UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

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ADVISORY BOARD ON RADIATION AND WORKER HEALTH

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62nd MEETING

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WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 2009

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The meeting convened at 9:00 a.m. in the Holiday Inn Amarillo Hotel, 1911 I-40 East, Amarillo, Texas, Paul L. Ziemer, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT:

PAUL L. ZIEMER, Chairman

JOSIE M. BEACH, Member

BRADLEY P. CLAWSON, Member

MICHAEL H. GIBSON, Member (via telephone)

MARK GRIFFON, Member

JAMES E. LOCKEY, Member

JAMES MALCOLM MELIUS, Member

WANDA I. MUNN, Member

ROBERT W. PRESLEY, Member

JOHN W. POSTON, SR., Member

GENEVIEVE S. ROESSLER, Member

PHILLIP M. SCHOFIELD, Member

THEODORE M. KATZ, Acting Designated Federal Official

REGISTERED AND/OR PUBLIC COMMENT PARTICIPANTS

ADAMS, NANCY, NIOSH BRADFORD, SHANNON, NIOSH BRITTEN, BRENDA, PANTEX BROOKS, BRITTANY CONNER, A.K., MR. & MRS. ELLIOTT, CATHY FUNK, JOHN GILMORE, KAREN, PFW HAYES, BILL, PANTEX HILL, JR., ALVIN HOWARD, BARBARA HOWELL, EMILY, HHS KLEA, BONNIE KOTSCH, JEFF, DOL LEWIS, MARK, ATL INTL LORD, DAN, IMAGE RAD MAKHIJANI, ARJUN, SC&A MAURO, JOHN, SC&A McCAMPBELL, DAVID, PANTEX MCFEE, MATT, ORAU TEAM McGOLERICK, ROBERT, HHS McGRUEN, BILL, PANTEX MORGAN, SUE, PANTEX PRESLEY, LOUISE S. RAY, SARAH RITTER, ERIN, PANTEX ROLFES, MARK, NIOSH SALAS, RICH, PANTEX SHAW, CARRIE SKINLEY, NORA, THORNBERRY TEICHMANN, PAUL VAUGHN, GLENN, PANTEX WILEY, FLOYD, PANTEX

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

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(9:07 a.m.)

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1 DR. ZIEMER: Good morning, We are ready to begin deliberations 2 the second day of this meeting, 3 on the Radiation 4 Advisory Board on Worker Health meeting in Amarillo, Texas. 5

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We thank everybody for their participation yesterday. I think we made good progress in staying on the agenda schedule.

We also had good phone lines, and we thank the group and the gentlemen who operated the phone lines for us; much better than the last time, and we appreciate that.

Let me ask our designated federal official, Ted Katz, if he has any preliminary comments for us today?

MR. KATZ: Thank you, Dr. Ziemer.

Just a couple of things to note. One, there
is another public comment session this
afternoon. It's from 4:00 to 5:00.

And secondly, for the folks who are listening by telephone, please keep your phones on mute. If you don't have a mute button, use star six to mute it, and if you need to come back on to speak, press star six

again and that will give you the line again for speaking.

Thanks. That's it.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay. I should give my usual reminder that you should register your attendance with us today if you have not already done so. In the foyer there is a registration booklet. Also if any of the members of the public here wish to speak at the public comment session this afternoon, please sign up in the foyer as well.

We begin our session today with a report, an update, from the Nevada Test Site working group, and Mr. Presley, the Work Group Chair, will present that report.

The Chair will just comment, we do have at least one individual conflicted on Nevada, but we have no action item before us on this; this is simply a report from the Work Group. I don't believe the conflicted individuals need to leave the table.

Am I correct on that? Let me ask - is counsel here? Emily, is this considered
part of the debate on the site? No, she has

indicated that this is simply information, and therefore, the conflicted individuals do not need to leave the table.

If a motion were to arise from this that would be different. I don't anticipate that, but who knows what will happen in the course of our deliberations.

MR. PRESLEY:

Okay, let's proceed. Mr. Presley.

Thank you all.

First I'd like to thank Jim and Mark Rolfes for doing the slides. The reason I've been on the road for 12 days now, and talking back and forth, and Jim and Mark have taken my thoughts and the working group's thoughts and put them together and created the presentation that you see today. So I want to thank them. It would have been kind of hard for me to do this on the road.

As you see, the working group consists of myself, as chair; Brad, Wanda, Jim, Phillip, Mark Rolfes is the NIOSH lead, and Arjun is the SC&A.

And I'd also like to thank John Mauro for helping out. John has been very

good on helping out on this.

A little bit about our history. February, 2004, we had an approved NTS site profile that was released by NIOSH.

In December of 2005 SC&A issued a draft review of the site profile.

In the spring of 2006 the working group was formed to review the NTS site profile for accuracy and authenticity.

Things that we were tasked to do as a working group: may make recommendations to the Board for changes in the site profile as appropriate; and the working group should also strive for the development of recommendations to the Board on adding one or more classes to the SEC. And we will get into that later.

Some of the site profile issues; SC&A did their report at our first meeting. They had 25 findings. We started working through these findings. Some findings were determined to be appropriate. Changes to the technical basis document resulted.

Other findings required significant
-- and I do mean significant, because this has

been going on almost four years -- resolutions of differing techniques, positions between NIOSH and SC&A.

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The NTS site profile was updated to provide clarification for the issues of the technical information bulletins. And the working group reviewed these rewrites.

findings were found inappropriate appropriate or to -sites, and they were passed on to NIOSH and Board with recommendations the that the working group be appointed to look into these findings as a multi-site issue. Actually the -- I think the multi-site issues really came up probably from the results of what we did find out in the early years of NTS.

Our history was started out in 2006. I won't go through this. You all can see it. If anybody has a question, let me know. We did, January 7, 2008, the working group was tasked to review the SEC petition.

What we did, we decided that rather than stop work on what we were doing, that we would go ahead and task SC&A with working on a

site profile and the TBD at the same time.

And so we started working on the SEC petition at the same time.

We've gone through our last meeting, was this April the 23rd. We have resolved all but a couple of issues. We will go through these issues here in just a minute.

Some of the topics that we reviewed and discussed are the environmental internal dose reconstruction methodology; radiation monitoring practices; external coworker dose data; external exposure geometries; neutron photon ratios; time-dependent beta gamma ratios; internal coworker dose data; radon exposures; and Area 51.

And I will talk about Area 51 at the end. We want to make a statement and get it on the record.

Some of our major issues, complex-wide, were dose reconstruction, covers a significant amount of radionuclides; that's not just at NTS, but most work areas have the same problem. Hot particle, internal and external; oral-nasal breathing and ingestion;

dose; extremity monitoring; badging geometry; assumptions for unmonitored workers; and high-fired plutonium.

Going back to a little bit of our history, December the 19th, 2007, the NTS working group reviewed all of 25 findings, NIOSH worked to resolve each finding and update the site profile as appropriate.

January, 2008, NTS working group tasked by the Board to review the NIOSH Special Exposure Cohort Petition Evaluation NTS SEC 0084.

January the 7th we reviewed and discussed open comments on the correction factors for external doses due to geometry or organ related to the location of the film badge.

Internal non-use of film badges -the issue was resolved. NIOSH updated the
site profile, and I must say that these two
subjects have been gone through thoroughly.

As part of the SEC discussion NIOSH presented an extensive analysis of worker

affidavits, reentry access logs, external dosimetry records, and pocket ionization chamber data.

April, 2009, we had status of three most recent issues. They were: removal of dosimetry badges. We felt like this was an SEC issue, and NIOSH and the working group considered this issue closed in the NTS site profile and in the SEC analysis.

The environmental intake model was also a site profile issue. NIOSH proposed to -- a combination of air monitoring data with resuspension models for assigning internal doses to workers outside radiological areas and outside controlled areas.

And in coworker internal dose models was also an SEC issue. NIOSH proposed to use bioassay data from the 100 highest externally exposed NTS claimants to bound unmonitored workers for internal dose.

History of the working group activities: disposition on the top 100 coworker model. In the SEC-0084 Evaluation Report NIOSH proposed using bioassay data for

the 100 highest externally exposed NTS workers to bound unmonitored workers' internal dose.

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Much input on this would be -- much input on who would be in the most exposed group, who is the top 100 most exposed people at NTS. And that has been looked at very closely.

NIOSH has agreed to request additional bioassay data from DOE for a more defensible coworker model -- intake model.

Previous NTS SEC classes added. 2006 NIOSH issued 83.14 April of an SEC Evaluation Report, Nevada Test Site Petition 0055, the Department of Energy employees, DOE contractors and subcontractor employees worked at the Nevada Test Site from January 27, '51, through December 31, 1962, for a period aggregated at 250 day period. And this was added to the SEC in July, 2006.

Current SEC petition status: we have January 31st, 1963 through September 30, 1962. In September, NIOSH evaluated -- or the Evaluation Report determined that sufficient information is available to allow dose

reconstruction to be completed with sufficient accuracy.

NIOSH says no dose reconstruction is being held up at this time for any ongoing SEC discussions. I wanted to get that in there; that was one of the things that we were asked -- were we holding anything up.

Path forward: topics for future NTS working group. NIOSH is developing a coworker internal dose model for the 1963- 1992 SEC issue. The ambient-environmental intakes are being updated by NIOSH, for a site profile issue.

Now one of the things that I would like to clear up. We have been asked, well, what about Area 51? How are the people at Area 51?

For the record, and Larry, Jim, make sure I'm right on this, for the record, if these people were NTS workers, working in Area 51, they are covered by this petition and site profile. Area 51 has its own SEC or technical data basis document that is tied to the Sandia site profile. Is that correct?

Mark, do you want to --

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That's right, MR. ROLFES: Mr. Presley, just to clarify, on one of the topics. Area 51 was added as a portion of the Nevada Test Site for the years of 1958 through 1999. There is currently an SEC that has been added for Nevada Test Site workers from the years of 1951 through the end of 1962.

For individuals that worked for the Nevada Test Site and also did work at Area 51, those individuals would be included if they have the appropriate requirements for being added to the SEC -- those individuals that worked for Nevada Test Site and did work in Area 51 for the years 1958 through 1962, would be covered under NIOSH's 83.14 SEC, and I believe that was SEC 55.

And also to clarify on the Area 51, the portion of your discussion on Area 51, what is covered in the Sandia technical basis document is actually the Tonopah test range. That is covered in the site profile for Sandia rather than Area 51.

MR. PRESLEY: Thank you very much.

I wanted to get that on record, because we have had quite a few questions about how the people up there are going to be covered, and what they are going to be covered under.

At this time I'd like to call on John Mauro. John is going to give an update from the SC&A side of the house.

DR. ZIEMER: Before John begins that, just two things very quickly. For the record, slide #14 dealing with SEC petition 0084, I think your oral statement on the dates might not have been the same as on the slide. And just for the written record, I think the dates are January 1st, '63, through September 30th, 1992. I believe is the correct ones.

And then also if either Bob or Mark, help me understand on Area 51, are the Sandia employees that worked in Area 51 covered the way you described? Or are these NTS employees who were in Area 51? Or both? I wasn't quite clear how you were specifying that.

MR. ROLFES: I do have in the EEOICPA circular from the Department of Labor,

and I can read the information from that circular if that helps.

This specific information to answer would your question be: DOE contractor employment in Area 51 counts for the 250 days needed for inclusion in the NTS SEC class. This means that any RICO, Bechtel Nevada, or other DOE subcontractor contractor or employment in Area 51 between the years 1958 and 1962 counts towards inclusion in the NTS SEC class.

MR. PRESLEY: Is that cleared up?

DR. ZIEMER: Yes.

MR. PRESLEY: Thank you, sir.

John.

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MR. MAURO: Thank you.

You may have received, you should have received last week, I emailed out what I'm calling now a one page -- it turns out to be three pages. But I tried to capture the sense of what transpired since the last time we met.

If you recall the last time we met

I gave a briefing on where we were. I'd like

to basically go into some detail on where we were and where we are now, and what actions -- and this is really SC&A's understanding.

NIOSH really hasn't had a chance to look at this, nor the Work Group, whether or not I captured all of these developments faithfully.

But I believe I did the best I can to do that.

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The important point is that we have converged to a point where there are three issues. And quite frankly from our perspective two of them are for all intents and purposes really at a point where SC&A is not doing any additional work. And they are a matter where we have Ι guess reached fundamental agreement and concurrence, the three issues being -- the first is the badges left behind issue. We talked about this last meeting; nothing has changed. It's exactly where it was before. The general consensus is, we completed our work, and there nothing in the work that we have done that reveals that there was a badges left behind issue to the extent that it could undermine

the ability to build a coworker model.

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We did find that there was quite a bit of badges left behind activity; there is no doubt about that, for a variety of reasons. But we could not conclude on that basis that it created a situation where it was going to be difficult to reconstruct doses or to develop a coworker model.

So from SC&A's perspective our work on that matter is completed, and our position regarding these matters is on the record.

The second issue was an issue that has been resolved since the well, principle. Ι hate resolved. to say Technically in principle SC&A and NIOSH are in agreement. I guess that is the best way to characterize it. And that has to do with the environmental doses. These are the doses that were experienced by workers out in the flats, but not in controlled access areas. These are people who were working in open areas where there was lots of dust being generated.

At the last meeting NIOSH's approach to dealing with those exposures was

to make use of air sampling data that collected in the 1970 timeframe from air samplers sort of sprinkled around the site, information and then use that to back calculate what the exposures might have been in '63, '64, '65, to workers.

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We wrote a White Paper with our position that we thought there was a problem with that, and Ι believe that NIOSH accepted that, and yes, we understand those limitations, and have now offered up - and this was a very important outcome of the April 20 workgroup meeting, the outcome being, well, yes, we understand those limitations. We are going to use a combination of the air sampling data where it's applicable, and that basically means areas really where there was not a lot of activity going on at the flats where lots of dust was generated, but more in areas where you are really looking more at background conditions, cafeteria and other non-active And for the places on the flats where there was considerable movement of equipment, people were doing activities to

various purposes, NIOSH decided to use the method that they proposed, it might have been about a year ago, which was based on the dust-loading approach.

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That approach is conceptually very simple, and also very conservative. Lots of good information on the activities and becquerels per meter squared in soil, isotopically throughout the site.

The assumption are made that whatever the activity is, in becquerels per gram, under your feet, we don't assume that the people working there are being exposed to airborne dust at five milligrams per cubic Five milligrams per cubic meter is a very high dust loading, especially when thinking in terms of long term exposures, 2,000 hours per year. Certainly there will be time periods where the dust loading could be a little bit higher. But most of the time it would probably be quite a bit lower.

So that fundamental approach, which by the way was offered up about a year ago, SC&A did find favorably with regard to that.

In fact, you can agree that yes, it was a conservative application of the problem.

It's our understanding now that it is NIOSH's intent to retrieve that method and reapply it and in principle we are in agreement with that.

So that is issue number two, and from SC&A's perspective we believe that when that White Paper is issued SC&A is probably going to find favorably, if it's fundamentally the same one we saw before.

The third item is the -- by far the most important item, and I think we are on a path to resolution. Let me explain. The most challenging issue related to dose reconstruction post-1962 is the inhalation of internal exposures to workers that were in the tunnels and for workers that worked in the flats, before shots, and after shots.

NIOSH has come up with a strategy which selected the 100 workers that had the highest cumulative external exposures, pulled them out, and they have the bioassay data for all those workers. And they say, okay, we are

going to use the bioassay data for those 100 workers, and we talked about this at the last meeting, there is nothing new right now, but I'll get to the new stuff in a minute, we are going to use bioassay data to build a coworker model.

We at SC&A were given the mandate to look very closely at that, and we did look very closely at that, and we issued two White Papers, the first paper which was in fact available at the last board meeting, and a supplement which was relatively recent which adds a lot more material.

The bottom line is, we believe the 100 workers that were selected have -- do not capture the full range of exposures that workers might have experienced at the site during that time period. A specific concern is overemphasis of workers that were in the tunnels, I believe it was in Area 15 -- I forget the area number, 12? -- represents workers that were involved in tests that were in tunnels.

It turns out that 95 percent of the

tests during that time period were in flats.

And in addition the records reflect RAD safe workers, and not the myriad of other workers that were involved in a whole bunch of different crafts in the flats area.

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So we have in our report, it goes on and on about all the different events that The general concept that during the occurred. below-ground testing period there wasn't very much above-ground activity, we're finding that is not the case. Our reports show that there events took place, lot of not venting but deliberate activities that generated airborne aerosols.

So that coupled up with the fact that most of the tests by far, 90 percent were borehole or shaft tests that took place in the flats. We were concerned that the 100 workers that were heavily biased toward tunnels might be missing the high exposure folks. Because that is where the bioassay data was collected.

So the way we left it, and I think there is agreement that it is important that that issue be aired, one other thing that was

important, we found that the concept of picking the 100 workers that had the highest cumulative exposures, the philosophy was, well, if they had the highest cumulative external exposures, it probably meant that they had the highest internal exposures.

We did a fairly detailed analysis of that, a correlation, to see okay, these are the workers with the highest external, also have the highest levels of plutonium iodine, beta gamma emitters, in the urine, and we did not find a correlation in fact. In some places there was actually an inverse relationship for iodine for example.

So those findings left us in a position where we really were not comfortable with the group of 100. So the way it ended in fact -- Robert Presley sort of made this suggestion -- what do we do? And I think NIOSH has agreed to this it's my understanding a two-pronged approach to trying to close this down. One is a series of investigations be performed on what are the different scenarios whereby workers at the flats, in tunnels and

throughout the site from 1963 on could have been exposed to internal emitters. What type of events took place, what type of activities took place, where you could actually identify Here we have a list of workers who workers. that did things in principle would have considerable elevated resulted in exposure.

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Independent of that, grab all the bioassay data you can grab, over and above the bioassay data that is for the tunnel workers, and then map the two together. And say okay, here are the workers that we think should be the ones in theory that had the highest potential for exposure. Let's map them back on all the workers that we have bioassay data for, and is there a pretty good linkage.

If it looks like there's a good linkage, you could make a compelling argument that the group -- that we do have the data to reconstruct doses to build a coworker model.

And it's my understanding that that is in fact the line of inquiry that NIOSH is performing at this time, and when completed

SC&A will be asked to review that.

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I hope I have characterized that correctly. Jim, if it is somewhat different, please help me out. But that was understanding of the path forward, and it's really a test. If it turns out they miss each other -- think of it like this, let's say you do that, and look for the -- and then you look at the bioassay data, and you can't connect them up. Well, you have a problem. you going to reconstruct the doses for the workers who you believe have a high potential for internal exposure but you don't have any bioassay data. So that fails the test. Ιf there is an overlap, and here is a judgment call as always, if there is a degree of overlap one could argue, well, it looks like we have a tractable problem. We could somehow build a coworker model. And that is understanding of where we are right now.

MR. PRESLEY: John, thank you very much.

Arjun?

DR. MAKHIJANI: Just one more thing.

Just to supplement what John said. This didn't come up at the last working group meeting, but it came up the working group meeting before, based on our prior report in October of 2008. We had raised a number of questions regarding the quality of the data, and I'm presuming that NIOSH will address those as it goes through this new bioassay data. I just wanted to call your attention to it.

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MR. PRESLEY: Thank you, Arjun.

Mark? Jim is going to discuss something first.

DR. NETON: Mark is going to address the bigger picture, but I just had a couple of comments relative to what John Mauro will summarize.

In general John was right on as usual with his characterization. But I'd just offer of points а couple of possible clarification. Relating to the environmental intake model, we now are in a position and are I would call evaluating what Ι guess hybrid environmental intake model, which is a combination of the mass, dust loading, versus the environmental air monitoring model.

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How that came about though is sort of interesting perspective, is that we originally proposed the mass loading model to all people on the site. And SC&A believed that it was bounding but probably implausibly bounding; I mean too high to be used.

with So about went some considerable effort to develop environmental model based on air data, generated that, at which point we were going to apply it to all workers. And then this is where the disconnect arose, well, that really doesn't apply to all people, because these were sort of environmental air station bulldozer samplers, and where you have activity and that sort of thing it might not be appropriate.

So that's when we decided, well, we will take the mass loading model and apply it in the environmental conditions that originally SC&A felt was too high to apply to all workers but I think now agrees that it is

appropriate to apply to at least workers in controlled areas that are disturbing soils. So just a slight point of clarification.

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Related to the 100 worker issue, we did pull out these 100 workers that were tied to highest external exposure. One of the -in my opinion one of the reasons that there correlation between the was exposure and the internal exposure was because the internal exposures were extremely low. fact most of the results that we used in those 100 workers or we identified were at or very near the detection limit. So in essence all that was proved through that analysis was that variability about the detection there was limit, and you can't generate а nice squared, a correlation coefficient with the data.

I think that is going to be the situation by and large with most of the NTS workers for internal exposures in the timeframe we are investigating; exposures in general were pretty low, and we are having to go back, and I don't believe right now

necessarily that the coworker model we
proposed for using the highest exposed RAD
tests would be unreasonably unreasonable, and
I think what is going to happen, as we
typically, we need to go back and pull the
thread, and collect more data as SC&A has
suggested, and to at least demonstrate that
what we propose is accurate or come up with
possibly even a lower model. I don't know at
the end of the day how it's going to come out,
but I don't believe we proposed something that
is totally out of line with what we believe to
be the typical exposures at the test site
during this time period.

I believe Mark is going to -
MR. PRESLEY: Thank you, Jim.

Mark.

MR. ROLFES: I just have a brief slide if you are finished.

MR. PRESLEY: I am finished. But I would like to -- when you get through I need to do some last minute things.

MR. ROLFES: Okay, if you want to take care of those.

1 MR. PRESLEY: I was going to see are you on the phone? John Funk? 2 John, John? 3 MR. FUNK: Yes, I'm here. 4 All right. 5 MR. PRESLEY: What I'm going to do is let Mark Rolfes give his ending 6 7 presentation, and then we are going to give

that?

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MR. FUNK: Thank you.

MR. PRESLEY: All right. Mark?

MR. ROLFES: Okay, thank you Mr. Presley and members of the advisory board.

you a chance for a short discussion; how's

I just wanted to provide a brief NIOSH update on the Nevada Test Site issues that we have been discussing for approximately the past three years.

The three main issues that we have been discussing as both part of the Nevada Test Site, site profile and also the SEC Evaluation Report include the non-use of personnel, external dosimetry. This issue has been resolved and closed based on a detailed analysis of affidavits, health physics

procedures, access logs, pocket ionization chamber data, and other dosimetry records.

The second issue is the environmental intakes in contaminated forward areas which were subject to soil disturbances

Jim had mentioned, such as the movement of drill rigs, scraping of the soil with a bulldozer.

We are currently resolving this. The resolution is in process as Jim had mentioned. ORAU, NIOSH's contractor, is finalizing the draft model which incorporates resuspension -- the mass loading model, and the air monitoring data.

And the third and final main issue is the Nevada Test Site coworker intake model for the years of 1963 through 1992. And NIOSH has agreed that the path forward would be to request additional bioassay data to strengthen the coworker intake model.

And we have spoken once again with DOE Nevada to prepare a plan to recover some additional bioassay results, and should be sending that request pretty soon.

I guess there were a couple of things that I did want to point out also in SC&A's update. I did want to mention that radiation safety staff were present on site during any operational activities. So they did cover both operations in the tunnels and in the flats.

So bioassay data from radiation safety personnel would be a good indicator of some unmonitored individuals' internal dose.

Another point I did want to make for clarification, the majority of the routine operational internal exposures which were incurred by Nevada Test Site employees were actually in the tunnels rather than the flats.

And as Jim had pointed out there was no direct correlation between the external and internal exposures, and because at NTS the external dose is a controlling factor, significant doses for an individual that has no recorded external doses, very unlikely.

Are there any questions?

DR. ZIEMER: Did you want to take questions now, Bob, or wait?

33 1 MR. PRESLEY: We can take questions now. 2 Sure, okay. DR. ZIEMER: 3 Brad Clawson. 4 Mark, as we talked MR. CLAWSON: 5 earlier, one thing that I wanted to make sure, 6 7 especially with Area 51, we brought this in, 8

especially with Area 51, we brought this in, but I really haven't seen any kind of data.

And I was wondering I guess from SC&A, have we seen actual data from the Area 51 that we can

That says where they were at

or so forth.

correlate that?

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MR. MAURO: I don't recall ever collecting or reviewing data for Area 51. I'll ask Arjun, who is a little closer to it than I am, whether we have actually looked into that matter.

DR. MAKHIJANI: We compiled data for 220 workers, the 100 workers in Table 7-1 of the Evaluation Report, and then the 120 workers that we had selected at random. And if there was any data from Area 51 it would have been minimal. But I don't recall any actually.

MR. CLAWSON: Well, and Mark, I know me and you have talked about this, that you can separate it out. But this still to me is an issue that we, we brought them in, but I'm just trying to figure out how we distinguish on the Area 51 issue. And we can

work through that in another work group.

My other issue was, Mark, was me and you have talked about this, John Funk has given us a lot of very valuable information, and I have not been able to see it. And you said that you did locate it. Has that been moved to the O drive?

MR. PRESLEY: Yes, it has, Brad. To address the Area 51 issue, NIOSH has Area 51 data for the individuals that worked for the Nevada Test Site and entered into Area 51 to perform work. The monitoring requirement for individuals that entered Area 51, if they were employed by DOE, they were subjected to the same monitoring requirements as the rest of the employees on the Nevada Test Site. And we have always received, in our DOE response files for an individual's claim, we do receive

dosimetry results for that individual's work in Area 51.

MR. CLAWSON: Okay, well, it was just interesting. We've tried to address this issue of Area 51. It's just been over the last year that we finally got it, and I just want to make sure that -- because I haven't seen anything on it, and I just wanted to make sure that we were incorporating it right.

MR. ROLFES: Yes, there was some uncertainty as to whether we had been receiving that data. However when DOE Nevada provides a DOE response file to us for a claimant that data is, and always has been included in the file. So we do in fact have it somewhere.

DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Melius?

DR. MELIUS: Yes, my question is - sorry if I missed it and you already said
it, but what is the timeframe for this follow
up activity that NIOSH is planning? I was a
little taken aback to see that you were just
now requesting the information, the data from
the Nevada Test Site. So how long is this

going to take to evaluate and be put out as a report.

MR. ROLFES: As far as how long it might take DOE I do not know. I know there have been some funding concerns. I believe those have been resolved. There are several different databases however from which the bioassay data must be recovered, and that's why we are working with DOE Nevada to try to come up with a better idea of how long it might take, and how easy it might be to get the data.

DR. MELIUS: And then how long is it going to take you to evaluate the data in the way that you are proposing to do it?

MR. ROLFES: I would have to have the data in hand first and know how much data we have before I could answer how long it might take us to analyze it.

DR. MELIUS: Well, a decade, a year? Can you give us a ballpark figure? Okay, fine, the record will show that NIOSH has no ability to estimate how long this will take.

DR. ZIEMER: Dr. Lockey.

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DR. LOCKEY: Mark, one question. You said in the borehole which you had tested, the dosimetry you were going to use was a safety officer personnel, right?

MR. ROLFES: I'm sorry, if you could repeat that, please?

DR. LOCKEY: You were going to use the safety officer personnel -- explain the rationale for that.

Well, because all MR. ROLFES: activities on the Nevada Test Site required that radiation safety staff be present for any operational activities where there was potential for radiation exposure to employees. Radiation safety was present, conducting monitoring. If you take a look at the 100 highest externally exposed individuals in our claimant population, a great majority of those of individuals comprised radiation are monitors, radiation safety personnel, miners.

The majority of those individuals in radiation safety, some of those individuals

have the highest numbers of bioassays, because they were routinely in operational monitoring workers. That is the basis for our bounding intake analysis. And we had used highest 100 externally those exposed individuals to give us an indicator that these individuals could have an elevated potential at the Nevada Test Site, and we felt that those bioassay data from those individuals could be used to demonstrate a bounding intake model.

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certainly realize that We additional data would help us to refine our intake model, and that's what we have committed to do, is to obtain additional bioassay data.

DR. LOCKEY: Thank you.

DR. ZIEMER: Mark, did you have a question?

MR. GRIFFON: Yes, I guess looking at your final slide here, Mark, is there an external dose -- I mean I'm not on the Work Group, and I'm conflicted on the Nevada Test Site, but I was just curious if there is an

external coworker model for the site?

MR. KATZ: Mark, can I just -- let me just say for the record, Mark, you have a potential for conflict with NTS. You are not conflicted in this situation, so you don't have to feel like you are on a tether here. You are not conflicted at all in this situation. So I just want to make that clear.

MR. GRIFFON: Conflicted from voting I guess.

MR. KATZ: No, you are not conflicted for even voting on these issues at all. You have a very narrow conflict of interest with respect to NTS, but it doesn't apply to this situation at all. I just want to make that clear.

MR. GRIFFON: Thank you. The question still applies.

MR. ROLFES: Yes, Mark, one of the updates that we did put into the site profile as part of the working group review process and the NIOSH updates to the site profile included a method for assigning unmonitored

external doses to workers.

MR. GRIFFON: Unmonitored -- are you building a coworker model I guess is what I'm asking.

MR. ROLFES: We have addressed the unmonitored external exposures. If an individual was not monitored appropriately or had no monitoring data, we do have a method in the site profile that allows us to assign an external dose to that individual.

MR. GRIFFON: I guess I'm asking what that is, is it like an LOD over two model, or is it a coworker model?

MR. ROLFES: I believe right now it is a table of external doses received by all employees of the Nevada Test Site by year, and I believe the information is derived from that table.

MR. GRIFFON: That brings me back to my next question, which is that this database which Jim was sort of questioning about, Jim Melius was questioning about, I had excerpted version of this database 10 years ago when I was doing some research on the

site, and I'm shocked that you are just getting around to requesting this database.

But it does have external dose information as well, so I'm not even sure if you get this stuff when you are looking at the bioassay records and the external dose, are you going to want to consider that for your coworker model for external dose as well?

I'm not sure the door is closed on the external dose question is what I'm getting at.

MR. ROLFES: If you take a look at the external doses received, we did discuss this in quite a bit of detail at one of our previous working group meetings, and I'd have to refer back to the transcripts to figure out the resolution and see exactly what was discussed and what was agreed upon.

MR. GRIFFON: That's fine. I just wanted to get it for the record here, and the Work Group can consider it.

MR. ROLFES: If you take a look at the external doses that were received by employees of Nevada Test Site, roughly 99

percent of the recorded doses were less than detectible, or zeroes. And so if you are building a coworker exposure model from a bunch of zeroes, you are not going to have a large -- it's going to be driven by missed-dose essentially.

DR. ZIEMER: Brad, did you have an additional question? Any further questions right now?

MR. CLAWSON: Yes, I think we talked about this earlier, but we are using the RAD safety because as we've said they are mainly out there, and we are going to use them as one of the higher exposed. But how many RAD site people were there to cover that entire site? I mean that would be there on an average day?

MR. ROLFES: Off the top of my head I couldn't answer. There are several pages listing names that we have received with radiation safety personnel, and I don't recall if that has been provided to the Advisory Board or not.

DR. ZIEMER: Perhaps we are ready

to hear from Mr. Funk then? John if you are still on the line do you have some comments?

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MR. FUNK: Yes, I do, I have quite a few comments.

First of all I'd like to say when I'm speaking, I'm speaking with a voice of authority. I was there. I seen what happened.

As to these RAD safe monitors who were supposed to have been all over the place, if they were there I sure as heck never seen I was out on many sites when we were them. doing -- not scraping it down as Mark puts it, when we were doing deep excavation. And when I say deep excavation, we were knocking down four and five foot sand dunes, leveling it out so we could build a pad that would facilitate the coaxial cable and the test trailer. But. this wasn't like scraping the ground; this was a heavy excavation. And as to the RAD safe monitors, they were rarely if ever a RAD safe monitor on the site when we were excavation work.

And the only time I ever seen a RAD safe in any force at all was when post-shot

was brought in and set up, I don't know how many times I'm going to have to say this, because I'm been harping on this from the beginning, when the post-shot was set which was well into six weeks after the reentries had started, there was а whole series of reentries. And it wasn't until the post-shot was actually set up, which actually set up, was the RAD safe people come on board to that area.

So using RAD safe personnel for internal exposure is a very poor selection. I'd like to point out again the bioassay -bioassay done on the flats there was no workers. And these 100 potential exposed list from the miners, Mark keeps pushing at us, are not the most exposed, and he has no proof to prove this because there information to back up what exposure the flats workers were exposed to. You didn't have bioassays. You didn't carry picks. damn sure didn't have the kind of monitoring he said there was.

And I'm glad Brad asked the

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question about how many RAD safe monitors were on the Nevada Test Site. I've been asking that question for quite a length of time. There was nowhere near the RAD safe coverage that the Department of Energy has tried to portray throughout this program. If I seen a RAD safe person once a month, it was pretty often, in Area 3, and we covered quite a few areas.

The 100 -- I intend to give a list to the working board of flats workers. If they could find bioassay on them then I'll go away, but I'm sure you are not going to find it. So I'm going to turn the list over to John Mauro and to the working board, SC&A, just as soon as possible.

I'd like to make one last point in closing. It seems that because NIOSH or the Department of Labor anymore with issues, nobody ever returns your phone calls. It's almost as if everybody was on vacation since the new president has taken office, and I don't know what's going on back there. But I've had a phone call into Larry Elliott for

over a month, and I still haven't received a phone call. And I don't think this is any way for us to be conducting this investigation of the site, just to freeze people out.

Thank you.

MR. PRESLEY: John. John? Thank you very much.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay, we are getting a little feedback here. Thank you for those comments, John.

Let me see if there are any more questions or comments from the Board members, or do you have any final statement?

MR. PRESLEY: Well, I'd like to say that all of John's input has been put on the O drive and updated. I have it, have gone through it. I think back in the early days when John was sending that in it was already known to the working group people. So it is out there for everybody to look at.

Does anybody have anything else?
Thank you.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much.

And we will expect some updates on progress

on this most recent issue that has been outlined, and perhaps a little better idea of a timetable after you get a look at that information.

Next we are going to have an SEC petition update to cover concurrent and upcoming SEC activities. And LaVon Rutherford will give us that summary, and I believe you probably have copies of the presentation also on your memory stick.

Wanda, did you have a question first?

MS. MUNN: No, I didn't have a question; I had a comment to make there on one of the items that has to do with an SEC petition. I wanted to point out that Josie's comment yesterday was correct with respect to the status of the Blockson SEC --

DR. ZIEMER: Yes, the Blockson --

MS. MUNN: It is on the table.

DR. ZIEMER: It is on the table and would require a motion to untable it.

MS. MUNN: That is correct. The motion we voted on at the previous meeting was

a motion to table, and it was a split vote.

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DR. ZIEMER: Thank you.

MR. RUTHERFORD: I'm going to give the status of the upcoming SEC petitions. routinely make this presentation to provide the Board an update on the current SEC petitions we're working on, and it allows the future work Board to prepare for group sessions and future board meetings.

As of April 21st we had 141 petitions which we now have 144 as of today. had four petitions We that are in qualification process; 75 petitions qualify. Of those 75 seven in the are evaluation process, and 68 we have completed our evaluation. And we have 16 petitions of t.hose 75 t.hat. are with the Board for recommendation; actual 15 since you cut away one of them yesterday. And then 57 petitions did not qualify.

The petitions that are currently in the evaluation process at this time, Brookhaven National Lab, I think we talked about it a little bit yesterday. We have had

difficulties with data capture, with PII, as well as DOE funding. We hope to have a report ready in July, but based on recent activities I really believe it will not be until the next meeting after July when we will be able to present that evaluation, which will actually work out okay if we are doing the Board meeting on Long Island.

United Nuclear Corp., we are -- we did exceed the 180 days on this evaluation as the Board is aware, and sent a letter to the Board and the petitioner. We had -- the site had a number of documents, 600 plus boxes of documents that we were unable to get to during evaluation process. There the was some litigation concerns at the site. In March of this year the site had decided to allow us access to those 600 boxes. We were working some issues, so we did get that information. We have completed that data capture, and the evaluation is almost complete, anticipate that report being out in June, and we'll present it at the July meeting.

At Piqua Organic Moderated Reactor,

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we did complete that evaluation in May. However we completed it too late in May to really -- for this board meeting, and actually too late for this board meeting. And with the Board meeting in July being in Cincinnati, we felt it appropriate to make that presentation there.

Bliss and Laughlin, we were moving along with this Evaluation Report, and we were on track for completing within the 180 days. However, we came up during the evaluation with some issues concerning the covered period. We are waiting right now for a response from the Department of Labor on the covered period. We believe it's actually different than what is currently identified on the DOE facility aid based website.

Assuming that we have that resolution, we will be able to complete that report in June.

Baker-Perkins, we are on track to completing that report in June.

And Electro Metallurgical, we are on track to completing that report in August.

And Oak Ridge Hospital we have identified July, but we believe we may have that report completed a little sooner than that.

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So if you look at it, actually the number of petitions we have prepared to present at the July meeting looks like Lindy, which we have tabled and haven't presented at petitioner's request. the Possibly Brookhaven, however, I don't think that will happen. Piqua Organic Moderated Reactors, United Nuclear, Bliss and Laughlin, Baker-Perkins, likely Oak ridge and more than Hospital.

In addition we plan on presenting possibly three to four 83.14s as well at that meeting.

petition Okay, we have some evaluations that are with the Board recommendation. Chapman Valve, we believe we completed all actions. There was a suggestion by Dr. Lockey at the last board meeting that we take a sampling of the contracts, Navy contracts, to look through for potential activities involving enriched material.

felt that that wouldn't be a very productive exercise, and we are not moving forward with that activity.

Blockson Chemical, that discussion occurred yesterday, and we presented a White Paper on the radon yesterday, and that activity is continuing.

Feed Materials Production Center, with the Work Group, research and discussion continue.

Bethlehem Steel, we completed all actions, and it's with the Surrogate Data Work Group, waiting for recommendation.

(Audio interference)

I think it's my Blackberry going off. I felt this vibration.

All right, Hanford, there are a number of White Papers that we are working on and NIOSH is working on, and that we will have out into the Work Group very soon, for research and discussion with the Work Group. SC&A continues at Hanford.

The Nevada Test Site, we just got the update from Mr. Presley on that, and work

continues.

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Mound Plant, there has been a number of work group meetings, papers that have been generated by NIOSH, activities back and forth with SC&A and the Work Group continues.

Texas City Chemicals, there was a work group meeting last week in which Texas City Chemical was discussed. When we had issued our Evaluation Report for Texas City Chemical, right after issuing that report or at about the same time we received a number of documents that provided us additional details on the operation links and such. We felt after discussions at the Work Group meeting last week we feel it's appropriate that we will revise our Evaluation Report to address that additional documentation, and there is one other issue associated with Texas City Chemical with the radon modeling for site.

Area IV Santa Susana, we did provide an updated Evaluation Report to address the Class definition change. We

discussed it at this board meeting. Research and discussion: there are a number of issues that are still on the table with Santa Susana that the Work Group, SC&A and NIOSH, are working through.

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Dow Chemical, we recently, Ι believe it was last week we received SC&A's response to our resolution to their issues they had initially provided based on their review of our addendum two. We are going to review their responses, any actions, provide an update as necessary.

Pantex, again research and discussion with the Work Group, SC&A continues at this site.

Savannah River Site, they are early on with that group right now. There is some work that we are working on right now. NIOSH as you know, in December we committed at the Augusta board meeting that we had not made a feasibility concerning thorium exposure during the early years at Savannah River site. We are working on a resolution to that issue. We had hoped to have that issue resolved by now,

but we ran into a little bit of data capture difficulties. We anticipate though that that issue will be resolved in the July-August timeframe.

General Steel Industries, that is with the Work Group awaiting recommendation. I'm not sure -- I don't recall that we have any activities that NIOSH -- has NIOSH committed to -- I do apologize, we do have a couple of things that we are working on for GSI.

LANL, research and discussion with the Work Group continues on that site as well.

Standard Oil Development, we have presented that report yesterday, made a recommendation for a class. The Board concurred with that.

Then Linde Ceramics, which we have completed that evaluation before -- back in November. We would have typically presented that report at the next board meeting. However petitioner had determined that they wanted more time to review. We pushed that out a few times, and we now plan to present

that report at the July meeting.

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However, since that, I think the last board meeting the Work Group has been reestablished, and SC&A is reviewing that Evaluation Report.

And that's it.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you, LaVon.

Any questions concerning the SC&A activities that are before us or upcoming?

Clearly a large number of SEC activities, and these need to move along. We have a number of work groups involved, so these activities will by their very nature have pretty high priority in what we do and what we task our contractors to assist with.

So questions? Comments? Okay.

I think we can probably begin our subcommittee/work group reports. I think we will probably begin with our two subcommittees. And Mark has a report from the Dose Reconstruction Subcommittee. We were looking at whether or not the Board members had the backup information. I think

Mark distributed everything electronically, so perhaps, Mark, unless we need to make copies we can proceed.

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MR. GRIFFON: I think we are okay with proceeding. If everybody has the two things I'm referring to, the first 100 cases report, it should say, Rev. 8. Yes that is the 8th revision of that report. And then there is another file called attachment, and I 3, and think that is Rev. that is attachment that goes with the report, SC&A put together some descriptive statistics of cases that we reviewed, the first 100. Ιf everybody has those? Okay.

Let me just back up for a second and give a little overview of what the dose reconstruction subcommittee has done so far since the last Advisory Board meeting.

We had a few meetings. We had a meeting on April 16th in Cincinnati, our normal meeting location. And we also had a phone call meeting last week, May 6th. And that was just to wrap up some final items, this report I just mentioned actually.

As far as the normal work, the case resolution process, we have been working on the sixth set of cases and the seventh set. These are basically groups of 20 cases, for those who have not been following this discussion that closely. And we are also into the eighth set now of cases on review.

As far as the resolution goes, the sixth and seventh sets have not totally been closed out. But I think there is a handful of findings remaining that we have an outstanding action either for NIOSH or for SC&A. So we are very close to finishing the sixth and seventh case matrices.

And the eighth set we went through I think we got through the entire eighth set one time; that's about as far as we've gotten on that one. We might not have even made it through that entire matrix. But that is a work in progress.

But we are almost ready to close out this sixth and seventh set of cases. And just for a point of reference, SC&A is working on the 11th set? Is that -- 11th set of cases

now in their hands, and I think they have probably contacted the individual teams on the Board to go over their individually assigned cases.

So that process is working fairly well. The resolutions sometimes are a little slow, but we are getting through, and we are getting resolutions. Like I said, we are almost ready to close out the sixth and seventh, so we are catching back up to SC&A's work. I'll talk more about that case selection stuff in a second.

I guess the primary item that this subcommittee has before the Board today is the first 100 cases we did a roll up report, and we actually brought a version of this to the last meeting in Albuquerque, and I think the Board tasked the Subcommittee to go back and put a little more into the report I guess, a little more front end, a little more bottom line kind of conclusions, and we made an attempt to do that, and that is what you have before you on your computers, Revision 8.

The Subcommittee, it was still a

little rough in the April 16th meeting, so I took comments in the April 16th meeting. I made some revisions and emailed it out, and we scheduled a May 6th conference call to go over the final revision, and at that point the Subcommittee -- not all members were present, I should say; Bob Presley I think was traveling, and Dr. Poston as well I think was on travel -- we did have Mike and Brad and Wanda and myself, and the Subcommittee was in support of this aside from some grammatical corrections.

I did make some grammatical corrections in this version that is before us now, but the Subcommittee is bringing this report forward as a recommendation I guess to send to the secretary as a summary report for our first 100 cases that we reviewed, and I'll leave it there.

DR. ZIEMER: And that recommendation constitutes a motion to the Board, and if the motion is adopted the report would go forward to the Secretary of Health and Human Services with the report as

prepared.

So this motion is open for discussion. Wanda.

MS. MUNN: Mark has really done a yeoman's job putting together this executive summary up front of this, the previous three reports that have been put together. As you know I am one of those people who are continually urging everyone to shorten their material, because I genuinely don't believe most people read more than the executive summary.

This executive summary has done an admirable job in my view. I had told Mark earlier than I -- in reading through it after we had worked on it at considerable length in committee, I found myself adding commas and changing one or two words, which I had not cleared with him. But if you would like me to, I would be glad to go over this for the Board's four statements.

My attempt here is to avoid any bias word that might change a view or in a couple of cases to clarify by the addition of

1 a single word. 2 If you would like me to go through those, I'd be glad to. I don't want to hold 3 up the train because there is so much work 4 going into this, and I consider it --5 DR. ZIEMER: I think we can go 6 7 through those, Mark. MS. MUNN: The wording changes, 8 again, on page two, that would be the third --9 10 fourth paragraph I guess. The third sentence there begins, first of all --11 MR. GRIFFON: Are you in 12 13 primary -- I'm not sure. MS. MUNN: I'm in the Introduction 14 15 and Executive Summary. 16 MR. GRIFFON: Okay. Fourth paragraph. 17 MS. MUNN: does 18 MR. GRIFFON: How that 19 paragraph begin? There were 76 cases 20 MS. MUNN: completed -- and the third sentence reads: 21

"First of all, in all the cases reviewed NIOSH

that were," I suggested

has used this overestimating approach

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eight

cases

addition of the word, later, "compensated." 1 2 MR. GRIFFON: That were later compensated? 3 Yes, to clarify that 4 MS. MUNN: they weren't immediately compensated. 5 6 MR. GRIFFON: Weren't they finally adjudicated, cases that they were reviewing? 7 I quess I'm fine with that. 8 But this was a -- I MS. MUNN: 9 10 suggested the use of significant quality assurance finding rather than rather serious, 11 because rather serious does have a very strong 12 13 connotation to it, and I recognize we are implying that, a strong connotation, but would 14 15 suggest the word, significant, instead of 16 that. MR. GRIFFON: Well, I'm not sure, 17 that does downgrade it a little in my opinion. 18 19 So maybe we should -- I don't know if others 20 have a thought on that. It does, but the rest MS. MUNN: 21 of the paragraph is about that. 22

MR. GRIFFON:

MS. MUNN:

Yes, I know.

And so since the rest

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of the paragraph --

MR. GRIFFON: Yes, I know, it does ratchet it down a bit though. I just wonder if others -- I mean I chose those words on purpose.

DR. ZIEMER: The word, later, seems like a friendly amendment.

MR. GRIFFON: Later is fine.

DR. ZIEMER: This may have some connotations, so let's see what the consensus is. Everybody see where we are? Rather than saying, "this is a rather serious quality assurance finding," Wanda is suggesting "this is a rather significant quality assurance finding." Either way you are going to define what it means.

MS. MUNN: And the rest of the sentence says, this brings into question the fairness of the overall programs. That is the sense of the meaning of the sentence I believe.

DR. ZIEMER: Well, perhaps we should get some input to see what the consensus is. Jim and then Mike.

DR. MELIUS: I mean I think it is a serious quality assurance finding. I think it's accurate and reads well as it is. I'm not sure it's worth making changes at this point.

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DR. ZIEMER: Michael.

I agree with Mark. MR. GIBSON: think "rather serious," it that attention although the rest of the paragraph defines what the finding was, draws opening sentence attention to potentially stop the Secretary so he would pay attention to what the issue was rather than perhaps maybe missing it if we ratchet it down.

DR. ZIEMER: Other comments on that one?

MR. GRIFFON: I mean that was my reasoning for those words, just to make sure we didn't downgrade it and we did draw the attention of the reader. And I thought -- instead of serious, I chose "rather serious," so I thought I ratcheted it a little bit.

MS. MUNN: And my point was that

the entirety, the bulk of that paragraph repeats, and delineates exactly what the concern is, so if anybody is going to be reading it, they are going to be fully apprised of the rest of the paragraph, with the extent of the effect.

That was my suggestion.

DR. ZIEMER: I don't hear -- I've heard several that have indicated they would like to leave it. I don't know if we need to go into a formal debate on this particular one. I think either way the rest of the paragraph delineates what is meant in any event. So I'm wondering perhaps we should just leave it.

MS. MUNN: Please leave it.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay.

MS. MUNN: The second sentence after that one, which begins, "one such consequence is -- the claimants were diagnosed with additional cancer after a decision has been made, and are therefore eligible to resubmit a claim."

I would like to insert the word,

"may receive a lower overall dose," because 1 2 they don't always receive an overall dose. MR. GRIFFON: 3 Okay. So add the word "may" 4 DR. ZIEMER: before the word "receive." 5 MS. MUNN: Correct. 6 7 MR. GRIFFON: Yep, that's fine. MUNN: And in the very lat 8 I would suggest using -- starting 9 sentence, 10 with the word, article "A," rather "another," because we have already enumerated. 11 DR. ZIEMER: Instead of saying 12 "another similar misunderstanding," just say 13 "a similar misunderstanding?" 14 15 MS. MUNN: Yes. 16 MR. GRIFFON: That's fine. 17 DR. ZIEMER: Okay. And the other words 18 MS. MUNN: 19 that I had was in the primary findings, under one case review methodology; and the second 20 first paragraph, the of the 21 sentence sentences -- the first and the second sentence 22

MR. GRIFFON: Wait, are you on the

23

together --

second primary finding?

MS. MUNN: No, I'm on the primary findings, large item Roman numeral I, Case Review Methodology. The first sentence reads, "This report summarizes the findings of the first 100 dose reconstruction cases. This is a summary of the findings outlined in three" - I would suggest using "previous" rather than "separate" reports, because they have gone in earlier.

MR. GRIFFON: That's fine.

MS. MUNN: And those are the only words that I suggested.

DR. ZIEMER: That's helpful.

Other comments or questions on this debate? We have a motion before us to adopt the report which has been amended in a friendly manner.

Now I want to pose my original -- I mean one of the reasons you had it sent back was the chairman was concerned that we had not addressed what is the sort of bottom line of why we do these dose reconstruction audits. And that is to attest to the scientific

validity -- I forget the exact wording -- of 1 2 the dose reconstruction process. And I think the Subcommittee was perhaps struggling with 3 what words could be said to address 4 within the context of pointing out some flaws. 5 Would they be able to attest that there was 6 7 some degree of validity to the process while the shortcomings that 8 pointing out identified? 9 10 Mark, you had some trying to go back to the summary, because you 11 had added some words. And I just want to 12 13 identify where those were. I thought I had found them when I originally read this report, 14 15 and I think it's in the Executive Summary. 16 MS. MUNN: The last of the primary findings, the last paragraph under five. 17 think he MR. GRIFFON: Т 18 19 actually looking at the Executive Summary. Is that where I want 20 DR. ZIEMER: to be? 21 MS. MUNN: 22 Yes.

24 front.

MR.

GRIFFON:

If you go to the

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MS. MUNN: Right under the Executive Summary, the primary findings, and the very last sentence in that section says, "The Board feels that the audit and the finding resolution process whereby the Board, NIOSH and the Board's contractor --"

DR. ZIEMER: Got you.

MS. MUNN: "-- collectively resolved the findings, has been an effective means of improving on NIOSH dose reconstruction program."

And that MR. GRIFFON: speaking to that the process was basically. I thought answer But to the question that the Board sent down to the Subcommittee, really I tried to put in Executive Summary the breakout of the types of cases we reviewed, the best estimate, the over-estimate, the under-estimate, and say, a little bit of inclusion on how we felt about each of those types of cases, instead of saying here is how we felt about the overall 100 cases, we decided to break it out because we didn't do many best estimates, even though it ends up being I think seven out of 100, we were targeting in our sampling roughly 40 percent to be in the 45 to 50 POC range. So we didn't as many of those types of cases as we would like to do in our -- or we had planned to do in our audit process.

But we did want to at least give some conclusionary remarks.

DR. ZIEMER: And I appreciate that. I want to re-express my concern, however, on what the charge is to this Board. And I know this has been a bit of a struggle to determine how to say this or convey this in a way that can satisfy all the members.

But we are charged with advising the Secretary on the scientific validity and appropriateness of the procedures used in dose reconstruction; that is the charge.

And in my mind we have not been able to state that that measure has been met.

Now if we are unable to state that, that's fine; we won't state it. But I just want to point out to the Board that we -- this report does not tell the Secretary that the program

has met that level.

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And if you do not believe we are at the position of saying that, that's fine; we will send the Secretary what we have, and what our evaluation is at this point. I don't object to doing that, but I do want to point out that the actual charge, in my mind, we have not been able to address.

MR. GRIFFON: That's true. And that -- I mean that was our feeling that 100 cases in I don't think we are ready to make that final bright line test, or response. I think we chipped away at the edges of it in that introductory section.

ZIEMER: And I would agree DR. that this is better than the previous report. I just want to make the Board aware of that, that ultimately that is what we are charged to And you know, the bottom line may be no, it may be yes, or it may be somewhere between, we think that this does at least get doing this, the impact of and if improvements hadn't occurred and so on so is helping the process. So I think that

fine, and we can go forward with this.

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I am not telling you this to object. I am not objecting to the report. I simply want the Board to be aware of what we ultimately need to be able to state or explicitly address at some point.

So I have that in the back of my mind. Wanda.

MS. MUNN: I think many members of the Subcommittee feel that we haven't had enough of best estimate cases in the pipeline for us to be able to make that kind of a clear statement one way or the other. I think that is what Mark was trying to imply in his wording here with respect to the small actual number of cases.

DR. ZIEMER: Yes but let me add, I don't think that though, however, dependent only on best estimate cases. The that methodology covers all the ways reconstruction are done. So we should not put our hats on saying, best estimate cases are the test. If the overestimates and the underestimates scientifically are not

dependable ways of doing dose reconstruction 1 then we have to say that. If they are, in my 2 mind, we should say so. That's all I'm 3 4 saying. MR. GRIFFON: And I just think, we 5 broke those out on purpose and we wanted to 6 7 chip away at that question but we were not ready to go to that final extent. 8 I'm okay with that. DR. ZIEMER: 9 10 I just want to keep the ultimate goal in our minds as we move towards it. It won't be long 11 before we'll have another 100. 12 MR. GRIFFON: Right, and we've had 13 a lot more best estimates. 14 15 DR. ZIEMER: And we're moving 16 along. Incidentally, this doesn't speak to 17 the motion, but I'm not sure that we have the 18 19 teams on the 11th set yet. We just finished the 10th set. 20 MR. MAURO: I'm sorry, that's 21 correct. 22

DR. ZIEMER:

we just finished doing the reviews of the 10th

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And John, I believe

set. And I'm not sure we have -- I don't think I've seen the 11th set yet, the team assignments.

MR. MAURO: We're halfway through the 11th set. The 10th set has already completed action in there. So that is done, all the one on one discussions behind us, all the divisions in light of that.

Just to let you know that the next set of -- to get to the next team, just to let you know by the time of the next meeting in July we certainly will be ready to fill up the pipeline again.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you.

Back to this motion on the report to the Secretary, Wanda, did you have an additional comment, or any other comments? Anyone wish to speak pro or con? I haven't heard any cons other than perhaps my own words. And they were not intended to be against the motion as I pointed out. I support it.

Are we ready to vote then? If the motion carries, this report will be prepared

for the new Secretary of Health and Human Services. We do have some new rules apparently on how these are transmitted, and we will work with Ted and Nancy to get this transmitted.

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I don't think this is quite in the category of the SECs with the 21-day limit, but this will go forward as soon as we get the clean copy of the report, and the appropriate -- I may need a cover letter, a transmittal letter, which I would add to this just to And if that's transmit it to the Secretary. agreeable, I don't see any reason to return letter the the cover report -- or letter, or the transmittal letter, Board. It would simply be, here is report, sort of thing.

MR. KATZ: Okay, just before the vote, I know Jim had a quizzical look about the new rules. Just to explain that the --we've just got -- I just got as the DFO a note from CDC -- and this doesn't apply to our board uniquely; it's to all FACA committees --there is a new process in place for how

committees communicate with the Secretary of 1 2 HHS, and there is more process I think than I was aware of. But as I understand from Nancy, 3 in effect, it's not that dissimilar from how 4 things are done now. But there is a process 5 for all the communications that come from the 6 7 committee to go through the agency before they go out to the Secretary. I don't need to get 8 into the details of that. 9 DR. ZIEMER: We will take care of 10 that. 11 Okay, we are ready to vote. 12 do a roll call vote. 13 MR. KATZ: So Brad Clawson. 14 15 MR. CLAWSON: Yes. 16 MR. KATZ: Mr. Griffon? MR. GRIFFON: 17 Yes. Dr. Melius? 18 MR. KATZ: 19 DR. MELIUS: Yes. 20 MR. KATZ: Dr. Poston. Yes. 21 Dr. Roessler. 22 MR. KATZ:

MR. KATZ: Dr. Ziemer.

DR. ROESSLER:

Yes.

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1	DR. ZIEMER: Yes.
2	MR. KATZ: Mr. Schofield.
3	MR. SCHOFIELD: Yes.
4	MR. KATZ: Mr. Presley.
5	MR. PRESLEY: Yes.
6	MR. KATZ: Ms. Munn.
7	MS. MUNN: Yes.
8	MR. KATZ: Dr. Lockey?
9	DR. LOCKEY: Yes.
10	MR. KATZ: Mr. Gibson.
11	MR. GIBSON: Yes.
12	MR. KATZ: Ms. Beach.
13	MS. BEACH: Yes.
14	MR. KATZ: That's all.
15	DR. ZIEMER: The motion carries.
16	Thank you very much.
17	We are going to take our break.
18	No, Mark you got five minutes, Mark.
19	MR. GRIFFON: The other item that
20	we had before us from the Board actually, and
21	we ended up discussing it at the April 16th
22	meeting and the phone call meeting, was
23	reexamine the case selection process.

And I think the Board asked us --

you know, we are 11 sets in -- is this working appropriately? Can you examine it?

And the bottom line, after quite a bit of conversation on our subcommittee, and with SC&A's input as well, we felt like it is working pretty well.

We had a breakout, NIOSH's Stu Hinnefeld provided us a case breakout on what our targets were versus what we actually had done, and also SC&A's Kathy Behling they've developed a database now similar to the one used in the Procedures Subcommittee, where we are beginning to -- it's in draft form, but we are starting to looking at tracking the cases. And that also allows for sort of statistics reports to come out.

But we looked at -- a couple of items we looked at. One was the overall number of cases that we should review. And we've been working on this 2.5 percent. It was the number from the previous audit of the other program. And you know that would roughly get us, it's a moving target because more pieces are coming in, but roughly 500 to

600 total cases for the review. Right now we are a little over 200 -- that's right, isn't it? -- yes. So you know we are on target.

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Then the other question we looked at was, do we need to -- and we have certainly been targeting the best estimate cases. We were projecting 40 percent of our cases that we audit, that we review, would be in this 45 percent range. And right now to 50 problem with that is that those cases aren't available in the final adjudicated hopper so to speak, so that pool has been sort of that has been sort of the plug in our case We can't really add more cases processing. without having a bigger pool of cases there to get those best estimate cases up.

interesting fact, though, The that Stu looked, and we asked him, look at the overall cases that you've done dose reconstructions on, how many of those best estimate cases? And he said roughly 8 it percent; perfect number, wasn't а admitted that, but roughly 8 percent of 20,000 at that point when asked the question were best estimate type cases. That would be about 1,600, and if we -- based on my numbers, if we went our 40 percentile, we would be looking at 200 to 240 cases in the best estimate territory.

I think they are there, and out of 1,600 that's close to 15 percent of the overall cases in the hopper so far for NIOSH.

So and to process faster I think the -- really we can't process much faster because we have to wait for that pool to fill up with final adjudicated. Because I know Jim is going to tell me something about that pool.

DR. NETON: Well, I just have a question. I don't know whether Stu broke out the ones that were truly best estimates, or were they, a lot of those cases, the one-size-fits-all dose reconstructions where there really is not what you said are traditional best estimates.

 $\mbox{MR. GRIFFON:} \quad \mbox{We did ask for truly} \\ \mbox{best estimates.} \\$

DR. NETON: It sounds a little on the high side.

MR. GRIFFON: I can show you what Stu sent us, but yes, we did ask that. We said we didn't want the one-size-fits-all included.

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DR. NETON: We can work through that, but I just had that question.

MR. GRIFFON: And we thought -- we also agreed that, let's touch base on this issue again in six or 12 months and see if we may come to a different -- if we are not right on those number of cases we may have to adjust. But right now we felt it was working reasonably. All the other targets that we were looking at targeting, the distributions were actually fairly good. We were getting the right number of cases for decades we wanted to sample. We were getting probably a higher percentage in the high number of years worked, but we were pretty reasonable in our other sort of breakouts of the selection criteria. And we saw at this point really no need to change that approach. So I guess I will leave it there, and others Subcommittee can comment.

DR. ZIEMER: Jim, separate comment?

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DR. MELIUS: A separate comment. think Ι one is our new communication I just would like to be assured procedure. that on all our communications, when they are mandated by the Act, which this one is as well as our SEC evaluations, that however it is being communicated through does not delay them inordinately, and remind them that this is an independent function that we are mandated to do.

MR. KATZ: That is absolutely my concern. I will assure you, that will work.

DR. ZIEMER: And I might add to that, I'm aware of the Health and Human Services and CDC committee structures. And we are quite unique both in our makeup and our activities. So the other groups are pretty much across the board appointed by HHS, and are within HHS' regular reporting structure.

So we need to be assured for example that if there is a CDC review of things that it doesn't get bogged within the

agency for some reason.

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DR. MELIUS: Then I have a second item I'd just like to suggest as an agenda item for the next meeting. Whether it's a serious quality assurance significant or a issue, I'd like to have -- is it possible to include that on the agenda for the next meeting so there'd be a briefing from NIOSH on what their procedures are, and so we can sort of see what progress. I mean these are the first hundred cases. I mean there are issues, significant whether they are or serious, whatever. I think it behooves us to get an update from them and discuss this issue at the I think it's been awhile since Board level. we discussed this issue. At one point a long time ago there was a committee that looked at this, or excuse me, work group. So that's all.

MR. GRIFFON: Let me just go back to the case selection thing a little bit. I know it's a little bit drier topic. But I guess I would offer that I know you don't have all the data in front of you here. The other

1	thing I would offer is that if we don't I
2	think there should be changes, and I don't
3	think the Subcommittee thinks we should change
4	anything now. But I could offer that maybe
5	not at every board meeting, but maybe at every
6	other or maybe at every board meeting, once
7	we have this database up and running, I can
8	sort of give the the statistical reports
9	will be easy to generate, and we can give an
10	overview of where our projected versus what we
11	have so far. And that will give the Board a
12	sense of how we're doing in our case selection
13	process. You will have more data in front of
14	you to look at while we are discussing this.
15	And I will commit to doing that at every board
16	meeting or every other, which ever you choose.
17	DR. ZIEMER: Okay, let's go ahead

DR. ZIEMER: Okay, let's go ahead and take our break now.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record briefly.)

DR. ZIEMER: If you would please take your seats. We have one additional item from the Subcommittee on Dose Reconstruction.

Mark Griffin.

MR. GRIFFON: Yes, I just have one final item the report from on the Subcommittee. And I consider - I mean this has been one of my things ongoing for awhile, so it's kind of important to me. But this question of -- and in our letter report it's actually highlighted as number two primary findings of the case files should include internal guides or instructions used by the district instructor, and should include supporting data analysis.

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I haven't fully inspected the transcripts, but I know that over a year ago we had these discussions and I was surprised to find out at the April 16th subcommittee meeting that NIOSH was still not doing this. I know we had the discussions on the Board as well, and I thought we had a commitment from NIOSH to do this to include where they were used, and we understand they are not used on every site on all cases, to include these DR instructions in the case file.

And I mean the reason -- and I also compromised, and I think all of us kind of

compromised on this -- was that it might be a major effort to go retrospectively to do this, because they would have to find these -- these documents, are not controlled these DR guidelines that they use, so to find the right revision that was used during a certain case, the case was done, would be difficult retrospectively.

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But we said going forward, we totally expect these to be used. And this is well over a year -- I'm guessing almost two years ago that this initially came up, and they are still not being put in the case files.

Now Stu gave me another of what I thought commitment at the last was а subcommittee meeting. But I'm not sure that formal motion don't need а here, recommendation from the Board, that NIOSH do this. This has been one of the problems, especially in the best estimate cases, one of the problems we've had reviewing the cases is we don't know -- it's sort of like the showyour-work thing in school. If we don't have

all the work there to review, it's harder for us to do our audit function. And a lot of times in the best estimate cases, getting our response from NIOSH at the meetings that well, we think what this dose reconstructor was doing in this situation was, he selected this value because -- you know, sort of seemed like after it response, explanations of how and why and what was done, and we thought it would be really beneficial to have а little more of the thought process right in the case file. And the DR guidelines there, and the following it reconstructor was or was not following it, then it is there and we track along and see.

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So the guideline along -- and we have also talked about this show-your-work, if you do several -- a lot of times with internal dose estimates they will go through a series of trials. And we have talked about that, and I think they have been better at adding some of those trial runs. If they end up using class M, but they tried -- they ruled out

other possibilities as the most claimant favorable, show it right in the file.

And I think they have been better at doing that lately, but these guidelines have not yet been included.

And I just wanted to be maybe even more clear at this meeting that I think they should be included. I don't know if we need a formal recommendation from the Board. I hope NIOSH gets the message and starts doing that.

DR. ZIEMER: Well, of course this Board does not task NIOSH. We can request things, and often they are agreed to. We normally don't like to get to the level where we have to make a recommendation to the Secretary to invoke some pressure.

But maybe we could hear from NIOSH.

Is this something that there is a plan to do, or it got overlooked? Do you need something more formal from the Work Group or the Board to delineate more exactly what -- this comes I would say in the form of a friendly request, really, and we're wondering if it can be done readily and so on.

MR. GRIFFON: Less friendly than it was two years ago.

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DR. ZIEMER: It's getting less friendly every minute. But you understand what I mean by that. We are not tasking NIOSH.

Т don't think we DR. NETON: necessarily need to have a formal motion from the Board to check this. I need to go back and check with Stu. Apparently Mark is under the understanding that Stu made a commitment we would start doing that proactively from here forward, and if Stu committed to that we certainly would follow up and do that. If I find out something different though, and there is some rationale why it's not possible, we would certainly be happy to come back and communicate that to the Board and discuss it further.

MR. GRIFFON: Well, that's what we had done -- I'm having a little deja vu here because that is what we did two years ago, and Stu reported back that it would be very difficult for the contractor to go back. And

that's when I thought we decided that going forward that would be done, but going backwards was too much of a burden. And I don't have a problem with that.

DR. NETON: This is not something
I have been intimately involved with. But I'd
be happy to go back and discuss this with Stu
and report back to the Board as to our status.
I suspect it's going to be that we committed
to do it, but until I talk with Stu about it
in some detail I can't commit.

DR. ZIEMER: I'm going to suggest that it be reported back to the Work Group, the status of that.

Is Stu entirely clear on what it is that we are requesting? If there is any ambiguity we can get it spelled out.

DR. NETON: I think one of the issues may be there are different flavors of these guidelines and instructions, and some are more formal than others, and to what extent we need to sort of memorialize these documents which really are not what I would consider to be control documents in the sense

that they are numbered and signed off completely by NIOSH; they are more informal guidelines.

I will go back and we will research that, and can get back to you with our finding.

DR. ZIEMER: And then if we are at a point where we need something more formal action-wise, the Work Group can recommend that. But perhaps we could also add to the agenda to at least have a report on that. That will spur us to make sure that it is not falling between the cracks, and ask Ted to specifically ask for an update on the status of that item for the next board meeting.

Thanks, Mark.

Phil, did you have an additional comment?

MR. SCHOFIELD: Yes, I'd like to back Mark's comments. We had some modifications that none of us could figure out what the -- how they did anything without the documentation in there. We were all at a loss. And in one case in particular that was

just -- couldn't understand how they got to that point.

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DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you.

Okay, then we can proceed with our other subcommittee report. Wanda, do you have any update for us, status report?

MS. MUNN: The Procedures Subcommittee is continuing to approximately every month depending schedule and the Work Group load that parties involved and the agency the and contractor have.

We are maintaining the extensive electronic database that we need to track and archive the procedures, the large number of findings that are generated by the SC&A reviews. The overall process is continuing to function very well. We have occasional challenges with it, but for the most part it does well.

If you will excuse me a minute, I will go up and punch up the slide that will show you the summary report of where we are right now.

No magic has occurred. And again, F8. Voila. I hope you can all see it all right. I know it's difficult for those of you back up against the wall.

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You'll notice that these are segregated into groupings by date. That's the way we've chosen to approach them. database itself as you probably all know by now the procedures, the individual procedures, are listed alphabetically. We find it easier to get to them, but when we actually start to work with them we segregate them into groups. We have three separate groups there, and the dates that show in between, with only one or procedures involved were additional two procedures that this body has for some reason or another chosen to insert into our database, to SC&A's review, at a time other than the grouping that we normally go through.

The total number of findings as of the first part of this month, as of our last meeting, was 538. The number that are open is 154. I think we have all told you before what open and in progress and in abeyance and

addressed and transferred. I'm going to talk a little more about transferred later. But items total 154; our open in progress, actively working right now, 28. We have 75 in abeyance; 15 that are addressed in some other finding other than the one that we're working on; 29 that have been transferred; and 237 that are closed.

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You can see the percentages there for yourself. And get some feel for where our current numbers lie.

I'm going back to my chair.

Our ability to work with these findings on a real-time basis in our sessions has been very helpful for all of us. It helps keep the database quite current, and being able to filter whatever parameters we want from the O drive keeps all the Board members and the personnel that are involved able to obtain specific information that they want very quickly from anything that's been selected for review.

The bulk of the Subcommittee effort during this year has centered almost entirely

around requested revisions to the letters, and reviewer script, questionnaires that were used for the energy employee and survivor CATIs.

As you know that has been a major topic for the full board, and has been in our area of responsibility, so we've been working that extensively. Each one of those documents has been scrutinized at considerable length and discussed extensively.

We've suggested a number of wording changes incorporated into the active draft that NIOSH is working with at this moment for consideration. Our remaining suggestions for changes are relatively minor in scope, and we have clearly identified what they are. At our next meeting, scheduled in Cincinnati on June 9th we expect to complete those proposed subcommittee revisions incorporating all the comments that have been brought forward, so that NIOSH will have our suggestions ready for you before very long.

The subcommittee is requesting the agreement of the full board on a proposed process to eliminate some duplication of

effort and to clarify areas of responsibility with regard to procedure reviews. mentioned a couple of times in the past how we should proceed with respect to transferring of have asked our contractor items. We segregate some specific procedures for us that are site-specific in nature. It's very clear to us that when we have tasked SC&A with reviewing procedures that are site-specific, if we are working those findings they are findings which may be affecting the activities of the Work Group as well. We would make these suggestions in the hope that we would not find ourselves in a position where both the Procedure Subcommittee and the Work Group would be dealing with the same issue oblivious to the actions of the other.

So our subcontractor has provided for us a list of known procedures which are site-specific in nature. I did not make a slide of them, but I will read for you the number of outstanding issues that we have that are related to site-specific procedure.

For Y-12, we have seven; for

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Savannah River Site, five; Rocky Flats, five; Hanford, two; K-25, two; X-10, two; Bethlehem Steel, two; Paducah, one; Pinellas, one; Mallinckrodt, one; and General Steel, one. I'm sorry I don't have that list of actual procedure names for you, but those are the numbers.

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What we are proposing is that when a site-specific work group has already been appointed for one of these procedures, it will be the responsibility of the chair of the Subcommittee to notify the chair of the Work Group and the Board probably by email that the responsibility of resolution of those findings is being transferred to the Work Group.

Ιt the feeling of was our Subcommittee that it. logical was the responsibility of the Work Group to be dealing with those findings directly. The entire procedure will then show on our subcommittee master database as transferred, and it will stay there as transferred.

As those findings reach closure within the Work Group we would anticipate that

the Work Group chair would notify the Subcommittee chair and the Board that that particular item had been closed, and the circumstances over which it had been closed.

Then the master database being maintained here will reflect those changes and show the item as closed.

In cases where the Work Group doesn't exist, the Subcommittee might, depending on how extensive the findings are, might request that the Board assemble a work group for the specific purpose of addressing those findings if nothing else. But that would depend upon the circumstances.

And the Subcommittee will continue to do what it is doing, and will be very pleased to hear comments from the Board, and their reaction to our suggestion with respect to this process.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, Wanda. I think what you have described as a suggested procedure; I don't know that it requires necessarily formal board action unless there are concerns about it. But basically what the

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Subcommittee is saying is that if there are procedures that they are reviewing that are site-specific, say for General Steel Industries, then they will transfer that with notification to the appropriate work group, that they believe that that work group should deal with that issue since it is a site-specific issue.

So I think we would want to have some discussion on this to see if there are some concerns about doing this, or whether or not that seems to be a good way to approach those procedures which are clearly sitespecific.

 $\operatorname{MS.}$ MUNN: We are open to suggestions.

I agree with the DR. MELIUS: general procedure. My only cautionary note, and I think this would be the responsibility SC&A would be the best way of handling this, is that you make sure that we retain consistency in terms of how reviewing the site specific procedures. Because often I think there is sort

subpart of another set of procedures that may apply to other sites and so forth, so they don't exist in isolation all the time -- some do, but some don't, and I think we need to make sure that there is some consistency from site to site in terms of what we are recommending, and what changes we recommend to NIOSH and so forth.

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So I think as long as SC&A can keep track of that for us, I think that is probably the best way of handling it. And again there may be issues where it is a concern, we could refer it back to the procedures committee, or communicate with the Procedures Subcommittee in a way that would deal with that issue.

DR. ZIEMER: Well, it's a good point, and I think the Procedures Subcommittee has thought about that as well, because there are indeed procedures that are more complexwide, and Wanda, you can speak to this, but I believe they have made an effort to identify those. For example, it might arise, such as the high-fired oxide issue, at one site, and then there is a recognition that it is more

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broadly applicable, so we would have to deal with those on a case-by-case basis. But perhaps the chair could comment.

MS. MUNN: I would be challenged to do the math right here, but needless to say the numbers that I did not read to you with respect to the number of procedures that we have that are site-specific are the numbers which we have deemed to be more generally applicable across the Board.

Of course as Jim points out there are some procedures which have a finding or two that may apply to a specific site only, but for the most part what we are trying to do segregate those site-wide is Ι complex-wide -- procedures from the sitespecific procedures, and those that are clearly site-specific, address them that way.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you.

Other comments? Then I believe if there is no objections your Subcommittee will proceed along those lines and make the appropriate contacts as you identify those procedures which are indeed site-specific and

1 which can best be handled by the appropriate 2 work groups. MS. MUNN: We will attempt to do 3 4 that at our next meeting, and several of the anticipate getting 5 Work Group chairs can communications from me, as will the rest of 6 the Board and Mr. Katz. 7 DR. ZIEMER: Yes, Josie, sorry I 8 missed you. 9 10 MS. BEACH: Oh, no, I just put it I'm just curious of what timeframe you 11 up. are thinking that might take, Wanda, not to 12 13 put any pressure on you. No, we expect -- we are 14 MS. MUNN: 15 going to be meeting in Cincinnati in June as I 16 said, on June 9th, and that's when we expect to do this. We already have numbers; all I 17 is identify the specific work have to do 18 19 groups that are involved. MS. BEACH: You expect to be done 20 with that by the first meeting in June? 21

MS. MUNN: Oh, we anticipate -- it is fairly direct. I don't anticipate any complications. Yes, we expect to do that.

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MS. BEACH: Thank you.

DR. ZIEMER: Then I think we are ready to proceed with updates from the various work groups. And Ted, perhaps we can just go down the list, indicate either that there is no action to report, or that you give us an update on when and where there is going to be a meeting or any specific action items that you think the Board needs to be aware of.

MR. KATZ: Sure, Dr. Ziemer, the first is Blockson. And I just wanted -- I don't know if there needs to be clarification for the record. You know this was discussed yesterday, Blockson. And there was agreement I think that Mark would receive from material from OCAS to review, and Mark was questioning whether there needs to be -- if there needs to be any kind of process involved with respect to work group and so on, so I don't know if you want to address that.

DR. ZIEMER: On Blockson, I believe that the information was going to be provided for Mark. And I see no particular reason for it to go back to the Work Group.

It's not obvious to me that it would need to

be returned to the Work Group, but Mark would

have the opportunity to review that. Mark is

not here; I was going to ask -- oh there he

is, okay. Mark, we certainly need to have a

way of sharing the outcome of that with the

full Board.

MS. MUNN: And I would have a request with respect to specificity. We asked the last time at our last meeting when we were addressing Blockson issues, we asked to be very clear about what exactly was wanted. And it had been the assumption that what Jim Neton brought to us would fulfill the requested information. But since they are asking for more, real specificity would be greatly appreciated.

DR. ZIEMER: And I think we had previously agreed that it didn't need to go back to the Work Group, did we not?

MS. MUNN: Yes, we did.

DR. ZIEMER: Yes, and so Mark hadn't had the opportunity to look at that dataset.

MR. GRIFFON: I was just wondering 1 2 just in terms of if Ι get process analytical file and have some questions on 3 parameters, do I -- can I email directly to 4 NIOSH, and should I cc all the Board members? 5 6 I just don't know how to --DR. ZIEMER: Well, let me suggest 7 something. 8 MR. GRIFFON: If I just hold all 9 10 my questions until we meet again then we could be in the same position. 11 ZIEMER: 12 DR. Let me suggest the following. This is top of the head, but if 13 you have questions, direct them to NIOSH; 14 15 share them with the Board. And then I guess 16 whatever responses are generated could be shared equally. 17 I guess that sounds 18 MR. NETON: 19 fine to me. Just for completeness I was going to distribute this file to the entire Board, 20 just in case Mark raises issues they can at 21 least open the file and see which parameters 22

DR. ZIEMER: That makes sense.

or such that he is concerned with.

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2	especially since this entire debate is now at
3	the Board level. I'd appreciate having all
4	board members advised simultaneously.
5	DR. ZIEMER: That way when we
6	return for our next meeting, hopefully we will
7	have seen not only that information from
8	NIOSH, we will have seen the questions and
9	whatever responses there are, and perhaps be
10	in a position to take some action.
11	MR. GRIFFON: So this would be on
12	the agenda for the July meeting? And then I
13	guess I just have to ask the question then
14	since the Work Group isn't operating any more,
15	do we need to sustain the Work Group?
16	DR. ZIEMER: I suppose we should
17	sustain the Work Group until there is a final
18	action on Blockson.
19	DR. MELIUS: Purgatory.
20	DR. ZIEMER: I'm not sure you want
21	that in the record, but go ahead.
22	MR. KATZ: So next on the list then
23	is Chapman Valve.

MR. POSTON:

There has been no

MS. MUNN: It makes perfect sense,

action on Chapman Valve. Does Dr. Lockey know
that we are somewhat surprised that NIOSH is
not following the recommendation? Until today
we didn't know that there was no action. So
we hadn't been doing anything. I'll try to
get the committee together for the next
meeting.

MR. KATZ: Then we heard yesterday from security. But there is more to discuss on that that Jim raised.

DR. ZIEMER: Well, the security document is with the DOE, and we had a motion yesterday on that. And I think we keep the Work Group -- it's an ad hoc work group but keep them in place until the final adoption. But I think we are hopeful that that will take effect in a couple of weeks.

MR. CLAWSON: Right. We have the pending -- we already voted on it pending everything?

DR. ZIEMER: That is correct.

DR. MELIUS: Excuse me. I raised an issue yesterday and I don't know if we want to discuss it at

some later point today. But I think at least in my mind it needs to be discussed, and that is sort of the larger question, how are we going to deal with the issue of classified in terms of this information program, really our activities, our review of information from these sites, our presentation of this information either in terms of work groups, in terms of board actions, in terms of communication with the petitioners And I don't think we can postpone -forth. other with that issue one would authority Ι understand led to as decisions by NIOSH in terms of not holding work group meetings, or at least not calling them work group meetings. And this is all very confusing to people. And I think it really comes down to that issue which we talked about a long time ago with the Iowa site, which was how do we handle those types of sites in terms of the SEC. I mean come up with a site profile too, but really the SEC.

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DR. ZIEMER: Well, actually, I have that down as a separate item, because it

wasn't in the purview of this particular work
group to deal with that, so if there is no
objection we will just finish the Work Group

reports, and then that is the next thing.

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MR. KATZ: Okay, so Fernald; Mr. Clawson.

MR. CLAWSON: Okay, with Fernald Work Group we've met five times, if my figures are right. We are still reviewing readiness, reviewing completeness of data accuracy for the urine bioassay validation of the HIS-20 The recycled uranium white paper database. that was dated on March 3rd. We are reviewing radon breath data for adequacy. The K-65 radon emission issue, the breathing general air sample data associated with the daily weight of average thorium-232 the intake.

And NIOSH has given us a White Paper on that, and we are reviewing that at this time.

MR. KATZ: Thank you, Brad. Any questions for Brad?

DR. MELIUS: Yes, are you still

waiting for data from Fernald? Or is taken care of? You went through this quickly, and I thought the report that SC&A prepared for updating us on Fernald was long. I mean there were lots of issues; I don't think you need to go through all of them. I am just trying to understand where are we overall with this. Is this going to resolve Is this going to take a lot of time? It appears to me to be a number of significant issues to be resolved there.

MR. CLAWSON: Personally, just being the Work Group chair, I think we've got several issues that are going to take some time. John is the head for SC&A, he can kind of give a rough estimate of where we are at. It's like at almost every site we are looking at data integrity, and also the -- how much data we really have.

MR. MAURO: I will try to give it the 30-second sound bite to each of these six issues.

The first issue has to do with sampling plan. There is an enormous amount of

bioassay data from the workers, urine samples where they measured uranium in urine.

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And there is a coworker model that has been developed by NIOSH for reconstructing the doses to those workers who were not bioassayed or inadequately bioassayed.

The question becomes how do we know the coworker model will in fact appropriately bounding for all the workers. We, SC&A, did a lot of work looking into this where issue. And we came out was an interesting place. Effectively we found, we looked at all the different buildings, all the categories of different workers, all the different time periods, and there is a lot of data.

I guess you have to get the essence of it. The essence of it is, are there workers out there who don't have bioassay data that there is reason to believe they may have experienced exposures that are higher than what would be assigned by the coworker model? And that is really the essence of the question.

And Jim, during the Work meeting, said, no, we will look at that. will go and grab data from workers who were not bioassayed; it's only a small fraction. And we'll see whether or not there is reason to believe these workers who weren't monitored may very well have experienced exposures that would be underestimated because of the nature of their work and where they worked and when they worked by the coworker model. So that's how item one is. So the action item now is, and the first bullet -- I assume everyone got my email -- the very first bullet, that is with NIOSH right now. They are looking into that.

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The second has do with to validation of the HIS-20 database. This is a relatively easy problem. The first one Jim probably has a better sense of the schedule to do that. The second item is in The HIS-20 database SC&A's hands. is electronic database that was compiled going NIOSH performed from hard copy to electronic. very comprehensive audit using MIL-Spec

procedures, for sampling the hard copy to see how faithfully it was transferred into electronic copy. Got a big report out there. We have been mandated to review it. Our statistician is purely looking at, did they implement the MIL-Spec standard in a way and come to conclusions that say, yes, the data that was in hard copy was in fact faithfully transferred into electronic copy.

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The ball is in our court. A couple of weeks of work.

Third item, recycled uranium; big item. Don't know, right now you saw our summary; we have a number of issues that we are concerned about. I'm not going to go into details.

is basically a fundamental There approach that NIOSH has adopted. Bottom line, 100 parts per billion plutonium and radionuclides, and we were not able to independently verify that that in fact is bounding. in the midst of And we are discussion on these matters. And SC&A is basically through with our investigations

the extent that we could, and it's really a bunch of questions that we have posed to NIOSH, and I believe to the extent to which those questions can be answered will be a

subject at the next work group meeting.

The next item is radon breath analysis. We did not discuss that at the last meeting on the 22nd, the 23rd. We have a report, where we performed a review of the use of radon breath sampling to determine body burdens of radium, from workers at Fernald who handled radium and thorium.

We have a number of observations and findings in that report. However, that report has not yet been discussed at the Work Group. It is one of the subjects that just didn't make it to the table, nor into the last Work Group meeting. So that is still very much a subject for additional discussion.

Finally, K-65 silos, we discussed that at length at the last meeting. SC&A and NIOSH have a big difference of opinion on this one. In effect we believe the radon release rates from the silos have been underestimated

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midst of some technical discussion on these matters. Jim is looking at it, maybe has something new to add. But when we left the

by at least a factor of 10, and we are in the

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meeting we agreed to disagree.

And finally on that end the ball is in NIOSH's court on the radon emanation. We posed our questions and concerns; they have it.

The last item is in our ballpark, namely, there is a set of data and a coworker reconstructing thorium-232 approach to inhalation rates. There is a lot of data. All of that data has been loaded up on the O drive, and NIOSH has been given -- NIOSH, I'm sorry, SC&A has been given the responsibility to look at that data, sample the data, and convince ourselves that in fact that data is of sufficient adequacy and completeness allow you to reconstruct and place a plausible upper bound on the inhalation doses of all workers from thorium-232.

And the way we look at as always is by time, location and job category. So we're

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1	in the process right now of looking at that
2	data, and the ball is in our court to prepare
3	a report to the Work Group.
4	DR. ZIEMER: A couple of questions
5	here. Mark and then John.
6	MR. GRIFFON: And I knew there was
7	a reason I should have looked at John's report
8	before the meeting. But I think one of the
9	biggest items that's an SC&A action item is
10	missing on that, and maybe I'm wrong. But and
11	it might be just a complete disconnect,
12	because we have discussed this topic at
13	length. But it is the data completeness
14	question related to the individual case files.
15	In other words did you cover
16	that in there?
17	MR. MAURO: I covered it in here,
18	but I overlooked it.
19	MR. GRIFFON: Okay, then that is
20	different than the coworker models.
21	MR. MAURO: Absolutely. It's in
22	the write-up, but I neglected to mention it in
23	my oral presentation

Yes, we are currently looking at --

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we have downloaded the 15 cases that we have already audited, during the DR process, the 15 Fernald cases. And we are pulling another 15, so we have a total of 30, and we are going to write a report to folks about the completeness of the data for those 15 cases. And we feel that that is a very good place to get a snapshot, you are absolutely right.

DR. ZIEMER: Jim.

DR. NETON: I can just offer a brief update to a couple of items that John mentioned.

The first one, Mark Rolfes has just informed me, we have competed our analysis of the unmonitored worked at Fernald, and out of something in excess of 1,000 cases we have identified 80 cases of workers who have no bioassay monitoring data, and we will prepared to provide a report on the status of those workers and the type of jobs performed, that sort of thing, at the next So indeed it is a very work group meeting. small fraction of the Fernald workforce, which is not surprising in light of the fact that I

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believe there is something in the order of a half a million bioassay samples for uranium that were taken over the history of the plant.

The second issue relates to John's discussion of their belief that the emanation rates from the silos were off by an order of magnitude. That was not our opinion; that was the report that was issued by John Till of Radiological Assessment Corporation who evaluated the Fernald offsite emissions. It was a report that was reviewed by the National Academy of Sciences, and was reviewed the National Academy being bу as scientifically valid and accurate.

SC&A has identified an interesting twist and analysis of the data by Hans Behling that we are looking into, and we will be prepared to report on that at the next meeting.

However, I would say that I think we somewhat agree that this is not necessarily an SEC issue, it's a matter of whether the doses on site are an order of magnitude higher or not.

DR. ZIEMER: John, did you have a comment?

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POSTON: Not Jim MR. now. answered my question. I think everybody is number of calculations of the aware emanations from the silos. This is not something new. And as Jim pointed out, it's even been reviewed by the National Academy of Sciences. It sorts of begs the question, what are you going to do to make it any better.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Any other comments on Fernald? Brad, did you have an additional comment?

MR. CLAWSON: Yes, I've heard the Academy of Science and all these wonderful people and so forth, don't those things ever change. So many of them do change as they find new information where they get a new process. I don't want us to hang our hat on that, because I do agree. And I appreciate Jim, because I was very impressed with his research into this, but I think that John has brought forth a very interesting -- Hans and so forth, I thought it was very interesting.

Okay,

There have been

1 DR. NETON: I'm sorry; I didn't 2 mean to imply that we are not taking their analysis seriously. I just wanted to put it 3 in context; it's not a NIOSH-derived model. 4 It's a previous model that had been thoroughly 5 deeply vetted. We are looking into it. 6 7 MR. CLAWSON: And I want to tell you right up front I appreciate that, because 8 I appreciate your interest into the actual 9 10 science of this. I watched Jim fervently working, and it did, it brought up 11 some interesting points. 12 13 DR. NETON: Thank you. ZIEMER: Thank you. 14 DR. 15 let's go ahead. 16 MR. KATZ: Hanford. At Hanford our work 17 DR. MELIUS: is at a standstill now waiting for NIOSH which 18 19 has been -- had to obtain a lot of data, mostly on neutron exposures, from Hanford. 20

talked about it here before.

to some extent has been worked out.

But then secondly for NIOSH to then

significant delays with DOE. I think that is

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redo their neutron exposure models. That work I understand is underway and at least some of that work is expected to be finished within the next month or two. Arjun and I had a call with Sam Glover a couple of months ago, and that was his estimate at that point in time. So Arjun and I, and it did make sense, do we need to take any more action on the part of until that activity the Work Group completed. And Arjun and I plan to do a conference call with Sam hopefully within the next week or so, and sort of figure out what the schedule would be for NIOSH to complete their reports in order that the Work Group would have -- or SC&A would have something to review on this issue, and secondly then the Work Group could proceed.

I don't know if Jim or Larry have anything to add in terms of timing or anything on how that is proceeding, but I know it's underway and I haven't heard otherwise.

MR. ELLIOTT: I think you have accurately portrayed the situation. And I don't have anything to add other than we are

very concerned about where Hanford is at and how much time has been expended and how much more time is needed. It's not clear to me though that we have all the data yet, so I'm asking Sam, I will be on the call with you next week. Because I need to understand exactly where we're at on this one. MELIUS: I mean it's the DR. situation we thought we had before, you don't know until you're actually working, looking at what you have received and what you haven't received, and start to work on the actual model, do you have enough.

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ELLIOTT: And right now we MR. have hundreds of claims pended for this site for this reason.

No, it's a serious DR. MELIUS: issue. Well, we'll be following up and then reporting back at our July meeting.

MR. KATZ: Thank you. Brad? Oh no, sorry, Phil. Idaho?

MR. SCHOFIELD: Okay, on the Idaho National Labs, SC&A just did a site profile review on it. We will be having a meeting on that on June 10th. And then I'll go ahead and do Pinellas at the same time. On the 11th we will be looking at the SEC for Pinellas. We have had a hold up there until we were able to meet with DOE about some security issues, about what we could discuss, and I think we are set to go forward.

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MR. KATZ: Any questions? Thanks

DR. The Linde work ROESSLER: group along with NIOSH and SC&A has completed the evaluation of the site profile. We announced that at the last meeting. With regard to the SEC I'll remind you that class was added to the SEC status. This was the October 1st, 1942 to the October 31st, 1947 operating period. So what the Work Group is ready to address is the January 1st, 1954, July 31st, 2006, through the radiation period, which has qualified evaluation.

We had hoped to get right at that and have a report by this meeting. But for

two reasons we have been delayed. SC&A have not completed the evaluation of the NIOSH report, and also the petitioner asked that we delay so that the petitioner has time review the document. So we are now hoping to give a report at the July meeting. We're hoping we can convene the Work Group And we are waiting now for SC&A to tell us -and John, it's looking like he's saying yes -their evaluation of to give us the NIOSH report, and then we'll get to work on that.

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DR. ZIEMER: While we are on the topic of Linde Ceramics, I think it would be appropriate for me now to mention the letter from Senator Schumer of New York, a copy of which was placed on your table and a copy of which was distributed electronically to the Board a little over a month ago. This letter came to us after our last meeting. Under the Board's rules replies to congressional members have to be -- need to be approved by the Board. I have drafted a potential response which I would like to put before the group now.

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Basically Senator Schumer's letter as you look at it indicates that he supports an SEC class for the later time period which is currently under consideration. And he also mentions keeping the petitioner in the loop; that would be [Identifying information redacted]. And the response letter I put before you, it's a straw-man letter, basically it acknowledges in the first paragraph, it acknowledges receipt of his letter and also acknowledges his concerns about the SEC period or potential SEC coverage for the period 1954 to 2006. It also points out that we now have the Evaluation Report; it was received It has not been formally presented November. by the way; it's the one that Jim just mentioned. But the Board has the Evaluation Report; that we have passed the contractor to review that, and that at the request of the have delayed the discussion petitioner we until the July meeting. So basically it says what you just told us, Jim.

And then it indicates that we will indeed keep [Identifying information redacted]

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apprised of progress and actions of the Work Group. So if it would be appropriate to have motion to approve this letter or some version of it.

DR. ROESSLER: Before we do that, I think it might be appropriate to bring up one sentence in his letter that I don't think you have addressed.

In his third paragraph -- first he talks about agreeing to review the petition for those who worked at Linde between 1954 and 2006. Then he continues, he says: continue to urge you to qualify the petition for those who worked at Linde between 1947 and 1953, and I don't think you addressed that.

DR. ZIEMER: You are quite That was an inadvertent omission. We can have a friendly amendment to the letter if it becomes a motion.

Dr. Melius?

I was just going to DR. MELIUS: ask for some clarification from NIOSH. the Linde petition issue.

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MR. RUTHERFORD: Okay, we had two petitions, one for the residual period, for the operational period. one The operational period we did not qualify because it indicated that there was no personal area monitoring. We had personal area monitoring We went back and forth a number of data. times with petitioner trying to get that basis to qualify it, and we couldn't get that.

Ultimately we did not qualify the petition. It went to the administrative review panel, and they concurred with our findings.

And again, so we qualified the residual period. The reason we qualified the residual period was because it was supported, the basis was supported, a lack of monitoring data for that period. But the operational period from '48 to '54, whatever it was, was not supported.

DR. ZIEMER: Well, of course, this
Board does not qualify the petition. To
address that I need some additional sentences,
you are quite right. I actually overlooked

There appears to be no objection.

And that will also give you a little more time

that. But if we had a motion to put this on the floor we could certainly amend it in some appropriate way. But I feel like we do need to respond to the Senator's letter, so this would be a starting point. We can completely redo it, but at least you have a straw man to work from.

MR. PRESLEY: So moved.

DR. ROESSLER: Second.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay, it's moved and seconded to consider this response. Now it would be appropriate for someone to move to amend. And if necessary actually perhaps in the interest of time we could defer action on the motion until after our lunch break, so we don't have to wordsmith here. I'm sorry, it was an oversight on my part, I simply missed that part.

Is there any objection simply to defer action on the motion until we have a chance to allow someone to make an appropriate amendment?

to digest the letter. But I did want to get it out so you could have a look at it.

We will proceed.

MR. KATZ: Los Alamos.

MR. GRIFFON: Very very quick update. The Los Alamos Evaluation Report was completed and NIOSH presented on it. And there are a couple of areas where they are continuing to either to try to get additional data or to supplement the report; I forget how it was phrased.

In the meantime SC&A has been tasked to look at the Evaluation Report, and I've talked to them. And they are getting underway with their Evaluation Report review, along with the -- their evaluation process for any full review of an SEC Evaluation Report. That would include interviews and the things they do along with the actual written reports.

Of course, I guess, I cautioned SC&A that if there are these areas that are sort of held in ongoing research, I don't want to get into this situation where SC&A is reviewing something that is being modified by

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NIOSH, so they are going to kind of put holds on those items that continued research is ongoing.

Once I'll be in touch with NIOSH as well as SC&A, once we're at a point where we have enough to bring to a work group, I will schedule a work group meeting.

MR. KATZ: Any questions?

Mound.

MS. BEACH: At this time Mound has a work group scheduled for a two day meeting for May 27th and the 28th. We do have a number of topics to discuss in those two days. It's looking like it's going to be a very full two day schedule at this point. going to cover White Papers from both SC&A and NIOSH, some of those include neutron doses, high-fired Pu-238, radon, quite a list. believe everybody got the one-page brief. that is all I'll say at this point. Hopefully we will be able to close a couple of the items during that work group meeting and get to the bottom of some of these during that timeframe. Thank you.

quick

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already, reported. And Pantex.

CLAWSON:

MR.

MR. KATZ: Any questions?

Okay, and then NTS has discussed

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Questions? MR. KATZ:

have a work group scheduled yet.

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DR. MELIUS: Just

question, I think you've done this, but just

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Pantex work group has not met yet. We have

At this time the

front before we get into it. One of our big

been trying to do some security issues up

issues is how to be able to take care of this

classified information in a public setting.

We have made one trip to Amarillo where we did try to take care of some of these issues, but due to things beyond our control we weren't able to do that. We were able to speak with petitioners and learn a little bit more information. We have tomorrow scheduled security briefing with Pantex, and headquarters personnel, to be able to deal with this. SC&A has issued their report. are still waiting for a report back from NIOSH on their SC&A report. At this time we don't

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for the record, there were some issues raised petitioners last night about the communication and being unaware of activities of the Work Group and so forth. And I believe you have talked to them, but if you just want to update us. I just want to make sure that they are aware of what is going understand and will be going forward.

MR. One of the CLAWSON: petitioners I was given her email, and so I let her know that I was the Work Group chair and this is what is a little bit troublesome to me is that no notification went out to them. So Ι know that there and are disconnects and so forth like that. just wanted to -- we will take that and go on from there.

DR. ZIEMER: Larry.

MR. ELLIOTT: I spoke with [Identifying information redacted] last night, and she had been contacted. She admitted that she had been contacted about the Redondo Beach meeting. She admitted that she had been contacted and consulted about the petition in

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recognize that that is part of the interaction that we have with folks.

the qualification process. But she failed to

It is our responsibility, I feel, to make sure that through our SEC counselor that we contact these petitioners and that they are notified as to when a work group meeting is going to be held. So that is on us, I feel, and we have been doing that.

And I took a little issue with [Identifying information redacted] last night about the fact that she articulated that she had not been contacted. But she has. And she told us she could not be available for the Redondo Beach meeting. She would prefer that the meeting was held here, of course. explained to her at the time that the Board the agenda on where they hold meetings, and that they can't hold meetings at every location where there is an SEC petition that is going to be discussed at that point in She understood that; she accepted that time. last night.

So I just wanted for the record, we

think we have an obligation to talk to petitioners, and we do. And we will make sure 2 that the petitioners know about the Work Group 3 meetings, when you schedule it. Mr. Wiley is 4 interested in knowing when this work group 5

meeting gets scheduled, and I'll make sure 6

7 that he knows.

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And Larry, that was DR. CLAWSON: the questions that I was kind of one of wondering about, whether it fell into worker what. It's like having this outreach or meeting here in Amarillo, many of the people last night were saying that the reason they found out about it was because it was on the And I thought -- and this may be my mistake -- but I thought that when we had petitioners like Pantex or so forth like that, it they had been not compensated whatever, that they were notified of meetings and so forth like that in the area.

MR. ELLIOTT: Let's be clear. do send letters to all active claimants. told them about this meeting. They have a We told them who to contact if they

wanted more information about the meeting. Laurie contacted the SEC petitioners that had a stake or interest in this meeting, and told them what was on the agenda. And since it's Amarillo, called and talked in she [Identifying information redacted]. The Board chair wants to know which petitioner is going to be available for which session, and that's doi of Laurie's is to feed that part information to the Board chair so he knows who is going to be available and when. And so we are making those things happen. I'm sorry if people on the outside feel that we need to do But I don't a better job, and we will try. know how much more I can do.

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DR. CLAWSON: And we understand that. It's just like anything, when anybody makes a comment about us we try to follow up.

MR. ELLIOTT: As I do too, you see me pull them out and see if I can find out what the root cause is because I want to cure it. And in this instance all I can say is, we made the contact. We will continue to try to improve and make more -- we sent out a media

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announcement, we put it in what we thought, we were told, would be the right local media to present that in. talked to reporters We before we came down here.

You saw me yesterday. I understand my face on the TV gets people in the room. Ι don't know why. Maybe they want to take a poke at me. But you know we are happy to do that, and we want to make sure folks know that you guys are meeting. So we are trying to do all of those things. If you have ideas or thoughts on where we can improve let me know.

> DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Robert.

MR. in the PRESLEY: Ιt was We were here a couple of days newspaper. early, and we saw it in the newspaper. had a big article in the newspaper about the meeting.

> DR. ZIEMER: We can proceed.

Rocky Flats. MR. KATZ:

The Rocky Flats work MR. GRIFFON: group hasn't met, and one item that is sort of outstanding on the Work Group's agenda is the Ruttenber Database. Larry gave

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yesterday on that. And all I would ask is that once the NIOSH report is finalized that they bring it to the Work Group. I did commit to the petitioners and congressional staffers that we would discuss it in the Work Group. So once that product is final we will call a work group meeting, either by phone or person, and look at that, look at resolved there, and we may or may not have to go further than that.

We haven't asked SC&A to look at that database yet, but it is on the O drive. I've tried to familiarize myself with it, but I haven't gone further than that. I might ask SC&A to do the same before our work group meeting certainly. We'd ask them to look at NIOSH's report, but that is down the line. I guess that is what we are waiting for that product, and I understand it's pretty close to being ready.

> Thank you. Larry? DR. ZIEMER:

Just to be clear on MR. ELLIOTT: the process we intended to send the report to the whole board, and you guys in the Work

Group decide what you are going to do with it.

But we were going to give the whole board the chance to review the whole report.

MR. GRIFFON: Yes, distribution is fine. Yes, send it to the whole Board, that is fine. I just wanted to honor my agreement to have a work group discussion of it.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you.

We are going to go ahead and take our lunch recess at this point. We are past the appointed hour. I would like to encourage us to be back by the appointed time. That leaves us one hour and 15 minutes. Do we need that long? Okay, I guess we do.

Okay, we will recess for lunch.

Return promptly so we can start at 1:30.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 12:17 p.m. and resumed at 1:30 p.m.)

DR. ZIEMER: We are ready to resume our deliberations. Just for the record Dr. Lockey had to leave, so -- but of course we still have a quorum so we are able to proceed.

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I've asked -- and we have tasked

We are going to finish up the Work Group reports; there's only a couple left to do. Then we will move immediately to discussion of the security issues that have been raised earlier by Dr. Melius, and we want to have those while we still have the DOE staff people with us this afternoon.

So Ted, where are we on the Work Groups?

MR. KATZ: Yes, we are up to Santa I don't know, Mike, if there is Susana. anything to add? I don't think so. Savannah River Site.

MR. GRIFFON: Yes, Savannah River is in a similar situation as LANL that I reported earlier, that the Evaluation Report was presented by NIOSH. And there are a couple of areas that are sort of reserved for further research, specifically the issues of thorium especially in the early years; pre-1960, I believe. And then neutron dose reconstructions, how they are going approach neutron dose reconstructions.

SC&A with reviewing the Evaluation Report. Same sort of process as LANL, review the Evaluation Report, conduct interviews that you would normally do for the follow up for our evaluation process, but in these areas where NIOSH says they're still developing it doesn't make sense to -- for SC&A to spend resources in those areas obviously.

One concern I just wanted to raise,
I got an update from Tim Taulbee on the status
sort of in preparation for this meeting. And
in his email he indicated to me that due to
the quote perceived low priority of this
Savannah River petition resources have been
pulled. So he wasn't sure how quickly these
coworker models and other things would be
developed.

He also put in here that data access was a challenge. There was a slow down--and this might have been the site resource issue. So I don't know if NIOSH can speak to either one of these. I mean if it is perceived that it is a low priority from the Board, I don't think it's true. I haven't had

a work group meeting, but it's only because we don't have these things completed. And I just wanted to make sure that the resources are

being dedicated to this so we can finish up.

DR. NETON: I think they are. I saw Tim's email as well, and have not had a chance to talk to him about it. I am not sure where that phrase is coming from, low priority of this project; I don't view it that way.

MR. RUTHERFORD: Actually, Stu had said he had talked to you, and this is -- I'm just relaying how the priorities kind of shifted a little bit. Stu had indicated that he had talked to you; that you weren't in a big hurry at the time because there were so many other things on the plate right now you weren't in a big hurry to convene that work group.

Now if that was misinterpreted, that's no problem. One of the things that we have done is, some of the resources that we are working on, the data capture and the data coding, had shifted to the Hanford to close out a couple of those issues, since Hanford

has been on an out for quite some time. So we shifted those resources to lock down a couple of those things, and then that would only delay the work at Savannah River for a couple of weeks.

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So I don't think there is a huge delay.

And it might have GRIFFON: I mean I did talk to Stu; this was been. probably at а DR Subcommittee meeting or something. But I expressed the concern that from the Board's standpoint, that's where it's a little bit of a disconnect, but from the Board's standpoint I think I was talking about we need to prioritize, because I feel like we come back to work groups and we rehash issues that we have been to at the last meeting, because they are so far apart we have to sort of review. And I was just talking that maybe we should prioritize, Fernald and Mound and some other ones were probably furthest along and we should probably try to close them out.

But that wasn't any official board position, and I would hope it wouldn't in

anyway tell NIOSH to hold off on doing this work. So anyway.

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MR. KATZ: SEC Work Group.

DR. MELIUS: Our Work Group has We should be setting up a meeting not met. shortly. SC&A just finished up a week or two ago on a response to NIOSH on the Dow site. Hopefully making we are progress on [Identifying information redacted] FOI requests and other information requests, think it will be timely there.

We also at the same meeting would need to deal with the 250-day issue. We need to meet. But I think now with the --relatively shortly should be the time for that.

MR. KATZ: Okay, and I can just -on the question of the Dow, the FOIA, I know
the last bits there were a couple of documents
that DOE needed to review, because they had
never been reviewed -- the DOE documents had
never been reviewed under the current
clearance process, and they have been reviewed
just recently. So you should be getting the

last bit of that, which is great.

TBD 6000.

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DR. ZIEMER: The TBD 6000/6001 work group met on March 11th, and the main focus there is on Appendix BB, which is basically General Steel Industries.

We are dealing with the Landauer film badge data. SC&A has provided some and input, had input we've some from [Identifying information redacted], and NIOSH is reviewing that data, and we still have some issues to resolve. But many of the issues at General Steel revolved around the film badge data as well as exposure to unbadged people. So we are still dealing with those issues. We will be meeting again very soon.

MR. KATZ: That concludes I think
-- oh no, I'm sorry, Worker Outreach, Mike.

MR. GIBSON: Oh, nothing new to add other than we have a work group meeting scheduled June 16th in Cincinnati.

MR. KATZ: Okay, and I left out -- skipping here -- Surrogate Data, too, which is also --

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DR. MELIUS: You would think that Surrogate Data would have no information -- only to report from other committees.

MR. GRIFFON: Can I just ask a question on the worker outreach before we go into surrogate data?

On worker outreach, I asked this question of Mike during one of our breaks, but from what I understand, there used to be at least on the O drive a database with all the comments and stuff. Can someone give me an update on that? I don't seem to find the database on the O drive that has the collected these all worker comments from outreach meetings. I thought that existed, and then I heard there was an updated version of it or something. Has anybody -- maybe you can get an answer back to us or whatever.

And sort of as a -- maybe --

MR. ELLIOTT: The whisper database doesn't exist anymore; it's gone. And it's been consumed in another ORAU software program. I don't know if it's on the O drive or not. The ATL outreach efforts that are

summary minutes of 1 summarized in those 2 interactions are on the website. MR. GRIFFON: Well, that's all 3 fine and good, but is there a database? That's 4 what I'm asking. 5 6 MR. ELLIOTT: There is. I don't know if it's on the O drive. 7 I don't know where it's at. I'll have to get that info for 8 9 you. 10 MR. GRIFFON: Because part of the question is to have it in the database to see 11 if there are similar comments, and also to see 12 13 what happens with these comments. Those are some of the issues we have. So I was just 14 15 wondering. 16 MR. ELLIOTT: Well, there is a tracking system. That's what you want to see; 17 that's what you're asking for. The tracking 18 19 system, I'm sure you all have been given that, but we will reissue that to you. 20 MR. GRIFFON: Maybe I just don't 21 know where it is. It might be that I'm not 22

24 DR. ZIEMER: Jim.

finding it.

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DR. MELIUS: Does this database include comments that people submit in the public comment periods at the Board meetings?

I thought at one point ORAU had been tasked to collect that information and provide some sort of record, possibly --

MR. ELLIOTT: No, ORAU had not been tasked to do that. ORAU was at one point in time, on their own initiative, they were tracking those kind of things for their own management of their other tasks. And that got generated into this whisper database that was just unsearchable and unusable. It was an application that we did not ask for. The government doesn't hire contractors to develop these applications; we want to give them an application. couldn't So we accept that application.

The Board public comment period is only kept in the transcript record at this time. There is no concerted effort to tease out from board public comments issues that need to be followed up on. We follow up on those, you see me do it here at the meetings.

It's not a formal documented process.

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MR. GRIFFON: And just a related question, it's maybe a little off topic, but there also exists at least I understand there exists a questionnaire database that has all the CATI questionnaires in it. Is that on the O drive? I haven't been able to find that either. Maybe it doesn't exist?

MR. ELLIOTT: CATIS are kept within the claim files. So each claim file has CATI for every claimant that is interviewed. There compilation is no those, and I'm not going there because DOE wants to review every one of those, and I'm not going to let them, flat out. I'm just going to be that candid about it. No. Ιf they were in a compilation they would have If they are contained within access to them. the individual specific claim file, we've convinced them that they don't need a security review.

MR. GRIFFON: Oh, I see.

MR. ELLIOTT: Okay? This is one of the things I fought hard for, and I'm not

willing to relinquish, and I think rightfully so for the claimants.

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MR. GRIFFON: I understood it existed, so I must have misunderstood that.

MR. ELLIOTT: Unless I am speaking out of my hat. The CATIs are kept within the claim files. That's where you are going to find them. You won't find a compilation of those in a relational, searchable database.

MR. KATZ: Okay then Surrogate.

DR. MELIUS: At last.

Surrogate Data Work Group I'll remember this next time -- Surrogate Data little Work Group did meet. We had а difficulty organizing a meeting just because of everyone's calendar and other conflicts, and Dr. Lockey was out of the country for an extended period. So we postponed trying to deal with sort of the general criteria issues related to the use of surrogate data until we had a full work group meeting or at least a more complete work group meeting, more people definitely would going to be available.

We did spend time reviewing the

Texas City Chemical's SEC because that is based on largely on surrogate data, and heard from the petitioners about any issues they raised; heard from both NIOSH and SC&A on the status of their review on it.

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And my understanding, which has been somewhat confused by LaVon's today. So I'll ask for an update. But there -- and then I can -- maybe after this we can talk more about where we go from here. NIOSH has, after the Evaluation Report was received, had obtained additional some information from DOE about the site. And that has never been incorporated into an Evaluation Report, and would need to be because it could potentially change the current NIOSH evaluation and what would happen to the site significantly.

SC&A has never had the opportunity to review that information also, so it's not incorporated into SC&A's review of the Evaluation Report. The Evaluation Report was issued in December or January of '08 I believe. The SC&A report in July of '08. Now

what I'm a little confused on is where NIOSH is in terms of planning to do a revised Evaluation Report. At the Work Group meeting we were told that they wanted to wait until after the Blockson issue was addressed, because that is also an issue that would come up with Texas City. And then LaVon seemed to imply in his report that no, they were going to go ahead and do the revised Evaluation

Report.

Now maybe I misheard or whatever, but if someone could just provide an update.

MR. RUTHERFORD: I-- I don't know how I came across it, but we are -- we all are waiting on the radon issue to be resolved as well. Now there is additional documentation that we have to update the Evaluation Report to include that documentation. But finalizing that radon model still is on the plate if I'm correct.

DR. MELIUS: Okay, because one of the difficulties we've had here, and I'm not sure how it occurred, but the information that was received from DOE if I understand

correctly has only recently been made available to the Board. The letter, if I understand this right, was put on the O drive, but the actual information from DOE wasn't -- I'm not even sure it still has, so SC&A was not aware of it. It's even more confusing, Jim did mention -- Jim Neton did mention it in his I believe April 2008 presentation to the Board, though reviewing the transcript I became even more confused.

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DR. NETON: Yes, it's true. Ι mentioned the existence of those new data, the new references, during my presentation of the Evaluation Report in Tampa I believe is where that was. And it is true that we posted the letter from the Department of Energy, the transmittal letter which included the attachments which were those documents. And for some reason we only -- there was a mix-up within our office -- we only posted the letter and not the attachments that went along on the O drive. That has since been rectified, and all the documents are on the O drive, and I think an email went out to all the working group members at least indicating where they are located on the O drive, and SC&A was also copied on that email. So everything is out there now in the open, and we are starting to move forward with the revision of the ER based on that new information.

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But as LaVon suggested, we do feel it's important for a complete document to have some approach for the radon reconstruction which would be not dissimilar to what we are proposing for Blockson Chemical.

So a couple of things DR. MELIUS: follow from this. One is, I think it would be -- and I haven't talked this over with other work group members -- but I think it would be helpful if SC&A reviewed the new information, at least became familiar with it, even though it's not in an Evaluation Report yet, I think it'd be helpful in our overall thinking about how to proceed. It's out there, and they actually commented on this issue in their report; it has something to do with how much information is available regarding production periods at this pilot facility.

So if the other members -- if that's okay with the other members of the Work Group I'd like to proceed with that. I don't think it's a big task, but it'd be worth doing.

Secondly I think it does sort of change how we've been approaching the overall surrogate data issue. We had been hoping to use some examples such as Texas City as one where -- as an example of surrogate data. I think the problem is to use the current Texas City Evaluation Report and look at that in terms of surrogate data doesn't make sense, because it's really not a complete report, until we get the new information that was added to it.

And I think a lot of the judgments that are made on the use of surrogate data depends on how much information is available on a site. And the less information, in some sense, the less -- the more justification one needs for using surrogate data, or how do you tie the surrogate data to the site is limited by that. So I don't think that makes sense

going forward.

So one approach, I think the surrogate data working group will need to meet again. We need to talk about the general criteria, perhaps also think of some other approaches that we can use to come up with some examples. I'm reluctant to use Bethlehem given our long history with that, but at some point we also need to deal with that site so I don't want to put it off too long.

But I think we first need a meeting to talk about the general criteria, and then we'll move from there.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. I'm not sure whether we need formal tasking on what you suggested. It's not a great effort, but I'll ask Ted, do we need to task SC&A on that issue.

MR. KATZ: I think they are so tasked.

DR. ZIEMER: Under the existing task you are saying?

MR. KATZ: Yes.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay, fine, I just

wanted to make sure. I think that completes
our work group reports.

I'd like to have us move now to the

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DR. MELIUS: Can I make one other comment?

DR. ZIEMER: Okay, you are eating into your security time.

MELIUS: I know, but this DR. includes sort of self criticism also. think it also points out the need to do at least periodic communication between group chairs, SC&A and NIOSH on where things stand. Because this went on -- everybody thinking it was on the O drive. Everybody at NIOSH thinking they had told people about it, et cetera. And I think if we had done what we are doing for example like at Hanford trying to do at least, even when there are delays, some periodic quick technical calls, whatever you want to call them, just to keep updated, I think it would have been better for all of us.

And I'm not faulting anybody per se. All of us I think are equally guilty in

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this. But it's a difficult situation and I think we should try to avoid it in the future. When there are these things we sort of delay ourselves thinking we are waiting for something else to happen.

DR. ZIEMER: Right, and SC&A is before each meeting has been preparing a kind of summary of where we are on things. I don't know to what extent that would cover some of your concerns, but nonetheless it's a good suggestion.

MR. couple MAURO: Α of observations. The ground rules we've been working on is, once we deliver a work product to the Board, we stop all work until the Work Group forms or until the Work Group gives us direction. For example this action item related to following up on Texas City, that would not be something we would automatically do until the Work Group told us. So for all intents and purpose, we have just been given that mission.

The second item you had mentioned -

DR. ZIEMER: The summary?

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MR. MAURO: The summary material. Ι summary material, I When prepare the usually limit my ___ for example in this particular meeting I limited it to Mound, Fernald and NTS. It's basically a judgment call when there has been a lot of activity, lots of work group meetings, lots of White Papers going back and forth, lots of direction given, I will submit a summary on that. don't submit a summary on everything.

And it's really right now a judgment that I make. However if you feel that a summary of that nature is appropriate for all active work groups certainly we could do that also, probably a lot briefer than the ones I send.

DR. ZIEMER: Well, I would say for now we will put the burden on the Work Group the coordination chairs to make sure carried out. They can sort of monitor their own work groups. I don't see the need to task SC&A at this time with additional things. think Jim has pointed out potential the

problem we have of thinking that someone else is doing something. So I guess right now it would just behoove the chairs to continue to track with their contact, or both contacts, SC&A and the NIOSH contact, and make sure that things are on track. Thank you.

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MR. KATZ: And can I just add to that? And I'd encourage all the chairs to copy me when you are doing that, these communications, because then I can sort of help out in the tracking process.

DR. ZIEMER: Now let's move to the issue of security, particularly with respect to the issues that Dr. Melius raised earlier in the meeting.

DR. ZIEMER: As I've thought about this and others have probably thought about it too, it seemed to me that to get underway we need to identify the kinds of issues that would arise. And I think Jim, you sort of delineated some of them, broadly, but in certain cases with specificity. And think about what kind of problems could arise with respect

of classified information. handling For example, to point out an example, how can the Work Group function if they are dealing with classified material? Or how does the Board function if there is classified material involved? How do we involve the petitioners which normally have free access to our work group meetings and so on?

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So one of the things we need to do is identify those potential problems. It may be that we don't have a full grasp of what kind of problems could arise until we actually get into it, but certainly the DOE folks here and others who have been dealing with the classified material can help us define that, and also I think I'd like to get a feeling for whether or not we are going to need to think about having a subset, a work group, look in greater detail than we might be able to get into at this meeting or at a regular board meeting in terms of what the issues are, and how one might deal with them.

Are there some policy things that need to be determined in terms of whether or

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not we will have to meet full disclosure of information to the full board in order to make decisions on, for example, SECs?

So with those kinds of background comments, Ted, you have some additional ones, and then we'll get some others after that.

MR. KATZ: Yes, just to preface this discussion, let me just explain a little bit about at least what has come up to this point with my involvement. As has been mentioned there's been issues with Pantex, with Pinellas, with a few sites where we have sensitive information and concerns about this.

And what we have done so far, we have not -- we have not had working group meetings regarding those sites, regarding those issues. But what we have done is sent members of the Working Group as members of the SC&A staff and members of OCAS to meet with the security experts facilities to responsible for those discussions serious not about any deliberations with respect to the Board on the petitions or what have you, the site profile,

se, but only to you, per discussions about process in terms of how can we have the discussions that we need to have working group while maintaining as classified protection of and sensitive information. And they have been -- so they've been sort of explaining to the DOE security people this is the nature of information that we really need to have debates about on the Board to be able to come to understanding about what our position is with respect to this petitioner site profile. And then giving it -- giving DOE with that understanding an ability to give them guidance as to how can you present this information without it posing security problems. And that -- so that has been the full nature of the interactions with DOE as I understand it, at least in terms of the guidance I've given them in terms having these meetings with them, so that they could pave the way for having -- because the goal is certainly to have work group meetings and board meetings where everything that needs to be discussed is discussed in the open, not

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DR. ZIEMER:

Okay, maybe we could

a closed classified meeting which legally is possible, but that is not our aim on this board to have anything behind the curtain in effect that has to be debated and discussed to come to a conclusion. So that is where we are coming from at least, and that's what's happened to date.

DR. ZIEMER: Phil, did you have a comment at this point?

MR. SCHOFIELD: Yes. Joe Fitzgerald, who was along with Brad and Bob and Josie, attended the meeting in D.C. with the security people. And they gave us kind of general guidelines, what we can and cannot say and do. It is going to have an impact on several of the sites. Because there were several things, they gave us more leeway than we had before. But we still -- there are some things that we just will not be able to discuss except in very generic terms. I don't know if everybody on the Board got his notes from that meeting which are pretty good.

hear from NIOSH and also DOE if you have some

comments for us at this point would be good also. Larry.

MR. ELLIOTT: It is important for the Board to be comfortable in understanding what information is behind the curtain. But I think we want you to understand that we see it starting with our work in researching whatever the issue is, developing the site profile, evaluating a petition and understanding what it is we can say about it, what we can't say about it.

So when we bring something to the table, our goal is that it -- unlike I think we learned out lesson in the Iowa experience.

We are not going to come to this board with a proposal on how we are going to handle something that we can't talk about in public.

I can't say it any clearer than that. We are going to bring something that we can talk about in public.

That doesn't mean that there might be information that is behind that that the Board wants to become familiar with and understand. But our goal is to bring

something to the table that has not been classified, not in any way sensitive information.

In our discussion in Germantown we talked about, I talked about the fact that some of the information that was of concern for that day was not necessarily an SEC issue in our mind but really an implementation issue of within a site profile, and how we implement that, and the Board would need to see that, and we would perhaps say how we were going to do X differently at different sites, because of the constraints in classification at different sites.

But it is still our goal not to bring anything to the Board that can't be discussed in public. But I understand and I appreciate the Board's interest to be comfortable in knowing what is behind that.

DR. ZIEMER: Greg or Gina, do you have any comments at this point?

DR. ZIEMER: Greg.

MR. LEWIS: Sure, thank you, Paul.

I would say we have general

be able to make your

We agree with what Larry said as

1 2 far as the history and what we have done to get here. And we have the same goal. We want 3 4 to allow you to discuss the things that you need to discuss to 5 decisions and we'd like to be able to discuss 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

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can use it.

it without getting into territory that can't be aired in public, and there are a number of tools that we can provide to do that, both these briefings that give you some guidelines about what to say. We also review documents, if there are ever statements you'd like to prepare we can review that, specifically language-wise to get a very detailed specific statement that you can read in front of the public. So there are a number of different tools that we are prepared to provide, and we are willing to work with you to get

Larry, additional 22 DR. ZIEMER: 23 comment?

information you need in the manner that you

think 24 ELLIOTT: Ι it is MR.

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important to note for the record that the Board and SC&A have more Q-cleared people than ORAU and NIOSH/OCAS have. And I just think that is important to put on the record so that folks in the audience and folks in the public understand that you are taking this serious. We understand how serious you are taking it. But there are more cleared people on this Board and in SC&A than there are at OCAS and ORAU collectively.

The issue is not DR. ZIEMER: going to be access to the information, it's going to be how we are able to deal with it in a public forum in a manner that provides the protection yet is sufficiently proper transparent so that all Board members and all of the public have some level of members confidence in how the material is handled and how decisions are made.

DR. ZIEMER: Wanda Munn, then Dr. Melius.

MS. MUNN: Doesn't our concern here really at the base become whether or not any of these sites have such inadequate

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bioassay and dosimetry data that we have to use extraordinary methods of dose reconstruction? At base isn't the question whether we have adequate personnel records for these?

DR. ZIEMER: I guess you are asking do we need to go to process and source term information that might jeopardize the classification issues. I don't know the answer to that. Is that the question?

Well, that's almost the MS. MUNN: question but not quite. The real question is, are we certain to begin with that the sites we concerned with do adequate are not have personnel data for to make the us reconstructions? Because if the records exist then the number of secure meetings or secure documents that we might have to see might be very small.

DR. ZIEMER: I don't know that we know the answer to that. But in almost every case, even where there is a plethora of dosimetry data there seems to always be a subset where some sort of cohort or coworker

dataset or other estimating methods have to be used.

Larry.

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MR. ELLIOTT: I think the answer
- I would frame it as a slightly different
question. It does go back to the touchstone
for an SEC situation: can we effectively bound
dose. Or more precisely estimate dose. And
so when we get into that for an SEC question,
are there things that weren't monitored or
aspects of the process that yielded exposure
or dose that can't be accounted for in the
monitoring process?

And if we've got to speak about that in a classified setting, I'm telling you we are not going to come to the table with To me, I'm going to say that's an that. 83.14, we're just done. We can't talk about it in public; we're just done. Okay? But that doesn't cure your problem, because there are situations, we can come to the Board and we can say, we can effectively bound the dose for this site, for that issue. And we'll be using words that been able we have

1 approved to use that won't violate national security, but there will be information behind 2 that that you may want to see, individual 3

board members may want to see.

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Does that help? Yes, it does. touchstone here is, can we effectively bound Can we sufficiently reconstruct dose? into situations like And if we get attempted to do at Iowa, which was not a well designed or a well envisioned modeling effort, I'll give you that. We missed the boat there. We don't want to come to this table and say, here's the way we have modeled that dose, but we can't tell you what the parameters are because they are classified. We are not going to do that.

> DR. ZIEMER: Jim.

I actually agree with DR. MELIUS: both Wanda and Larry, and I think the issue is not going to come up if we just simply accept what NIOSH has proposed. But when we have questions about it, and when or the claimants or petitioners have questions about it.

And I think, thinking back to last night, I think we heard lots of issues that were process and procedural issues, and so forth, at Pantex, that the claimants and petitioners were concerned about and that they raised.

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And I question whether we are going to be able to handle those in the same manner that we handle them now. Again it's all well intended, and I think it is necessary to do to try to see what we can talk about and so But not everybody on the Board is Ocleared, everybody in the not public petitioners are Q-cleared, and we have not а Q-cleared setting for operated in the actions and activities of the Board. And that would be a major change in the Board and how the Board's activities were perceived, because people, petitioners and so forth, are very skeptical of this program, and very concerned about it, as we heard at length last night.

And I just don't see a very good way of doing this. And I see us very quickly on Pantex or one of these other sites running

a situation here I ask a question or somebody else on the Board asks a question saying, okay, show me, why is this? are you proposing this way? Or what about Or trying to link something that a this? petitioner or a claimant said to understand it in the context of what's being proposed. that is going to raise a security issue. what are we going to do? And am I going to feel comfortable -- you say, I'm sorry, we can't talk about that. Or two or three of us have to go off in a closed room and talk about that and come back and say whatever. I think that -- certainly it's a major change in the program, and I think we have to decide how far we want to go one doing that, and also what level of resources we are going to spend in doing that. Because we could spend an awful lot of time trying to figure this out and still might not get a resolution. We already have enough problems resolving issues on SEC evaluations without adding another problem to that list, and to that. At one point we also, and I think I hear Larry talking differently

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now on behalf of NIOSH, but at one point we were told that security could not be the basis for making something an SEC. That was sort of a mysterious legal opinion that we never could get much follow up on. But I think that is still relevant, basically relevant to how we should have to decide how to proceed here and so forth. But I just am very skeptical that we are going to be able to move forward on a site like Pantex or some of these other sites where it seems the security issue is also the key issue related to the Special Cohort for that evaluation. And it's problem.

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DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Other comments? Ted?

MR. KATZ: I would just suggest, I appreciate fully what you said, Jim. I guess I would just propose that we give this -- now that there are several work groups that are sort of on the brink of this, of sort of trying to go forward this way, that we give it a run for its money, and if we -- when we actually bang our nose up against the wall if

we do, we can then evaluate how do we deal with this.

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But I think it's hard to deal with it in the abstract, not actually knowing exactly whether these problems can actually be mechanically fixed a piece at a time as they occur, or whether we do really run into a situation where we can't operate with transparency the way we want to.

DR. MELIUS: And I think we already have an example, which is Pantex, which is already causing problems.

MR. ELLIOTT: Τ think it's appropriate for the Board to call attention to this, but it's not a change. This is not a change. We have been operating like this; you just didn't realize it. We have not brought anything to the table that you had brought question on that resulted in going behind the So we have done effectively what I have been relating to you as our goal. you are right, Dr. Melius, in the example of Pantex, we are dealing with a whole other kettle of fish. And it could go awry, and so

I think it's good to call attention to it.

But I just want you to understand, there is no change. We have been -- at NIOSH we have been operating this way to bring to the table a nonsensitive but sensible--I hope--approach on how we are going to handle the issue. If we can't do that, then we are going to add a class. I am not going to bring something to the table that I can't talk about in public.

DR. ZIEMER: Additional comments?
You would have to wait until the public comment period, sir, sorry.

Ted has suggested that -- sort of pragmatically, that we face the issue or issues as they come with eyes wide open I guess or something like that.

I'm struggling in my own mind as to whether or not we could effectively develop any kind of policy in the abstract, not knowing exactly the nature of the hurdles that we would come to.

Larry, I guess what you are saying, and you have said that Pantex is a new kettle of fish and perhaps the security issues will

be more salient here than they were in other places, or more impinging on what we do that would I guess remain to be seen. But if at some point, even though one could discuss in open meeting how general approaches, if fact board members, or members of the public could not qain information on how, example, the coworker model would be either developed or applied or some sort of important parameter of dose reconstruction, are telling us then that NIOSH would default to a saying that because position of disclose the needed information we would have

to then defer to an 83.14?

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MR. ELLIOTT: Well, I think that is the worst case scenario. I am not saying that is going to be the rule. I think actually that will probably be the exception. But it is an option. It's an option that is based not necessarily on the fact that there is something behind the screen that we can't talk about. In my opinion it's an option that is based on, well, are we going to have to develop some modeling approach that we really

can explain in public to account for that kind of dose. And if that is the case I'm going to say no. I don't want to do that. I don't think that's right. If we scientifically can't explain how we're modeling this because there are parameters that we can't speak about, we're not going to do that. That's in 83.14 in my opinion.

DR. ZIEMER: Let me just -- well, let me ask actually counsel to come to the mic to speak to this since there are legal implications here.

MS. HOWELL: With all due respect that is not a legal basis for moving for an 83.14.

DR. ZIEMER: Which is what we bumped into in Iowa I believe.

MS. HOWELL: Right. I mean just because it can't be publicly discussed does not mean it can't be scientifically done by persons with the correct clearance. So I think that this is a little bit more of a thorny issue both legally and policy-wise, and it can be discussed further. We can look into

some things further. But I would hesitate to agree with what Larry has said.

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MR. ELLIOTT: And I appreciate that legal counsel. But I'm telling you, I'm to put something up here that's not going can't going to be something we defend publicly. So the lawyers can do what they want, and they can talk to the Secretary, but I'm not bringing that stuff forward. that's where we're at.

DR. ZIEMER: It looks like there are probably two levels of this, one of which is a legal level, and that would have to be solved at the Agency level I presume. The other will be a practical -- yes.

MR. ELLIOTT: -- on 8313(b) and (c). And if we've got to go to extra extremes to try to research something and model it, I got a time element I can call. And that's what I'll do.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. Josie.

MS. BEACH: I personally would like to see maybe further exploration of this

in a work group possibly. Because waiting until it hits us I don't think is a good method. I've already come across it with Mound, and I don't really have any clear direction on the one item we have to deal with how we are going to discuss it. So I would like to propose that maybe we get a work group together.

DR. ZIEMER: We need more work groups, right?

Brad, do you have a comment and then Phil.

MR. CLAWSON: I understand what Josie is talking about, because we are both stubbing our noses right now. And this has been the concern from the beginning. I have no problem with proceeding forward. But I have a problem with when do we get to that wall and how far do we push it and so forth like that.

And this is a very complex question. How do I come back to the Board and say, we've addressed this, we've addressed this, and then certain questions come into it

that I can't.

DR. ZIEMER: Phil?

MR. SCHOFIELD: Some of these questions that we're going to run into are the key to a lot of these sites. Pinellas is one that if we can't deal with these in some generic way, we're sunk.

DR. ZIEMER: Robert.

MR. PRESLEY: Get Wanda.

DR. ZIEMER: Wanda.

MS. MUNN: Again I have to point out, if we are dealing with a black box situation where we cannot publicly discuss what's inside the black box, if the employees who were inside that black box have adequate bioassay and monitoring data for reasonable dose reconstructions to begin, then it should not be necessary for anyone to explain what went on in the black box as long as we have the data.

If we don't have the data, then that's an entirely different question. But I'm hearing the assertion if not the basic assumption that that kind of data is not

likely to exist inside these very sensitive areas. And I don't know that we have a basis for making that assumption.

DR. ZIEMER: Robert.

MR. PRESLEY: Well, I've kept my mouth shut. This is what I do for a living.

One thing that I think this Board ought to understand is, we have people on this Board that are competent. We have working group leads that are competent on these areas where we are going to have classification problems.

Now if these working groups and the people cannot get together to have a Q-clearance and come up with a recommendation back to the Board, that is unclassified, then we really have a problem. The Board ought to be able to accept a decision of the people that are on these working groups that have the classification and the knowledge to make a decision on this stuff.

The other thing is, every site that we are going to go to has a classification office. When you get to an area and need

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MR. CLAWSON: And I agree with that to a point. But back to what Wanda was

something that is more than, say, a urinalysis report or something like this, or there's a document that mentions a material that unmentionable, then those documents can redacted hopefully to a point where the Board can get them, and if they would be unclassified.

I can see very, very, very few instances where things could not be redacted down to a Board level.

Now it may take awhile to do that, and it's going to end up having to go through headquarters in Washington to be done, but it can be done. People don't realize that the areas we are getting into today are national security, still national security. So we are going to have to work with it -- you don't work around it, you are going to have to work with it. But there are ways that it can be done.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you. Brad, additional comment?

saying about the black box, as we've got into every one of these sites there is partial information, which is subsidized with other lot information, and а of times one information isn't classified, the other isn't, but when you put them together, they become And that's -- the urinalysis and so forth like that, there's holes just like any other site, and I'm speaking of Pantex and with Mound. But part of what a work group chair that we are getting into -- and don't let me speak for Josie -- but we've still got issues that we are trying to have certain meetings to talk about stuff, and we can't really hold it as a work group, because we want to hold the transparency of what the Work Groups are, but talk about tritium, it's one that we've got to get out of the way and stuff, and we can't really meet at a work And this is why it's getting kind of frustrating as a work group chair.

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MR. ELLIOTT: Let me give an example based on what Brad just brought up, tritium. Highly soluble in tritium, highly

insoluble tritium compounds. I can say that.

But there are other things I can't say.

I can say that at Pinellas it's not a big issue. We heard that from DOE. That's what we heard; that's not what the public has heard yet. That's why the Board's process is so valuable and the transparency, so that the public can understand that the Board has been engaged in this and has heard what they needed to hear.

So at Pinellas, highly insoluble tritium compounds are not an issue per se from a dose. Also highly insoluble tritium compounds we must recognize have a primary effect on respiratory tract, not the rest of the cancers -- lung and respiratory tract. So we've got to keep that in mind.

And with that we've got to look, okay, given that side of Pinellas, it may not be a big issue; but at Mound it's a different story. Savannah River is different than Mound. Pantex is different than Savannah River and Mound. At Mound we may be able to say -- this all goes back to TIB-66, how are

we going to implement highly insoluble tritium compounds at different sites.

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I say that's a site profile issue; it's not an SEC issue. We say we can bound And we're not bounding it based that dose. upon a model that has parameters that we can't talk about in public, and we are implementing it at a given site unless we can talk about how we are implementing it and use the right words.

I don't know if that helps, but I hope it helps the public understand what we are talking about here. This is a critical example because it cuts across by my count five sites. And each site is different. Mound is probably on one end of the spectrum the biggest, baddest actor, and we have to be very careful about what we say and how we dose these compounds. Pinellas is at the other end of the spectrum. And then we got the three sites in the middle.

So that's an example, and we plan to come forward and tell the Board and the public and the petitioners, this is how we are working at Pinellas. This is how we are implementing TIB-66 at Pinellas. And the site profile, this is what it's going to say.

Mound is going to be an entirely different situation. We will tell the Board something entirely different than what we are doing at Pinellas. But it's going to be something we can say in public.

MR. KATZ: Can I just add a thought that Larry raised in my mind that may make a difference in this situation too is that I think that between the SC&A Q-cleared staff and the OCAS Q-cleared staff and Board members who are particularly versed in dose reconstruction, those individuals -- I mean I think there will be a difference in -- I understand Brad and Phil's concerns because they are just looking at all the information that can't be spoken.

But only certain of the information is necessarily going to be germane for how to do dose reconstructions, I think. And that's why I think practically going forward I think a lot will be learned from the SC&A staff and

the OCAS staff and the Board members who are health physics trained in terms of really what information is absolutely necessary to be discussed in the public forum, versus the larger scope of information, and clearly a lot of that will never come out from behind the curtain and shouldn't. But if it needn't, then it won't necessarily be an issue.

So I can see that it's sort of an imposing -- it looks like a high hill for now, but I do think that some experience with this will be very illuminating in what the real problems are.

DR. ZIEMER: Greg.

MR. LEWIS: I just wanted to reiterate there are a number of tools that we are willing and able to provide that will allow you to talk about these in terms of the briefings so you can discuss in public; also reviewing any documents or statements you'd like to prepare and read to the public, as well as setting up secure space to do work. So if somebody would like to prepare some documents in a secure area there are members

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of the Board, SC&A, NIOSH, OCAS, that all have access to a secure area so they can prepare certain statements and documents that we will then review and determine exactly what you are and aren't able to say, hopefully leaving in the information that you feel is important while keeping out the things that we need to keep out of the public domain. So I just want to reemphasize that.

> DR. ZIEMER: Jim.

DR. NETON: We want to make this practical, then, with what was just suggested, does that mean that I would submit a question in writing, I would hear a presentation, I would submit the question in writing. the answer would need to be reviewed. And either they would -- DOE would either have somebody on site here at the Board meetings to review that which I am skeptical of or that they would be sent and we would then wait 2-1/2 months to the next board meeting and I would get an answer, and then I would ask the follow up question, and then the follow up question would go on. That is my first issue.

My second practical issue is when are we going to have a work group meeting on Pantex, and how is that going to operate?

MR. KATZ: So can I just respond a little bit to this?

So on the first point the folks that are involved on the Board and SC&A and OCAS are getting guidance about parameters -- general guidance too, not just specific to the issue that they may have at hand, but so that when they come to a public forum and are having a discussion they have a decent understanding of their working parameters.

So I imagine some of the questions you might raise they will already be prepared, what can I say, what can't I say. You may raise a question that they are not prepared for or that they feel like they're on the edge with that, in which case I'm sure they would refrain. And you may be in exactly that situation where there needs to be feedback from DOE before they can go forward.

But at least to some extent I think there will be work done to try to anticipate

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is that a public work group meeting?

DR. MELIUS:

MR. KATZ: Yes, that is a public

So that work group --

what are the questions that might be raised and how can I deal with this in a public forum, or at least that's the hope.

The second question was Pantex, when will it get going. And again as far as preparations to date there are a number of board members who are going to be visiting for just this kind of Pantex briefing tomorrow, and SC&A staff and OCAS staff for exactly this, to get this guidance so that they can get this -- go forward with this. They had hoped to go forward earlier. had -- as Brad mentioned -- they had gone to Pantex, a number of these individuals earlier. There was a misfortunate with the scheduling with other things going on in Pantex; they couldn't do all of what they wanted to do. But presuming that this meeting is effective tomorrow, then there will be coming a time when they can schedule a work group meeting and get going.

work group meeting, absolutely. That is the whole idea.

DR. MELIUS: With a public transcript?

MR. KATZ: With a public transcript, absolutely.

DR. ZIEMER: Josie and Brad, and I think Phil had expressed a felt need to have a work group deal with some of these things in more detail.

One thought I had, Brad, would be to simply keep the Security Work Group in place for a time, and if you felt the need to discuss and develop both concerns and resolutions on some of these, perhaps that could be handled.

I'm somewhat reluctant to set up a new work group because in my mind, although we've discussed a lot of things, the parameters are still pretty fuzzy in terms of exactly what will or will not take place. We do need to gain some experience; perhaps this week's experience at Pantex, because I think Pantex and Pinellas have exemplified this and

Mound and Fernald to some extent as well. But as we gain a little experience that might delineate in more detail exactly where the glitches will be if there are to be any, or whether or not we will see a clear path.

And I'm just wondering if that wouldn't be a way just to keep the Work Group in place and give you the prerogative to, as you see some of these issues emerging, to call the group together and deal with it in more detail, and perhaps develop recommendations for the Board if you deem it necessary.

MR. CLAWSON: I think that's a good suggestion, actually. Because it'd be the same people if we made another work group.

DR. ZIEMER: But you are the folks who are the present time are dealing with the security issues on behalf of the Board. Most of the folks involved I think all have clearances and have dealt with the issues, so you certainly have a better feel for it if there are going to be problems.

You also understand what NIOSH is doing in terms of minimizing the impact of the

security issues on our ability to have transparent meetings. So I think we'd be in a position to at least evaluate and recommend if necessary to the Board.

John, do you have some wise words for us?

MR. MAURO: I don't know about wise, but a few words.

SC&A is an interesting microcosm of the problem you are discussing on a higher level. I don't have a Q clearance. I am responsible for the technical quality of all our deliverables. Before our work products leave our house, I read everything -- usually a team of people read everything. And I have to understand that what we are delivering to you makes sense to me. And if it doesn't make sense to me I'm not happy.

Now I'm going to know, because this happened in Iowa, I'm going to know when the piece of information we are about to deliver has in it -- trust me, I can't tell you about it but this is okay. I'm going to be almost like the first line of defense from SC&A's

perspective, you can think of it that way. That is, any work product that SC&A is working on in any capacity eventually comes out as a White Paper or an official report regarding an issue. And I'm sort of like the first barrier to that. And I — if it's any help I'm the first place where that is going to be tested; that is, are we delivering a product that I don't understand the reason, the rationale behind it, because there is some information in it that cannot be explained to me.

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I just wanted to leave you with that thought, because there are I guess filters, and I'm one of the filters.

Well, and that is DR. ZIEMER: quite analogous to the situation I think Mr. Presley described to some extent, that if you have that you have a set of folks who are cleared and a set of uncleared, and you get to a point where you say how comfortable are the uncleared folks in simply saying, yes, we will agree to this even though we don't know what Sometimes we are comfortable doing is. that, and other times are not SO

Phil.

MR. SCHOFIELD:

First I would like

They are not so comfortable with it to start with.

Mike has got a comment here, and then --

comfortable. So that is part of the dilemma.

And certainly if we are not comfortable, you

can figure what the general public is going to

- they're going to be mighty uncomfortable.

MR. GIBSON: That is just what I was going to say. What about the plants sitting out there, who have basically this process through administering instructions, it will take due process, and they are just going to be left holding the bag if we're saying, trust you.

DR. ZIEMER: Well, and I think Larry has expressed to us the desire on the part of NIOSH to try to avoid that having to be the case, that everything that they — that they would need to know about how things are done is transparent. In the event it isn't then we certainly have a problem.

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to let Greg Lewis know that we really appreciate all the work he's done on this issue for us in helping us get things done.

At the meetings in Germantown they gave us a lot more leeway than we used to have; they moved a lot of barriers. But I've already seen some questions that are very specific, and this is because some of the workers, this is what they did everyday. lot of things are going to have to be -- some of the things are going to wind up being answered in generic а more sense terminology, but we can still deal with those issues. We just have to be aware of what we We can't control what they say, but in say. of Larry's comments, а lot some and comments I agreed with him. It is an issue that we need to be aware of as a board.

DR. ZIEMER: I'm going to suggest as a path forward if it's agreeable that we do give our Security Work Group the flexibility to continue to look at this issue, to report back to us at the next Board meeting, particularly as you look at the outcome of the

Pantex review that occurs this week and any follow ups as well as your own work groups, report back to the Board if you have either particular concerns or particular issues that you have identified. I think we need to be monitoring this. I don't feel that we're in a position today to come up with either policies or directives as to how we will proceed. I think the problem has been identified; we thank Dr. Melius for raising the issue. And I think we have people who can now monitor this and keep us apprised of how we should proceed.

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Mike, do you have an additional comment on this? No?

Would that be agreeable as a path forward so that we continue to look at this issue?

MR. CLAWSON: I just have question the Work Group chair for as Security Group. Are we just going to Or are there issues that we monitoring this? have to handle or look into for these? Τ guess this is my issue. I guess I'm wondering are tasked with. Because we

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already been told that we cannot hold a work group that is not open to the public, and being the Security Work Group if it's a classification issue then we would need to handle it --

DR. ZIEMER: As I see it right now you would be discussing conceptually the kinds of problems you are running into; you would be discussing particular not data at particular sites, other than to say, at Pantex we have this kind of problem. You understand what -- what I think I'm saying. I don't think I even have a good enough feel for this to know more precisely how to task this, other than to ask the group to monitor it and as you identify concerns that you raise those to the And if in relation to those concerns Board. you have suggested solutions, you raise those to the Board.

This again is kind of top of the hat. I'm certainly open to those more experienced to help us. Robert.

MR. PRESLEY: I see items coming up in the future where a security work group

reconstruction.

whatever site they're at to have their people look at that to see if it can be redacted down to where it can be let out unclassified. And then if it can't, if they say no we can't do that, then we are going to have to go back and look again and say, do we really need to do this, or is there some other way we can get around this?

would look at a given piece of paper and say

yes, this piece of paper we do need for dose

Then they would then ask

Like I said a minute ago, I don't see many many cases where we cannot have something redacted down that could be used for dose reconstruction. And that's what I -- I see this work group running into items, reports, procedures, papers, things like that where they would have to look at it and make the decision on, yes, this is needed, or this is not needed for dose reconstruction.

DR. ZIEMER: And that indeed might be part of the responsibility down the line. It's probably not there yet.

Gina.

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MS. CANO: Dr. Ziemer, sorry, I just wanted to make an official statement. DOE is committed to work with the Board. We have been working with the Board, I think we have made some progress I guess in the past couple of years in regards to providing the necessary information. We don't want to withhold information. there and have been many instances where we have actually recommended alternate wording for reports.

So our classification officers will work with the Board, or those that are Q cleared, to make sure that you are saying what you need to say but in an unclassified manner.

So our classification officers are taking this seriously, and they know that this is an important program, and they are committed to assist you.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you, and we certainly do recognize that commitment and we have seen it at work in the last two years as your crew has been aboard, and we do appreciate that, and that will be very helpful as we move forward.

Brad.

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MR. CLAWSON: And I wanted -- in no way, shape or form I wanted to give the impression that DOE had not been working with Because DOE, I want to thank Greg or us. Gina, Pat, everybody, because they have gone to great lengths, and they don't know how much it has helped us like with Germantown, with the headquarter declassifiers and so forth, that they have also offered to be able to, if there are issues at certain sites that we can them and they can help us this, they are making great leaps and bounds to be able to do this. I wanted to tell them thanks personally.

DR. ZIEMER: Larry.

MR. ELLIOTT: If I could be so bold to suggest that I think it's a good idea to have the Security Working Group at the ready. I think it's beneficial because those members of that security working group, are they work group chairs for the sites that have the most imminent issues? And so as those chairs of those respective work groups deal

with those issues, I would envision that in certain instances they are going to want to share across to the other chairs if not to the Security Work Group and say, at this site this is how -- or we are seeing that issue dealt with. And we know that NIOSH is dealing with it differently at that site. And I think that kind of coordination will help if you have that group in place. So I just applaud that.

DR. ZIEMER: Very good. Thank you for that.

If there is no objection we will proceed on that basis, and appreciate the Security Work Group being willing to take that responsibility and help guide the Board as we move forward in that area.

I'd like to return to an item that we postponed from before lunch, and that is the letter to Senator Schumer.

DR. ZIEMER: We didn't table the motion. The chair simply deferred action by concurrence with everyone. So I simply declare that the motion is now before us, and the motion was to approve the draft letter

1 that the chair had prepared as a response to 2 Senator Schumer. And also we recognize that there was a need to address some information 3 regarding the earlier period for 4 which petition was not qualified, and so it would be 5 6 in order to have a motion to amend. And the 7 chair recognizes Jen Roessler. Oh, Ι recognize you. 8

DR. ROESSLER: I move to amend the motion that we made earlier with regard to the letter to Senator Schumer about the Linde petition, particularly addressing some changes in the letter. Perhaps the best way would be to read the letter with the changes in it.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay, and I think we have prepared copies. Zaida was going to provide us copies of your amendment.

DR. ROESSLER: So as soon as we get it, this will then address --

DR. ZIEMER: And this is a markup copy that has the original letter with the inserted changes which address the issue of the unqualified years.

DR. ROESSLER: So Board members

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are getting copies and then we will read it into the record.

(Pause)

I'll start reading:

"Dear Senator Schumer, this will acknowledge receipt of your letter of March 23rd, 2009, concerning a Linde Ceramics SEC petition.

In particular you expressed your support for SEC coverage of Linde workers for the period from 1954 to 2006, and concern that the petition for the 1947 to 1954 period failed to qualify for review."

DR. ZIEMER: Well, what has happened here in this next one is just that for some reason the spacing changed. It's all one paragraph.

DR. ROESSLER: Oh, I got it.
"With respect to the 1954 to 2006 period the
Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health
received the Evaluation Report (ER) from NIOSH
concerning the Linde Ceramics petition in
November, 2008. And in February, 2009 the ER
was assigned to the Board's Linde Ceramics

work group for review.

"The Board also tasked the Board's contractor, SC&A, to assist the Work Group in their review of the ER.

"At the request of the petitioner the Board has deferred the formal presentation of the NIOSH Evaluation Report and the related recommendations of the Work Group to the July 2009, Board meeting.

"At that time the Board expects to have more detailed deliberations on the Linde Ceramics petition, the Evaluation Report and the SC&A review.

"Regarding the 1947 to 1954 period, the Advisory Board does not have the legal authority or responsibility to qualify petitions. That responsibility rests with NIOSH. Thus the Board is unable to take specific action on qualifying the earlier period.

"As you suggested we will continue to keep [Identifying information redacted] appraised of the schedule of work group activities and board progress concerning the

Linde Ceramics petition.

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"Thank you for providing your comments and concern regarding the Linde Ceramics workers."

DR. ZIEMER: So that is the motion to amend. Is there a second?

MS. MUNN: Second.

DR. ZIEMER: So we have before us the amended letter.

DR. MELIUS: Can I raise a question?

DR. ZIEMER: You certainly may.

Okay, this is for DR. MELIUS: The new paragraph on the qualifying counsel. petitions, I thought I recalled that in the Act the Board could -- did have the right to review or to qualify petitions. We had put in the regulations that we were not involved with it, at one point in the drafting of the initial regulations -- it was before your time working with us were considering we whether the Board should be involved in the initial review of incoming petitions and the qualification form. And I think it has the

1 same effect, but I just wanted to make 2 since Senator Schumer is the Judiciary Committee, that be 3 we correct legally. Because I think that under the Act 4 he may be able to -- the Board may be able to, 5 could have reviewed petitions. We decided we 6 didn't want to be involved in that. 7 ZIEMER: I don't honestly DR. 8 recall that. And are you suggesting that we 9 10 modify this for example leave out the word, 11 legal, and simply say we don't have authority or responsibility? 12 13 DR. MELIUS: Yes, I would say the authority to qualify or review petitions. 14 15 MR. KATZ: If I could suggest, you 16 could certainly that under the say regulations, you don't have a role, and that 17 way sort of skirt this trouble. 18 19 DR. MELIUS: Yes.

DR. ZIEMER: So then, does not have legal authority or responsibility to qualify petitions under the existing regulations?

DR. MELIUS: Yes.

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DR. ZIEMER: I will take that.

1	DR. ROESSLER: What about the
2	word, responsibility? Does that stay in?
3	DR. ZIEMER: The typographical
4	"concerning" would be just changed to
5	"concern" in the last paragraph.
6	Any other comments or suggested
7	amendments?
8	If not, we'll just take a voice
9	vote on this. If the motion to amend passes,
10	the amended letter becomes the letter. If it
11	fails we return to the original version.
12	We are voting on the motion to
13	amend the letter, and if that motion carries
14	it becomes the letter.
15	Are you ready to vote?
16	Okay, all in favor of the motion to
17	amend say aye.
18	(Chorus of ayes)
19	DR. ZIEMER: And the opposed, no?
20	(No audible response)
21	DR. ZIEMER: Any abstentions?
22	The motion carries. Thank you very
23	much.
24	We also have as a carry forward

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from yesterday we had approved the wording of the Santa Susana Petition, but we did not have the final wording on the Standard Oil development company petition; is that correct?

DR. MELIUS: Vice versa.

DR. ZIEMER: I'm sorry, just the other way around. Okay.

I had a 50-50 chance of getting it right.

MR. KATZ: Can I -- I don't know which order this needs to go in, but also I think counsel just needs to give us some edits on the motions themselves. I think there was some discrepancy that needs to be corrected.

MS. HOWELL: For both Santa Susana and the Standard Oil SEC the language of the Class definition in what the Board -- in the Board write-ups is not the same as the SEC Evaluation Report from NIOSH and the language needs to track. And part of that was because of the presentations, the slide different language than is in the Evaluation Report.

But if they could both be changed

1 reflect what's actually in the 2 Evaluation Report. Can you give us --DR. ZIEMER: 3 4 let's take the one that we had already approved, which was Standard Oil. 5 MS. HOWELL: Okay. 6 It's the definition 7 DR. ZIEMER: of the Class itself which is in the second 8 paragraph? 9 MS. HOWELL: Yes, and I also had a 10 couple of other grammatical --11 Could you read for us 12 DR. ZIEMER: 13 the correct definition? MS. HOWELL: Sure. The Advisory 14 Board on Radiation and Worker Health -- this 15 16 is the language prior to the definition; there were two grammar changes -- the Advisory Board 17 on Radiation and Worker Health (the Board) has 18 19 evaluated SEC petition dash 00129 concerning the Standard Oil 20 workers at Development Company in Linden, insert a comma, New Jersey, 21

under the statutory requirement established by

EEOICPA and incorporated into 42 CFR Section

8313 -- there's an extra period there.

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1 And then this next sentence is the 2 actual class definition. "The Board respectfully recommends a Special Exposure 3 Cohort SEC status be afforded to all atomic 4 weapons employer (AWE) employees" and 5 6 NIOSH Evaluation Report -- someone could be 7 looking at it while I'm saying this to make sure I've got all of it -- the language "who 8 worked at" is not in the NIOSH definition. 9 10 says, all atomic weapons employer the Standard Oil Development 11 employees of So take out the words, "who worked 12 Company. at", and insert "of", "The Standard Oil 13 Development Company in Linden," insert comma, 14 15 "New Jersey."

Then insert the words, during the period before "from." And I think that will correct everything.

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DR. ZIEMER: Let me ask, though, so under this revision a person could have been an employee of Standard Oil but never have been at the plant, never have worked at the plant but been on their payroll?

MS. HOWELL: That's right. Does

that create a problem for DOL? Because the other thing would be for you guys to keep your language and for NIOSH to revise their report.

(Off-mic comment.)

DR. ZIEMER: You have to come to the mike. You will need to be at the mike.

Maybe this would not be an issue. But as I hear what Emily read to us, it seems to me it's possible to have someone employed by them who doesn't physically work at the plant. I mean many plants have this.

MR. KOTSCH: Yes, one thing is, I can't recall what definition we saw when we -- you know, when the department approved -- basically said that is an acceptable definition for both of these things.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay, I guess though we will need to have the language parallel what was in the Evaluation Report, which is what Emily read to us, and you will have to determine whether you can administer it. I think probably what they are saying is if a person was employed by Standard Oil you have no way of guaranteeing that they never were at

that plant, so therefore they would covered. just struck me as little Ιt а 4 strange. Mike. MR. GIBSON: It could also be read that if the vendor worked at the site, even though he wasn't a DOE employee -- or AWE employee -- would be covered. DR. ZIEMER: It says atomic weapons So I think that eliminates the employees. Coke quy. 12

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to make note of.

MS. HOWELL: I mean you can leave them different where NIOSH may determine that it needs to change theirs. But if you are more comfortable with this language, that's fine. It's something that we wind up having

DR. ZIEMER: I don't think it was a comfort level. I think it was what was on the slide, and we need to track your report.

This may be a red herring. just concerned that -- in reality, you want to cover the people who work there, regardless of who --

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DR. MELIUS: Would it be proper, can we designate our chair to deal with this submits issue when he the final, after consultation with because have we I think essentially approved both versions. we just need to clarify with DOL, and it's not fair to Jeff.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay. We have the two editorial changes, and then we will go with whichever version you say we should.

MR. KOTSCH: I don't think it's an I think we can -- you amendment to our ER. propose what you want to propose in Ι don't see it language. as that different, DOLsaying they can administer either language, and we would take care of the designation package the Secretary to explaining why the words may not match up exactly.

DR. ZIEMER: Well, okay. I mean I don't see an ER amendment change on two words. We'll be okay. So any other changes?

MS. HOWELL: To the Santa Susana, if

I can switch over to that for a second, in this one I do think is a little different than the Standard Oil one. The only distinction between your class definition and the NIOSH Evaluation Report, the word, or, that you guys used between DOE contractors "or" subcontractors who worked in any area of Area 4, the Evaluation Report says "and." And I'm not as worried about that, but you also insert the location of Ventura County, California for Santa Susana, and that does not appear in the NIOSH Evaluation Report. And I checked with LaVon and he was uncertain as to whether there might be any portion of Area 4 that is in a different county. And I would just suggest that in order to avoid any potential problems that you eliminate that language since it doesn't appear in the Evaluation Report.

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DR. MELIUS: Well, excuse me, but on page 18, top sentence, consists of 2,850 acres and is located in the Simi hills of Ventura County, California; the first sentence. That's where I took it from. I mean you can still leave it out; it's not a

1	big deal.
2	MS. HOWELL: The issue is, it's not
3	in the Class definition itself. So it may be
4	nitpicking.
5	DR. ZIEMER: Okay, but in the
6	official definition as you gave it, the "in"
7	Ventura County, California is left out.
8	MS. HOWELL: Yes.
9	DR. ZIEMER: And I see no reason
10	not to so let's just exclude that.
11	And what was the other one?
12	MS. HOWELL: The actual definition
13	has "and" DOE contractors "and" subcontractors
14	as opposed to "or."
15	DR. ZIEMER: That's an editorial
16	that is easily handled.
17	I don't know that we officially
18	read this one into the record yesterday, this
19	motion. We only did the Standard Oil, right?
20	Jim, are you willing to read this
21	into the record?
22	DR. MELIUS: Like anyone's going
23	to listen to it.

DR. ZIEMER: We won't guarantee

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you we will listen. We're just asking you -- the court reporter will listen.

DR. MELIUS: Let me take out Ventura County.

By the way the "and" is in the first page of the Evaluation Report, or NIOSH proposed classes to be added to the SEC which is where I copied that part from.

(Off-mic comment.)

DR. MELIUS: Okay, the recommends that the following letter be transmitted to the Secretary of Health Human Services within 21 days. Should the chair become aware of any issue that in his judgment would preclude the transmittal of this letter within the time period, the Board requests that he promptly informs the Board of the delay and of the reasons for this delay, and that he immediately works with NIOSH to schedule an emergency meeting of the Board to discuss this issue.

"The Advisory Board on radiation and Worker Health (the Board)has evaluated SEC petition 00093 concerning workers at the Santa

Susana Field Laboratory Area 4 under the statutory requirements established by EEOICPA

incorporating 42 CFR Section 8313.

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"The Board respectfully recommends Cohort (SEC) Special Exposure status be afforded all employees of the Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies, and DOE contractors and subcontractors who work in any area of Area 4 of the Santa Susana Field Laboratory for а number of work aggregating least 250 work days from at January 1st, 1955 through December 31st, 1958, for in combination with work days within the parameters established for one or more other classes of employees in the SEC.

"This recommendation is based on the following factors. Number one, the Santa Susana Area 4 facility was involved in the development and testing of nuclear reactors and related research.

"Two, NIOSH found that there was insufficient monitoring data or information on radiological operations of these laboratories in order to be able to complete accurate

individual dose reconstructions involving internal and external radiation exposures for Area 4 workers during the time period in question. The Board concurs with this conclusion.

"Number three, NIOSH determined that health may have been endangered for workers exposed to radiation in Area 4 during the time period in question. The Board concurs with this determination.

"Based on these considerations, the discussions held at our May 12th and 13th 2009, Advisory Board meeting in Amarillo, Texas, the Board recommends that a special exposure corps petition be granted. The Board notes that NIOSH is continuing to evaluate information on exposures at this facility during later time periods, and will make a recommendation regarding this -- these time periods sometime in the future.

"Enclosed is the documentation from the Board of meetings where this Special Exposure Cohort class was discussed. The documentation includes transcripts of the deliberations, copies of the petition, the
NIOSH review thereof, and related materials.

If any of these items are unavailable at this

time they will follow shortly."

Just one other editorial note. I believe we had discussed this in earlier meetings, the CDC website was down when I was writing this so I couldn't get access to the website to check it out. But hadn't we talked about this and then reported it back? I couldn't remember. Maybe I'm wrong, but --

DR. ZIEMER: No, there was the discussion and agreement that the later years -- but that doesn't need to be part of this letter per se.

I did have a question between what I'm seeing and what you read, in the second to last paragraph on the front page, the last sentence, will make a recommendation regarding this time period or these time periods?

DR. MELIUS: These time periods.

During later time periods. It reads wrong. I
was going to give you the correction.

DR. ZIEMER: Regarding --

1	DR. MELIUS: at this facility
2	during later time periods.
3	DR. ZIEMER: Later time periods.
4	DR. MELIUS: And will make a
5	recommendation regarding these time periods
6	sometime in the future.
7	If you want to be also
8	grammatically correct, I believe the second
9	bullet down is, there was insufficient it
10	really should be, there were insufficient
11	DR. ZIEMER: Data were; yes.
12	MS. BEACH: If you want a couple
13	more, in the first bullet there is an extra
14	period, and there is an extra space between
15	Susana and Area 4.
16	MR. CLAWSON: I would like to tell
17	you all, I apologize for my emails.
18	(Laughter)
19	MR. CLAWSON: And future emails.
20	DR. ZIEMER: Nancy Adams will be
21	assisting us in getting the formal copies out,
22	so we need to make sure that she has an
23	electronic version. Nancy, is Nancy here?

DR. MELIUS: She's in the hallway?

1	DR. ZIEMER: Okay, I will touch
2	base with her.
3	DR. MELIUS: It is also my claim
4	to find another DOE facility some place else
5	and rename it Santa Susana Laboratory Area 4,
6	so then it will automatically be eligible,
7	since location doesn't appear to matter.
8	DR. ZIEMER: Okay, some other
9	county.
10	We have another issue regarding our
11	calendar
12	MR. POSTON: Mr. Chairman, could we
13	take a time out?
14	DR. ZIEMER: Time out? Yes.
15	MR. POSTON: It's 10 after 3:00.
16	DR. ZIEMER: You mean a break time
17	out? Okay, while you are taking a break, why
18	don't you look at your calendar for July, and
19	see whether or not you can
20	DR. MELIUS: Is this our last
21	item?
22	DR. ZIEMER: This is our last
23	item.
24	DR. ROESSLER: What about Biloxi?

ZIEMER: I thought we were 1 DR. 2 done with Biloxi. MR. POSTON: Well, then, let's 3 4 proceed. Ted has a comment. 5 DR. ZIEMER: MR. KATZ: Yes, so for scheduling. 6 7 So right now we are scheduled for July 27th through 29th, which is a Monday through 8 Wednesday. You can tell from this meeting 9 10 that there is a lot on the agenda, which means it's going to be three very full days. 11 someone may have had a conflict at one point, 12 13 but everyone I've asked doesn't seem to. We could shift from the 27th to the 29th of July 14 15 over to 28th to 30th July, that would mean no 16 one would have to travel on Sunday, which would be a good thing, unless someone has a 17 conflict with that. 18 19 MS. MUNN: Ι have family commitments on the evening of the 30th. 20 So do whatever you want. 21 ZIEMER: You would have to DR. 22 leave early? 23

MS. MUNN: I would have to leave

1	early on Thursday. I made that commitment
2	based on our calendar here in July.
3	DR. ZIEMER: Are we certain we
4	have a full three days' worth of stuff?
5	MR. KATZ: It sounds like we do,
6	but I wouldn't shift it and lose a board
7	member doing that.
8	DR. ZIEMER: Okay. I believe
9	that's all of the items that need to come
10	before us today.
11	We will have a break, and then we
12	have a public comment period at 4:00 p.m.
13	Thank you.
14	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off
15	the record at 3:53 p.m. and resumed
16	at 4:02 p.m.)
17	DR. ZIEMER: We are ready to begin
18	our public comment session of our advisory
19	board meeting.
20	The public comment session, I'll
21	provide just a couple of guidelines here.
22	Number one, we ask that you limit
23	your remarks to no more than 10 minutes. Also

there are some policies related to both

But if you discuss other people,

freedom of information and Privacy Act issues, and Mr. Katz, our Designated Federal Official, will go over those rules with us here briefly.

MR. KATZ: Welcome, first of all, to anyone who is new, who has just come for this public comment session.

And I just want you to understand, we have a transcript being made of this public comment session, a verbatim transcript, so everything that you say, if you come up and want to give comments, will be recorded, it will end up in a transcript that will be put on the Internet, on the web, on the NIOSH website so that other people can read and see what people had to say here.

So if you give your name, for example, you don't have to, but if you give your name, that will appear in the transcript.

A couple of things will -- some things will be redacted though. Any personal information you give about yourself will be included. If you give medical information about yourself that will be included, and so on.

third parties, then their names and identifying information about those individuals will be redacted.

So when you see the transcript ultimately on the NIOSH website, it normally takes about 45 days or so for the transcript to appear. But their names will be blacked out or any other truly identifying information will be blacked out. But the statement you make about them generally otherwise will still be in there.

So you need to understand that. If you want more detailed accounting of these rules there is out on the table there is a sheet, a Redaction Policy that explains this in detail. And that is also in detail on the Internet, on the NIOSH web page, OCAS web page.

That's it, thanks.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much.

We have several individuals here this afternoon that wish to address the assembly. Also we may have folks on the phone lines, as soon as we hear from the folks

assembled here we will open the opportunity to those of you on the phone who wish to comment as well.

I'm going to just proceed with the names here in the order in which you signed up for public comment beginning with Paul Teichmann.

Paul, you may proceed.

MR. TEICHMANN: Good afternoon, gentlemen. To introduce myself I am Paul Teichmann. I have been a worker at Pantex for over 35 years.

I claimed thymus cancer sometime back, and as far as I know my claim has been denied. Anyway I do have a statement, and I will give the Board a copy of the statement along with some attachments.

Now one of these attachments may have some sensitive information so you can protect that as well. It won't be read here for the comments.

First of all I wanted to thank the Board, especially for coming to Amarillo. I know you have worked hard, and we appreciate

the economy of those that y'all brought to the site. Also I want to thank the DOL and NIOSH

for their work.

Any comments I make I hope the people at NIOSH won't take negatively or personally.

I do know that they have been given a job. In fact my notes here say the reconstruction is a monumental task if not impossible.

And I say that because of the armchair quarterback approach that they have taken. They cannot get to the truth or what I understand is the truth of some of the problems that I have noted at the site.

Practices are much looser since-or excuse me, practices prior to the Tiger
Team findings at Pantex were much looser, as
was the reporting, the event reporting. So
since the Tiger Team things have tightened up
considerably.

And my contention is that possible exposure to whatever at Pantex could have been greatly exaggerated prior to Tiger Team

coming.

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My interview with NIOSH went very well except for the fact that the interviewer did not understand an air-handling unit.

Now all the buildings at Pantex have environmental control, and all that air is passed through an air handling unit where it is processed for heating, cooling, dehumidification and primarily air filtration.

Мy contention is that any in that facility contaminants would be concentrated on the air filtration system. Now we got into a long discussion about some of the constituents may or may not be. okay, maybe those constituents were plated out or had an affinity for the water on the air conditioning coil. So I think that was gaffe in the NIOSH reconstruction area.

Uncle Sam dangled this carrot in front of us, yet it is our responsibility as workers to prove to NIOSH and to whomsoever, at least my experience has been, that our illnesses are work related. Amarillo is kind of a small town. And the doctors here depend

very much on the workers at Pantex for their business, and Pantex as an employer with their fine insurance for their cases. And it's difficult for one to crawl out on a limb and say, yes, that particular problem was caused by that particular exposure at that site.

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Now it may not have that problem in large cities where only a few clientele of the medical community comes from the general public, or wherever.

The process of application is easy, but the burden of responsibility falls squarely on the applicant, if there is any questions at all.

In keeping up those to correspond with has been a problem, at least for me, and do have noted here, mystery. I reporting my skin cancers for that reason; I'm not sure who to send the information to next.

four times There are I've been discouraged by my government. First of all Pueblo was when the USS was captured. Secondly treatment of returning the the

_ _

Vietnam vets. Thirdly, the treatment of the Cold War workers. And I'm not going into number four.

Without such investigation alluded to above, I would suggest that the taxpayer money be shifted from paying to theoretical possibilities, to aiding the Cold War workers who are suffering.

If you want to call it a Stimulus Package, call it a Stimulus Package.

There was a recent article in the paper about a shipment that went to New Mexico, and it was found to be contaminated. And the paper also said that no one at the origin of the shipment was contaminated. Hm. Was that container damaged in shipment?

The -- now I know better than to believe everything in the newspaper -- but how was contamination determined at the receiving end but not at the shipping end unless it was damaged in shipment?

It looks like someone's monitoring needs to be questioned.

I have attached in my handout, and

if you will tell me who to give it to at the end of the presentation I'll do that, five different attachments. One is called "Horror Now these horror stories I have no Stories". proof of. All I know is, whenever investigating or talking about my situation with other employees, I heard stories, stories that did not set right. And my personal experience with whistle blower program made me very nervous. And I can easily see why people that I spoke with wanted to remain anonymous. So there are very few names mentioned in my notes here, but those with the exception of one has agreed to respond to any questions.

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My second attachment has to do with a narrative of radiation exposure. And while I was writing this up a few minutes ago I didn't see a particular interest of mine.

When they tore down the old boiler house at Pantex, a facility I spent quite a bit of time in, they kept the boiler tubes for -- to be shipped off to a waste site. And my knee jerk reaction was, why did they cap those tubes?

If it was a water tube boiler, and I assumed

that contamination was from the natural gas and on the outside of the tubes.

Now maybe some radiological people may know the affinity of water and such contaminants, and the fact that it may have been indeed in the water tubes and that's why they capped them.

The -- my type cancer is thymus cancer. And how many of you have heard of thymus cancer? It's apparently pretty rare; is that what you understand?

At the time I looked at the registry at the Harrington Cancer Center, and I was the first case; since there has been one other.

The cause of thymus cancer on the first brochure I got from the American Cancer Society was unknown; possibly exposure to radiation. Very weasel words there; possibly.

The first question Dr. Perryman asked me at the Cancer Center was, where were you exposed to radiation? I told him where I worked; the subject was never broached again.

And I think that I've said probably

enough, and who would I present this to?

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DR. ZIEMER: Mr. Katz, thank you sir.

The next person we will hear from is Brenda Britten.

BRITTEN: I was going to tell you about some incidents that I was in at I was working on the swing shift. think it was about 1989, but y'all can verify this with the Tiger Team reports. working at 1226 on the swing shift. working in bay with one a other [Identifying information redacted]. They had open bays, and the bay next to us had a tritium alarm that went off. And we shut the operation down and stepped out in the hall like we were supposed to -- out of the bay like we were supposed to with everyone else with their bays. And a supervisor came down on a bicycle, and he said, hey, y'all go back to work, that was a false alarm.

So we went back in the bay, and we were running units that were really, really loud with high hoists, so unbeknownst to us it

was a real alarm and they evacuated the building.

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so [Identifying information redacted] and I were working. About an hour and a half later, some doors opened at the end of the building, and some guards came in on bicycles and when they opened the doors and saw us, they just froze. And they said, what are y'all doing in here? And we said, we're running 83s. What's the problem?

And they said the building has been shut down for about an hour and a half; two It's been airing to the outside. a tritium alarm. And we were locked in the building. So we were escorted to medical where we discovered that all the other people had been over there being monitored and being watched, in medical, on swing shift, they only had one nurse. He had not been trained on what to do with a tritium accident. not know what to do. He was frantically calling the doctors in town who were telling him what to do. Engineers had to come from town; they were so ticked off that they had to come out there at 10:00 or 11:00 o'clock at night. They were angry at us.

So after the evening evolved they just told all of us they need urine samples and told us that none of us were exposed to anything.

And the year the Tiger Team came -like I said, I can't remember the exact year
they came -- I called to make a report. It
was the very last day they were there. And we
were so -- most of us were so afraid to call
and make a report. Everybody was terrified;
it was the first time anyone had come in like
that to make a report and follow up on things
that had been called into Washington about
problems. And people were afraid to make a
report, and they were angry that anyone else
that made a report for fear that they might
lose their jobs.

So on the very last day they were there, I went to another area outside my work area on my break and made a call because I was so afraid that my peers would hear me make a call and there would be retaliation against

me.

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And a man thanked me for calling; he took my information. And I talked to him on the phone from home several other times. And he said other people had made -- coworkers had made reports on that. And he told me that when they went to medical and checked on the that [Identifying information accident redacted] and I were in on that night, there were no medical records on it; there were no records anywhere in that plant on the fact that [Identifying information redacted] and I in left that building and totally were There were no records in medical; exposed. there were no records in our personal files. And he said that was one of the things that they really talked to the medical director about, was how they pulled files, people's medical records and data that looked bad for them.

I think it was about a year and a half later that [Identifying information redacted] started showing up with cancer, and he suffered terribly. He had bladder cancer

and colon cancer and bone cancer. And he never told his family anything about what happened. He was an old military retired guy that just toughed out everything, and never accused anyone.

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I believe that was in '89, and by '90 I was in -- I was becoming increasingly And by September of '90 I Houston, Texas, at Baylor Medical Center with doctor, Dr. Bernard Patton, who tenured professor there. And he worked with for a week doing testing. And he pretty sure that I had ALS. All the tests came back negative, and he was puzzled. tested me again and again, and he tested me for MS and all the other neurological -myasthenia gravis. And he was very puzzled. And so he kept me there a second week, and he began doing more complex tasks. And he did a lot of horrendous testing, one of which was -they did muscle biopsies to the bone with my laying there awake, they gave me no medicine, no pain killer, not even a Valium, because they didn't want to disrupt the values they were going to find in the biopsy. They did a nerve biopsy on my ankle where they cut it and pulled a nerve, and at that point three medical guys that were there, students, lay their body across me that way, and three lay their body across me that way, while they jerked a nerve out with no anesthesia. I tell you it was pretty horrendous.

And from that data he could see antibodies attacking the nerves, the muscles, the fascia in the vascular system throughout my body. And he said, he had no explanation except for where I worked. And of course I couldn't talk about it. And he said, but I can look -- I can study what Pantex is and what they do. And he said the government has never admitted what they expose y'all to. And he said, it's what you work with. He said be careful when you go back to work because they will be trying to fire you.

So I thought that was strange, but I went on back with my medical records, and I had taken two weeks vacation by the way, because I was so terrified of what medical

would do with me when they saw where I had been outside the community to different doctors.

Anyway when I got back, medical from the line, pulled me pulled me working on the line. They gave me written restrictions that I could no longer work with toxic chemicals, MOCA or HE. They pulled me off the line, had me working away from any of those chemicals. And after about two years into medical one they called me Friday afternoon just about 3:00 o'clock, kind of a strange situation, called me over there, and the medical director said, what are restrictions? And I said, I can't work around any toxic chemicals, MOCA or HE, and I wear brown coveralls because I'm allergic to the blue dye in the blue ones. And he said, no, you can't wear the blue coveralls, but you have no other restrictions.

And I said, oh yes I do, and he said, no, that never happened. And I said, excuse me. He said that never happened.

And so after about 30 minutes of

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him telling me that that never happened, I had to go back to my work place, because it was about time close So to up. Ι saw mу supervisor, and Ι said, [Identifying information redacted], what are mу restrictions? And he said, oh you have no restrictions except wearing brown coveralls. And he said, by the way, we are moving you back to the line next week. And all those documents disappeared from all files, personnel files, medical files. They said it never happened.

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So that's just another situation of how documents could disappear, just on a whim or whatever they decided. Like I said, even my supervisor said, oh you've never had any restrictions. That never happened. And that was just another situation where a supervisor would look me straight in the eye and lie about something he said the day before.

I'm not the only one that experienced things like that. I found from the time -- especially from the time I was diagnosed in Houston, I found my experiences

at Pantex to be a delicate dance because I never knew what was going to be the truth from day to day, which supervisor was going to change an attitude or a rule or a regulation, including written documents.

Thank you for listening.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much.
Then Floyd Wiley.

MR. WILEY: Gentlemen, I've enjoyed being here today, and glad to see all of you, because I've seen all your names on the Internet and I read all your reports that you write.

I appreciate you letting me sit in here today because I realize now how much you're working, how hard you are doing, what you do, and how much you would like to help us but you are handicapped considerably.

As you know this security business came up today and it made me feel like it wouldn't have happened if I wouldn't have been here, and I was the only one here; nobody else here. Well, tonight, there's nobody here, but there is certainly some people that are sick.

There certainly some people that haven't been There certainly dozens of them that claimed. have been turned down on data that's not valid. The site profile looks like it was made know who in the world went don't up. through there, but they didn't know much about the assembly bays. They probably were given a dog-and-pony show just exactly like I gave the congressmen when they come down. them a dog-and-pony show and show them what we wanted them to see and took them out of there.

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If they kicked up a fuss, well, you don't have any need to go in here. You're not even cleared. You're lucky we showed you this business. And you know I disagree with the records, the dose reconstructions records. The primary reason that I disagree with them is because no one that I have talked to other than the few people who went down on the audit understands that each bay is an entity in itself, and it could have no units in it, it could have one unit it, and it could have units that overcome the limits that's allowed, provided that the foreman wasn't watching. As

a foreman I followed the rules. I made my people follow the rules.

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There's one of my boys here right now, and he will tell you that I never once told him to violate a rule; never. And -- but you know they took my dose reconstruction, took the first one and gave me a 43 percent probability. They took the second one, same data, data ain't any good. I can show you -or I could; I put it back in my car -- I can show you what data that they used. It don't my name, my badge number on dosimeter badge number on it. It's made up Because we didn't wear dosimeters until data. somewhere in the late '60s and then it was film badges, and there wasn't a true dosimeter in Pantex until somewhere in the mid-'70s, I don't know when because that kind of stuff didn't register up here.

But my job, and building bombs, that registered with me, and we built a lot of them; you don't even have a clue. But the newspaper published that they had authority to have 20,000 pits out there in storage right

now, and they were going to have to up that. They are going to build a new facility, \$175 million underground. What have we been doing with those 20,000 pits all this time? build them right there in the base. Of course there weren't all 20,000 there at once, but there were a size and amount of them that you don't even have a clue. See, I can't even tell you how many kilograms of plutonium was allowed in a bay. I'm afraid to. Nothing secret about that. You know how kilograms of plutonium is liable critical. You know that if you put so much plutonium here side by side it'll go critical. And the closer you get it together the higher the radiation hits. If you got one pit in there, you're not getting much radiation. got five pits in there you're getting more radiation. If you got 20 pits in there it'll run off the scale; it might even go critical, I don't know. We did have records, but when I first went to work out there, there was such thing as a KG requirement posted on the wall. Didn't exist. I didn't know what a KG

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didn't even tell me what plutonium was; wasn't allowed to. Because I was just an operator. I had a clearance, but I didn't have a Q But when I was a supervisor then I clearance. got a Q clearance. Well, then I could find out anything from anyone that I worked with. And I learned plenty because I worked five developing the 68 with [Identifying years information redacted] who has already been compensated because he has beryllium -- I mean tested positive for beryllium. healthier than I am, but that is neither here I worked with him on the nor there. 57. Started the 57 from day one. We built every one of them. This boy here helped me; he And we were only working on worked for me. them for a year, and Burlington took them, because we had more work here than we could We had the 58 program coming, take care of. and several other programs coming, and we didn't have but six cells and 36 bays in 26, and 1241, what we called the snake pit where inserted squashes. Squash used to be a

Nobody ever told me what a KG was.

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classified word; I don't know why, because you eat squash all the time. But anyway, if you call the FBI on that, that was a little slip. But you know, that's damn foolish of me, I lost my train of thought, as I'm 83 years old, I'm lucky to be alive.

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But what I'm trying to get at is that you can't take one shoe, it don't fit all any more than these one-size-fits-all socks. You can go buy them, but they are not comfortable as if you buy a pair that fits Same way with underwear or anvthing else. One size don't fit all, and one foreman might stay in one cell, which one of them did. He's dead now, one of my very best friends. As a matter of fact he worked for me before he He was promoted and worked on was promoted. the program on handling the nuclear components of the 68 and I was handling the mechanical build of it, mechanical and packaging. worked in there 18 years in that one cell; had two or three people. I worked 20 or 30 units all over the building. See, you're going to measure his, compare his radiation to mine.

You are going to compare mine to him? he got probably 100 times more than I did because he was in there with the bear pits day after day after day doing his thing without He was one of the men who was any problems. in the cell five or cell six. Everybody is telling me it was cell six, but I remember it was cell five; but it doesn't matter, when they had the plutonium spill, he was in there. Well, he's dead now. I don't know why he His wife wouldn't even call me. died. afraid to even talk to me. And there's dozens of others like that. Very few of them would ever call me, because they don't trust me. They think that foreman there, he don't care about us. He just worked the whey out of us. Badgered us every minute of every day to get one more unit, and build five, and then you ought to build six. But you do it following the rules. But in the early days we didn't have standards. There was no thing as an overnight standard, and we learned to build them in our heads. One boy taught the next one, and if you couldn't learn to

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build one of them, why, you went somewhere else.

We had secret documents, but we couldn't put a secret document up on the wall. Somebody walk in that doesn't have access to see it. You see, you have to be cleared to see some documents. There are a lot of them that lay around there that are classified, and in later years we let classified materials lay out all the time because the buildings were secured. But in the early days you couldn't leave OUO laying out; you'd get a security infraction.

And I worked out there 34 years, and handled millions of classified parts, secret parts, and never lost but one, and we found it at the Nevada Test Site because an engineer carried it out in his suitcase, instead of putting it -- letting my boys put it on the unit.

And I got one security infraction because I left one door open that could be unlocked from the outside in a building that is secure with alarms on it. It had something

like 90 or 100 doors in it, and we had to check them, every one, every night, and sign a slip that we checked them and call security and say, "Set the alarm". Well, the alarm set up fine, but the guard came along about midnight and said he found that door open. And he gave me a security infraction, the only one that I got in 34 years.

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And I really thank this security thing we you people is classification -- I don't see how you can make any kind of judgment as to how much radiation one man gets when you don't even know what he worked on, how many units he had in the bay. I mean every time you bring a unit in, the radiation goes up; you know that. In the 48 program you had to put one of them over in this corner, one over in that corner, and one in that corner, and one in this corner; and you could have two out in the middle to work on, and that was all you could do. And three of them had to be in the refrigerator all the time. have one of the highest radiation units that was built out there. Whenever they had

to rework them, they started trying to rework them, couldn't it under the rules, so they done them in Germany; sent a team to Germany to rework them, and foreman who went over there, he'd do anything in the world to get one of them fixed as quick as he could. He's the one -- I'm not going to name any names because he is still alive. But he is the one that I came into the work bay one night and all the boxes that holds the tritium balls were full, and had to be carried on a special cart, and the cart was gone home, so I had to call the man out to come get the bottles out of there before I could go to work. We had to open them to see the bottles in there. opened one container, and it had three of them in there, and it had melted the foam.

Now there was a guy that told me, you're lying. Those tritium bottles don't get hot. Well anybody that has ever worked one of them will tell you, put two of them close together and it gets so hot you can't pick it up.

We kept them on the same plane in

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the cell; we kept them on the same plane; we kept them scattered out. And Ms. Britten, she worked for me, or rather I supervised her a time or two. She'd be working the swing; a good operator. She's not going to lie to you about that tritium spill. I didn't know anything about that tritium spill, but I'll bet you \$50 it happened, because she wouldn't lie about it.

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But we had T289S, and they would alarm just all the time. When they alarmed my people would evacuate as quick as they could. We called safety. Safety come down there with an old T1-90, a hand-held tritium monitor, and me and him would put on safety masks and go in there, and he'd sit the old T1-90s doing knobs on it, I don't know what he was doing, and walk in there and say, there ain't no tritium in here. Let's get back in here boys and go Set the old monitor down on the floor and call maintenance to come and check the tritium monitor. This would happen time and time again. The old T289s would cost me a million hours in production time, because they were undependable.

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They started the Mark 58, this is the hottest program we ever worked on, when I say hot I mean high radiation. Ιt didn't have as much radiation as the 48, but it was a high one, and we could only work in there, we could only keep a man in there three weeks, and then we had to rotate him out for that quarter. We could put him in there for three weeks in a quarter. And I'm trying to meet a production schedule and rotate people every three weeks. Some of them didn't even know what the program was. Usually we'd train people on a program and they stayed on it, you know, until everybody worked through and they all got trained. But we couldn't do that on the 58 because we had to work everybody in the plant three weeks at a time.

And Pete Looney is dead now. He got a year's radiation which at that time was 2-1/2 rem -- well, actually in the early days we worked under five rem per year; that was the rules was five rem per year. He got 2-1/2 rem in three weeks. They pulled him out of

there for a year. He started losing weight, and he was a great big old boy, he began to lose weight. He got down, it looked like he'd lost about 100 pounds and I thought I'd killed But it turned out he was going through a him. divorce, and he wasn't eating very much. Не did get fat again.

DR. ZIEMER: Floyd, I need to have you wind it up if you could. You've gone considerably over your time here.

MR. WILEY: All right, I'm sorry, and I do appreciate y'all -- I understand what you are going through, and I certainly understand what Larry was talking about when he was telling you that he was saying he wasn't going to approve something he couldn't stand behind. I'll be just like him.

Thank you much.

DR. ZIEMER: Thank you very much.

I wanted to check with people on
the line here. Do we have any folks on the
telephone that wish to make public comments?

MR. FUNK: Dr. Ziemer, this is John Funk. I've got a couple of things I missed

this morning. I have a few phone calls. You could save me a spot at the end of the session.

MS. KLEA: This is Bonnie Klea.

I'll wait until the people there in your audience are done.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay. And anyone else?

Okay, I've got two more folks here that we want to hear from. Sue Morgan.

MS. MORGAN: My name is Sue Morgan, and I left Pantex in 1986 because I was ill.

None of the doctors in Amarillo would even approached the subject of my exposures, and so I spent several years with health food stores, home remedies et cetera, trying to detox myself from radiation.

My time on the line began over in research and development, one day my partner and I were packaging high explosives which were in talc form with no protective equipment. We had to stop and go up to the division manager's office, and he was giving a talk about carcinogens, known carcinogens.

And he mentioned the explosives we were working with right at that moment.

My partner and I had that talc all over us -- in our hair, in our coveralls, et cetera. And he said that we were not to work on those explosives without protective equipment, and that included respirators.

So when we went back to work we requested protective equipment and respirators. We were given white paper suits and a pollen mask. I transferred over later to -- well, I was an inspector, and I worked mostly in building 64, and 23, which was on the 68 program.

And I was exposed to various chemicals, toluene -- I never have been able to pronounce it -- and beryllium.

Now today -- well, years ago I checked out to being beryllium sensitive. The first time I went to Denver to the hospital for a checkup, the doctor tore the lining in my lung, my right lung, so he couldn't get an accurate count of the beryllium, so there was no sediment.

Since then I have been several
times and they have refused to do one biopsy;
still no settlement. I now have emphysema. I
have never smoked; never will smoke. But I
have emphysema, and I am very sensitive to
beryllium, according to the test.

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The doctors, I have made the comment more than once, the doctors have the attitude that they are working for the company and not for the court, which I don't like. It's the wrong attitude in my opinion.

I went to my -- my doctor sent me specialist for Ι quess unknown diseases. Не was а high powered rheumatologist, and he ran all these tests, and he came back and told me, he said the only thing I can tell you is that all -- everything you have today, all of your conditions can be attributed to your exposures.

And we don't have any help for it.

You are going to have to treat symptoms, and
you are going to have to live with it.

Today I am supposedly in my golden years. Because I left Pantex early, I didn't

get a retirement. I am running out of money, and I am ill. I spent the last 2-1/2 years pretty much in bed; I'm a semi-invalid. And the doctors did admit -- the ones here that will admit -- the ones in Houston out and out say, you know, you have this and this and this, and you just have to live with it; there is no help for it.

So my wonderful golden years that I worked 50 years for are controlled by the conditions of my health, and those conditions are painful; they are not pleasant. And I resent it, because I have been a good hard working member of society, and here I am now 68 years old, running out of money, with no settlement to which I am entitled. So far there has been no cancer, nothing that I can directly necessarily attribute to radiation. That came out several years ago that daily ongoing doses of low level radiation are more dangerous than one high exposure.

At the time I was working there, if you are on the last day of the month, if your dosimeter indicated the limit you could have

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so many REM per month, if it indicated the limit, and the next day was the first, then that just rolled over and you went right back in the cell and went right back to work, and that did happen to me.

I read -- I don't know how true it is, but I kind of think it's true -- that when all of this started, and the lawsuits with the unions started, that they found 80 boxes of medical records which were buried at Pantex, and my record was one of them, and that person that told me that was in a position to know.

Thank you for your time.

DR. ZIEMER: And thank you for coming today.

Next we will hear from David McCampbell. David, it looks like we'll have to raise the microphone.

MR. McCAMPBELL: Looks that way.

My name is David McCampbell. I am speaking on behalf of my father, Elvin McCampbell. And he would love to be here, but he died in 2002 of renal cancer which was attributed by the surgeons and the doctors in

Wichita Falls, after all their tests, that it was probably related to radiation exposure.

They had heard of Pantex, and they knew all of

these stories. So Dad can't be here.

But he worked out there form '70 to '84. He filed all the paperwork in about 1999. He was denied in 2002. The reasons for which only a physicist or a biochemist or an industrial hygienist or somebody of that nature would understand all the paperwork that was included.

As I said he died in 2002 of renal cancer. Since that time, on behalf of my mother, I have continued to work to try to get a resolvement out of this situation, primarily because I worked out at Pantex from 1969 to 1974, as a training specialist in 1215, a lot of the stories these people are telling you, I personally during that period of time know what they are talking about, because we would bring people up to the line, I mean to 1215, we would have the engineers come in and the quality people, and we would sit and write standards. The assembly workers would learn

to do the assemblies, then we would shift every thing down on the line. I worked on about seven programs during that particular period of time.

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The thing that bothers me most is -- and this is just an anecdote I thought up while the person was mentioning the tritium -my boss in the training center was a man by of the [Identifying information name redacted], who had been with Pantex or Mason & Hanger forever, because he transferred from Medina, he had badge number like а [Identifying information redacted], something like that. And we were talking numerous times about what do we do, or how do we train people for when a tube breaks. he said, well, the ongoing story is that you take duct seal and you put it over the tube, and then you go home and you drink eight or 10 beers and flush it out of your system.

This was kind of the mentality that existed at Pantex during that particular period of time whenever there were really no definitions given or -- about the dangers or

the true hazards. The first one I know about was '73, something like that. I was asked to develop a series of programs called Atomic Weapons Familiarization. And in that by that time the cloak had fallen to some degree, and we brought all of the operators up and put them through that program, talking about how an atomic bomb worked, what the components were, what chemicals were, what explosives were made up of, how it all went together, how it detonated, and everything else.

And at that time I remember very clearly a lot of guys coming up and saying, you know I've worked here for 10 or 15 years.

Nobody has ever -- nobody ever put this kind of a presentation to us. That program was cut out about a year later because people in management decided we were telling too much.

So it gives you some idea again about the state of mind at Pantex.

My dad, according to the last denial by NIOSH or whoever has got these forms, said that he had a 37.61 percent chance of developing cancer based on his film badge,

and again it was a film badge, it was not a dosimeter or anything else.

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The point simply is this: how many of you in your present jobs would accept that job if you knew you had a 37.61 percent chance of getting renal cancer? The point being these things are hidden, and that's what these folks are hurting about. That's what my mother is hurting about because she lost her husband.

been involved in Now Ι have discussions with the U.S. Department of Labor, filled out all their forms. I have talked to the Energy Employee Compensation Resource Center. I think -- I don't know when that was -- maybe a year ago; they came in, gave me a new set, because my dad was turned down under the radiation portion because he was 37.61 percent. But toxic side they decided, and we got a letter shortly after, that they were reconsidering his case and had sent it all to NIOSH.

Now I have also worked with people over in Albuquerque. They know me. It's

gotten to the point where the first thing they tell me is, I'm sorry we understand your case. We hear it from others. And they keep -- I keep calling and say you told me -- this was around Christmas -- you told me I would have information within three or four months, and it'd been six months, and she said, I'll check.

She called back, said, I talked to the people in Colorado. You will have -- his file was in on somebody's desk and they moved it to the top. That was at the first of the year. I called again last month. I don't know where the file is, but anyway, supposedly it has all been sent to NIOSH, because now they have decided that he may be eligible because he was exposed to toxic chemicals.

Now I know for a fact that he was exposed to toxic chemicals because I trained him in the training bays. The methyl ethyl ketones, right now I can't even recall all the chemicals. We just kept them all in a big cabinet. We had no idea, or any toxicity reports or anything else about any of these,

and we trained in using the actual materials
that they would be using down on the line. So

I know for a fact that his time out there, his
hands, sometimes they wore rubber gloves,
sometimes they didn't. They didn't wear

respirators; they didn't wear masks.

So I know that his exposure, he was exposed heavily, and I put that in the letter I sent this last time, last summer I quess.

The point again, I appreciate your time. But I would really like to say that nine years that this has been going on without a definite answer or without something legitimate understandable conclusion is very frustrating.

My mother is [Identifying information redacted] years old. She is on Social Security. I have to help her when I can money-wise. I don't expect anything. I figure it will probably be denied, because that is the way everything has gone. And these people, they all tell you the same thing.

But that is not right. Like I said

267 1 my five years out there were fascinating; I 2 enjoyed it. But it didn't take me long to figure out I had to get out of there, because 3 I watched people die. Now I'm not a doctor, 4 but it doesn't take one when you start looking 5 at the mortality rate. 6 did 7 So anyway, I have O clearance. Anything they talked about, I 8 standards, I worked on standards. 9 wrote 10 Believe me, they were not the safety issues addressed that needed to be addressed. 11 I do appreciate your time. 12 13 you very much. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you 14 DR. 15 David. 16 We are going to go to the phone 17

lines Let's see, [Identifying now. information redacted], I believe you were first on the line.

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MR. FUNK: Yes, Dr. Ziemer. will give me a second I will get my paperwork.

I believe a statement MR. FUNK: made this morning that the Nevada Test Site was a low exposure area. I'd like to bring it to the attention of the Board that millions of dollars were spent out there plowing under the entire testing area. And to date about 60 percent of that site is fenced, and no access is granted. This is hardly a place where you would call low exposure.

Now later on after the comment period, a couple of the people who were in the know were also claimants, and they brought it to my attention that Mr. Rolfes had said there was a database with the highest exposures on the test site.

Now if there is such a database I'd sure like to see it, because I've been asking for it.

I've been told that there is a database for exposures period. There is no database for highest exposures, lowest exposure, for medium exposure. This was an incorrect remark made by Mark Rolfes that said that there was a database of highest exposure, because there isn't any such thing.

And I'd like to get into something else. Last working board meeting I thought we

were in agreement that I was supposed to help NIOSH by supplying them a list of name for flats workers who they were going to pull their film badge records and their records and see if any of them had bioassays or PIC readings or full body scans, and if they didn't have then they agreed that they were going to move on in a different direction.

Now it seems like we went right back to the 100 selected random workers. Now they're saying they are the highest exposed. Now I challenge that thinking because there is no comparison. How can you say this is the highest, that the tunnels were higher than the flats, when there is no information on the flats to compare it with?

If you don't have the information you can't compare. And I'd like to take this time to address all the Board. I think you've done a very good job, and I apologize for some of my caustic attitude toward you in the past. I don't mean that personally. It's a very hard thing for the job that we have to do. We don't have the access at NIOSH. We've got

sometimes very frustrating, and I would like to say that this board has done a very good job, especially a few of you, you all know who you are, you've been very good to me. And I appreciate everything Mr. Katz has done as

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well, too.

I would like to also point out that before we go anywhere on the site profile and everything, some of the supporting documents are still inaccurate. There is still discrimination between a drill shaft and a mine shaft, and this does relate to exposure, to site profile, the SEC and everything else, because it relates the people, to the different types people who of did the different types of work.

And I think that we are a long way from closure on coming up with a program on the Nevada Test Site.

Dr. Ziemer, you and one -- at a few of the meetings in the past you asked for other sites that had not been mentioned. I'd like to point out that there is auxiliary test sites in Nevada. There is Double Tracks,

there is Clean Slate and there is FAULTLESS, and some of them people have come to me wanting to file claims. I found out that there was no film badges issued to some of these people; there wasn't even a badge period for access. Some of these places were so remote that everybody knew everybody that they didn't even bother with security or a RadSafe monitoring for that matter.

And there was one more site I wanted to bring to your attention. It's not the Nevada Test Site. It's in Salt Lake City. It's on 59th and State Street. It was a uranium processing plant was not mentioned yet, so I'd like to see what they could do about getting that one designated as a site too.

And I'm not real happy with this film badge investigation. I think it needs a bit more looking into. A lot of the interoffice memos were not addressed.

Just to show you how bad information was out there I want to give you one quick example from the Glenn Clayton

report. I know this may not relate to film badges or exposures, but it just goes to show you how the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing.

There was an incident up there, a test, where they had a slug of gold inside of a lead shield that was fastened to a cable. And it was described to the miners during the reentry to look for a four-inch cable with a 40-pound lead cast with an eight-pound gold slug in it.

Turned out it was a three-quarter inch cable. It had a 200-pound lead cask, with 40 pounds of gold in it.

So this goes to show you that the information that is out there is really -- I don't know how you can get that far off, especially with that much gold.

And once again I'd like to say, I don't see how anyone can say the tunnels were the highest exposure, because as I mentioned time and time again the tunnels and all the mine shafts only constituted one percent of all the tests on the Nevada Test Site, and I

could hardly see how you could take one percent and extrapolate back to the other 99

percent.

That's all, thank you very much.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay, and for the record that was John Funk representing the Nevada Test Site. I had thought initially that it was [Identifying information redacted] from the General Steel Industries that was on the phone, but that was John Funk. Thank you, John.

And Mr. Presley, the chair of that work group, has heard your comments as well, as did the other work group members.

Then I think we had another person on the line as well that wanted to comment.

Bonnie, are you still there?

MS. KLEA: Yes, I am. Thank you very much. And I'd just like to thank the Board for all the work you've done so far on the Santa Susana Field Laboratory. And for those who don't know that laboratory was in California, and we had 10 experimental nuclear reactors with one large failure in 1959;

actually they all failed because they were experiments, and they were powering them to see how high they could go before they failed.

But anyway I have a question and a

But anyway I have a question and a comment about the tritium. I've heard it mentioned that people have seen only the widows getting paid. Now I think I've heard from NIOSH that you are giving priority to paying the widows over the workers. Is this true?

DR. ZIEMER: Your question was, is
NIOSH --

MS. KLEA: Do you have a policy of compensating the widows before you would compensate the workers?

DR. ZIEMER: I'm certainly not aware of such a policy. I'll ask Mr. Katz is he can address that?

MR. KATZ: Well, just for clarification, NIOSH doesn't compensate or decide compensation for anybody. They do dose reconstructions.

But there is no priority given to one group over another in terms of whose dose

reconstructions get done first according to whether you are a survivor or an energy employee.

MS. KLEA: Okay, because I thought at one of the meetings where the Department of Labor and NIOSH were in California that I heard that mentioned.

DR. ZIEMER: We are not aware of such a policy. And compensation decisions are actually not made by NIOSH. They are made by the Department of Labor.

MS. KLEA: Okay, also I'm very intrigued by the mention of the tritium. As you know we have a very large groundwater tritium plume at Santa Susana. And throughout the years Rockwell was asked if they had ever tested for tritium releases, and they said oh no, there is no need to.

Well, when EPA in 1999 took some samples themselves they found tritium everywhere. And even today we have -- I think it's measured at 119,000 picocuries per liter, and it's been estimated that had this happened in the '60s there would have been 199 million

-- I think it's picocuries per liter, or is it parts per billion, I don't know.

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But anyway you mentioned highly insoluble compounds. So this will be something I'll be exploring with my own work group. have data from former workers who are deceased on tritium and tritium alarm systems, and I found that all the buildings, all the work at Santa Susana with tritium releases, they had tritium leak into the ground from broken in pipes, then it saturated the was foundations. they also released And through the cold traps, ventilated it, and the cold traps were only 15 percent effective. So that will be an issue I'll want to go into with my own work group.

And thank you again for all your work.

DR. ZIEMER: Okay, thank you. And Mr. Gibson has made a note of your comments. He's the Work Group chair for Santa Susana.

MS. KLEA: Right.

DR. ZIEMER: Were there others on the phone lines that wished to make comments

this evening?

(No response)

DR. ZIEMER: Let me ask if there is anyone else here that didn't get a chance to sign up that wishes to make a comment, please approach the microphone and give us your name for the record.

MR. VAUGHN: My name is Glenn Vaughn. I'm one of Floyd's boys as he calls me.

But I'd just like to say that I agreed with what everyone has said, that I don't see how they can accurately go back and reconstruct the records from times that you didn't wear badges, and being out there 43 years, and like Floyd said, first 15, 20 years we didn't wear badges; if we did it was just the film badges. And also the cell five incident that Floyd mentioned, I would like to know if there is any record of this incident, and if there is and where you can find out the information about it.

I was in on the cleanup. One of my best friends was in the cell when it happened,

and he's not longer with us. And I feel sure that was it, because he got the full dose right in the face.

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And I'm sure that all this has been advertised -- information put out on it, but we were watching the news last night, and that's the reason we are here today. And I would like to have come and participated more, or listened more to what's going on.

Another thing, I don't know if this is strictly radiation, but I feel like the chemicals is as much a problem there as radiation. You make concoctions up of formaldehyde and acetone and toluene, in the early years we'd take that toluene, throw it out of the floor and scrape the floors and the floors. It helped to open the reseal doors, or you'd get so high that your head would just swim.

And I feel like my wife came out to a retirement party, she said, does everyone in your department shake? And as you know, maybe it's age, but I've been old quite awhile if that's what it is, but now I have to use two

hands, most of the time, to write my name. 1 And I do appreciate the opportunity 2 to talk, and appreciate what y'all are doing. 3 Thank you again. 4 Thank you very, very 5 DR. ZIEMER: much. 6 Let me ask, do we need to have him 7 spell his name, or did you catch it? Could 8 you spell your name for the court reporter? 9 10 DR. ZIEMER: Your last name is V? V-a-u-q-h-n? Thank you. spelled? 11 Are there any others that wish to 12 13 make comment now? If not, we thank you all very much. 14 15 This actually concludes the Board's meeting 16 here in Amarillo. certainly appreciate 17 We the hospitality that has been shown to the Board 18 19 by the local folks here as well participation of many of you in our sessions 20 both yesterday and today. 21 Thank you all very much. 22 5:16 23 (Whereupon at the

proceeding in the above-entitled matter

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1 adjourned.)