sending out a recommendation should be
8	added without any substantiating
9	documentation.
10	MS. KLEA: Well, I don't have it.
11	You can't get substantiating documentation
12	because every workers there also when they
13	left had to sign lifetime secrecy.
14	DR. NETON: Okay. Again, anything
15	that you would have I'd be more than happy to
16	send down, but
17	MS. KLEA: Okay.
18	DR. NETON: it does need to be
19	something that indicates that there was some
20	type of covered activity there under the AEC.
21	MS. KLEA: Okay. Anyway, we'll
22	work on my petition for now.

1	DR. NETON: Okay.
2	MS. KLEA: You know, it's a step at
3	a time.
4	MR. KATZ: Thank you, Bonnie.
5	MS. KLEA: You're welcome.
6	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: So is there
7	anything else? I don't think right now we're
8	in a position to schedule a future meeting.
9	MR. KATZ: We probably need to get
10	a sense of when all of these co-worker
11	MS. KLEA: I have one more
12	question. It was mentioned that Boeing
13	doesn't have a budget to produce data. Is
14	this data on worker claims?
15	MS. KLEA: I have one more
16	question. It was mentioned that Boeing
17	doesn't have a budget to produce data. Is
18	this data on worker claims or is this on site
19	description?
20	DR. NETON: This is providing
21	employee monitoring information.
22	MS. KLEA: Oh, my gosh, how can

1	they do that?
2	DR. NETON: Well, they don't work
3	for free
4	MS. KLEA: Wow.
5	DR. NETON: like most people.
6	MS. KLEA: Okay. What's happening
7	in the other sites? Is DOE paying for the
8	facilities to?
9	DR. NETON: Well, the DOE pays for
10	DOE facilities to provide information to us,
11	and there has been a sort of sporadic missing
12	funds for a while because of various budgetary
13	issues.
14	There's also an issue most recently
15	with personally identified information,
16	whether DOE has put a hold on sending
17	information until they can get encrypted
18	electronic drives to these sites so that the
19	data are adequately protected for the Privacy
20	Act and such. So there's a number of
21	MS. KLEA: Okay. Because I have
22	met and been in touch with several old

1	employees who had cancer maybe, oh, ten years
2	ago, and they're just now filing claims, and
3	so that means that they won't be able to get
4	the records.
5	DR. NETON: Well, I expect this to
6	lift fairly soon. This is not going to be a
7	continuing problem in my estimation.
8	MS. KLEA: Okay.
9	CHAIRMAN GIBSON: Okay. Is there
10	anything else from anyone? If not, I think
11	we're ready to adjourn.
12	MR. KATZ: Thank everybody for all
13	the hard work.
14	MS. KLEA: Thanks, everybody.
15	Bonnie signing off.
16	MR. KATZ: Goodbye, Bonnie.
17	Thanks to everyone else on the
18	line.
19	(Whereupon, the above-entitled
20	matter went off the record at 2:29 p.m.)
21	

# **NEAL R. GROSS**

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