The etiologic factors for Alaska commercial fishing deaths are complex (Appendix II, Matrix #1). Gear type, fatigue, and environmental conditions also contribute to the severity of work-related incidents.
The CFIVSA primarily emphasizes the use and availability of safety equipment during and after a disaster at sea (Appendix II, Matrix #2). The findings presented in this report demonstrate considerable reductions in fatalities in some sectors of this industry, while persistent problems remain in other areas. We recommend augmenting this approach to commercial fishing fatalities by preventing these disasters in the first place, as well as continuing to prepare to react to them if they should occur. Additional efforts must be made to reduce the frequency of vessel capsizings and sinkings, particularly during crabbing operations, and to prevent fishermen from falling overboard.
The Alaska Interagency Working Group for the Prevention of Occupational Injuries, established in 1991, provides an opportunity for various Federal, State, and municipal agencies involved in occupational safety and health to meet. In addition to fostering better cooperation between agencies, this group can develop and assist industry in implementation of intervention strategies that will prevent some of the injuries and illnesses that occur in Alaska's work places. During the March 1997 Working Group meeting, several subcommittees were formed, including a commercial fishing subcommittee, which includes governmental agencies, nonprofit (and nongovernmental) organizations, and industry representatives. The purpose of this new fishing industry-specific working group is to identify the root causes of fishing casualties, to develop countermeasures for each root cause, and to report their findings. The working group will also formulate recommendations to reduce these fatalities and participate in the evaluation of the effectiveness of interventions. The critical etiologic factors the subcommittee has identified that must be addressed for definitive, primary prevention efforts in this industry are vessel stability and hull integrity to keep vessels afloat, licensing and training of operators and crew to ensure a minimum level of competency, management regimes, avoidance of the most harsh sea and weather conditions, falls overboard, and unsafe diving practices (Appendix II, Matrix #3).
Vessel Stability and Hull Integrity
Recommendation #1: A requirement for periodic stability reassessment and vessel inspection of all vessels should be seriously considered, as equipping and retrofitting can substantially affect the stability of vessels.
Recommendation #2: Minimum specifications for watertight components and bulkheads sufficient to keep swamped or capsized vessels afloat should also be developed, implemented and evaluated.
Since vessel-related events continue to claim the most lives, they warrant the greatest attention. It has been shown previously that the presence of crab pots on deck provide the most potentially dangerous safety condition and that older wooden vessels are most commonly involved in capsizings [Storch 1974]. While the requirements of the CFIVSA have greatly improved the chances of a successful rescue after a vessel capsizes or sinks, the capsizing events themselves should be generally preventable, as vessel stability is measurable and predictable. By integral design enhancements and subsequent modifications (e.g., retrofitting of sponsons); by careful attention to loading, possibly with additional (empirical) stability tests when loaded; by considering use of collapsible crab pots; and by anticipating and planning for the uses of the vessel and for necessary adaptations to environmental factors, vessels can be made much less susceptible to capsizing/sinking due to sudden changes in weather. In their 1991 report [NRC 1991] the NRC recommended that the USCG establish minimum standards for vessel design and construction or conversion of vessels.
As stated previously, the NTSB conducted a Safety Study of Uninspected Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety in 1987 [NTSB 1987]. It recommended seeking legislative authority to require that stability tests be conducted and that complete stability information be provided to the captains of commercial fishing vessels (NTSB Recommendation M-86-11) [NTSB 1987]. Currently, there are stability requirements for new or altered (after September 15, 1991) vessels greater than or equal to 79 feet in length. While stability requirements for vessels less than 79 feet have been controversial, development of stability criteria for these smaller vessels is imperative, even if it requires an entirely different method and approach than that used for large vessels.
Licensing and Training of Skippers
Recommendation #3: A thorough assessment should be made of current training requirements and efforts, and deficiencies should be immediately corrected.
The NRC recommended that the USCG establish regulations requiring that each person involved in vessel operations acquire skills necessary to their duties through a certification program and licensing requirement [NRC 1991]. NTSB also recommended in its report that the USCG seek legislative authority to require the licensing of captains of commercial fishing vessels, including a requirement that they demonstrate minimum qualifications in vessel safety including rules of the road, vessel stability, firefighting, water tight integrity, and the use of lifesaving equipment (NTSB Recommendation M-85-68) [NTSB 1987].
The USCG has submitted a licensing plan and inspection program to Congress [USCG 1992b]. The licensing plan requires knowledge of stability for the master of a vessel. The persistent contribution of vessel instability to vessel casualties (in the face of no implementation of such a licensing program) and to the consequent deaths of fishermen should be addressed.
Human Factors
Recommendation #4: Consideration should be given to establishing adequate watchkeeping and staffing requirements for all vessels.
Minimum watchkeeping and staffing requirements currently exist for uninspected fishing vessels over 200 gross tons. It has been well documented that long hours and fatigue are a major part of fisheries in Alaska [NRC 1991]. The hazards of deep-sea fishing vessels have been summarized previously by asserting that the causes of vessel casualties include negligent navigation and fatigue [Schilling 1971].
Training of Crew
Recommendation #5: Consideration should be given to requiring the successful completion of basic fishing safety training, such as those programs currently offered by the Alaska Marine Safety Education Association (AMSEA), before an Alaskan (state) crew license or a commercial fishing permit is issued.
In addition to the safety gear requirement, the CFIVSA requires assurance from the master of each vessel that safety drills involving the use of safety equipment are conducted at least once a month. The individual conducting the safety drills must be trained in the proper procedures. AMSEA, formed in 1985 to address many of the risks described here, has played a major role in preparing Alaska's fishermen to meet these needs. AMSEA provides an intensive 18-24 hour course covering emergency preparedness, response, and survival training which includes the use of this survival equipment and instructions for conducting emergency drills on deck. As of the end of 1996, AMSEA had trained 3300 fishermen. A retrospective evaluation of the effectiveness of this training showed that it had a measurable effect in reducing drownings among commercial fishermen [Perkins 1995]. In other studies it has been recommended that improving worker training, using PFDs, maintaining safety equipment, and developing improved clothing and personal flotation devices can save lives [Driscoll et al. 1994].
Management Regimes
Recommendation #6: All current and proposed management regimes should be examined from a safety and health perspective.
The management of fisheries must ensure the preservation of the resource, while optimizing the opportunities for fishermen, and allowing local authorities and fishermen the freedom to exercise judgement about the advisability of fishing in current conditions so as not to exert undue pressure to fish in poor weather.
Harsh Sea and Weather Conditions
Recommendation #7: Weather information should be more closely heeded.
Weather buoy observations are now accessible via the Internet and should be used in conjunction with nomographic estimates for icing hazard, [USCG 1986; Ball 1978], enabling the trained skipper to make an informed decision whether to sail, return to port, or seek a protected anchorage before the worst conditions occur.
Icing of the ship's superstructure can rapidly compromise the stability of any vessel and predispose it to capsizing. Icing nomograms show the relationship between air temperature, surface wind speed, and water temperature to the rate of ice accumulation, and can be used to predict icing hazard [Ball 1978]. The National Weather Service includes vessel icing forecasts with their regular weather broadcasts as a service to fishermen. The forecasts are given in four categories: light, moderate, heavy, or very heavy freezing spray [Ball 1978] (Appendix III).
Falls Overboard
Recommendation #8: All fishermen should wear PFDs when on the deck of any vessel [NIOSH 1994b].
In overboard events where the victim is entangled in the gear, or is not observed falling overboard, a PFD might not result in a successful rescue. However, in 45% of the fatal man-overboard (MOB) cases from 1991 to 1996, the victim was not tangled in gear and was observed falling overboard, and should have been floatable and recoverable if the vessel had been adequately prepared for an emergency. Also, anecdotal concerns by fishermen about entanglement in lines by many PFD's are not supported by the events. All entanglements resulting in a fatal MOB event involved the entanglement of an extremity (arm or foot) rather than clothing covering the torso. An expanding number of compact PFD options unlikely to interfere with deck operations (self-inflating vests, pile-lined jackets, and suspenders), have become commercially available during the past decade.
Recommendation #9: MOB alarms should be thoroughly evaluated and widely deployed if such evaluations demonstrate that the devices are effective.
Man overboard alarms are worn by fishermen to alert others that they have fallen overboard. The devices operate by automatically setting off an alarm when the fishermen fall into the water. These devices, which can be linked to personal EPIRBs and vessel automated cutoff ("deadman") switches, have recently become commercially available. They show promising results in efficacy studies, although their effectiveness in saving someone from drowning remains unevaluated.
Recommendation #10: Thorough study of the handling of lines, especially during deployment of crab pots, should be conducted to reduce worker exposure to this hazard.
The frequency of line entanglement resulting in man-overboard events is high. As indicated elsewhere in this bulletin, many of these events are not likely to be mitigated by PFD usage.
Diving Events
Recommendation #11: A training curriculum should be developed, implemented, and evaluated for fishermen who are harvesting seafood or clearing lines or nets by diving.
Dive-related fatalities have emerged as a new problem in Alaska. Recently a new dive fishery for sea cucumbers has emerged in Southeast Alaska and Kodiak, and some fishermen for other species have encountered trouble when they dive to check their vessels or to clear nets or lines.
During 1992-1993, six persons died while
diving for sea urchins off the coast of Maine.
Authorities identified inexperienced divers and
persons unfamiliar with operating vessels in adverse
sea and weather conditions as the groups at
greatest risk [CDC 1994]. As a result, Maine
passed emergency regulations to require (1) persons to
be a resident of Maine to participate in the fishery,
(2) divers must show proof that they are certified
in basic open water diving from any recognized
national association, (3) both divers and
tenders must attend a competency class, and (4)
tenders must be licenced by attending a competency class.
Since the implementation of this program in 1994, only one diver has been killed [Fetterman 1997].
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