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All response begins at the local level. Being prepared to prevent, respond to, and recover from all types of public health threats requires that states and localities improve their capabilities in surveillance, epidemiology, laboratories, and response readiness. Facts on laboratories and response readiness activities appear below. See appendices 1 and 7 for a more detailed description of data points and data sources.

A healthy population is more resilient in public health emergencies. People with chronic conditions may require additional care such as specialized medications, equipment, and other assistance. To develop an effective response plan, a state or locality must consider the unique needs of its own population. In the District of Columbia, 9.6% of adults reported having asthma, 8.0% diabetes, 3.8% heart disease, and 2.7% had a stroke. In addition, 17.4% reported a limiting disability and 55.1% were overweight or obese.*

	Laboratories: General			Labor	atories: Chemical Capabiliti	es	
Maintaining core laboratory functions during an emergency Ensuring availability of	Status of continuity of operations COOP was under develop Locality had a standardized electronic data system			Participation in Laboratory Response Network for chemical agents (LRN-C)	LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is exposed to chemical agents ⁵ Note: There are three levels, with Level 1 having the most advanced capabilities. See appendix 1.	One Level 2 lab	
Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratory results for decision making	capable of messaging laboratory results between LRN laboratories and also to CDC ² Note: For a description of LRN laboratories, see appendix 1.	Yes		Evaluating LRN-C laboratory	Core methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents ⁵	0 out of 6 methods	
Labor	atories: Biological Capabiliti	es		capabilities through	Additional methods		
Participation in LRN for biological	LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for biological agents ³	3 reference labs		proficiency testing	successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents ⁵	0 out of 0 methods	
agents Assessing if Iaboratory	LRN laboratories successfully	2 out of 3		Assessing LRN-C laboratory capabilities through exercises	LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly during LRN exercise ^s	Did not participate	
emergency contacts can be reached 24/7	contacted during a non- business hours telephone drill ³	labs			Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in unknown samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise ⁶	Not eligible	
Evaluating LRN laboratory capabilities	Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national laboratories ³	1 out of 1 test					
Rapid identification	 Rapidly identified <i>E. coli</i> 0157:H7 using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)⁴ Samples for which state performed tests Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 	_			Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise (range was 71 to 126 hours) ⁵	N/A	
of disease- causing bacteria	working days (target: 90%)			Response Readiness: Communication			
by PulseNet laboratories	 Rapidly identified L. monocytogenes using advanced DNA tests (PFGE)⁴ Samples for which state performed tests Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working days (targot 2006) 	_		Communicating emerging health information	Locality public health department had a 24/7 reporting capacity system that could receive urgent disease reports any time of the day ⁷	Yes	
Assessing laboratory competency and reporting through exercises	working days (target: 90%) Locality public health laboratory conducted exercise(s) to assess competency of sentinel laboratories to rule out bioterrorism agents ¹	Yes			Responded to Health Alert Network (HAN) test message within 30 minutes ⁸	_	
					Locality public health laboratory used HAN or other rapid method (blast email or fax) to communicate with sentinel laboratories and other partners for outbreaks, routine updates, training events, and other applications ¹	3 times	
	CDC-funded LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drills ³	Did not participate					
	Note: There is one CDC- funded LRN laboratory in DC and in each state, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, which have two.				Epidemic Information Exchange users responded to system-wide notification test within 3 hours ⁹	29%	

¹APHL; 2008 ²CDC, OSELS; 2008 ³CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008 ⁴CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 ⁵CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 ⁶CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2008 ⁷Locality data; 2008 ⁸CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2009 ⁹CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008

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Response	Readiness: Communication (co	ontinued)	Respons	se Readiness: Exercises and Incid	dents	
<i>Improving public health information exchange</i>	Participated in a Public Health Information Network forum (community of practice) to leverage best practices for information exchange ¹⁰	Yes	Notifying	Pre-identified staff notified to fill all eight Incident Command System core functional roles due to a drill, exercise, or real incident ¹³ Note: Locality must report 2 and could report up to 12 notifications.	4 times	
R	esponse Readiness: Planning		emergency			
	Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) jurisc 2008 technical assistance review (TA		operations center staff	Pre-identified staff acknowledged notification within the target time of 60 minutes ¹³	4 out of 4 times	
Assessing plans to receive,	District of Columbia: 94 (part of Cohort 1, which was establis	hed in 2004)		Conducted at least one unannounced notification outside of normal business hours ¹³	Yes	
distribute, and dispense medical assets from the Strategic National Stockpile and other sources	Scoring Note: A score of 69 or higher indicates a CRI jurisdiction performed in an acceptable range in its plan to receive, distribute, and dispense medical assets. See appendix 6 for the average TAR score for the metropolitan statistical area of the National Capitol Region, which has multiple contributing jurisdictions in addition to the District of		Activating the emergency operations center (EOC)	Public health EOC activated as part of a drill, exercise, or real incident ¹³ Note: Locality must report 2 and could report up to 12 activations.	4 times	
				Pre-identified staff reported to the public health EOC within the target time of 2.5 hours ¹³	4 out of 4 times	
	Columbia.			Conducted at least one unannounced activation ¹³	No	
Enhancing	response CHEMPACK nerve-agent antidote 5 capability containers ¹¹ 5 for chemical events A		Response Readiness: Evaluation			
capability for chemical		Assessing	AAR/IPs developed following an exercise or real incident ¹³ Note: Locality must report 2 and could report up to 12 AAR/IPs.	3 AAR/IPs		
Meeting preparedness standards for local health departments	Local health departments meeting voluntary Project Public Health Ready preparedness standards ¹²	0	response capabilities through after action report/ improvement plans (AAR/IPs)	AAR/IPs developed within target time of 60 days ¹³	3 out of 3 AAR/IPs	
				Re-evaluated response capabilities following approval and completion of corrective actions identified in AAR/IPs ¹³	Yes	

¹⁰CDC, OSTLTS; 2008 ¹¹CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2008 ¹²NACCHO; 2008 ¹³CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008

In addition to the activities listed above, CDC supported other projects and activities to enhance preparedness efforts. Snapshots of these CDC efforts are provided below.

Research, Training, Education, and Promising Demonstration Projects						
Project	Location/Project Name	Amount				
Centers for Public Health Preparedness ¹⁴	—	N/A				
Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Centers ¹⁴	—	N/A				
Advanced Practice Centers ¹⁵	— N/A					
Centers of Excellence in Public Health Informatics ¹⁶	—	N/A				
Pandemic Influenza Promising Practices Demonstration Projects ¹³	—	N/A				
Additional CDC Resources Supporting Preparedness in States and Localities						
 Epidemic Intelligence Service Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers¹⁶ Investigations conducted by Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers¹⁶ 	1					
 Deployments Type of Incident (number of CDC staff)¹⁷ 	Hurricane Gustav (2); HIV Investigation (3)					
Career Epidemiology Field Officers ¹⁴	_					
Quarantine Stations ¹⁸	Dulles International Airport, Washington, District of Columbia					

¹³CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 ¹⁴CDC, OPHPR (OD); 2008 ¹⁵NACCHO; 2008 ¹⁶CDC, OSELS; 2008 ¹⁷CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008 ¹⁸CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008