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All response begins at the local level. Being prepared to prevent, respond to, and recover from all types of public health threats requires that states and localities improve their capabilities in surveillance, epidemiology, laboratories, and response readiness. Facts on laboratories and response readiness activities appear below. See appendices 1 and 7 for a more detailed description of data points and data sources.

A healthy population is more resilient in public health emergencies. People with chronic conditions may require additional care such as specialized medications, equipment, and other assistance. To develop an effective response plan, a state or locality must consider the unique needs of its own population. In Hawaii, 9.6% of adults reported having asthma, 8.2% diabetes, 4.8% heart disease, and 2.6% had a stroke. In addition, 16.8% reported a limiting disability and 57.3% were overweight or obese.\* \*CDC, ONCDIEH (NCCDPHP) Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2008

	Laboratories: General			Labora	atories: Chemical Capabiliti	es	
Maintaining core laboratory functions during an emergency Ensuring	Status of continuity of operations State public health laboratory h State had a standardized electronic data system	· · · /		Participation in Laboratory Response Network for chemical agents (LRN-C)	LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is exposed to chemical agents <sup>5</sup> Note: There are three levels, with Level 1 having the most advanced capabilities. See	One Level 2 lab	
availability of Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratory results for decision making	capable of messaging laboratory results between LRN laboratories and also to CDC <sup>2</sup> Note: For a description of LRN laboratories, see appendix 1.	Yes	Evaluating LRN-C laboratory	appendix 1. Core methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents <sup>5</sup>	6 out of 6 methods		
Labor	atories: Biological Capabiliti	es		capabilities through	Additional methods		
Participation in LRN for biological agents	LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for biological agents <sup>3</sup>	3 reference labs		proficiency testing	successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents <sup>5</sup>	0 out of 0 methods	
Assessing if laboratory emergency contacts could be reached 24/7	LRN laboratories successfully contacted during a non- business hours telephone drill <sup>3</sup>	3 out of 3 labs		Assessing LRN-C laboratory capabilities through exercises	LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly during LRN exercise <sup>5</sup>	Passed	
Evaluating LRN laboratory capabilities	Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national laboratories <sup>3</sup>	2 out of 2 tests			Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in unknown samples during the LRN	2 out of 2	
Rapid identification of disease-	Rapidly identified <i>E. coli</i> 0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE) <sup>4</sup> • Samples for which state	32			Emergency Response Pop Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise <sup>6</sup>	agents	
	<ul> <li>Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working days (target: 90%)</li> </ul>	78%			Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise (range was 71 to 126 hours) <sup>5</sup>	N/A	
causing bacteria by PulseNet	Rapidly identified			Response Readiness: Communication			
láboratories	<ul> <li>L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)<sup>4</sup></li> <li>Samples for which state performed tests</li> <li>Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4</li> </ul>	6 83%			State public health department had a 24/7 reporting capacity system that could receive urgent disease reports any time of the day <sup>7</sup>	Yes	
Assessing laboratory competency and reporting through exercises	working days (target: 90%) State public health laboratory conducted exercises to assess			Responded to Health Alert Network (HAN) test message within 30 minutes <sup>8</sup>	Yes		
	competency of sentinel laboratories to rule out bioterrorism agents <sup>1</sup> CDC-funded LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC	No Did not participate		Communicating emerging health information	State public health laboratory used HAN or other rapid method (blast email or fax) to communicate with sentinel laboratories	6 times	
	Emergency Operations Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill <sup>3</sup> Note: There is one CDC- funded LRN laboratory in DC and in each state, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, which have two.				and other partners for outbreaks, routine updates, training events, and other applications <sup>1</sup> Epidemic Information Exchange users responded to system-wide notification test within 3 hours <sup>9</sup>	51%	

<sup>1</sup>APHL; 2008 <sup>2</sup>CDC, OSELS; 2008 <sup>3</sup>CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008 <sup>4</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 <sup>5</sup>CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 <sup>6</sup>CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2008 <sup>7</sup>State data; 2008 <sup>8</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2009 <sup>9</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008

Response Readiness: Communication (continued)		Response Readiness: Exercises and Incidents				
Improving public health information exchange	Participated in a Public Health Information Network forum (community of practice) to leverage best practices for information exchange <sup>10</sup>	Yes	Notifying	Pre-identified staff notified to fill all eight Incident Command System core functional roles due to a drill, exercise, or real incident <sup>14</sup> Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 notifications.	2 times	
R	Response Readiness: Planning			Pre-identified staff acknowledged	2 out of 2	
	CDC technical assistance review (TAR) state score <sup>11, 12</sup>	2007-08:	operations center staff	notification within the target time of 60 minutes <sup>14</sup>	times	
Assessing plans to receive, distribute, and dispense medical assets from the Strategic National Stockpile and other sources	Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher indicates performance in an acceptable range in plans to	74 2008-09:		Conducted at least one unannounced notification outside of normal business hours <sup>14</sup>	Yes	
	receive, distribute, and dispense medical assets.     84       Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) location and 2007-08 TAR score <sup>11</sup> 10		Activating the emergency operations center (EOC)	Public health EOC activated as part of a drill, exercise, or real incident <sup>14</sup> Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 activations.	1 time	
	*Cohort I: No sites *Cohort II: No sites *Cohort III: Honolulu, HI: 51			Pre-identified staff reported to the public health EOC within the target time of 2.5 hours <sup>14</sup>	1 out of 1 time	
	See Scoring Note above. CRI locations can consist of multiple jurisdictions, some located in more than one state. See appendix 6.			Conducted at least one unannounced activation <sup>14</sup>	Yes	
	*Cohort I, II or III refers to the year when the		Response Readiness: Evaluation			
Enhancing	Indication was added to CRI. See appendix 1.           Enhancing response capability containers <sup>11</sup> CHEMPACK nerve-agent antidote         6         Assessing response		AAR/IPs developed following an exercise or real incident <sup>14</sup>	5		
response		6		Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 AAR/IPs.	AAR/IPs	
events Meeting				AAR/IPs developed within target time of 60 days <sup>14</sup>	5 out of 5 AAR/IPs	
preparedness standards for local health departments	Local health departments meeting voluntary Project Public Health Ready preparedness standards <sup>13</sup>	0		Re-evaluated response capabilities following approval and completion of corrective actions identified in AAR/IPs <sup>14</sup>	Yes	

<sup>10</sup>CDC, OSTLTS; 2008 <sup>11</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2008 <sup>12</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2009 <sup>13</sup>NACCHO; 2008 <sup>14</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008

In addition to the activities listed above, CDC supported other projects and activities to enhance preparedness efforts.

Research, Training, Education, and Promising Demonstration Projects						
Project	Location/Project Name	Amount				
Centers for Public Health Preparedness <sup>15</sup>	—	N/A				
Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Centers <sup>15</sup>	—	N/A				
Advanced Practice Centers <sup>16</sup>	—	N/A				
Centers of Excellence in Public Health Informatics <sup>17</sup>	—	N/A				
Pandemic Influenza Promising Practices Demonstration Projects <sup>14</sup>	Countermeasure and State Immunization Information Systems Integration; Distribution and Dispensing of Antiviral Drugs to Self-isolated/quarantined Persons; Electronic Laboratory Data Exchange; Public Engagement	\$350,374 \$136,255 \$718,000 \$178,112				
Additional CDC Resources Supporting Preparedness in States and Localities						
<ul> <li>Epidemic Intelligence Service</li> <li>Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers<sup>17</sup></li> <li>Investigations conducted by Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers<sup>17</sup></li> </ul>	1 4					
Deployments <ul> <li>Type of Incident (number of CDC staff)<sup>18</sup></li> </ul>	_					
Career Epidemiology Field Officers <sup>15</sup>	2					
Quarantine Stations <sup>19</sup>	Honolulu International Airport, Honolulu					

<sup>14</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 <sup>15</sup>CDC, OPHPR (OD); 2008 <sup>16</sup>NACCHO; 2008 <sup>17</sup>CDC, OSELS; 2008 <sup>18</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008 <sup>19</sup>CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008