

**California** Laboratory data includes Los Angeles County (LAC); see separate fact sheet for LAC-specific data.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION

BePreparedCalifornia.ca.gov/epo

All response begins at the local level. Being prepared to prevent, respond to, and recover from all types of public health threats requires that states and localities improve their capabilities in surveillance, epidemiology, laboratories, and response readiness. Facts on laboratories and response readiness activities appear below. See appendices 1 and 7 for a more detailed description of data points and data sources.

A healthy population is more resilient in public health emergencies. People with chronic conditions may require additional care such as specialized medications, equipment, and other assistance. To develop an effective response plan, a state or locality must consider the unique needs of its own population. In California, 8.4% of adults reported having asthma, 8.5% diabetes, 4.9% heart disease, and 2.2% had a stroke. In addition, 18.8% reported a limiting disability and 61.4% were overweight or obese.\* \*CDC, ONCDIEH (NCCDPHP) Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2008

	Laboratories: General		Labor	atories: Chemical Capabiliti	es	
Maintaining core laboratory functions during an emergency	Status of continuity of operations State public health laborato COOP that included laboratory	ry had a	Participation in Laboratory Response Network for	LRN-C laboratories with capabilities for responding if the public is exposed to chemical agents <sup>5</sup> Note: There are three levels,	One Level 1 lab One	
Ensuring availability of Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratory results for	State had a standardized electronic data system capable of messaging laboratory results between LRN laboratories and also to CDC <sup>2</sup> Note: For a description of LRN	Yes	chemical agents (LRN-C)	with Level 1 having the most advanced capabilities. See appendix 1.	Level 2 lab (LAC)	
			Evaluating LRN-C laboratory	Core methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents <sup>5</sup>	Level 1 lab: 6 out of 6 methods	
decision making	laboratories, see appendix 1.		capabilities	Additional methods successfully demonstrated by Level 1 and/or Level 2		
Labor	atories: Biological Capabiliti	es	proficiency testing		Level 1 lab: 4 out of 4	
Participation in LRN for biological	LRN reference and/or national laboratories that could test for biological agents <sup>3</sup>	22 reference labs		laboratories to rapidly detect chemical agents <sup>5</sup>	methods	
agents Assessing if laboratory emergency	LRN laboratories successfully contacted during a non-	17 out of 22 labs		LRN-C laboratory ability to collect, package, and ship samples properly during LRN exercise <sup>5</sup>	Level 1 lab: passed	
contacts could be reached 24/7	business hours telephone drill <sup>3</sup>				Level 2 lab (LAC): passed	
Evaluating LRN laboratory capabilities	Proficiency tests passed by LRN reference and/or national laboratories <sup>3</sup>	28 out of 30 tests	Assessing LRN-C laboratory capabilities	Chemical agents detected by Level 1 and/or Level 2 laboratories in unknown	Level 1 lab:	
Rapid identification of disease- causing bacteria by PulseNet laboratories	Rapidly identified <i>E. coli</i> <i>0157:H7</i> using advanced DNA tests (PFGE) <sup>4</sup> • Samples for which state	180 90%	throug exercise	through exercises	samples during the LRN Emergency Response Pop Proficiency Test (PopPT) Exercise <sup>6</sup>	2 out of 2 agents
	<ul> <li>Test results submitted to PulseNet database within 4 working days (target: 90%)</li> </ul>			Hours to process and report on 500 samples by Level 1 laboratory during the LRN Surge Capacity Exercise (range was 71 to 126 hours) <sup>5</sup>	Level 1 lab: 112 hours	
	Rapidly identified <i>L. monocytogenes</i> using advanced DNA tests (PFGE) <sup>4</sup>		Respor	nse Readiness: Communicat	ion	
	<ul> <li>Samples for which state performed tests</li> <li>Test results submitted to</li> </ul>	16		State public health department had a 24/7 reporting capacity system that could receive urgent	Yes	
	PulseNet database within 4 working days (target: 90%)	94%		disease reports any time of the day <sup>7</sup>		
Assessing laboratory competency and reporting through exercises	State public health laboratory conducted exercises to assess competency of sentinel laboratories to rule out bioterrorism agents'	Yes		Responded to Health Alert Network (HAN) test message within 30 minutes <sup>8</sup>	Yes	
			Communicating emerging health	State public health laboratory used HAN or other rapid method (blast email or fax) to communicate with sentinel laboratories and other partners for outbreaks, routine updates, training events, and other applications <sup>1</sup>		
	CDC-funded LRN laboratory ability to contact the CDC Emergency Operations Center within 2 hours during LRN notification drill <sup>3</sup>	1 passed (LAC), 1 did not participate	information		0 times	
	Note: There is one CDC- funded LRN laboratory in DC and in each state, with the exception of CA, IL, and NY, which have two.			Epidemic Information Exchange users responded to system-wide notification test within 3 hours <sup>9</sup>	52%	

<sup>1</sup>APHL; 2008 <sup>2</sup>CDC, OSELS; 2008 <sup>3</sup>CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008 <sup>4</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 <sup>5</sup>CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2009 <sup>6</sup>CDC, ONDIEH (NCEH); 2008 <sup>7</sup>State data; 2008 °CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2009 °CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008

50

Response	Readiness: Communication (co	ontinued)	Respons	se Readiness: Exercises and Incic	lents
Improving public health information exchange	Participated in a Public Health Information Network forum (community of practice) to leverage best practices for information exchange <sup>10</sup>	Yes		Pre-identified staff notified to fill all eight Incident Command System core functional roles due to a drill, exercise, or real incident <sup>14</sup> Note: State must report 2 and	9 times
Response Readiness: Planning			Notifying	could report up to 12 notifications.	
	CDC technical assistance review (TAR) state score <sup>11, 12</sup>	2007-08: 100	emergency operations center staff	Pre-identified staff acknowledged notification within the target time of 60 minutes <sup>14</sup>	8 out of 9 times
Assessing			Conducted at least one unannounced notification outside of normal business hours <sup>14</sup>	Yes	
plans to receive, distribute, and dispense medical assets from the Strategic National Stockpile and other sources	Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and 2007-08 TAR score <sup>11</sup> *Cohort I: Los Angeles, CA: 82; San Diego, CA: 82; San Francisco, CA: 74 *Cohort II: Riverside, CA: 73; Sacramento, CA: 60; San Jose, CA: 77 *Cohort III: Fresno, CA: 22		Activating	Public health EOC activated as part of a drill, exercise, or real incident <sup>14</sup> Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 activations.	10 times
			the emergency operations center (EOC)	Pre-identified staff reported to the public health EOC within the target time of 2.5 hours <sup>14</sup>	10 out of 10 times
	See Scoring Note above. CRI MSAs can consist of multiple jurisdictions, some located in more than one state. See appendix 6.			Conducted at least one unannounced activation <sup>14</sup>	Yes
	*Cohort I, II or III refers to the year when the MSA		Response Readiness: Evaluation		
Enhancira	was added to CRI. See appendix 1.			AAR/IPs developed following an exercise or real incident <sup>14</sup>	2
Enhancing response capability	CHEMPACK nerve-agent antidote containers <sup>11</sup>	165	Assessing response capabilities through after action report/ improvement plans (AAR/IPs)	Note: State must report 2 and could report up to 12 AAR/IPs.	AAR/IPs
for chemical events				AAR/IPs developed within target time of 60 days <sup>14</sup>	2 out of 2 AAR/IPs
Meeting preparedness standards for local health departments	Local health departments meeting voluntary Project Public Health Ready preparedness standards <sup>13</sup>	5		Re-evaluated response capabilities following approval and completion of corrective actions identified in AAR/IPs <sup>14</sup>	Yes

<sup>10</sup>CDC, OSTLTS; 2008 <sup>11</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2008 <sup>12</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSNS); 2009 <sup>13</sup>NACCHO; 2008 <sup>14</sup>CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008

In addition to the activities listed above, CDC supported other projects and activities to enhance preparedness efforts. Snapshots of these CDC efforts are provided below. Also see separate fact sheet for Los Angeles County-specific data.

Research, Training, Education, and Promising Demonstration Projects							
Project	Location/Project Name	Amount					
Centers for Public Health Preparedness <sup>15</sup>	University of California at Berkeley; Loma Linda University	\$525,760 \$525,760					
Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Centers <sup>15</sup>	-	N/A					
Advanced Practice Centers <sup>16</sup>	Santa Clara County Advanced Practice Center	\$250,000					
Centers of Excellence in Public Health Informatics <sup>17</sup>	-	N/A					
Pandemic Influenza Promising Practices Demonstration Projects <sup>14</sup>	Electronic Laboratory Data Exchange	\$800,627					
Additional CDC Resources Supporting Preparedness in States and Localities							
<ul> <li>Epidemic Intelligence Service</li> <li>Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers<sup>17</sup></li> <li>Investigations conducted by Epidemic Intelligence Service Field Officers<sup>17</sup></li> </ul>	6 29						
Deployments <ul> <li>Type of Incident (number of CDC staff)<sup>18</sup></li> </ul>	Dermopathy (1); Post Operation Infections (2); Measles Outbreak (1)						
Career Epidemiology Field Officers <sup>15</sup>	1						
Quarantine Stations <sup>19</sup>	San Francisco International Airport; San Francisco; Rosecrans Street, San Diego.						

14CDC, OPHPR (DSLR); 2008 15CDC, OPHPR (OD); 2008 16NACCHO; 2008 17CDC, OSELS; 2008 18CDC, OPHPR (DEO); 2008 19CDC, OID (NCEZID); 2008