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NIOSH Publication No. 2002-115:Surveillance and Prevention of Occupational Injuries in Alaska: |
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Contents
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| Date | Number Killed | Number Injured | Type of Helicopter | Logging Company |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/23/1992 | 6 (Co-pilot and 5 loggers) | 5 (Pilot and 4 loggers) | Manufacturer A Type A Single engine | Company A |
| 3/6/1992 | 0 | 2 (Pilot and Co-Pilot) | Manufacturer A Type A Single engine | Company A |
| 11/10/1992 | 0 | 0 | Manufacturer A Type B Single engine | Company A |
| 2/19/1993 | 2 (Pilot and Co-Pilot) | 0 | Manufacturer A Type A Single engine | Company B |
| 5/2/1993 | 1 (Solo Pilot) | 1 (Ground Crew Logger) | Manufacturer A Type C Single engine | Company B |
| 5/8/1993 | 0 | 2 (Pilot and Co-Pilot) | Manufacturer A Type A Single engine | Company B |
After the occurrence of two serious helicopter logging crashes during one week in May 1993, NIOSH began a series of urgent consultations, culminating in convening an emergency session of the Alaska Interagency Working Group for the Prevention of Occupational Injuries in early July 1993. Prior to this meeting, the first helicopter logging matrix was developed to identify risk factors contributing to these events. (See Table 3.) Based on the collaborative efforts of the Working Group, there were tangible outcomes:
| Host/Human | Agent/Vehicle | Environment | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-event/ Pre-injury | Pilot Training Experience Fatigue Stress Alcohol Ground crew Training Experience |
Helicopter design Lift & durability Maintenance & repairs Engines & controls Ergonomics Unstable work platform Surplus/improvised equipment |
Terrain Weather Landing zones Oversight FAA (CFR pt 133) Industry |
| Event/Injury | Pilot Reaction to emergency situation (i.e.,autorotation) Task overload Ground Crew Reacting & avoiding |
Helicopter Autorotation performance Deformation on impact Fires & explosions |
Terrain Weather |
| Post-event | Types of injury Severity | Little assistance available EMS not available |
Photo 5: A helicopter crash at Dora Bay, Alaska
The prevention–matrix approach resulted in recommendations including more vigorous oversight; development of rigorous voluntary industry standards of equipment, maintenance, and training; exclusive use of multi–engine motor craft; and more stringent controls on alcohol and drug use in this industry. (See Table 4.)
| Host/Human | Agent/Vehicle | Environment | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-event/ Pre-injury | Increased training for pilots and ground crew Improved work/ rest cycles |
Maintenance per manufacturer's recommendation Impact (g)- resistant seats NTSB - to prohibit surplus equipment |
Improved interagency communication Increased FAA oversight |
| Event/Injury | Practical training in autorotation | Emergency (backup) landing zones | |
| Post-event |
By late July 1993, all helicopter logging sites and ramps in the state had been visited by the jurisdictional agencies, with a number of these operations being curtailed or entirely shut down for irregularities. Since that intervention and the implementation of the Working Group’s recommendations during July 1993, there were no additional helicopter logging crashes or fatalities in Alaska until July 1996, when a single crash occurred, with one fatality. (See Figure 8.) There have been no more since (through December 2001), despite continuation of large-scale helicopter logging in Alaska.
Photo 6: A long line load of logs being lifted by a multi-engine, heavy-lift helicopter
Figure 8: Crashes, Fatalities, and Nonfatal Injuries in Alaska Helicopter Logging Operations, 1990-1999 (By 6-Month Intervals)
July 8, 1993, Interagency Intervention
This effective application of surveillance data in an interagency intervention for helicopter logging-related crashes has continued. In March 1995, the Alaska Interagency Working Group for the Prevention of Occupational Injuries and NIOSH cosponsored a Helicopter Logging Safety Workshop. An additional prevention matrix was developed to further refine safety countermeasures in the industry. (See Table 5.)
| Host/Human | Agent/Vehicle | Environment | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-event/ Pre-injury | Qualified second pilot Flight/duty time limits Drug/alcohol/ testing Availability of alcohol/drug rehabilitation |
Multi-engine only Dual drive train Improved controls Improved crash worthiness Limit to certified parts with valid FAA history |
Industry SOPs for maintenance safety culture & management Education by helicopter logging association Improve communications among management & crews |
| Event/Injury | Qualified second pilot | Crash-resistant fuel tanks Controlled deformation |
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| Post-event | EPIRBs (emergency position indicating radio beacons) | Improve EMS availability CPR/first aid training for crews |
Additional workshops were held in 1996 and 1997. (The proceedings of these workshops have been combined and published in one volume.)13 Building on Alaska’s leadership in this area, a Helicopter Logging Safety Committee was formed under the auspices of the Helicopter Association International (HAI), "...to help promote the safe use of helicopters in all aspects of the helicopter logging industry." The committee has established its own "Helicopter Logging Guidelines," which address four issues: (1) general helicopter safety for forestry operations; (2) integration of ground and flight activities; (3) helicopter specific planning; and (4) a pre-accident plan (HAI, 1997).14 More detailed accounts of these data, events, and interventions have been published elsewhere.13,15,16The insurance industry has also played a major role in progress made in helicopter logging by substantially discounting helicopter insurance costs for operators adhering to standards developed by the Helicopter Logging Safety Committee.
The partnership developed among government agencies, HAI, and insurance underwriters has demonstrated the value of joint efforts to address specific occupational safety problems to workers in Alaska.
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