

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

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All response begins at the local level. Being prepared to prevent, respond to, and recover from all types of public health threats requires that states and localities improve their capabilities in surveillance, epidemiology, laboratories, and response readiness. Facts on laboratories and response readiness activities appear below. See appendices 1 and 7 for a more detailed description of data points and data sources.

A healthy population is more resilient in public health emergencies. People with chronic conditions may require additional care such as specialized medications, equipment, and other assistance. To develop an effective response plan, a state or locality must consider the unique needs of its own population. In Maryland, 9.4% of adults reported having asthma, 8.7% diabetes, 6.1% heart disease, and 2.6% had a stroke. In addition, 20.5% reported a limiting disability and 63.4% were overweight or obese.* *CDC, ONCDIEH (NCCDPHP) Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2008

	Laboratories: General		Labor	atories: Chemical Capabiliti	es	
Maintaining core laboratory functions during an emergency	Status of continuity of operations State public health laboratory l that was tested		Participation in Laboratory Response Network for	LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is exposed to chemical agents ⁵	One Level 2 lab	
Ensuring availability of Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratory results for decision making	State had a standardized electronic data system capable of messaging laboratory results between LRN laboratories and also to CDC ² Note: For a description of LRN laboratories, see appendix 1.	Yes	chemical agents (LRN-C)	Note: There are three levels, with Level 1 having the most advanced capabilities. See appendix 1.		
			Evaluating LRN-C laboratory	Core methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents ⁵	6 out of 6 methods	
Labor	atories: Biological Capabiliti	es	capabilities through	Additional methods		
Participation in LRN for biological agents	LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for biological agents ³	6 reference labs, 2 national labs	proficiency testing	successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents ⁵	1 out of 1 method	
Assessing if laboratory emergency contacts could be reached 24/7	LRN laboratories successfully contacted during a non- business hours telephone drill ³	6 out of 8 labs		LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly during LRN exercise ⁵	Passed	
Evaluating LRN laboratory capabilities	Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national laboratories ³	9 out of 9 tests	Assessing LRN-C laboratory capabilities	Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in unknown samples during the LRN	Not	
Rapid identification of disease- causing bacteria by PulseNet laboratories	Rapidly identified <i>E. coli</i> 0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE) ⁴	22	through exercises	Emergency Response Pop Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise ⁶	eligible	
	 Samples for which state performed tests Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working days (target: 90%) 	22 95%		Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise (range was 71 to 126 hours) ⁵	N/A	
	Rapidly identified		Response Readiness: Communication			
	 L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)⁴ Samples for which state performed tests 	14		State public health department had a 24/7 reporting capacity system that could receive urgent	Yes	
	 Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working days (target: 90%) 	93%		disease reports any time of the day ⁷		
Assessing laboratory competency and reporting through exercises	State public health laboratory conducted exercises to assess competency of sentinel	Yes		Responded to Health Alert Network (HAN) test message within 30 minutes ⁸	Yes	
	laboratories to rule out bioterrorism agents ¹		Communicating emerging health	State public health laboratory used HAN or other rapid method (blast email or fax) to communicate with sentinel laboratories and other partners for outbreaks, routine updates, training events, and other applications ¹	6 times	
	CDC-funded LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill ³	Passed	information			
	Note: There is one CDC- funded LRN laboratory in DC and in each state, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, which have two.			Epidemic Information Exchange users responded to system-wide notification test within 3 hours ⁹	41%	

¹APHL; 2008 ²CDC, OSELS; 2008 ³CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008 ⁴CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 ⁵CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 ⁶CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2008 ⁷State data; 2008 8CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2009 9CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008

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Response Readiness: Communication (continued)		Respons	Response Readiness: Exercises and Incidents		
<i>Improving public health information exchange</i>	Participated in a Public Health Information Network forum (community of practice) to leverage best practices for information exchange ¹⁰	Yes		Pre-identified staff notified to fill all eight Incident Command System core functional roles due to a drill, exercise, or real incident ¹⁴ Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 notifications.	5 times
R	esponse Readiness: Planning		Notifying emergency		
	CDC technical assistance review (TAR) state score ^{11, 12}	2007-08:	operations center staff	Pre-identified staff acknowledged notification within the target time of 60 minutes ¹⁴	5 out of 5 times
Assessing	Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher indicates performance in an acceptable range in plans to receive, distribute, and dispense	93 2008-09: 96		Conducted at least one unannounced notification outside of normal business hours ¹⁴	Yes
Assessing plans to receive, distribute, and dispense medical assets from the Strategic National Stockpile and other sources	 Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) location and 2007-08 TAR score¹¹ *Cohort I: National Capitol Region: 82; Philadelphia, PA: 75 *Cohort II: Baltimore, MD: 77 *Cohort III: No sites See Scoring Note above. CRI locations can consist of multiple jurisdictions, some located in more than one state. See appendix 6. 		Activating	Public health EOC activated as part of a drill, exercise, or real incident ¹⁴ Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 activations.	2 times
			the emergency operations center (EOC)	Pre-identified staff reported to the public health EOC within the target time of 2.5 hours ¹⁴	2 out of 2 times
				Conducted at least one unannounced activation ¹⁴	Yes
			Response Readiness: Evaluation		
Enhancing	*Cohort I, II or III refers to the year when the location was added to CRI. See appendix 1.		AAR/IPs developed following an exercise or real incident ¹⁴	2 A A D //Dc	
response capability for chemical	CHEMPACK nerve-agent antidote containers ¹¹	36	Assessing response capabilities	Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 AAR/IPs.	AAR/IPs
events			through after action report/	AAR/IPs developed within target time of 60 days ¹⁴	2 out of 2 AAR/IPs
Meeting preparedness standards for local health departments	Local health departments meeting voluntary Project Public Health Ready preparedness standards ¹³	2	improvement plans (AAR/IPs)	Re-evaluated response capabilities following approval and completion of corrective actions identified in AAR/IPs ¹⁴	Yes

¹⁰CDC, OSTLTS; 2008 ¹¹CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2008 ¹²CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2009 ¹³NACCHO; 2008 ¹⁴CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008

In addition to the activities listed above, CDC supported other projects and activities to enhance preparedness efforts. Snapshots of these CDC efforts are provided below.

Project	Location/Project Name	Amount	
Centers for Public Health Preparedness ¹⁵	Johns Hopkins University - Center for Public Health Preparedness	\$525,760	
Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Centers ¹⁵	Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore - Preparedness to Address the Risks of Vulnerable Populations	\$1,495,398	
Advanced Practice Centers ¹⁶	Montgomery County Advanced Practice Center	\$450,000	
Centers of Excellence in Public Health Informatics ¹⁷	Johns Hopkins University	\$1,145,675	
Pandemic Influenza Promising Practices Demonstration Projects ¹⁴	-	N/A	
Additional CDC Resources Suppo	rting Preparedness in States and Localities		
 Epidemic Intelligence Service Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers¹⁷ Investigations conducted by Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers¹⁷ 	1 9		
Deployments Type of Incident (number of CDC staff)¹⁸ 	Salmonella Saintpaul (2); Hospital Infection Control (2); Dialysis Deaths (2); Acinetobacter Outbreak (2)		
Career Epidemiology Field Officers ¹⁵	1		
Ouarantine Stations ¹⁹	_		

14CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 15CDC, OPHPR (OD); 2008 16NACCHO; 2008 17CDC, OSELS; 2008 18CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008 19CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008