

Nevada

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

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All response begins at the local level. Being prepared to prevent, respond to, and recover from all types of public health threats requires that states and localities improve their capabilities in surveillance, epidemiology, laboratories, and response readiness. Facts on laboratories and response readiness activities appear below. See appendices 1 and 7 for a more detailed description of data points and data sources.

A healthy population is more resilient in public health emergencies. People with chronic conditions may require additional care such as specialized medications, equipment, and other assistance. To develop an effective response plan, a state or locality must consider the unique needs of its own population. In Nevada, 8.6% of adults reported having asthma, 8.6% diabetes, 6.3% heart disease, and 2.2% had a stroke. In addition, 20.3% reported a limiting disability and 62.6% were overweight or obese.* *CDC, ONCDIEH (NCCDPHP) Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2008

	Laboratories: General		Labor	atories: Chemical Capabiliti	es	
Maintaining core laboratory functions during an emergency Ensuring	tatus of continuity of operations plan (COOP): ¹ State had a COOP that included laboratory operations tate had a standardized lectronic data system		Participation in Laboratory Response Network for chemical agents (LRN-C)	LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is exposed to chemical agents ⁵ Note: There are three levels, with Level 1 having the most advanced capabilities. See	One Level 2 lab	
availability of Laboratory Response Network (LRN) Iaboratory results for decision making	capable of messaging laboratory results between LRN laboratories and also to CDC ² Note: For a description of LRN laboratories, see appendix 1.	Yes	Evaluating LRN-C laboratory capabilities	appendix 1. Core methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents ⁵	6 out of 6 methods	
Labor	atories: Biological Capabiliti	es	through proficiency	Additional methods successfully demonstrated		
Participation in LRN for biological agents	LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for biological agents ³	2 reference labs	testing	by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents ⁵	1 out of 1 method	
Assessing if laboratory emergency contacts could be reached 24/7	LRN laboratories successfully contacted during a non- business hours telephone drill ³	2 out of 2 labs		LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly during LRN exercise ⁵	Passed	
Evaluating LRN laboratory capabilities	Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national laboratories ³	6 out of 6 tests	Assessing LRN-C laboratory capabilities	Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in unknown samples during the LRN	Not	
Rapid identification of disease- causing bacteria by PulseNet laboratories	Rapidly identified <i>E. coli</i> 0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE) ⁴ • Samples for which state	13	through exercises	Emergency Response Pop Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise ⁶ Hours to process and report	eligible	
	 performed tests Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working days (target: 90%) 	77%		on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise (range was 71 to 126 hours) ⁵	N/A	
	Rapidly identified		Respor	Response Readiness: Communication		
	 L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)⁴ Samples for which state performed tests Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 	5 60%		State public health department had a 24/7 reporting capacity system that could receive urgent disease reports any time of the day ⁷	Yes	
	working days (target: 90%) State public health laboratory conducted exercises to assess			Responded to Health Alert Network (HAN) test message within 30 minutes ⁸	Yes	
Assessing laboratory competency and reporting through exercises	competency of sentinel laboratories to rule out bioterrorism agents ¹	Yes	Communicating emerging health	State public health laboratory used HAN or other rapid method (blast email or fax) to communicate with sentinel laboratories and other partners for outbreaks, routine updates, training events, and other applications ¹		
	CDC-funded LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill ³	Did not participate	information		0 times	
	Note: There is one CDC- funded LRN laboratory in DC and in each state, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, which have two.			Epidemic Information Exchange users responded to system-wide notification test within 3 hours ⁹	64%	

¹APHL; 2008 ²CDC, OSELS; 2008 ³CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008 ⁴CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 ⁵CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 ⁶CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2008 ⁷State data; 2008 ⁸CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2009 ⁹CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008

Response	Readiness: Communication (co	ontinued)	Respons	se Readiness: Exercises and Incic	lents
Improving public health information exchange	Participated in a Public Health Information Network forum (community of practice) to leverage best practices for information exchange ¹⁰	Yes	Notifying	Pre-identified staff notified to fill all eight Incident Command System core functional roles due to a drill, exercise, or real incident ¹⁴ Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 notifications.	4 times
Response Readiness: Planning			emergency	Pre-identified staff acknowledged	4 out of 4
	CDC technical assistance review (TAR) state score ^{11, 12}	2007-08:	operations center staff	notification within the target time of 60 minutes ¹⁴	times
Assessing	Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher indicates performance in an acceptable range in plans to	55 2008-09:		Conducted at least one unannounced notification outside of normal business hours ¹⁴	Yes
Assessing plans to receive, distribute, and dispense medical assets from the Strategic National Stockpile and other sources	receive, distribute, and dispense medical assets. 89 Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) location and 2007-08 TAR score ¹¹		Activating	Public health EOC activated as part of a drill, exercise, or real incident ¹⁴ Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 activations.	8 times
	*Cohort I: Las Vegas, NV: 82 *Cohort II: No sites *Cohort III: No sites		Activating the emergency operations center (EOC)	Pre-identified staff reported to the public health EOC within the target time of 2.5 hours ¹⁴	7 out of 8 times
	See Scoring Note above. CRI locations can consist of multiple jurisdictions, some located in more than one state. See appendix 6.			Conducted at least one unannounced activation ¹⁴	No
	*Cohort I, II or III refers to the year when the		Response Readiness: Evaluation		
Enhancing	location was added to CRI. See app	oendix 1.		AAR/IPs developed following an exercise or real incident ¹⁴	8
response capability for chemical	CHEMPACK nerve-agent antidote containers ¹¹	15	Assessing response capabilities through after action report/ improvement plans (AAR/IPs)	Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 AAR/IPs.	AAR/IPs
events Meeting				AAR/IPs developed within target time of 60 days ¹⁴	8 out of 8 AAR/IPs
preparedness standards for local health departments	Local health departments meeting voluntary Project Public Health Ready preparedness standards ¹³	0		Re-evaluated response capabilities following approval and completion of corrective actions identified in AAR/IPs ¹⁴	Yes

¹⁰CDC, OSTLTS; 2008 ¹¹CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2008 ¹²CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2009 ¹³NACCHO; 2008 ¹⁴CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008

In addition to the activities listed above, CDC supported other projects and activities to enhance preparedness efforts. Snapshots of these CDC efforts are provided below.

Research, Training, Education, and Promising Demonstration Projects							
Project	Location/Project Name	Amount					
Centers for Public Health Preparedness ¹⁵	—	N/A					
Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Centers ¹⁵	— N/A						
Advanced Practice Centers ¹⁶	— N/A						
Centers of Excellence in Public Health Informatics ¹⁷	— N/A						
Pandemic Influenza Promising Practices Demonstration Projects ¹⁴	-	N/A					
Additional CDC Resources Supporting Preparedness in States and Localities							
 Epidemic Intelligence Service Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers¹⁷ Investigations conducted by Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers¹⁷ 							
 Deployments Type of Incident (number of CDC staff)¹⁸ 	Ricin Incident (2); Hepatitis C Infections (3); Strep Infections (2); TB Outbreak (3); Hepatitis C Infections (2)						
Career Epidemiology Field Officers ¹⁵	_						
Quarantine Stations ¹⁹	_						

¹⁴CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 ¹⁵CDC, OPHPR (OD); 2008 ¹⁶NACCHO; 2008 ¹⁷CDC, OSELS; 2008 ¹⁸CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008 ¹⁹CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008