| Control of emerging infectious diseases will be difficult because of the large number of disease-causing organisms that are emerging or could emerge and the great diversity of geographic areas in which emergence can occur. The modern view of the evolution of pathogen virulencespecifically its focus on the tradeoff between costs and benefits to the pathogen from increased host exploitationallows control programs to identify and focus on the most dangerous pathogens (those that can be established with high virulence in human populations). |
Modern understanding of the evolution of virulence focuses on a tradeoff to which pathogens are subjected: the competitive benefits that pathogens accrue through increased exploitation of hosts and the costs that result from any effects of disease that reduce infectious contact between infected and susceptible hosts. The traditional view presumed that natural selection would favor evolution toward benign coexistence between host and parasite (9-12). The modern view, however, stresses that such benign coexistence will be unstable if pathogens that exploit hosts to a greater degree have more overall success across transmission cycles than those that achieve benign coexistence (13-17).
The primary assumption of this evolutionary argument is that increased
toxin virulence is correlated with increased pathogen propagation (manifested as increases
in pathogen reproduction within hosts and/or pathogen shedding from infected hosts).
This correlation need not be strong across host/pathogen associations for the arguments to
be valid; differences in pathogenic mechanisms, for example, could make the
correlation virtually undetectable when extremely different kinds of
The connection between virulence, host exploitation, and pathogen propagation may be indirect or direct. If the pathogenic mechanism involves toxin production, a positive association is expected between production and pathogen propagation. In Vibrio cholerae, for example, high toxin production is associated with increased densities of vibrios in the fecal material, apparently as a result of the toxin's flushing of competing organisms from the intestinal tract (17). In other organisms, the association between virulence, host exploitation, and pathogen propagation is more direct. The human plasmodia that reproduce more extensively often cause more severe illness and are more life-threatening (16). Similarly, more virulent strains of vector-borne dengue virus reproduce more extensively in cell culture (18). Growth rates of Salmonella typhimurium were reduced by eliminating one of its virulence plasmids and inhibiting the plasmid's expression; introduction of an 8-kb region encoding the spv genes restored increased growth rate (19). Comparison of Shigella species suggests a similar association between virulence and pathogen reproduction (20).
Sexually transmitted pathogens show analogous associations. For the best studied pathogen, HIV, more rapidly replicative HIVs are associated with greater cellular destruction in vitro, more rapid destruction of the immune system, and more rapid onset of AIDS (21-35). Similarly, the more oncogenic serotypes of human papilloma-viruses (HPV) generate greater numbers of progeny by interfering with the cell's mechanisms for restricting cell division (36). For both viruses, increased viral loads are associated with increased probability of transmission to contacted persons (37-39), and HIV-1, which propagates to higher densities than HIV-2, is more transmissible per contact (40).
The association between virulence and viral propagation in pathogens
circulating naturally in human populations therefore supports the modern emphasis on a
tradeoff between the fitness benefits and the costs accrued by pathogens as a function of changes
in host exploitation.
Recognizing this version of the general tradeoff led to several predictions: Because
vector-borne parasites can be transmitted effectively from immobilized hosts, they should evolve
to a higher level of virulence than
Each of these hypotheses has been evaluated and in each case the expected association occurred: virulence is positively associated with vector-borne transmission, waterborne transmission, attendant-borne transmission, and durability in the external environment (Table 1). This evolutionary framework, therefore, explains the diversity of human parasites in a way that contrasts starkly with the traditional view. Instead of being seen as a sign of maladaption, the severity of diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, smallpox, cholera, and typhoid fever is seen as a consequence of evolutionary adaptation because the causative parasites do not rely on host mobility for transmission. The tradeoffs between the benefits and costs of exploitation, therefore, favor evolution of relatively high levels of exploitation for such pathogens and hence high degrees of harm to the host.
Sexual Transmission
The evolutionary tradeoffs associated with virulence in sexually transmitted
diseases involve the requirements for sexual transmission imposed on the pathogens by the
sexual behavior of the host. Short durations of infections would be ineffective for most
sexually transmitted pathogens. If people changed sex partners once per year, for example, a
pathogen that was rendered noninfectious by immunologic defenses or the host's death within a
few weeks would have little chance of being transmitted. To survive, the pathogen must
be transmissible for a period that extends into the time of the next sexual partnership.
To prosper, the pathogen must be transmissible for periods that span more than one change
in sex partners; therefore, sexually transmitted pathogens may often need cell and
tissue tropisms that keep them from being eliminated by the immune system for relatively
long periods.
The evolutionary effects of changes in sexual behavior on virulence may be strongly influenced by tropisms that were present before the behavior change. Increased potential for sexual transmission should favor pathogen variants that reproduce more extensively sooner after the onset of infection. If the preexisting tropisms target nonessential cell types, this selection for earlier reproduction will have relatively little effect on virulence. If, for example, people changed sex partners every few days, the sexually transmitted pathogen should evolve virulence levels much like those of respiratory tract pathogens, which rely on host mobility for transmission. Examples of such pathogens are sexually transmitted unicellular pathogens such as Neisseria gonorrheae and Chlamydia trachomatis, which tend to infect mucosal tissues and, therefore, have relatively minor negative effects on the survival of adult hosts. If, however, the tropisms involve critical cells, the damage associated with increased levels of host exploitation should be more severe to the host. HIV provides an example: HIV has a tropism for helper T cells, which are critical regulators of immunologic responses. Although a high level of replication in these cells can be tolerated over short periods, it eventually leads (by mechanisms that are still being clarified) to the decimation of this category of cells and the collapse of the immune system.
If these arguments about evolutionary forces and tissue tropisms are applicable to
| Table 1. Categories of pathogens that pose threats of being stably harmful in human populations because of reduced dependence on host mobility | ||
| Characteristics allowing transmission from immobile hosts | Association with lethality | Reference |
| arthropod-borne transmission | lethality higher among arthopod-borne pathogens than among directly transmitted pathogens | (16) |
| water-borne transmission | lethality of diarrheal bacteria correlated with tendencies for waterborne transmission | (42) |
| attendant-borne transmission | lethality of E. coli correlated with duration of attendant-borne cycling | (20, 41) |
| durability in the external environment | lethality of respiratory-tract pathogens correlated with durability | * |
| * B. A. Walther and P. W. Ewald, unpublished manuscript | ||
The most important application of this evolutionary approach to HIV, however, pertains to interventions that can be used to control the future evolution of HIV. If the inherent virulences of HIVs depend evolutionarily on the potential for sexual transmission, interventions that reduce this potential should have a long-term evolutionary effect, as well as widely recognized short-term epidemiologic effects in addition to reducing the spread of HIV infection, such interventions should reduce the harmfulness per infection. Follow-up of persons infected with HIV-1 for more than a decade without deterioration of the immune system indicates that the mildness of the infections is sometimes attributable to inherently mild viruses (45-47). The raw material for this evolutionary change, therefore, appears to be already present in the HIV gene pool.
In Japan, which has a relatively low potential for sexual transmission (48), type E
HIV-1s have recently been introduced from Southeast Asia. If a low potential for sexual
transmission favors evolution toward mildness, the Japanese type E viruses should become milder over
the next few decades.
To identify pathogens that must be studied and controlled most intensively, each pathogen should be assessed for two characteristics that are associated with high virulence: 1) an ability to spread well from human to human (directly or indirectly through vectors) rather than infecting humans as dead-end hosts, and 2) transmission features that select for high levels of virulence.
The existing associations between virulence and transmission characteristics (Table 1) can be used to make such identifications. Table 2 offers a checklist that could be applied to each emerging pathogen to determine whether it makes the first cut in the process of identifying the most dangerous candidates. Subsequent analyses of the pathogens would then assess the nature of any barriers that limit the establishment of pathogens in human populations (e.g., the absence of suitable arthropod vectors for large proportions of the year).
| Table 2. First-level checklist for identifying the most dangerous emerging pathogens. If the answer to any of the questions is yes, the potential for continuous transmission between humans should be assessed. If this potential is high, the pathogen should be considered particularly dangerous. | |
| Does it have a tendency for waterborne transmission? | |
| Is it vector-borne with the ability to use humans as part of the life cycle? | |
| If it is directly transmitted, is it durable in the external environment? | |
| Is it attendant-borne? | |
| Is it needle-borne?* | |
| If it is sexually transmitted, is it mutation-prone with a tropism for critical cell types or does it have invasive or oncogenic tendencies? | |
| *The hypothesized importance of needleborne transmission has not yet been tested; it has been included in this listing on the basis of the harmfulness of needleborne pathogens and the hypothetical assocations between needleborne transmission and virulence (17). | |
Durability
Although durability in various external environments was quantified in detail
by microbiologists during the first half of this century (49), modern studies have paid
this attribute little attention. Evolutionary considerations, however, indicate that it should be
one of the first variables quantified when a new pathogen is being studied. If a new,
directly transmitted pathogen can remain viable in the external environment for many days to
many weeks, it falls in the category of especially dangerous pathogens. If, for example, Ebola
virus were viable upon natural desiccation for weeks instead of hours, its level of host
exploitation and potential for transmission from exploited hosts would not be so mismatched, and it,
like smallpox virus, would pose a much more serious threat. Durability in the
external environment depends largely on environmental conditions (49), and thus assessments
of viability should cover all feasible environmental conditions.
Vector-borne Transmission
The most serious threat involved in vector-borne transmission comes from pathogens
that can be maintained by human/mosquito cycles but are absent from suitable areas because
of historical accidents or past eradication campaigns. Dengue and malaria are members of
this category; they have the potential to spiral out of control immediately upon release into
areas with suitable vectors. Nonevolutionary analyses of emerging infections recognize the
threat posed by these pathogens because their damaging effects on human populations are known.
Vector-borne pathogens that have not used humans as the primary vertebrate host but may be capable of doing so represent less easily recognized threats. Evolutionary considerations heighten concern because such vector-borne pathogens are expected to become increasingly harmful as they become adapted to human/vector cycles of transmission (16).
Rift Valley fever virus provides an example. For most of this century, this virus
was believed to infect humans only as dead-end hosts. Although it was vector-borne in
ungulates, humans were seen as acquiring the
All emerging vector-borne pathogens need not be viewed as equally threatening. For example, Borrelia burgdorferi, the agent of Lyme disease (an emerging vector-borne pathogen in human populations in North America), does not need to be monitored to avoid its establishment as a human pathogen because once emerged, it does not threaten to spiral out of control; it is tick-borne, and ongoing human/tick cycles are not feasible because of the limited exposure of infected humans to susceptible tick populations of the appropriate instar. Tick- and mite-borne rickettsiae do not present a great threat for similar reasons.
Sexual Transmission
The tradeoff concerning sexually transmitted pathogens may prove particularly useful
in identifying pathogens that are capable of sexual transmission and have cell tropisms
that would cause severe damage if host exploitation increased but have not had high potential
for sexual transmission. Human T-cell lymphotropic virus (HTLV) is in this category,
even though by nonevolutionary criteria it could be dismissed because it has been
geographically widespread in humans for a long time (1). HTLV type 1 (HTLV-I) is less damaging than
HIV; it kills or severely handicaps 5% to 10% of the people it infects, generally decades
after infection. Although HTLV-I and HIV infections share many characteristics, HTLV does
not have HIV's high mutation rate and hence does not have the potential for staying ahead
of immune responses and eventually decimating the immune system. Instead, HTLV relies
on modes of transmission that do not expose it to the immune system: proviral
replication through stimulation of host cell proliferation and transmission through cell-to-cell contact.
A concern with HTLV is that a high potential for sexual transmission may favor increased
rates of viral replication leading to increased exposure to the immune system and
increased mutation rates (48).
A preliminary step toward evaluating the threat posed by the emergence of particularly virulent HTLVs is assessing whether HTLVs exposed to different levels of potential for sexual transmission vary in virulence. HTLV-I infections tend to lead to leukemias and lymphomas at younger ages in Jamaica, where the potential for sexual transmission is high, than in Japan, where potential for sexual transmission is low (48). This difference also occurs among North Americans of Japanese and Caribbean descent (52), who presumably are infected predominantly (if not exclusively) by Japanese and Caribbean HTLVs, respectively. The inherent virulence and mutation-proneness of the Japanese and Caribbean HTLVs need to be assessed. Similarly, HTLV virulence needs to be better studied in regions of Africa where it has been long endemic to determine whether variations in HTLV virulence are correlated with the potential for sexual transmission.
Although mutation-prone sexually transmitted viruses that infect critical cell types
are particularly threatening, sexually transmitted viruses in general deserve special
attention. Even if a sexually transmitted virus invades only epithelial cells and replicates with
low mutation rates, a high potential for sexual
Waterborne Transmission
Although such pathogens as Vibrio cholerae O139 and Shigella dysenteriae
type 1 threaten emergence in countries with inadequate water supplies, the threat is much lower
in countries with safe water supplies. Although such pathogens continue to be brought into
the countries with safe water supplies by travelers and commerce, the pathogens show
little potential for emergence. For example, a major epidemic of S. dysenteriae type 1 spread
from Guatemala through Central America during the early 1970s. It entered the United States
in several places but dissipated without any great effort at containment. Its transmission
was studied in a Los Angeles neighborhood, where each infection gave rise on average to about
0.4 new infections (54). Without amplification by waterborne transmission, this outbreak,
like other introductions in the United States, was self-limited (54). The situation at the other
end of Central America was similar. The S. dysenteriae epidemic dissipated as it moved into
Costa Rica, where water supplies were relatively pure (L. J. Mata, pers. comm.).
Attendant-borne Transmission
Emerging hospital-acquired pathogens may pose one of the greatest and most
controllable threats to people in countries like the United States, where more than 5% of
hospital admissions and about 14% of intensive care patients acquire infections during their stay
(55-57). According to some estimates, nosocomial infections rank among the ten leading causes
of death in the United States (56), with dangerous bloodstream infections
approximately doubling during the 1980s (58).
Although high virulence has been documented in pathogens involved in nosocomial outbreaks (59-63), the damage caused by nosocomial pathogens has generally been attributed to the state of hospitalized patients, who may be compromised by underlying disease, immunosuppressive drugs, and invasive procedures. These factors, however, do not explain why nosocomial pathogens, such as Staphylococcus aureus often cause symptomatic infections in hospital staff (60) but rarely in persons in the outside community. They also do not explain the association between the extent of nosocomial transmission and the virulence of infection, or the differences in symptomatic infections among otherwise healthy babies (17,20,41). In a New York City hospital, for example, where attendant-borne transmission rates were very low, only approximately one of 30 babies with S. aureus were symptomatic (64). Among nosocomial outbreaks of endemic disease, the analogous proportion may be 5- to 10-fold higher (65).
Without an evolutionary framework for understanding pathogen virulence,
researchers would have no reason for expecting to find particularly virulent endemic pathogens
in hospitals. The only serious attempts to explain the apparently high-level of
pathogen virulence in hospitals involved the linking of virulence to another characteristic
associated with hospitals: antibiotic resistance. The emergence of antibiotic-resistant organisms
in hospitals in concert with the use of the antibiotics (66) led researchers to conclude that
high levels of antibiotic use caused the emergence of resistant organisms and to speculate
that antibiotic-resistant organisms might be inherently
Although the controversy regarding virulence and antibiotic resistance in hospital-acquired infections can be explained by the hypothesized connection between attendant-borne transmission and the evolution of both virulence and antibiotic resistance, none of the investigations of the topic made measurements that would allow assessment of the connection between attendant-borne transmission and the emergence of variants with increased virulence. The critical measure is the harmfulness per person housing the organisms in question, and the critical comparison is between nosocomial and community-acquired strains. Among persons that harbor nosocomial strains of S. aureus, for example, the proportion that show symptomatic infection could be compared with the analogous proportion of matched persons who are harboring community strains. After virulence-enhancing mechanisms are well understood, pathogens can be assayed for their virulence directly. Thus Clostridium difficile pathogens isolated from prolonged nosocomial outbreaks are predicted to be more toxigenic than C. difficile isolated from the outside community. Similarly, nosocomial Escherichia coli are predicted to have virulence-enhancing characteristics (e.g., invasiveness, adherence) (69) more often than community strains.
Further knowledge about virulence enhancing mechanisms and development of techniques for rapid detection (e.g., [72-75]) should offer opportunities for carefully controlled experiments to test whether reduction in attendant-borne transmission causes a greater decline in the inherent virulence of nosocomial pathogens in experimental hospitals than in control hospitals in which interventions are not imposed. Long-term follow-up should clarify the degree to which attendant-borne transmission may foster the emergence of virulent variants among both established human pathogens (e.g., S. aureus, E. coli) and new or newly recognized pathogens (e.g., Serratia spp., and Pseudomonas aeruginosa).
Harmful, often antibiotic-resistant, hospital-acquired pathogens can readily emerge beyond a hospital's boundary, when patients are moved, or attendants move between hospitals; the documentation is particularly strong for dangerous variants of E. coli and S. aureus (62,74-78). The degree to which emerging nosocomial pathogens spill over to generate outbreaks in the outside community is not well understood, but evidence suggests that this spillover represents a substantial threat when the organisms can infect healthy people. When large-scale communitywide epidemics of pathogenic E. coli have occurred, for example, transmission in hospitals often was strongly implicated. During 1953 and 1954, an E. coli epidemic advanced up the East Coast of the United States from the Carolinas through New England; "As it spread, explosive outbreaks were limited to institutions, hospital wards, and newborn nurseries" (59). A focal study of the U.S. Army Hospital at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, indicated that the epidemic strain was brought into the hospital by infected people in the community, with the proportion of inpatient to outpatient cases reversing dramatically during the hospital's 5-month outbreak (59). Similarly, during the winter of 1961, in an outbreak in Chicago and adjacent communities in Indiana, about 5% of the infants were affected, and nearly half of the affected infants had direct or indirect contact with one of the 29 involved hospitals just before their illnesses (75).
Studies of S. aureus have also shown that nosocomial and community outbreaks are sometimes synchronous with transmission occurring in both directions between the hospital and the outside community (79-80). The long-term consequences of emergence of nosocomial strains for the outside community, however, still need to be assessed. The possibility that nosocomial pathogens may tend to be not only more resistant to antibiotics, but also more inherently virulent lends some urgency to this need.
Almost no work has been done to determine the potential of pathogens thought to
be almost exclusively associated with nosocomial infection
(e.g., Enterococcus, C. difficile) to take hold in the outside community. The high durability in the external environment of
many nosocomial pathogens heightens the need for additional information. Durable pathogens
that can infect uncompromised hosts (e.g., antibiotic-resistant
S. aureus and to a lesser extent C.
difficile) possess the basic characteristics that damaging organisms need to spread in
the outside community. Durable organisms unable to infect healthy people pose a relatively
low threat, but this inability is often presumed. Any transmission of durable
nosocomial organisms like P. aeruginosa from patients after discharge heightens the threat to the
outside community by providing an avenue for further adaptation to humans. Molecular analyses
that allow reconstruction of epidemiologic patterns (e.g., molecular phylogenetics) could be used
to improve assessments of the degree to which nosocomial pathogens can emerge in the
outside community; such studies need to provide quantitative assessments not only of the
threats posed by nosocomial pathogens in their current state, but also of their potential to breach
by evolution the barriers that have inhibited their broader spread in the past.
The periodic emergence of yellow fever in European and American cities during the 18th and 19th centuries took a heavy toll; the 1878 epidemic, for example, killed about a quarter of the population of Memphis, Tennessee (81). If yellow fever virus were first encountered today, it would be recognized as an important threat because it is vector-borne and can be transmitted indefinitely through human/mosquito cycles.
With regard to the emergence of virulent variants from established pathogens, the influenza viruses circulating at the Western Front during World War I would be considered dangerous because barriers to transmission from immobile hosts were removed by cultural practices and because influenza virus is mutation prone (17,20). It is, therefore, not surprising that the Western Front has been identified as the source of the highly lethal variants of the 1918 influenza pandemic and that a pandemic of this severity has never recurred (17). More importantly, evolutionary considerations suggest that such a lethal pandemic will not recur unless influenza viruses are again exposed to opportunities that allow transmission from immobile hosts, as they are on poultry farms where highly lethal influenza outbreaks periodically emerge (17).
Uncertainty about the Dangerous Epidemics of the Future
These arguments about the evolution of virulence provide only coarse approximations
of the selective processes in pathogen populations. To determine whether the implications
of these arguments need to be substantially modified, we need empirical studies that
evaluate these arguments against alternative explanations. Considering the current state
of uncertainty, some might argue that it is dangerous to incorporate the current
coarse understanding of the evolution of virulence into policy making. But failing to incorporate
this understanding is dangerous.
Although the precise mechanisms that increase virulence in pathogens in the high-risk categories still need to be clarified, the associations (Table 1) are strong. One could argue, for example, that durable or waterborne pathogens are more harmful because hosts tend to pick up a greater diversity of genotypes from the environment when pathogens are more durable or are mixed in water; if the within-host genetic variability of such pathogens is greater, they would have more potential for within-host competition, which could favor the evolution of increased virulence. By this argument, factors such as durability, vector-borne transmission, and waterborne transmission would increase virulence indirectly by increasing within-host genetic variation. With regard to the prevention of the emergence of highly virulent disease, uncertainties about mechanisms are not critical. Whether the effects of these factors are direct or indirect, elimination of the factors should discourage the emergence of severe disease and favor the decrease of highly virulent pathogens.
Decisions to invest in interventions without certainty about mechanisms is not new to the health sciences. The hygienic interventions to control hospital acquired diseases and the purification of water supplies to control cholera were appropriately advocated on the basis of epidemiologic data (from Ignaz Semmelweis and John Snow) a half century before the causative agents of these or any other infectious diseases were first identified. Jenner's smallpox vaccine program was accepted globally more than a century before viruses were discovered or the mechanisms by which vaccines provide protection were understood. Even now the mechanisms by which the immune system provides protection encompass major areas of uncertainty. This uncertainty is evidenced, for example, by the controversies about the importance of the different legs of the immune system (such as cytotoxic T cells, neutralizing antibody, and subsets of helper T cells) in HIV pathogenesis.
If the evolutionary arguments are correct, the emergence of the most harmful diseases can be countered not only for pathogens that are recognized as threats but also for those posing threats that are not yet recognized. Providing pure water supplies, reducing attendant-borne transmission, and reducing vector-borne transmission preferentially from ill people (e.g., by providing mosquito-proof houses [17]) should guard against the emergence of virulent pathogens, whether the pathogens are unidentified or are highly virulent variants of identified human pathogens. An understanding of the evolutionary determinants of virulence may thus make surveillance and prompt intervention much more manageable.
The emphasis thus is on suppression of the emergence of particularly virulent variants rather than suppression of the emergence of new disease organisms. The expectation is that the frequency of disease will drop even though the frequency of individuals harboring organisms may decline little if at all. The data on decentralization of nursery/maternity wards, for example, indicate that the rates of nosocomial infection decline among mothers and babies, even though the rates at which babies harbor pathogens (colonization plus infection) do not decline (82). Indeed the disagreement about the value of rooming-in as a mode of infection control (82) can be attributed to a failure to distinguish the prevalence of disease organisms from the prevalence of disease. Controversies about the value of waterborne transmission can be traced to a similar failure (17).
The lead article of the first issue of this journal was entitled, "Emerging infections:
getting ahead of the curve" (4). I propose that integrating evolutionary principles with
epidemiology would enhance our ability to stay ahead of the curve. Evolutionary insights should
increase our ability to distinguish emerging pathogens according to the long-term threat that they
pose and thereby adjust investments in accordance with the threat. Knowledge of the evolution
of virulence should also guide us to identify for each pathogen the critical data that will allow
us to make this assessment. Finally, evolutionary considerations should allow identification
of
| Dr. Ewald is a professor in the Department of Biology at Amherst College. Trained in ecology and evolutionary biology, he works at the interface of these areas with epidemiology, focusing on the evolution of virulence among infectious diseases of humans and insects. |
Address for correspondence: Paul W. Ewald, Department of Biology, Amherst College, Amherst, MA 01002-5000; fax: 413-542-7955; e-mail: pwewald@amherst.edu.
References