

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

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Washington

All response begins at the local level. Being prepared to prevent, respond to, and recover from all types of public health threats requires that states and localities improve their capabilities in surveillance, epidemiology, laboratories, and response readiness. Facts on laboratories and response readiness activities appear below. See appendices 1 and 7 for a more detailed description of data points and data sources.

A healthy population is more resilient in public health emergencies. People with chronic conditions may require additional care such as specialized medications, equipment, and other assistance. To develop an effective response plan, a state or locality must consider the unique needs of its own population. In Washington, 9.3% of adults reported having asthma, 6.9% diabetes, 4.8% heart disease, and 2.3% had a stroke. In addition, 23.9% reported a limiting disability and 61.8% were overweight or obese.\* \*CDC, ONCDIEH (NCCDPHP) Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2008

## Laboratories: Chemical Capabilities Laboratories: General Maintaining LRN-C laboratories with Status of continuity of operations plan (COOP):1 core laboratory capabilities for responding Participation State public health laboratory had a COOP if the public is exposed to functions during in Laboratory that was tested an emergency chemical agents One Response Level 2 Network for Note: There are three levels, lab chemical agents with Level 1 having the most State had a standardized (LRN-C) Ensuring advanced capabilities. See electronic data system availability of capable of messaging appendix 1. Laboratory laboratory results between Response LRN laboratories and also Yes Network (LRN) Core methods successfully to CDC<sup>2</sup> demonstrated by Level 1 laboratory 6 out of 6 results for Evaluating LRN-C and/or Level 2 laboratories Note: For a description of LRN methods to rapidly detect chemical decision making laboratories, see appendix 1. agents⁵ laboratory capabilities Laboratories: Biological Capabilities through Additional methods proficiency successfully demonstrated Participation 0 out of 0 testing by Level 1 and/or Level 2 LRN reference and/or national in *LRN* for 6 reference methods laboratories to rapidly detect laboratories that could test for biological agents<sup>3</sup> biological labs chemical agents<sup>5</sup> agents Assessing if LRN-C laboratory ability to laboratory LRN laboratories successfully 5 out of 6 collect, package, and ship emergency contacted during a non-Passed samples properly during LRN labs contacts could business hours telephone drill<sup>3</sup> exercise be reached 24/7 Evaluating Proficiency tests passed by Chemical agents detected Assessing 7 out of 8 LRN laboratory LRN reference and/or national by Level 1 and/or Level 2 LRN-C tests capabilities laboratories<sup>3</sup> laboratories in unknown laboratory samples during the LRN 2 out of 2 capabilities **Emergency Response Pop** agents Rapidly identified E. coli through Proficiency Test (PopPT) O157:H7 using advanced DNA exercises Exercise<sup>6</sup> tests (PFGE)4 Samples for which state 72 Hours to process and report performed tests on 500 samples by Level 1 Test results submitted to laboratory during the LRN N/A PulseNet database within 4 96% Surge Capacity Exercise Rapid working days (target: 90%) identification (range was 71 to 126 hours)<sup>5</sup> of diseasecausing bacteria **Response Readiness: Communication** Rapidly identified by PulseNet L. monocytogenes using laboratories State public health advanced DNA tests (PFGE)4 department had a 24/7 Samples for which state 6 reporting capacity system performed tests Yes that could receive urgent Test results submitted to disease reports any time of 83% PulseNet database within 4 the day<sup>7</sup> working days (target: 90%) Responded to Health Alert Network (HAN) test message within 30 minutes<sup>8</sup> Yes State public health laboratory conducted exercises to assess competency of sentinel Yes Communicating State public health laboratories to rule out emerging health laboratory used HAN or bioterrorism agents<sup>1</sup> other rapid method (blast information Assessina CDC-funded LRN laboratory email or fax) to communicate laboratory with sentinel laboratories 20 times ability to contact the CDC competency and other partners for **Emergency Operations Center** outbreaks, routine updates, and reporting within 2 hours during LRN training events, and other applications<sup>1</sup> through notification drill<sup>3</sup> Passed exercises Note: There is one CDCfunded LRN laboratory in DC **Epidemic Information** and in each state, with the Exchange users responded to 51% exception of CA, IL, and NY, system-wide notification test within 3 hours9 which have two.

<sup>1</sup>APHL; 2008 <sup>2</sup>CDC, OSELS; 2008 <sup>3</sup>CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008 <sup>4</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 <sup>5</sup>CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 <sup>6</sup>CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2008 <sup>7</sup>State data; 2008 <sup>8</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2009 <sup>9</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008

Response Readiness: Communication (continued)		Response Readiness: Exercises and Incidents			
<i>Improving</i> public health information exchange	Participated in a Public Health Information Network forum (community of practice) to leverage best practices for information exchange <sup>10</sup>	Yes	Notifying	Pre-identified staff notified to fill all eight Incident Command System core functional roles due to a drill, exercise, or real incident <sup>14</sup> Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 notifications.	5 times
Response Readiness: Planning			emergency operations	Pre-identified staff acknowledged	4 out of 5
	CDC technical assistance review (TAR) state score <sup>11,12</sup>	2007-08:	center staff	notification within the target time of 60 minutes <sup>14</sup>	times
Assessing plans to receive, distribute, and dispense medical assets from the Strategic National Stockpile and other sources	Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher indicates performance in an acceptable range in plans to	94 2008-09:		Conducted at least one unannounced notification outside of normal business hours <sup>14</sup>	Yes
	receive, distribute, and dispense medical assets. Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) locati 2007-08 TAR score <sup>11</sup>	97 ion and		Public health EOC activated as part of a drill, exercise, or real incident <sup>14</sup> Note: State must report 2 and	4 times
	*Cohort I: Seattle, WA: 68 *Cohort II: Portland, OR: 58 *Cohort III: No sites		Activating the emergency operations center (EOC)	could report up to 12 activations. Pre-identified staff reported to the public health EOC within the target time of 2.5 hours <sup>14</sup>	4 out of 4 times
	See Scoring Note above. CRI locations can consist of multiple jurisdictions, some located in more than one state. See appendix 6.			Conducted at least one unannounced activation <sup>14</sup>	Yes
	*Cohort I, II or III refers to the year when the		Response Readiness: Evaluation		
Enhancing response capability	response capability r chemical events CHEMPACK nerve-agent antidote containers <sup>11</sup>	endix 1. 40	Assessing response	AAR/IPs developed following an exercise or real incident <sup>14</sup> Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 AAR/IPs.	3 AAR/IPs
events			capabilities through after action report/ improvement plans (AAR/IPs)	AAR/IPs developed within target time of 60 days <sup>14</sup>	2 out of 3 AAR/IPs
Meeting preparedness standards for local health departments	Local health departments meeting voluntary Project Public Health Ready preparedness standards <sup>13</sup>	2		Re-evaluated response capabilities following approval and completion of corrective actions identified in AAR/IPs <sup>14</sup>	Yes

<sup>10</sup>CDC, OSTLTS; 2008 <sup>11</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2008 <sup>12</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2009 <sup>13</sup>NACCHO; 2008 <sup>14</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008

In addition to the activities listed above, CDC supported other projects and activities to enhance preparedness efforts. Snapshots of these CDC efforts are provided below.

Research, Training, Education, and Promising Demonstration Projects					
Project	Location/Project Name	Amount			
Centers for Public Health Preparedness <sup>15</sup>	University of Washington - Northwest Center for Public Health Practice	\$525,760			
Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Centers <sup>15</sup>	University of Washington, Seattle - Improve Communications in Preparedness and Response	\$1,270,632			
Advanced Practice Centers <sup>16</sup>	Seattle-King County Advanced Practice Center	\$450,000			
Centers of Excellence in Public Health Informatics <sup>17</sup>	University of Washington	\$1,274,502			
Pandemic Influenza Promising Practices Demonstration Projects <sup>14</sup>	Public Engagement	\$180,699			
Additional CDC Resources Supporting Preparedness in States and Localities					
<ul> <li>Epidemic Intelligence Service</li> <li>Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers<sup>17</sup></li> <li>Investigations conducted by Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers<sup>17</sup></li> </ul>	3 6				
Deployments <ul> <li>Type of Incident (number of CDC staff)<sup>18</sup></li> </ul>	_				
Career Epidemiology Field Officers <sup>15</sup>	_				
Quarantine Stations <sup>19</sup> Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Seattle					

<sup>14</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 <sup>15</sup>CDC, OPHPR (OD); 2008 <sup>16</sup>NACCHO; 2008 <sup>17</sup>CDC, OSELS; 2008 <sup>18</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008 <sup>19</sup>CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008