

Rhode Island

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All response begins at the local level. Being prepared to prevent, respond to, and recover from all types of public health threats requires that states and localities improve their capabilities in surveillance, epidemiology, laboratories, and response readiness. Facts on laboratories and response readiness activities appear below. See appendices 1 and 7 for a more detailed description of data points and data sources.

A healthy population is more resilient in public health emergencies. People with chronic conditions may require additional care such as specialized medications, equipment, and other assistance. To develop an effective response plan, a state or locality must consider the unique needs of its own population. In Rhode Island, 10.6% of adults reported having asthma, 7.4% diabetes, 6.1% heart disease, and 2.3% had a stroke. In addition, 18.9% reported a limiting disability and 60.0% were overweight or obese.* *CDC, ONCDIEH (NCCDPHP) Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2008

| Laboratories: General | | | | Laboratories: Chemical Capabilities | | | |
|--|---|---------------------|---|--|--|-----------------------|--|
| Maintaining core laboratory functions during an emergency Ensuring availability of Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratory results for decision making | Status of continuity of operations COOP was under develop State had a standardized electronic data system | | | Participation in Laboratory Response Network for chemical agents (LRN-C) | LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is exposed to chemical agents ⁵ Note: There are three levels, with Level 1 having the most advanced capabilities. See appendix 1. | One Level 2 lab | |
| | capable of messaging laboratory results between LRN laboratories and also to CDC ² Note: For a description of LRN laboratories, see appendix 1. | Yes | Evaluating LRN-C laboratory capabilities | Core methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents ⁵ | 2 out of 6 methods | | |
| Labor | ratories: Biological Capabiliti | es | | through proficiency | Additional methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents ⁵ | | |
| Participation in LRN for biological agents | LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for biological agents ³ | 1 reference lab | | testing | | 0 out of 0 methods | |
| Assessing if laboratory emergency contacts could be reached 24/7 | LRN laboratories successfully contacted during a non- business hours telephone drill ³ | 1 out of 1 lab | | Assessing LRN-C laboratory capabilities through exercises | LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly during LRN exercise ⁵ | Passed | |
| Evaluating LRN laboratory capabilities | Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national laboratories ³ | 3 out of 3 tests | | | Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in unknown samples during the LRN | Not | |
| Rapid identification of disease- | Rapidly identified <i>E. coli</i> 0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE) ⁴ • Samples for which state performed tests | 7 | | | Emergency Response Pop Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise ⁶ Hours to process and report | eligible | |
| | Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working days (target: 90%) | 71% | | | on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise (range was 71 to 126 hours) ⁵ | N/A | |
| causing bacteria by PulseNet | Rapidly identified | | | Response Readiness: Communication | | | |
| láboratories | L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)⁴ Samples for which state performed tests Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 | — N/A | | Communicating emerging health information | State public health department had a 24/7 reporting capacity system that could receive urgent disease reports any time of the day ⁷ | Yes | |
| Assessing laboratory competency and reporting through exercises | working days (target: 90%) State public health laboratory conducted exercises to assess | Yes | | | Responded to Health Alert Network (HAN) test message within 30 minutes ⁸ | Yes | |
| | competency of sentinel laboratories to rule out bioterrorism agents ¹ | | | | State public health laboratory used HAN or other rapid method (blast email or fax) to communicate with sentinel laboratories and other partners for outbreaks, routine updates, training events, and other applications ¹ | | |
| | CDC-funded LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill ³ | Passed | | | | 40 times | |
| | Note: There is one CDC- funded LRN laboratory in DC and in each state, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, which have two. | | | | Epidemic Information Exchange users responded to system-wide notification test within 3 hours ⁹ | 63% | |

¹APHL; 2008 ²CDC, OSELS; 2008 ³CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008 ⁴CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 ⁵CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 ⁶CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2008 ⁷State data; 2008 ⁸CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2009 ⁹CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008

| Response Readiness: Communication (continued) | | Respons | Response Readiness: Exercises and Incidents | | | |
|---|---|--|---|--|-----------------------|--|
| Improving public health information exchange | Participated in a Public Health Information Network forum (community of practice) to leverage best practices for information exchange ¹⁰ | Yes | | Pre-identified staff notified to fill all eight Incident Command System core functional roles due to a drill, exercise, or real incident ¹⁴ Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 notifications. | 4 times | |
| R | esponse Readiness: Planning | | Notifying emergency | | | |
| | CDC technical assistance review (TAR) state score ^{11, 12} | 2007-08: 93 | operations center staff | Pre-identified staff acknowledged notification within the target time of 60 minutes ¹⁴ | 4 out of 4 times | |
| Assessing plans to receive, distribute, and dispense medical assets from the Strategic National Stockpile and other sources | Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher indicates performance in an acceptable range in plans to receive, distribute, and dispense | 2008-09: 99 | | Conducted at least one unannounced notification outside of normal business hours ¹⁴ | Yes | |
| | Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) location and 2007-08 TAR score ¹¹ | | Activating | Public health EOC activated as part of a drill, exercise, or real incident ¹⁴ Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 activations. | 2 times | |
| | *Cohort I: No sites *Cohort II: Providence, RI: 89 *Cohort III: No sites | | the emergency operations center (EOC) | Pre-identified staff reported to the public health EOC within the target time of 2.5 hours ¹⁴ | 2 out of 2 times | |
| | See Scoring Note above. CRI locations can consist of multiple jurisdictions, some located in more than one state. See appendix 6. | | | Conducted at least one unannounced activation ¹⁴ | Yes | |
| | *Cohort I, II or III refers to the year when the location was added to CRI. See appendix 1. | | Response Readiness: Evaluation | | | |
| Enhancing response capability for chemical | CHEMPACK nerve-agent antidote | erve-agent antidote 8 Assessin respons capabilitie through afte action repor | Assessing response | AAR/IPs developed following an exercise or real incident ¹⁴ Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 AAR/IPs. | 0 AAR/IPs | |
| events | | | capabilities through after action report/ improvement plans (AAR/IPs) | AAR/IPs developed within target time of 60 days ¹⁴ | 0 out of 0 AAR/IPs | |
| Meeting preparedness standards for local health departments | Local health departments meeting voluntary Project Public Health Ready preparedness standards ¹³ | 0 | | Re-evaluated response capabilities following approval and completion of corrective actions identified in AAR/IPs ¹⁴ | Yes | |

¹⁰CDC, OSTLTS; 2008 ¹¹CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2008 ¹²CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2009 ¹³NACCHO; 2008 ¹⁴CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008

In addition to the activities listed above, CDC supported other projects and activities to enhance preparedness efforts. Snapshots of these CDC efforts are provided below.

| Research, Training, Education, and Promising Demonstration Projects | | | | | | | |
|---|---|------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Project | Location/Project Name | Amount | | | | | |
| Centers for Public Health Preparedness ¹⁵ | — | N/A | | | | | |
| Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Centers ¹⁵ | — | N/A | | | | | |
| Advanced Practice Centers ¹⁶ | — | N/A | | | | | |
| Centers of Excellence in Public Health Informatics ¹⁷ | _ | N/A | | | | | |
| Pandemic Influenza Promising Practices Demonstration Projects ¹⁴ | Addressing Vulnerabilities in Populations; Electronic Laboratory Data Exchange | \$370,000 \$303,415 | | | | | |
| Additional CDC Resources Supporting Preparedness in States and Localities | | | | | | | |
| Epidemic Intelligence Service Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers¹⁷ Investigations conducted by Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers¹⁷ | | | | | | | |
| Deployments Type of Incident (number of CDC staff)¹⁸ | _ | | | | | | |
| Career Epidemiology Field Officers ¹⁵ | | | | | | | |
| Quarantine Stations ¹⁹ | | | | | | | |

¹⁴CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 ¹⁵CDC, OPHPR (OD); 2008 ¹⁶NACCHO; 2008 ¹⁷CDC, OSELS; 2008 ¹⁸CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008 ¹⁹CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008